As the survivors from Avaricum neared Vercingetorix’s camp
he took special precautions to conceal their flight and the fall of the town.
He posted his own supporters as well as tribal leaders at some way from the
camp to intercept the fugitives and secretly take them to their own tribes’
quarters.
The next day Vercingetorix gathered his men and delivered a
speech that was designed to minimize the impact of the fall of the towns on the
Gauls’ morale. He claimed that it had fallen due to superior Roman siege
technology and trickery, not because of the bravery of the Romans. He
disassociated himself from its fall by rightly claiming he had never been in
favour of defending it but had yielded to the pleas of the Bituriges. He
glossed over the prior defeats the Gauls had sustained at Cenabum and elsewhere,
claiming that such reverses were a normal part of warfare. He promised to
extend the alliance to those Gauls who had not yet joined. He then suggested
that the best course at present was to fortify their camp.
The speech was well-received. The fall of Avaricum enhanced
Vercingetorix’s standing and weakened his opponents. The Gauls were well aware
that he had advised against the attempt to hold the town and he had now been
vindicated. There was also strong support for extending the war to as much of
Gaul as possible. Doing so would not only add to the rebels’ manpower but it
would also create problems for the Romans who would find themselves
overextended. The capture of Avaricum as well as the earlier victories at
Vellaunodunum and Cenabum had brought Caesar no political benefit. They had
only served to strengthen Vercingetorix’s position and further unify the
rebels.
Vercingetorix took immediate steps to implement his
proposals. He sent out representatives to the tribes that had so far kept aloof
from the rebellion, enticing them with gifts and promises. He then set about
making up the losses suffered at Avaricum by instituting quotas from the tribes
and requiring them to come to his camp on a set day. These actions soon made up
for his losses. His diplomatic offensive also produced results. Teotomatus, a
son of Ollovico, the king of the Nitiobriges who had been given the title of
friend by the Senate, joined him with a large cavalry force and with
mercenaries hired in Aquitania.
For a few days Caesar remained at Avaricum. The captured
town provided him with an abundant supply of grain and the army needed to rest
and refit after the strains of the siege. The winter was now almost over, which
would make campaigning easier, and he set out in pursuit of the enemy in the
hope of bringing them to battle or starving them out by a blockade. Before he
could set out the leaders of the Aedui arrived to ask for Caesar’s help. Once
again, tribal politics created problems. The election to office of the
vergobret, their supreme annual magistrate, was at issue. Two men were claiming
that they had been legally elected while only one could hold office. One of
them was Convictolitavis, a distinguished young man, while the other, Cotus,
was an aristocrat with considerable connections and influence. Both men had
strong support and the dispute threatened to tear the fabric of the state
apart. The Aedui asked for Caesar’s help to resolve the matter. The delay the
request imposed was unwelcome. If he agreed to it, it would postpone the
campaign against Vercingetorix and give Vercingetorix further time to prepare.
But Caesar could hardly ignore such a request from the Aedui, Rome’s oldest
allies in the area. On occasion they had provided useful military support to
him, but more importantly they had been a major source of supply. In addition,
one side or the other might call in Vercingetorix as an ally. He had already
seen some evidence of the tribe’s less-than enthusiastic collaboration. Their
negligence in delivering grain during the siege of Avaricum hinted at
disaffection among the tribal elite.
To avoid breaking tribal laws which specified that vergobret
could not leave Aeduan territory, Caesar summoned the two men involved as well
as the entire council to Decetia, modern Decize, at the confluence of the Loire
and the Aron, within their territory. After hearing the facts of the case
Caesar awarded the office to Convictolitavis. It was a decision that stored up
trouble for the future.
After a conciliatory speech calling on the Aedui to set
aside their disputes he ordered them to send all of their cavalry and 10,000
infantry to serve as guards for his grain supply. Clearly Vercingetorix’s
strategy had had some effect. Caesar divided his army into two columns; four
legions were assigned to Labienus to conduct operations against the Senones and
the Parisii, while Caesar would take the remaining six legions along the valley
of the Allier towards Gergovia, the capital of the Arverni.
Vercingetorix, learning of Caesar’s arrangements, moved up
the western bank of the river while Caesar made his way along the eastern side.
He kept pace with the Romans, breaking down the bridges over which they might
cross, and he posted scouts to deny the Romans the opportunity of constructing
their own. This manoeuvre put Caesar in a difficult position. The Allier would
not be fordable until the autumn. To wait until then would mean the loss of an
entire campaigning season. The only course open to him was to trick
Vercingetorix. He encamped in a wood opposite one of the bridges that had been
torn down. The next day he hid two of the legions in the woods while he sent on
the remainder, who were formed up so as to conceal the absence of the legions
he had kept behind. When he estimated that those legions were now in camp he
ordered his two legions to rapidly construct a bridge. The task was made easier
because the piles of the original bridge had been left standing. He took his
two legions across, encamped and summoned the other legions to him.
Vercingetorix, realizing what had happened, moved on by forced marches to avoid
a fight.
The march to Gergovia consumed five days and on the last day
a minor cavalry skirmish occurred. Caesar then examined the site, which posed
formidable problems. It was situated on a mountain rising 1,200 feet (367m)
above the plain about 3.5 miles (6km) south of Clermont Ferrand. The northern
side of the mountain was broken by precipitous cliffs, which made an attack
impossible. An attack on the eastern side was equally out of the question. It was
rugged, steep and dotted with ravines. Looked at from the south the town was
situated on an oblong plateau that formed the mountain’s summit, and the higher
terraces were linked to an outlying height by a ridge on which the Gauls were
encamped. Their tents were protected by a stone wall that ran for the entire
length of the southern side of the mountain. There was no hope of taking
Gergovia by storm. Even on the south side where the ascent was easiest the
ground was steep and dangerous. The Gallic encampment on that side meant that
such an attack could not succeed. The only possibility was to cut off the
town’s food supply with a siege. But Caesar could not start the operation until
his own grain supply was secure.
Vercingetorix had seized control of a height close to the
town and had placed various tribal contingents at intervals along the ridge. He
was in constant contact with the tribal chiefs and did as much as possible to
involve them in the planning as a way to cement their loyalty and maintain his
army’s cohesion. He constantly sent out his cavalry accompanied by archers to
keep up his men’s morale.
Opposite the town there was a hill with precipitous sides,
the modern Roche Blanche, which was strongly fortified. The Gauls had also
installed a garrison on it but only of moderate strength. If Caesar could gain
control of it he would greatly ease the difficulties of besieging Gergovia, as
he could cut the enemy off from their main water supply, the River Auzon, and
prevent their forces from foraging. Caesar launched a night attack by which he
was able to dislodge the garrison and seize control of the hill. He built a
second smaller camp there with two legions, and linked it by a double ditch 12
feet (3.6m) wide to his main camp.
Despite this success Caesar was threatened by developments
among the Aedui that remain difficult to explain. Convictolitavis, whom Caesar
had recently installed in the tribe’s chief magistracy, had begun a plot to end
the Aedui’s allegiance to Rome. Caesar claims he was bribed, but it is
difficult to accept that this was the only reason for his change of heart. The
money may have been an incentive, but even for the Aedui who had benefitted
from Caesar’s victories the Roman presence was a heavy burden. They had been
under constant pressure to provide Caesar with supplies and troops, which must
have created extensive unrest. The tribal elite had as much to fear from its
Roman ally as the other Gallic states if the Romans established permanent
control. The Roman alliance had been attractive when it could be used by the
Aedui in their conflicts with their neighbours, but Caesar’s campaigns had
ended that possibility. The success of the Gallic revolt would once again open
up the options that Caesar’s campaigns had closed.
Convictolitavis seems to have been convinced of the success
of that revolt and saw it as an opportunity to enhance his position. He began
talks with younger members of the elite who had less to lose and more to expect
from a radical change in the political and military situation. The most
important faction among these young men was that of Litaviccus and his
brothers. The conspirators came to an agreement and began to plan their
strategy. They managed to have Litaviccus placed in charge of the 10,000
infantry that Caesar has requested to guard his supply lines to the Aedui. The
Aeduan cavalry had already arrived at Caesar’s camp before the infantry had set
out. When the infantry had advanced within 27 miles (43km) of Gergovia
Litaviccus called an assembly of the troops. With tears streaming from his eyes
he addressed them as follows:
Where are we going soldiers? Our entire cavalry force, all our nobility are dead. Eporedorix and Viridomarus without being allowed to offer a defence have been executed. Know this from these men here who escaped the slaughter. I am overwhelmed by grief at the butchery of brothers and all my relations and am unable to speak.
The men who came forward had been coached by Litaviccus and
confirmed his version of events. The troops were convinced by the story and
begged Litaviccus to tell them what to do. He pressed on them the urgent need
to head for Gergovia and to join the Arverni in their struggle with the Romans
to avenge the wrongs they had suffered. He then pointed to the Romans who had
accompanied his force under his protection and urged the troops to take their
revenge on them. Their goods were stolen and they were murdered. An act that he
must have known would, as the massacre at Cenabum had done, irretrievably
commit the Aedui to the rebel side. He then sent men back to Bibracte to rouse
the Aedui to revolt with the same fabrications that had already proved so
successful.
Meanwhile further trouble was brewing among the Aedui in
Caesar’s camp. Two young men, Eporedorix and Viridomarus, were disputing the
leadership of their cavalry contingent. This quarrel was only a continuation of
an earlier disagreement they had had over the appointment of the vergobret.
After hearing of Litaviccus’s plan Eporedorix had gone to Caesar during the
night to inform him of it and to beg him to prevent the Aedui from defecting.
Caesar was clearly upset. Along with the Remi in Belgica the
Aedui were his most important allies. His ability to carry on the siege of
Gergovia depended on the Aedui provisioning him with grain and other supplies.
If they rebelled his position there would become untenable. He immediately
assembled a force of four legions and all of his cavalry and marched out of
camp after issuing orders that Litaviccus’s brothers should be arrested, but they
had already fled. He left his legate Gaius Fabius in charge of the siege with
two legions but had had no time to reduce the size of the camp to make it
easier for the smaller number of troops to defend it. The Romans advanced 23
miles (37km) and came in sight of the Aeduan column. Caesar sent his cavalry
ahead to slow the column’s march but forbade his horsemen to kill any of the
Aedui. He also commanded Eporedorix and Viridomarus to accompany them and show
themselves to their fellow tribesmen. They rode up and called to them. When
they were recognized the lies that Litaviccus had fed them were revealed. They
immediately threw down their arms and begged for mercy. Finding himself exposed
Litaviccus along with his clients fled to Gergovia. Caesar sent messengers to
the Aedui to reassure them and to remind them that he could have put their
infantry to death but had generously refrained doing so.
After resting his army for only three hours Caesar began his
march back to Gergovia. As he advanced he was met by cavalry sent by Fabius to
inform him that the camp was in danger. The small garrison that he had left behind
was now under siege by a much larger force. The enemy had sufficient troops to
fight in relays and the legions were on the point of exhaustion, since the size
of the camp meant that no one could be spared in manning its defences. All of
the camp’s gates but two had been blocked and a screen had been erected on the
ramparts as a defence against the Gauls’ missiles. The threat to the camp
spurred Caesar and his soldiers on. They reached the camp before sunrise.
Litaviccus’s men reached the Aedui before Caesar’s
messengers. His accusations against the Romans were accepted as fact and they
began to plunder the goods of the Roman citizens in Bibracte and then massacred
or enslaved them. The ease with which his news was accepted points to how far
the relationship with the Romans had deteriorated. Convictolitavis did all he
could to support the uprising. Romans were expelled from Aeduan towns and then
attacked and stripped of their baggage: among them was a military tribune,
Marcus Aristeus, who was on his way to join his legion. However, once they had
learned that their infantry was in Caesar’s power they immediately halted their
attacks and approached Aristeus claiming that what had taken place was not done
publically but had been carried out by private individuals without community
sanction. To give substance to this claim they set up an inquiry into the
stolen goods and confiscated the property of Litaviccus and his brothers. An
embassy was dispatched to Caesar to try to clear the tribe of any wrongdoing.
Regardless of their pleas for forgiveness, the Aedui seem to have taken these
steps to rescue their men from Caesar; in fact, they seem to have already decided
to throw in their lot with the rebels.
Caesar claims to have been aware of all this and to have
decided on a withdrawal from Gergovia. It is difficult to assess the truth of
his statement. The fact that he later did so after suffering one of his few
reverses suggests that he may be exaggerating his foresight as a way of at
least partially excusing his failure at Gergovia. He claims that a chance
opportunity arose that offered the possibility of success and that led to a
change of plans.
On an inspection tour of the works at the smaller camp
Caesar noticed a hill that had previously been fully occupied by the Gauls now
appeared empty of defenders. He questioned Gallic deserters and his own scouts
and learned that there was a crest along the ridge of high ground on the rear
of the hill that gave access to the plateau on which Gergovia sat. To close off
this approach Vercingetorix had withdrawn his men from the hill so that they
could fortify the line of the ridge. The ridge was probably part of the heights
of Risolles, north-west of la Roche Blanche, where Caesar’s smaller camp was
located. Questions have been raised as to whether such an action by the Gauls
makes any military sense and if Caesar has altered the details to help excuse
his failure at Gergovia. It is however perfectly plausible that after the loss
of La Roche-Blanche Vercingetorix had decided to create a fallback position
from the hill along the ridge to prevent the Romans from reaching the plateau.
Caesar, in claiming the hill was devoid of men, is probably exaggerating.
Vercingetorix probably left a smaller than normal garrison while most of his
men were engaged in fortifying the ridge.
Caesar now saw the possibility of drawing the Gauls off from
their main camp below the town so that it could be attacked. He dispatched a
number of cavalry to the hill around midnight, instructing them to create as
much disruption as possible. The next morning at dawn he sent drovers mounted
on their mules and pack-horses disguised as cavalry and interspersed with a
small number of real cavalry to ride around the hill and create a diversion.
Caesar then sent a legion towards the same high ground but it halted short of
the hill and concealed itself in some woods nearby. All of these movements drew
off the Gauls from their main camp to defend the height. In preparation for his
real objective, the attack on this camp, Caesar began to move his legions to
his smaller camp nearer the enemy camp in small detachments to conceal his
intentions. He then instructed his legates, each in command of a legion, that
it was especially important to keep their men under control. The ground was
unfavourable and the speed of the advance was crucial. He reminded them that
his plan was not for a full-scale battle but simply to seize an opportunity
that had presented itself. He ordered the Aedui to make an ascent to his right
to further draw off the defenders.
In a straight line the distance from the town wall to where
the ascent began was just over a mile. Although there were paths that led up
that were less precipitous, their turnings increased the distance to the walls.
The Gallic camp, which was composed of a number of separate tribal encampments,
lay halfway up the hill and was protected by a 6 foot stone wall that followed
the contours of the mountain. Their tents filled the space between this
fortification wall and the town walls. The area in front of the 6 foot wall was
unoccupied.
At the signal for attack the Romans quickly reached the
fortification wall, crossed it and captured three of the enemy encampments,
including that of the Nitiobriges. Caesar claims that this was all he intended
and now he ordered that the retreat signal should be sounded. Caesar was with
his favourite Tenth Legion, which immediately halted. He says that the others,
because of a wide gully, did not hear the call for retreat but were held in
check by their officers, but apparently not very effectively. They continued
their pursuit of the fleeing rebels. The town wall was reached, creating panic
inside the town. Some of the soldiers of the Eighth Legion, led by their
centurion Lucius Fabius, managed to scale the town wall. However, the Gauls
employed in fortifying another part of the town heard the uproar. They sent
their cavalry on ahead and followed with all of their infantry at full speed.
The Romans were exhausted by their climb, fighting on disadvantageous ground
and faced by a much larger enemy force. Caesar became anxious about the
situation and sent to his legate Titus Sextius who was in charge of the smaller
camp to bring up cohorts quickly and to station them at the bottom of the hill
on the enemy’s right flank. If the Romans were forced back Sextius’s troops
would deter the Gauls’ pursuit. Caesar then advanced closer to the fighting
with the Tenth and awaited its outcome. Although Caesar does not say so he
presumably kept the Tenth as a reserve.
The Roman position deteriorated further when the Aedui, who
had been ordered to ascend the hill, appeared and were mistaken for enemy
reinforcements. Meanwhile Lucius Fabius and his men were killed and thrown
headlong from the walls, while another centurion of the same legion Marcus
Petronius, who was attempting to force the town’s gates, saved his men at the
expense of his own life by fighting back the enemy and giving his men time to
escape. The Romans were overwhelmed and forced back down the hill. The Tenth,
stationed on lower ground, served as a rally point while the cohorts of the
Thirteenth that had been brought up from the smaller camp and stationed on higher
ground moved down to the Tenth’s former position. Once they had reached level
ground the legions reformed and faced the Gauls, who now turned and made their
way back to their own fortifications. The toll had been heavy, with the loss of
700 soldiers and forty-six centurions.
The next day Caesar assembled his troops and reprimanded
them for their The next day Caesar assembled his troops and reprimanded them
for their lack of discipline, although he made admiring remarks about their
courage after so many tribulations. He then urged them not to despair. The
defeat was due not to the Gauls’ bravery but rather to their fighting at a
disadvantage because of the uneven ground. Right after the assembly he led the
legions out and deployed them for battle on level ground. Vercingetorix brought
his own troops down but after a cavalry skirmish in which the Romans prevailed
he led his men back to their fortifications. Caesar formed up once again the
following day and again the Gauls refused battle. It is clear that Caesar did
not expect the Gauls to fight. The manoeuvre was designed to restore his men’s
confidence rather than to threaten the enemy.
The fact that this was the gravest defeat that Caesar personally suffered in Gaul is indisputable but there has been much controversy over what Caesar intended at Gergovia. It is clear that his string of successful sieges at Avaricum and elsewhere led him to underestimate the strength of the Gallic resistance. Gergovia was a tempting prize. If he had captured it along with Vercingetorix he would have been able to extinguish a tribal alliance that was by far the most dangerous threat to Roman control of Gaul. However given the natural strength of the site and the large number of Gallic troops he faced, his forces were inadequate. Once he realized that capturing it by storm was a near impossibility his only option was to starve it out but he simply did not have the manpower to do so. The attack on the Gauls’ camp is mystifying. Did he simply intend a demonstration? If he did it is difficult to discern the purpose of it. Was it simply a demonstration to the Aedui and other tribes whose loyalty was ebbing away? It is hard to see what that would accomplish as long as he failed to take the town. It seems likely that Caesar intended to take Gergovia by drawing off the Gauls but that they responded too quickly and the Romans were defeated. Caesar has attempted to disguise his failure by obscuring the purpose of the attack and blaming his losses on his men’s lack of discipline rather than on the failure of his gamble. In spite of Caesar’s attempt to restore Roman prestige by offering battle to the Gauls, the failure to take Gergovia dealt a severe blow to his prestige. His legates had suffered reverses but Caesar had remained undefeated. Gergovia shattered any illusions the Gauls might have held about his invincibility and opened the way for a mass defection of the Gallic tribes now that they thought the Romans could be defeated.
