In forging the Macedonian military machine Phillip created
the first truly professional army in the Western world and established the
template upon which all current conventional armies are based. He standardized
equipment within formations organized according to their intended tactical
function. The rank and file (volunteers as well as conscripts) were issued
their kit gratis from government-operated armories and manufactories. Pay and
remuneration were standardized according to military rank and duty without
excessive regard to private status. Command and administrative structures were
rationalized and made permanent with reasonable opportunity for advancement and
recognition based (in part) on merit and demonstrated ability.
Institutionalized provision was made for the full range of support functions
from commissary through medical services to disability and veterans’ pensions.
Indirect command and control was exercised through a regular and consistent
chain of command from army down to squad with orders relayed by an elaborate
system of voice commands, visual signals, and music. In contrast to the rather
xenophobic and ad hoc tendency of the Southern Greeks, Phillip adopted and
institutionalized the best innovations from both Greek and barbarian military
practice, recombining these elements into a singularly effective and
synergistic whole.
The Macedonian tactical system was based on four fundamental
elements: Heavy Infantry, Light Infantry, Light Cavalry and Heavy Cavalry, but
it also made indispensible use of traditionally armed troops, artillery and
engineers, naval forces and the specialized skills of local troops as they were
available. Phillip modeled his Heavy Infantry after the concepts of the
mercenary general, Iphicrates, who had extended the traditional hoplite
seven-foot stabbing spear into an eighteen- to twenty-foot pike. In order to
effectively manage this heavy and awkward weapon with two hands, individual
body armor was greatly reduced or eliminated and the large hoplon shield, from
which Greek infantrymen (“hoplites”) derived their name, shrunk to a light
buckler that could be suspended from the neck. The members of these modified
phalanxes gained protection from the standoff provided by the deep hedge of
iron-tipped pikes. Groups of heavy infantrymen were organized into disciplined
“syntagma” or companies composed of 256 pikemen arrayed in ranks and files of
16 men each. The heavy Macedonian phalanx had relatively little tactical
flexibility and was slow moving, but it could generate enormous momentum in the
attack and could establish a formidably intractable defensive base.
Also following the ideas of Iphicrates, The Macedonians
fielded large formations of Light Infantry – primarily missile troops called
“peltasts” – who rapidly deployed in amorphous, but regulated formations to
shower enemy troops with barrages of arrows, javelins, and lead sling bullets,
relying on their own agility and mobility for protection. Light Cavalry also
relied primarily on missiles as their primary weapons; either short javelins or
arrows launched from composite bows. They performed the same range of critical
tasks – scouting, flank security, envelopment, and pursuit that modern armies
rely upon mechanized cavalry to perform. Under the right tactical circumstances
they could even join a general assault against disorganized or badly positioned
infantry.
Heavy Cavalry, although perhaps inspired by the eccentric
practice of some wealthy steppe warriors, was Phillip’s unique military
innovation and was a key to the Macedonian approach to set-piece battle. These
were relatively heavily armored horseman armed with a 12-foot lance and a heavy
slashing saber. They were mounted on large powerful horses selected for their
aggressive spirit and conditioned through patient training to be steady in the
confusion of close-quarters combat. Phillip used his heavy horse in the
then-non-traditional role of mounted shock troops. He is even credited with
developing the remarkable mounted wedge formation designed to penetrate and
disrupt enemy infantry and cavalry lines. Although these heavy horsemen were
originally drawn from the sons of the aristocratic elite (hence their famous
status as “Companions”), they were eventually expanded to include formations
comprising the “able” from more modest backgrounds and designated “hetairoi.”
The same regularity and consistent command and control Phillip had imposed on
his infantry was extended to his cavalry, which were organized into squadrons
of 200-300 riders each divided into troops of 50-60. These innovations gave
Macedonian cavalry a high degree of flexibility in deployment. They were
capable of rapid changes in direction of maneuver and attack with minimal
disruption to their formation. In addition to his role as overall commander,
Alexander generally led the senior squadron of heavy cavalry as “Hipparch” and
placed himself at the very tip of the lead assault formation.
As well as these basic tactical elements, the Macedonian
system also comprised significant formations of medium infantry equipped
similarly to the traditional Greek hoplite, but under more uniform organization
and training. These medium phalanxes provided greater flexibility and mobility
than the heavy pikemen and provided the essential connective link to the
cavalry formations. They were also indispensible for specialist tasks such as
leading a breach assault or escalading a wall in a siege, serving as marines in
a naval fight, or providing a rapid infantry reaction to an unexpected threat
or opportunity. Phillip also created the first regularly organized corps of
engineers whose technical prowess and creativity transformed the ancient
practice of siege craft. Under assault from the formidable Macedonian machines
directed by highly skilled specialists, Phillip and Alexander successfully
concluded their sieges not in months or years, as had been the traditional norm,
but often in weeks – sometimes days. The equipment and techniques they
developed continued to define siege warfare for millennia until they were
eclipsed by the introduction of gunpowder weapons in 13th Century AD. The
engineers were also critical in sustaining mobility over difficult terrain and
bridging obstacles, an essential element in Alexander’s scheme of relentless,
all-season warfare.
While less frequently mentioned by historians, naval forces
also represented a vitally important capability for power projection and
sustainment. Although generally inferior to the largely Phoenician fleet which
served the Persian Empire, the Macedonian and allied Greek fleet was
nevertheless critical in securing Alexander’s supply lines and protecting the
transport ships which were the most efficient and practical means of
transporting the hundreds of tons of food and material required daily by the
army in the field.
Under Phillip, the Macedonian nobility was, for all
practical purposes, transformed into a professional officer corps. Alexander
could and did rely on a large group of capable subordinate commanders and staff
officers. As complement to his own remarkable skills, Alexander was well served
by a group of highly competent subordinate generals many, such as Parmenion and
Ptolemy, justly famous in their own right and some of whom went on to rule
powerful successor empires themselves.
Together, these elements made a military machine of
unprecedented agility, flexibility, and sustainability capable of adapting itself
to dominate virtually any tactical situation, project power across enormous
distances and maintain a high operational tempo in difficult, poorly resourced
environments far from its strategic base. So sophisticated was the Macedonian
system that it even had what approached an institutionalized tactical doctrine
in which light forces deployed to create or to deny the enemy tactical
opportunities, the heavy infantry formed a solid base of maneuver, and the
heavy cavalry was used as a “hammer” to smash through the enemy line then wheel
and crush the enemy force against the heavy infantry “anvil.” The medium
infantry formed the flexible continuity connecting the different formations
ready to provide immediate support to the cavalry and missile troops or act as
a reserve. Alexander appreciated the utility of this doctrine, but never
allowed himself to be rigidly bound by it. He always found his army able to
adjust itself rapidly to his sudden creative insights or unconventional
inspirations.
In addition to these impressive capabilities, the Macedonian
Army possessed one final attribute that was equally important in explaining
Alexander’s unprecedented record of achievement. The Macedonian Army was a
fighting force of exceptional and terrifying ferocity. The average Macedonian
soldier was, even by the standard of his time, ruthless, relentless, and
remorseless. Collectively the Macedonians displayed a singular
bloody-mindedness seldom exceeded by any military force in history. Terror and
intimidation were primary weapons in their arsenal and they used them with
unapologetic vigor. Perhaps the only fundamentally original innovation of
Alexander was his technique of aggressively and relentlessly pursuing a
defeated enemy. In divergence from traditional Greek warfare and in stark
contrast to Asiatic practice, Alexander sought not simply to defeat his
enemies, but to annihilate them lest they later discover the temerity to
challenge him again. It was in pursuit operations that the inherent ferocity of
the Macedonian military found its most terrifying outlet. It is not the least
irony surrounding Alexander that in his campaigns – ostensibly undertaken to
restore Greek honor, liberty, and fortune lost in persistent conflicts with
Persia he killed more Asian and Greek soldiers than had died in the preceding
150 years combined.
For all of the Macedonian Army’s extraordinary potential, to
be effective, any military force must be well-led and directed, and it was the
gifts of military planning and leadership that Alexander possessed in greatest
abundance. It was a legacy of traditional Greek warfare that the military
commander should put himself at risk by participating personally in combat.
Alexander, in this as in so much else, took the “heroic” leadership model to an
extreme. He generally placed himself in the thick of the most desperate
fighting and plunged into the attack with reckless disregard for his own safety
in the process setting a powerful example for his men. Arrian relates that
during a siege of an Indian fortress, Alexander, impatient with the progress of
his men storming the enemy wall, impetuously seized a scaling ladder and
clambered to the top accompanied by just two companions. In the mad rush to
join their commander, the Macedonians over-crowded and broke the ladders,
stranding Alexander among the enemy. His men implored him to jump back down
into the many arms waiting to catch him, but, espying the enemy commander in
the interior court, Alexander instead leaped inside and killed the Indian
leader in personal combat. In the process, this tiny group of Macedonians
became the focus of the defenders and they were showered with arrows one
penetrating Alexander’s lung. Alarmed and enraged, the remaining Macedonians
swarmed over the wall to secure what they assumed would be a corpse. That he
survived this commonly mortal wound says much about Alexander’s physical
stamina and toughness (as well as the modern tendency to underestimate the
sophistication of ancient medicine). In all, the various sources record that Alexander
received a total of eight major wounds in combat at least two of them very
nearly fatal.
Mercenaries
A distinction between mercenaries and allied troops
certainly existed within the Macedonian order of battle; we saw this with the
Thessalian cavalry for example. The distinction drawn by Alexander was not
sharp, however, and could lead to some confusion. We must first therefore
clarify what these terms actually mean before we consider the individual
contingents themselves.
The meaning of the term ‘mercenary’ would seem at first
sight obvious: a soldier who fights for pay. But of course everyone in Alexander’s
army was being paid, including the Macedonian and allied contingents. I believe
that we can narrow the meaning down to ‘someone who fights without a political
imperative’, that is a soldier who is not compelled to fight by his city-state,
but does so purely for personal reasons. The distinction therefore becomes a
little clearer, but the status of the Balkan troops in the army is still
problematic. They are one of the contingents whose status changed whilst on
campaign; the Balkan troops came from peoples who were more or less formally
subject to the king of Macedonia, so that it is difficult to make the
distinction between whether they were mercenaries or allies. It is perhaps best
to avoid a splitting of hairs and to call them all mercenaries, because if they
were allies in the first place they certainly became mercenaries later. I will
here consider them amongst the allied contingent, as they were initially of
that status, and Diodorus certainly does not include them amongst the
mercenaries in his troop list of 334 BC.
By the time of the accession of Alexander in Macedonia,
mercenary soldiers formed an integral part, not just of the Macedonian army,
but also that of Persia and a number of the Greek city-states. The mercenary
soldier himself, however, had undergone considerable change. In the fifth
century, mercenaries were few in number and employment opportunities were
limited. Their first large scale employment in Greece was during the
Peloponnesian War, and was at first confined to the Spartan side, Athens having
no access to the large recruiting grounds of Arcadia. It is also the case that
Pericles’ defensive strategy had little need of mercenaries. Athens’ first
recorded use of hoplite mercenaries was on the Sicilian expedition, and even
here there were only 250 ‘Mantineans and other mercenary troops’. Persia tended
not to employ Greek mercenaries in large numbers in the fifth century, the
first large scale employment being Cyrus’ force of 10,000 so brilliantly
described by Xenophon. Mercenaries in the fifth century tended to be grouped
into one of the following classifications:
• Archers, often from Crete – Archery, throughout all
periods of history, was a specialized field and required considerable training.
It was very difficult for a citizen hoplite to acquire the necessary skills and
so specialists were hired. Crete is often mentioned as a source of such troops
throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, and it even furnished a contingent
in Alexander’s army; although Alexander also employed a native Macedonian
contingent of archers.
• Cavalry – Usually few in number, primarily because of the
expense involved, and because the geography of Greece also generally did not
lend itself well to cavalry engagements, with a few notable topographical exceptions.
• Hoplites – Troops armed and equipped in the same manner as
a citizen soldier; a heavily armed infantryman wearing a breastplate and often
greaves, and carrying a spear. Their main offensive weapon was weight of
numbers, hoplite battles could perhaps be thought of as a giant rugby scrum.
Heavily-armed hoplites were the main fighting force on either side in the fifth
and into the fourth century.
• Peltasts – Light-armed troops carrying a small shield and
little or no body armour. Their effectiveness was based almost entirely on
their mobility. Most mercenaries in the fourth century fell into this group
after the ‘reforms of Iphicrates’ early in that century.
