Contrary to our expectations, there was quite a lot of
tactical variation during the first half of the 18th century. The problem is
that most memoirs and battle accounts are very terse, providing the barest
minimum about tactical level detail. One has to literally look through
thousands of pages of period histories to find the occasional interesting
tidbits, such as the such and such regiment fired by platoon, or re-doubled its
files and attacked (i. e., increased its normal depth four times thus forming
what would later be called a “column of attack).
The practice of Platoon fire dates back to Maurice of Nassau
and the early 17th Century, it is a method whereby the battalion can maintain a
continuous fire across its entire front. There are certainly records of the
Imperialist troops using the practice against the Turks in the 1680’s. This
therefore does not mean Platoon fire was restricted to battalions deployed in 3
ranks. Platoon Fire does not get mentioned in English Language Drill books
until Bland in the 1720’s although I am aware from contemporary memoirs that it
was practiced in various forms long before that date.
It would seem that the later 17th and early 18th Century
armies adopted various approaches to the use of Platoon Fire and this was very
much dependent on the situation. Whether firing from a static position or by
introduction or extroduction the practice was very flexible in its use. While
this practice seem to deter the Turk from charging home it did not have the
same effect on either the French or Swedes (whose doctrine was Arm Blanc). In
addition, close range fire by all nations was still volley by rank or ranks
prior to charging home.
In effect the rate of fire was increased by widespread use
of the Fusil and reduction in ranks of the infantry. Infantry effectiveness and
cohesion was mainly affected by manpower … some battalions will perform
better than others simply because they have more men.
In effect Platoon fire seems to have not inflicted any more
casualties overall than any other method of firing. Increase casualties seems
more related to weaponry and manpower.
Fire Combat –
Malburian Pertod and Seven Years War
It will be noted that wooden ramrods were used by most
troops as late as the War of the Austrian Succession, first being abandoned in
favor of metal ones by the Prussians. Wooden ramrods have the effect of slowing
down the firing of infantry, and I believe that fire was generally much better
controlled and more deliberate during the Marlburian period than during the
Seven Years’ War and after. Generally speaking, during the later period, all accounts
indicate that after a controlled volley or two, troops started firing as
quickly as they could, in a “rolling fire.” If we read the famous
account of the exchange between the two Irish regiments at Malplaquet – the one
in Allied pay, and the other French – we find that the Anglo-Irish fired a
series of controlled volleys, while advancing by platoons. This sort of
“advancing fire” is only possible if you have control over individual
volleys, which makes a good deal more sense if the slower rate of fire is
mandated by the use of slower wooden ramrods.
Much has been written about infantry fire drill, but it is not
safe to assume that the “fire by platoon” system pioneered by the
Anglo-Dutch and Prussians during the Marlburian period was generally adopted by
all other nations, even during the period of the Seven Years’ War. If you look
closely at what happens to infantry firing by ranks – especially with metal
ramrods – you will quickly understand why the French fired their muskets and
then went in with the bayonet: they would simply be shot to pieces by an enemy
using an organized platoon fire. However, the “cold steel” doctrine
stayed with the French well after the Marlburian period, and the same is true
of the Austrian army. Arguably, there was much less standardization in these
armies than there was in the smaller, more centralized forces of their opponents.
It is also true that French platoon-fire systems were not as effective as those
of the British, at least during those years leading up to the Seven Years’ War.
If I were to characterize the differences between platoon
fire and fire by rank, I would accord the following major benefits to the
platoon fire system:
• Greater
arc of fire, by a matter of some 10 degrees or so
• Greater
fire control: the Marlburian system allowed for either three or four firings
• The
ability to reload while other platoons are firing, thus allowing a steady
stream of fire, so long as only one “firing” was discharged at once
(not possible when each rank fires and then reloads, as the fellows in front
block the firing of those in back when they stand to reload).
If we examine the platoon systems used during the Marlburian
period, we find that there were a greater number of platoons, and that greater
control was exercised over them, than during the Seven Years’ War. Typically,
by the end of the Seven Years’ War, even the Prussians used only volley fire by
the entire battalion, followed by a reliance on rapid fire at will
(“rolling fire”). While there were certainly cases where four
separate firings were maintained, two was more typical, and one was the norm. I
believe that what we are seeing here is the fact that (a) controlled fire was
less important than the sheer speed allowed using metal ramrods, once the first
devastating volley had been delivered; and (b) lower troop quality and levels
of training – and less practice with live fire – meant that there was no way to
achieve a level of fire control such as was the norm during the Marlburian
period. Armies such as the Austrians and the French typically had less
live-fire exercise, and less overall training, than the British and the
Prussians.
Infantry using platoon fire required the three ranks to be
‘locked’ when firing, but I think the lack of cadence during the War of Spanish
Succession meant they moved with a greater gap between the ranks (not files)
than their Seven Years’ War counterparts.
What this boils down to is that during the Seven Years’ War
period, it is unlikely that we would see the same emphasis on fire control that
characterized the earlier period. Firefights become more deadly, because more
lead is flying around, and troops get more easily out of control once rolling
fire starts, but even in better-trained armies such as the British the
controlled fire of the Marlburian period is probably inappropriate.
The primary sources I am drawing on are Chandler’s
“Warfare in the Age of Marlborough,” Brent Nostworthy’s “Anatomy
of Victory,” Christopher Duffy’s excellent books, and various other
articles and books, by Pat Condray among others.
