A German twin propelled Messerschmitt BF 110 bomber, nicknamed “Fliegender Haifisch” (Flying Shark), over the English Channel, in August of 1940.
After Dunkirk, the rhetoric of Prime Minister Winston
Churchill made it seem as though the fighters of the Royal Air Force had
snatched a victory out of the overall tide of defeat that had swept away the
British Expeditionary Force. The reality was somewhat different; the losses
sustained by RAF Fighter Command and the Luftwaffe during the evacuation phase
were about even, while the French campaign as a whole had cost Air Chief
Marshal Dowding’s Command 453 Hurricanes and Spitfires.
While Fighter Command strove to make good its losses during
June 1940, Bomber and Coastal Commands both stepped up their offensive
operations against enemy targets. In Coastal Command’s case, this involved
intensifying attacks on enemy shipping, with particular reference to convoys,
off the Dutch coast; night attacks were also made by Lockheed Hudsons on Dutch
oil targets and harbour installations. Bomber Command, while concentrating on
attacking communications and oil targets in Germany, and on minelaying
activities, also carried out limited attacks on coastal targets in the Channel
area; on the night of 13/14 June, for example, Handley Page Hampdens bombed the
docks at Boulogne and Dunkirk.
From 5 June, the Luftwaffe was also active, small numbers of
bombers attacking ‘fringe’ targets on the east and south-east coasts of
England. These attacks caused little significant damage; their main purpose was
to provide the German bomber crews with operational and navigational
experience. On both sides, great care was exercised in avoiding damage to
civilian property and loss of life. As one Ju 88 pilot, Kapitän Hajo Herrmann,
later recorded:
We were allocated important strategic and military
targets off the east coast of England, the oil refineries at Thames Haven and
the nitrogen works at Billingham [the latter in the north-east of England]. We
dive-bombed them under a full moon, with strict instructions either to bring
our bombs home or look for shipping targets if we were unable to identify our
main target quite clearly. I always flew on ahead and gave the others clearance
to attack only after I had recognised the target positively and had put down
one or two benzol bombs.
Many coastal reconnaissance and minelaying operations were
undertaken in the Channel area during this phase by Heinkel He 115 floatplanes.
On 30 June, the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe, Reichsmarschall
Hermann Goring, issued a general directive setting out the aims of the planned
air assault on Britain. The Luftwaffe’s main target was to be the Royal Air
Force, with particular emphasis on its fighter airfields and aircraft
factories; as long as Fighter Command remained unbeaten, the Luftwaffe’s first
priority must be to attack it by day and night at every opportunity, in the air
and on the ground, until it was destroyed. Only then would the Luftwaffe be
free to turn its attention to other targets, such as the Royal Navy’s dockyards
and operational harbours, as a preliminary to invasion.
On 3 July the Luftwaffe carried out its first daylight
attacks on the English coast. Among other targets, the forward airfield at
Manston in Kent was attacked by a small force of Dornier Do 17s, which came in
at low level and dropped anti-personnel bombs on the landing area. The only
damage was to a lawnmower. On the following day the Germans began flying
fighter sweeps over south-east England. Dowding and the Air Officer Commanding
No. 11 Group Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park, refused to be drawn, and it was not
until 7 July that there was serious skirmishes, the RAF losing six aircraft and
the Luftwaffe five. Three of the aircraft were Spitfires of No. 65 Squadron
from Hornchurch, bounced by Messerschmitt 109s.
On the morning of 10 July – the date generally accepted as
marking the start of the Battle of Britain – a Dornier Do 17P reconnaissance
aircraft of 2/Fernaufklärungsgruppe 11 sighted a large coastal convoy off the
North Foreland, heading south-west for the Straits of Dover. Although escorted
by Me 190s of I/JG 51, the Dornier was attacked and severely damaged by
Spitfires of No. 74 Squadron from Manston, eventually crash-landing near
Boulogne with the loss of three of its four crew. But the damage had been done,
and the Germans were now fully alerted to the passage of the convoy, code-named
Bread.
At about 1030, a Staffel of Me 109s appeared over the
Channel, sweeping parallel to the Kentish coast. Nine Spitfires were scrambled
from Biggin Hill to intercept them and, in a brief but inconclusive engagement,
one Spitfire of No. 610 Squadron was hit in the port wing and had to make an
emergency landing at Hawkinge.
The main action began after 1330, when the CH radar station
at Dover detected a build-up of considerable size behind Cap Gris Nez and
passed on the information to HQ No. 11 Group at Uxbridge. As the enemy force –
consisting of 24 Dornier 17s of KG 2, closely escorted by 20 Me 110s of ZG 26
Horst Wessel, with a similar number of Me 109s of JG 51 flying top cover – was
plotted leaving the enemy coast, five squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires
were scrambled to intercept. In the battle that followed one Me 109 was shot
down into the Thames Estuary and two more crash-landed in France after
sustaining damage. The twin-engined Me 110 Zerstörer, which had performed well
against inferior opposition over Poland and France, suffered heavily; ZG 26 lost
three aircraft over Folkestone and two more were damaged by RAF fighters as
they fled across the Channel. Of KG 2’s Dorniers, two were destroyed – one when
a Hurricane of No. 111 Squadron collided with it – and three others were
damaged.
The RAF’s only combat loss during the action was Hurricane
P3671 of No. 111 Squadron, which had collided with the Dornier whilst under
attack by a 109 of JG 51, losing a wing. The pilot, Flying Officer T.P.K.
Higgs, baled out but was killed. Three other 111 Squadron Hurricanes were
damaged, one by friendly fire; three Spitfires of No. 74 Squadron also received
damage, and although some of the RAF fighters had to make crash-landings their
pilots were unhurt and all the aircraft were repairable.
The determined RAF fighter attacks, together with some
accurate anti-aircraft fire – especially at Dover, where the barrage was
radar-directed – had made it impossible for the Dorniers to make a co-ordinated
attack on the convoy, although they did succeed in sinking one small ship. Away
to the west, however, the Luftwaffe enjoyed better fortune.
While the attack on the Bread convoy was still in progress,
63 Junkers Ju 88s of Luftflott 3 approached the Cornish coast from the west, confusing
the radar controllers at Dry Tree, on Lizard Point. Splitting up, the enemy
force attacked Falmouth and Swansea, its bombs falling on railways, ships at
anchor and a munitions factory, causing 86 casualties. It was a grim foretaste
of what the population of southern England would suffer in the weeks to come,
and to make matters worse the raiders escaped unscathed. Because of the radar
confusion, Spitfires of No. 92 Squadron were not scrambled from Pembrey in time
to make an interception; in fact, the only RAF pilot to come near the Ju 88s
was Wing Commander Ira (‘Taffy’) Jones, the World War I ace with 40 recorded
victories. Taking-off from a training airfield in an unarmed Hawker Henley
target tug, he chased a Ju 88 out to sea, firing Very flares at it and
doubtless cursing his lack of guns and ammunition. Jones’ exploit reinforced
the view of many Fighter Command pilots that the Henley – originally developed
as a fast light bomber, but never used in that role – might have been used to
good effect against enemy bombers if fitted with machine-guns. Capable of
nearly 300mph (480kmh), it would at least have taken some of the strain from
the hard-pressed Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons. About 200 were in service in
1940.
Thursday 11 July saw more fierce fighting over the Channel;
when the day ended the Luftwaffe had lost 15 aircraft to the RAF’s six. It was
on this day that the Junkers Ju 87 dive-bomber entered the battle, with
aircraft of LG 1 and StG 2 attacking Portland. Two Stukas were shot down, and
the inferiority of their escorting Me 110s was again demonstrated in dramatic
fashion when four were shot down by RAF fighters, two off Portland and one off
the Ney Breakwater. The fourth crash-landed at Grange Heath near Lulworth after
being attacked by pilots of Nos. 238, 87 and 601 Squadrons, in that order. All
the Me 110s belonged to 9/ZG 76.
Not all the successes of 11 July belonged to Fighter
Command. Early in the morning, an Avro Anson of No. 217 Squadron, based at St
Eval in Cornwall, was on patrol over the Channel when the Coastal Command crew
sighted a Heinkel He 59 floatplane, the type used by the German air-sea rescue
service. It was also found suspiciously close to British coastal convoys from
time to time. This example, belonging to Seenotflugkommando 1 and bearing the
civil registration D-ASOU, was damaged by the Anson and forced down into the
Channel. Its four-man crew took to their dinghy and were later picked up
drifting near the Channel Islands; the aircraft was retrieved by the Royal Navy
and beached at Walmer Harbour, Kent.
Actions against south coast targets and Channel shipping
also resulted in the loss of several Heinkel He 111s on 11 July. I/IKG 1 lost
two aircraft and had a third damaged during night operations against coastal
towns on 10/11 July, and in the early evening RAF fighters destroyed two
Heinkels of KG 55 in an attack on Portsmouth, damaging a third so badly that it
was a write-off. The Luftwaffe also lost two Dornier 17s and a Ju 88 during the
day’s operations.
The Heinkels suffered even more heavily on 12 July, five
being shot down and a sixth damaged beyond repair. All the Heinkels except one,
which belonged to KG 26 and was shot down over Aberdeen, were engaged in
attacks on convoys off Aldeburgh and Orfordness. Two Dornier 17s and a Ju 88
were also shot down. The fight, however, was not all one-sided; return fire
from the bombers – especially the Do 17s – was very accurate, accounting for
two Hurricanes destroyed and a number damaged.
Saturday 13 July, was hailed as a major success for the
Hurricanes of No. 56 Squadron from North Weald, which intercepted a force of Ju
87s and their fighter escort over Portland. The Hurricane pilots claimed the
destruction of seven Stukas; in fact, all the enemy dive-bombers returned to
base except two which made forced landings in France. One of the Me 110 escorts
was shot down and three suffered heavy damage. Elsewhere, Hurricanes of No. 238
Squadron shot down a Dornier 17 reconnaissance aircraft off Chesil Beach, while
Spitfires destroyed an Me 109 south of Dover. In the day’s action, No. 56
Squadron lost two Hurricanes and No. 238 Squadron one.
During this phase, Air Chief Marshal Dowding, anxious to
preserve his fighter strength, committed the Hurricanes and Spitfires to convoy
protection work in relatively small numbers; fighter cover was only increased
when a convoy reached the perilous waters of the Dover Straits, although the
forward coastal airfields of Fighter Command were reinforced on 19 July, when
an improvement in the weather brought expectations of greater enemy activity.
In fact, this day proved a black one for the Command, which lost ten fighters
against four Luftwaffe aircraft shot down. Six of the RAF aircraft were the
hapless Boulton Paul Defiants of No. 141 Squadron from West Mailing, which were
bounced by the Me 109s of III/JG 51 off Dover and shot down in flames one after
the other. Ten of the squadron’s pilots and air gunners were lost.
There were several major engagements over the Dover Straits
during the last days of July, and the entry in the war diary of No. 32
Squadron, operating out of Biggin Hill, is fairly typical of an 11 Group unit
during this period:
20 July 1940. Convoy escort, 10 miles east of Dover. At
17.58 hours with 610 Squadron, intercepted a raid on the convoy by about fifty
Junkers Ju 87s and Messerschmitt 110s, escorted by Messerschmitt 109Es. Led by
S/L Worrall the Squadron shot down six of the enemy (3 Me 110s, 2 Me 109s and
one Ju 87) and damaged four others (all Me 109s). One Hurricane was lost but
the pilot, F/Lt Bulmer, is reported to have baled out near North Foreland. Sgt
Higgins was slightly wounded in the face by splinters from bullets striking his
protecting armour.
Also typically, the claims in the above report are wildly
exaggerated. In all probability, No. 32 Squadron scored no success that day. No
Me 110s were lost on operations, and the five Me 109s confirmed as destroyed
were attributed to other fighter squadrons. Nor did the Luftwaffe lose any Ju
87s, although four made forced landings in France with varying degrees of
damage. In all, the Germans lost 14 aircraft on 20 July, the RAF nine fighters.
On 25 July the Luftwaffe adopted a change of tactics,
sending out strong fighter sweeps to draw the RAF fighters into battle before
launching its bomber attacks. As a consequence, 60 Ju 87 Stukas were able to
bomb a convoy with impunity while the fighters of No. 11 Group were on the
ground refuelling. Later in the day, the convoy was attacked by 30 Ju 88s,
escorted by about 50 Me 109s. The attacks continued until 1830 hours; 15 of
Dowding’s fighter squadrons were engaged in the course of the day, destroying
16 enemy aircraft for the loss of eight of their own, all Spitfires.
In four weeks of operations over the English Channel, the
Luftwaffe had sunk 40,000 tons of British shipping, including three destroyers.
Combat losses during the month’s air fighting were Luftwaffe 190, RAF Fighter
Command 77, of which 46 were Hurricanes – the aircraft which had borne the
brunt of the fighting, and would continue to do so. Fifty RAF fighter pilots
were killed or missing, and with German preparations for the invasion of
England clearly under way, the loss was serious. It was already apparent that
such a continued rate of attrition would be extremely hard, if not impossible,
to make good.
There followed a comparative lull lasting a week. Then, on 8
August, Hurricanes were at the forefront of a furious air battle that developed
when large formations of Ju 87s, under strong fighter escort, attacked a 250-ship
convoy code-named Peewit off the Isle of Wight. One of the Hurricane squadrons
involved was No. 145 from Westhampnett, led by Squadron Leader J.R.A. Peel. The
RAF pilots were about to engage a Stuka formation when they were themselves
bounced by 109s and forced on the defensive. Two of the squadron’s Hurricanes,
one of them Peel’s, were shot down; the CO was rescued from the sea off
Boulogne. That day’s fighting cost the RAF 15 Hurricanes and Spitfires against
21 enemy aircraft destroyed; it was the biggest loss sustained by Fighter
Command since the offensive began. The RAF’s losses for 8 August included a
number of aircraft destroyed in air actions over Dover and the Thames Estuary,
when six squadrons of Hurricanes and two of Spitfires intercepted two heavy
raids carried out under strong fighter escort. Six Hurricanes were lost in
these battles, the others claiming six enemy aircraft.
The Peewit convoy, meanwhile, had lost six ships, three sunk
by S-boats before dawn and the others by air attack. Several more were damaged.
It was the first convoy to attempt a passage through the Dover Straits in
daylight since 25 July, in the day of furious action when S-Boats and bombers
had sunk or badly damaged 11 out of 21 ships, mostly colliers. Peewit was
unfortunate in that the enemy had been alerted to its presence by a
newly-completed coastal radar station at Wissant (Ushant), one of several
experimental stations that were being set up along the arc of coast from the
Friesian Islands to the Cherbourg Peninsula. It was to be some time before the
British became aware that radar – or radio locations, as it was still known –
was no longer their sole monopoly.
Bad weather frustrated operations on 9 and 10 August, the
latter originally scheduled as Adlertag– Eagle Day, the start of the German air
offensive proper – but on the 11th four heavy air attacks were launched on
Dover and Portland. The Dover raids were intercepted by the Hurricanes of Nos.
1, 17, 32, 56, 85 and 111 Squadrons, which claimed 11 enemy aircraft for the
loss of nine of their own, and by the Spitfires of Nos. 64, 65 and 74
Squadrons, which claimed five for the loss of three. Five of the shot-down
Hurricanes belonged to No. 111 Squadron, which could claim only one
Messerschmitt 109 in return, and worse than the loss of the aircraft was the
fact that four of the pilots were killed. The attack on Portland, carried out
by Ju 88s with an escort of Me 110s, was broken up by 16 Hurricanes of Nos. 87,
213 and 218 Squadrons, together with ten Spitfires of Nos. 152 and 603; nine
enemy aircraft were shot down for the loss of five RAF fighters. There were
more skirmishes in the afternoon as the Germans attempted to bomb a convoy, and
the day ended with 35 enemy aircraft destroyed for the loss of 30 Hurricanes
and Spitfires. Since the beginning of July the Luftwaffe had lost 274 aircraft,
the RAF 124.
On 12 August, the Luftwaffe switched the weight of its
attacks to the coastal radar stations and the forward airfields of Manston,
Lympne and Hawkinge. That morning, 24 hours before the main offensive was due
to begin, 21 Messerschmitt 109s and 110s took off from Calais-Marck airfield
and set course out over the Channel. They belonged to Erprobungsgruppe 210; the
only unit of its kind in the Luftwaffe, its aircraft had all been fitted with
racks enabling them to carry 500- and 1,000lb (225 and 450kg) bombs. On the
previous day the Gruppe had tried out the idea operationally for the first time
when 24 Messerschmitts dive-bombed convoy Booty off the Harwich–Clacton
coastline, setting two freighters on fire. The German aircraft had been
intercepted by the Spitfires of No. 74 Squadron, but all had returned to base.
On the morning of 12 August, Erprobungsgruppe 210’s targets
were the radar stations at Dover, Pevensey and Rye. At 1100 hours, Me 110s
dropped eight 1,000lb (450kg) bombs on the Pevensey station, while the
remainder of the Gruppe attacked the masts at Rye and Dover. Although the bombs
caused some damage, all three stations were operational again within three
hours.
It was a different story at Ventnor on the Isle of Wight,
where the radar station was attacked 30 minutes later by 15 Junkers 88s of KG
51 and KG 54. Their bombing was extremely accurate and the station was damaged
beyond repair. To cover up the dangerous gap created by the loss of the Ventnor
station, the British transmitted a false signal on the wrecked transmitter’s
frequency; the German listening-posts on the other side of the Channel believed
that Ventnor was still fully operational. In fact it was only after 11 days of
non-stop work that another station was brought into action on the Isle of
Wight.
While Ventnor was under attack, around 75 more Ju 88s
dive-bombed Portsmouth harbour, Portland and industrial targets in Portsmouth
and Southampton, including the Supermarine Spitfire production plant at
Woolston. The Ju 88s made their attack through the balloon barrage and intense
anti-aircraft fire put up by shore batteries and ships in the harbour. Their
bombs caused substantial damage, especially in Portsmouth, and 100 or so
casualties. But the attack cost the Luftwaffe dearly; ten Ju 88s failed to
return, falling victim either to the anti-aircraft barrage, the Spitfires of
No. 152 Squadron or the Hurricanes of No. 213. Five Me 110s and an Me 109,
escorting the bombers, were also destroyed.
At noon, the CHL radar station at Foreness, untouched by the
morning’s attacks, reported 50 plus hostiles off North Foreland. They were
Junkers Ju 87s, and they were searching for two Channel convoys, Agent and
Arena. The attack on the latter was successful, the escorting fighters keeping
the Spitfires and Hurricanes at arm’s length, and several vessels were sunk or
damaged, but the attack on Agent was beaten off, albeit at the cost of four
Hurricanes destroyed. All the Ju 87s returned to base.
In parallel with these attacks, a force of Dornier 17s of KG
2 raided the airfield at Lympne with showers of 100lb (45kg) bombs, causing
some damage to the hangars, tarmac and buildings. Then, at 1330 hours, it was
once again the turn of Erprobungsgruppe 210; 20 Messerschmitts swept across the
airfield at Manston and dropped their bombs just as a flight of Spitfires of
No. 65 Squadron was preparing to take-off. The Spitfires got airborne amid the
exploding bombs and climbed for altitude, but the raiders had gone. Manston was
temporarily put out of action. Later that afternoon the German bombers struck
at Hawkinge and again at Lympne; both airfields were heavily damaged, and all
through the night personnel worked like slaves to repair the cratered runways.
By nightfall on 12 August the Luftwaffe had despatched 300
bombers, with as many escorting fighters, against British targets. The Germans
had lost 27 aircraft, the RAF 20; and the main offensive had yet to develop.
