Rome now dominated southern and central Italy, including
Etruria and the Greek cities. Northern Italy, of course, remained largely
occupied by the Gauls, and the Gauls remained a menace. The process by which
Rome had developed from a small military outpost on a river-crossing to become
the dominant power of the Italian peninsula had been by no means swift or
continuous. It had taken the greater part of five centuries, and during that
time Rome itself had twice been occupied by a foreign power.
According to traditional stories, the last of Rome’s kings,
Tarquinius Superbus, an Etruscan, had been expelled late in the sixth century
BC after his son had villainously raped the wife of a noble kinsman. Etruscan
armies under Lars Porsenna had attempted to restore Tarquinius but had been
thwarted by the heroism of Horatius who, with two comrades, defended the Tiber
crossing against them until the demolition of the bridge was completed. The
Latin cities to the south had then combined to replace the exiled monarch on his
throne, but had been defeated by the Romans at the battle of Lake Regillus
(where the Romans were assisted by the gods according to the legend!).
Illustrated Etruscan tomb inscriptions, taken in conjunction
with the existing legends, suggest that the underlying historical facts were
very different. It is clear that Porsenna was not the friend but the mortal
enemy of Tarquinius, his fellow Etruscan. He probably conspired with
aristocratic, partly Etruscan elements in Rome to precipitate Tarquinius’
downfall, and then himself occupied Rome. He certainly advanced south of Rome,
to fight the Latins and their Greek allies of Cumae – where according to one
story Tarquinius ultimately took refuge. When the Etruscans were defeated by
the Latin League at Aricia (as described by Livy), their fugitives were
received and protected in Rome. Moreover, Livy stresses the friendship of
Porsenna towards the Romans and his chivalrous respect for their way of life.
One would guess that Rome had accepted the position of subject ally to Etruria.
The Roman population, despite its Etruscan overlordship, was of course Latin;
their Etruscan allegiances brought them into conflict with the other Latin
cities, who were allied to the Greek maritime states – Etruria’s commercial
rivals.
At Rome, Latin patriotic sentiment may have accepted
Etruscan kings and welcomed their leadership against Etruria itself, just as
English patriotic feeling in the Middle Ages accepted French-speaking
Plantagenet kings as leaders against the French. The early Roman historians,
however, did not like to contemplate their city as a mere catspaw in Etruscan
dynastic politics, let alone a puppet state to be employed against their Latin
brothers. Consequently, these chroniclers substituted history of their own invention,
assigning fictional roles to historic characters.
As the strength of Etruria diminished, Rome asserted its
authority over both the Etruscans and the Latins, but at the beginning of the
fourth century BC the city was overwhelmed, after the disastrous battle of the
Allia, by a vast horde of Gallic raiders. The Romans retreated into their
citadel on the Capitoline Mount; they eventually bought off the Gauls, whose
immediate interest was in moveables and not in land. Roman history records that
the great Camillus, Rome’s exiled war leader, was recalled to speed the parting
Gauls with military action, but this thinly veils the fact that the Gauls
departed of their own accord, having obtained what they wanted. Livy blames
Roman decadence and impiety for the disaster, but the Romans must in any case
have been vanquished by sheer weight of numbers. Apart from that, they were
never at their best when dealing with a strange foe whose weapons and methods
of warfare were new to them.
Roman military history is chequered by catastrophes. Few
great empires can have sustained more major disasters during the period of
their growth. Nobody would deny that the Romans were a formidable military
nation; yet the genius which enabled them eventually to dominate the ancient world
was as much political as military. Their great political instrument was their
concept of citizenship. Citizenship was not simply a status which one did or did
not possess. It was an aggregate of rights, duties and honours, which could be
acquired separately and conferred by instalments. Such were the rights of
making legal contracts and marriages. From both of these the right to a
political vote was again separable; nor did the right to vote necessarily imply
the right to hold office. Conquered enemies were thus often reconciled by a
grant of partial citizenship, with the possibility of more to come if behaviour
justified it. Some cities enjoyed Roman citizenship without the vote, being
autonomous except in matters of foreign policy. Even the citizens of such
communities, however, might qualify for full Roman citizenship if they migrated
to Rome; where this right was not available, citizenship could be obtained by
those who achieved public distinction in their own communities.
■ The
Roman Army in Early Times
Citizenship, of course, implied a military as well as a
political status. For the duties which it imposed were, above all, military.
The Latin and other Italian allies, who enjoyed some intermediate degree of
citizenship, were in principle required to supply an aggregate of fighting men
equal to that levied by the Romans themselves. In practice, the Romans relied
on their Italian allies particularly for cavalry: an arm in which they
themselves were notoriously weak. The Greek cities did not normally contribute
military contingents, but supplied ships and rowers. They were known as “naval
allies” (socii navales) because of this function.
Any army whose technical resources are comprised by
hand-arms, armour and horses, will, at all events in the early years of its
development, reflect an underlying social order. Combatants who can afford
horses and armour will naturally be drawn from the aristocracy. Others will
have little armour and less sophisticated, if not fewer, weapons. This was true
of Greek armies and also of medieval armies. It was certainly true of the
Romans, whose military class differentiation was defined with unusual care and
with great attention to detail. The resulting classification is associated with
the military and administrative reorganization of Servius Tullius,
traditionally sixth and penultimate king of Rome. His name suggests a
sixth-century date for the reforms in question, though some scholars think that
the so-called Servian organization was introduced later than this.
The “Servian” infantry was divided into five property
classes, the wealthiest of which was armed with swords and spears and protected
by helmets, round shields, greaves and breastplates. All protective armour was
of bronze. In the second class, no breastplate was worn, but a long shield was
substituted for the round buckler. The third class was as the second, but wore
no greaves. The fourth class was equipped only with spears and javelins; the
fifth was composed of slingers. There is no reference to archers. The poorest
citizens were not expected to serve except in times of emergency, when they
were equipped by the state. However, they normally supplied artisans to
maintain siege engines and perform similar duties.
The army was also divided into centuries (i.e., “hundreds”),
as the citizens were for voting purposes. However, a century soon came to
contain 60, not 100 men. The first property class comprised 80 centuries; the
second, third and fourth class had 20 centuries apiece; the fifth class had 30.
A distinction was made between junior and senior centuries, the former
containing young men for front-line action, the latter older men, more suitable
for garrison duty. A single property class was equally divided between the two
age groups.
The cavalry was recruited from the wealthiest families to
form 18 centuries. A cavalry century received a grant for the purchase of its
horses and one-fifth of this amount yearly for their upkeep. The yearly grant
was apparently provided by a levy on spinsters! In general, the financial burden
of warfare was shifted from the poor on to the rich. For this imposition, the
rich were compensated by what amounted to a monopoly of the political suffrage.
Inevitably, it was felt in time that they were overcompensated, but that is a
matter which must not detain us here.
During the early epochs of Roman history, as archaeological
evidence indicates, Greek hoplite armour was widely imitated throughout the
Mediterranean area. Italy was no exception to this rule and, as Livy’s
description suggests, Rome was no exception in Italy. Greek weapons called for
Greek skill in their use, and this in turn assumed Greek tactical methods. The
Romans were in contact with Greek practice, both through their Etruscan
northern neighbours, who as a maritime people were more susceptible to overseas
influences, and through direct contact with Greek cities in Italy, notably
Cumae. The Roman army, as recruited on the Servian basis, must have fought as a
hoplite phalanx, in a compact mass, several ranks deep, using their weight
behind their shields as well as their long thrusting spears. The light troops
afforded by the fourth and fifth infantry classes will have provided a
skirmishing arm, and the cavalry held the wings on either side of the phalanx.
There were also two centuries of artificers (fabri) attached to the centuries
of the first class, and two of musicians (made up of hornblowers and
trumpeters).
■ The
Military Reforms of Camillus
The next great landmark in Roman military organization is
associated with the achievements of Camillus. Camillus, credited with having
saved Rome from the Gauls and remembered as a “second founder” of Rome, was a
revered national hero. His name became a legend, and legends accumulated round
it. At the same time, he was unquestionably a historical character. We need not
believe that his timely return to Rome during the Gallic occupation deprived
the Gauls of their indemnity money, which was at that very moment being weighed
out in gold. But his capture of the Etruscan city of Veii is historical, and he
may here have made use of mining operations such as Livy describes. Similarly,
the military changes attributed to him may in part, if not entirety, be due to
his initiative.
Soon after the withdrawal of the Gauls from Rome, the
tactical formation adopted by the Roman army underwent a radical change. In the
Servian army, the smallest unit had been the century. It was an administrative
rather than a tactical unit, based on political and economic rather than
military considerations. The largest unit was the legion of about 4,000
infantrymen. There were 60 centuries in a legion and, from the time of
Camillus, these centuries were combined in couples, each couple being known as
a maniple (manipulus). The maniple was a tactical unit. Under the new system,
the Roman army was drawn up for battle in three lines, one behind the other.
The maniples of each line were stationed at intervals. If the front line was
forced to retreat, or if its maniples were threatened with encirclement, they
could fall back into the intervals in the line immediately to their rear. In
the same way, the rear lines could easily advance, when necessary, to support
those in front. The positions of the middle-line maniples corresponded to
intervals in the front and rear lines, thus producing a series of quincunx
formations. The two constituent centuries of a maniple were each commanded by a
centurion, known respectively as the forward (prior) and rear (posterior)
centurion. These titles may have been dictated by later tactical developments,
or they may simply have marked a difference of rank between the two officers.
The three battle lines of Camillus’ army were termed, in
order from front to rear, hastati, principes and triarii. Hastati meant
“spearmen”; principes, “leaders”; and triarii, the only term which was
consistent with known practice, meant simply “third-liners”. In historical
accounts, the hastati were not armed with spears and the principes were not the
leading rank, since the hastati were in front of them. The names obviously
reflect the usage of an earlier date. In the fourth century BC the two front
ranks carried heavy javelins, which they discharged at the enemy on joining
battle. After this, fighting was carried on with swords. The triarii alone
retained the old thrusting spear (hasta). The heavy javelin of the hastati and
principes was the pilum. It comprised a wooden shaft, about 4.5 feet (1.4m)
long, and a lancelike, iron head of about the same length as the shaft; which
fitted into the wood so far as to give an overall length of something less than
7 feet (2.1m). The Romans may have copied the pilum from their Etruscan or
Samnite enemies; or they may have developed it from a more primitive weapon of
their own. The sword used was the gladius, a short cut-and-thrust type, probably
forged on Spanish models. A large oval shield (scutum), about 4 feet (1.2m)
long, was in general use in the maniple formation. It was made of hide on a
wooden base, with iron rim and boss.
It has been suggested that the new tactical formation was closely
connected with the introduction of the new weapons. The fact that the front
rank was called hastati seems to indicate that the hasta, or thrusting spear,
was not abandoned until after the new formation had been adopted. Indeed, cause
and effect may have stood in circular relationship. The open formation could
have favoured new weapons which, once widely adopted, forbade the use of any
other formation. At all events, there must have been more elbow room for aiming
a javelin.
Apart from these considerations, open-order fighting was
characteristic of Greek fourth-century warfare. Xenophon’s men had opened ranks
to let the enemy’s scythe-wheel chariots pass harmlessly through. Agesilaus
used similar tactics at Coronea. Camillus was aware of the Greek world – and
the Greek world was aware of him. He dedicated a golden bowl to Apollo at
Delphi and Greek fourth-century writers refer to him. It is at least possible
that the new Roman tactical formation was based on Greek precedents, as the old
one had been.
■
Officers and Other Ranks
The epoch of Camillus also saw the first regular payments
for military service. The amount of pay, at the time of its introduction, is
not recorded. To judge from the enthusiasm to which it gave rise and to the
difficulty experienced in levying taxes to provide for it, the sum was
substantial. It was a first step towards removing the differences among
property classes and standardizing the equipment of the legionary soldier. For
tactical purposes, of course, some differences were bound to exist: for
instance, in the lighter equipment of the velites. But the removal of the
property classes produced an essential change in the Roman army, such as the
Greek citizen army had never known. The Athenian hoplites had always remained a
social class, and hoplite warfare was their distinctive function. The Spartan
hoplites had been an élite of peers, every one of them, as Thucydides remarks,
in effect an officer.
At Rome, however, the centuries of which the legions were
composed were conspicuously and efficiently led by centurions, men who
commanded as a result of their proven merit. The Roman army, in fact, developed
a system of leadership such as is familiar today – a system of officers and
other ranks. Centurions were comparable to warrant officers, promoted for their
performance on the field and in the camp. The military tribunes, like their
commanding officers, the consuls and praetors, were at any rate originally
appointed to carry out the policies of the Roman state, and they were usually
drawn from the upper, politically influential classes.
Six military tribunes were chosen for each legion, and the
choice was at first always made by a consul or praetor, who in normal times
would have commanded two out of the four legions levied; as colleagues, the
consuls shared the army between them. Later, the appointment of 24 military
tribunes for the levy of four legions was made not by the consuls but by an
assembly of the people. If, however, additional legions were levied, then the
tribunes appointed to them were consular nominations. Tribunes appointed by the
people held office for one year. Those nominated by a military commander
retained their appointment for as long as he did.
Military tribunes were at first senior officers and were
required to have several years of military experience prior to appointment. In
practice, however, they were often young men, whose very age often precluded
them from having had such experience. They were appointed because they came
from rich and influential families and they thus had much in common with the
subalterns of fashionable regiments in latter-day armies. Originally, an
important part of the military tribune’s duties had been in connection with the
levy of troops. In normal times, a levy was held once a year. Recruits were
required to assemble by tribes (a local as distinct from a class division). The
distribution of recruits among the four legions was based on the selection made
by the tribunes.
“Praetor” was the title originally conferred on each of the
two magistrates who shared supreme authority after the period of the kings. The
military functions of the praetor are well attested, and the headquarters in a
Roman camp continued to be termed the “praetorium”. In comparatively early
times, the title of “consul” replaced that of “praetor”, but partly as a result
of political manoeuvre, the office of praetor was later revived to supplement
consular power. The authority of a praetor was not equal to that of a consul,
but he might still command an army in the field.
The command was not always happily shared between two
consuls. In times of emergency – and Rome’s early history consisted largely of
emergencies – a single dictator with supreme power was appointed for a maximum
term of six months, the length of a campaigning season. The dictator chose his
own deputy, who was then known as the Master of the Horse (magister equitum).
The allies, who were called upon to aid Rome in case of war,
were commanded by prefects (praefecti), who were Roman officers. The 300
cavalry attached to each legion were, in the third century BC at any rate,
divided into ten squadrons (turmae), and subdivided into decuriae, each of
which was commanded by a decurio, whose authority corresponded to that of a
centurion in the infantry.
