Given the United States’ inability to abandon its hostilities with Iran over their nuclear weapons arsenal, it seems unlikely that the new Tanker War will be ameliorated any time soon. Going forward, Washington will have to make ready plans to diminish Iranian oil production by targeting its hostilities toward Kharg Island and other oil-producing spots. This will, of course, create complications for U.S. foreign policy. But, there seems little hope of a peaceful settlement at this point, considering that Iran will not abandon its push for nuclear weapons.
The new Tanker War, then, is just the beginning. At the same time,
unless Saudi Arabia and the Israelis are willing to take the point in
this new campaign against Iran, the United States will have to fight the
Tanker War 2.0 tit-for-tat, just as the Iranians are. We must never
forget that the Iranians will not abandon their quest for nuclear arms
and we in the West simply cannot allow for them to acquire these nuclear
capabilities. Therefore, one can anticipate the global price of oil to
continue to increase–despite what many of the so-called “experts” claim.
This will mean that Russia will become more belligerent over time with
the West. Ultimately, though, the United States must do what it
can–along with its regional allies–to deny Iran the potential to use
nuclear arms against U.S. allies, such as Israel and the Sunni Arab
states.
One thing is clear: the Iran threat is not going away anytime soon and will only worsen as the years go on.
Iran’s Response to Britain’s Tanker Seizure – July 15 2019
Recent Iranian rhetoric and actions point to further
retaliation, but taking that route may lead to the same strategic
miscalculations and international intervention that cost the country so
dearly in the 1980s.
On July 4, British Royal Marines took control of the Grace 1, a
fully laden Panamanian-flagged super tanker suspected of carrying crude
oil from Iran to Syria’s Baniyas refinery in defiance of European Union
sanctions against the Assad regime. They used a helicopter to board the
330-meter, 300,000-ton ship in the middle of the night. Iran’s reaction
reveals much about its potential response options against Western
interests—and the limitations thereof.
INITIAL RESPONSE
Tehran reacted angrily to the seizure, with President Hassan Rouhani
and other civilian and military officials threatening to respond in kind
at the Strait of Hormuz if the tanker was not released promptly. Some
even called for banning British vessels from the strait altogether,
while the Iranian parliament introduced legislation that could lead to a
tolling system for ships of certain nationalities—an unlawful
discriminatory measure.
On July 8, Defense Minister Amir Hatami called the seizure an act of
piracy. A day later, Armed Forces General Staff chairman Mohammad
Bagheri promised to retaliate at the right time and place, and in line
with the “direct, transparent, and brave” operation that shot down an
American drone on June 20. He also reiterated Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei’s strategy of “no to negotiations, and no to war,” describing
it as “active resistance” and implying that Iran’s armed forces have
been directed to unmistakably demonstrate their deterrent power. Another
proponent of open-ended resistance is Gen. Hossein Salami, who
advocated the notion for years and is now in a position to implement it
as head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). On June 18, he
stated that victory is closer than ever because that the enemy is tired
and reluctant.
Iran made good on its threat of active resistance on July 10, when five IRGC speedboats attempted to stop the tanker British Heritage while
it was transiting the outbound section of a traffic separation zone
that lies mostly in Iran’s Persian Gulf waters leading to the Strait of
Hormuz. Although the effort was thwarted by a shadowing British warship
operating out of Bahrain, there are other British tankers in the
Fujairah anchorage and elsewhere that are still vulnerable to sabotage
operations.
IRAN’S PERCEIVED ADVANTAGES
The IRGC believes it holds a distinct geographical advantage in
carrying out this strategy. From its point of view, Iran dominates the
northern and eastern portions of the Persian Gulf and the entire Strait
of Hormuz, one of the busiest shipping routes in the world with as many
as fifteen oil tankers passing through every day (including three to
four super tankers).
Tehran also believes that its actions are legally permissible. The
regime claims control over maritime traffic through Iranian waters and
includes the Strait of Hormuz in this definition, despite it being
designated as an international strait under the 1982 UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea. Although Iran is a conditional signatory to UNCLOS,
it never ratified the document, and its own maritime law does not
recognize international straits. Under Article 24 of UNCLOS, a coastal
state can temporarily suspend innocent passage in specific areas of its
territorial seas for security reasons, but not in a discriminatory
fashion against specific states. More important, this provision does not
apply to international straits (paragraph 2 of Article 45).
CHARTING IRAN’S NEXT MOVE
Iran has not yet responded to British overtures for releasing Grace 1 in exchange for promises that it will not head for Syria. Apparently, Tehran does not want to establish that precedent.
Following the IRGC’s failed intercept of the British Heritage and London’s decision to arrest the Indian captain and chief officer of the Grace 1,
Iran can be expected to take further action, even amid diplomatic
outreach efforts such as Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s visit
to New York this week. A more forceful attempt at seizing a
British-linked ship would be the first option, but Iran might decide to
launch covert operations against such vessels as well, or even against
British business assets and support services in the region’s energy
market. For example, BP currently has major investments in Bahrain,
Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, while Saudi
Aramco recently rewarded another British company with co-development
rights in the Marjan offshore oil field (notably, Iran owns part of this
field).
Tehran might also ask its Houthi friends in Yemen to harass commercial
shipping in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, using both Iranian-supplied
equipment and intelligence gained using the Saviz floating
armory ship anchored north of the strait. There is precedent for such
operations: last year, IRGC general Nasser Shabani claimed that Iran had
ordered the July 24 Houthi attack against a Saudi super tanker,
possibly using an explosive-laden boat.
Meanwhile, senior cleric Kazem Sedighi threatened the British with a
“powerful slap” on July 12; he then reminded his listeners how Iranian
missiles landed near American frontline positions in Syria’s Deir
al-Zour province last October. If the IRGC aims to fulfill this
prophecy, it could fire ballistic or cruise missiles near HMS Jufair,
the British Royal Navy base in northeast Bahrain. It might also release
sea mines or suspicious-looking objects in waters approaching the base.
The specific forces involved in such operations would vary depending on
location, since the IRGC Navy has five districts in the Persian Gulf. A
potential ship seizure would most likely occur at the western
approaches to the Strait of Hormuz, which lies within the IRGCN’s 5th
District (as in the latest case). This area is home to an elite unit
called the Aba-Abdullah Special Operations Brigade (aka Sepah Navy
Special Force, or SNSF), commanded by Sadegh Amooie. They operate out of
Faror Island, located twenty-four kilometers from the Iranian coast,
200 kilometers from the center of the Strait of Hormuz, and 138
kilometers from Dubai. This was the unit that landed on the mockup of a
U.S. aircraft carrier in dramatic fashion during the 2015 Great Prophet 9
naval exercise.
The IRGC could also use one or two of its five naval Mi-171 helicopters
to land a boarding party on a targeted tanker similar to how the
British seized the Grace 1. Given their lack of night flying
capability, they would almost certainly conduct any such operation in
daylight, probably during the cooler early morning hours.
Whatever happens next, the failed British Heritage operation
indicates that Tehran and the IRGC may not be concerned about catalyzing
the formation of a Western-led coalition to protect regional shipping.
Although this would be in line with the regime’s behavior during the
1980s, such a posture ignores the historical lessons from that period.
Prior to Operation Earnest Will in 1987, Tehran escalated the situation
in the Persian Gulf by ordering the IRGCN to confront Western navies
there amid the Iran-Iraq War. This decision backfired, giving Western
governments justification for deeper involvement. Iran’s shipping
attacks had little effect on the “Tanker War,” the protracted conflict
with Iraq, or global oil markets. They did, however, escalate the
confrontation with Western military forces, culminating in a major naval
defeat at the hands of the U.S. Navy in 1988. Iran will arguably be
much better prepared and equipped this time around, and able to inflict
more short-term costs on Western countries and their allies, but the end
result might not be very different.
CONCLUSION
To deter Iran from escalation, various actors should maintain a strong
multinational naval presence in the area and empower it to intervene on
behalf of freedom of navigation in the region’s strategic waterways.
Such protective measures should include strengthening defenses against
cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as hardening critical
infrastructure against Iranian cyberattacks.
Officials should also urge Iran to take concrete steps (including
legislative) toward recognizing the Strait of Hormuz as an international
strait.
Perhaps most important, Iranian leaders should be made to understand
that taking a belligerent stance in these vital waterways would
seriously harm their own economy and national interests, as happened in
the late 1980s when attacks on nonbelligerent shipping contributed to
internationalization of the conflict with Iraq. The IRGC is attempting
to depict these historical deeds as instrumental to strategic success,
and Western countries are understandably bracing for further tanker
attacks, perhaps involving greater damage. Yet those past deeds were in
fact very costly at a time when Iran’s most important national interests
were at stake, and that would no doubt be the case again today.
Farzin Nadimi is an associate fellow with The Washington Institute,
specializing in the security and defense affairs of Iran and the Gulf
region.
