The Egyptian Empire under Ramesses II (green) bordering on the Hittite
Empire (red) at the height of its power in c. 1279 BC.
The Hittite chariots attack the Ra division.
Ramesses counterattacks.
Final phase of the battle
At this juncture there are a series of imponderables. Was the
second group of Hittite chariots, fewer in number than the first, a strategic
reserve or only the remaining ones that Muwatallis had? We do not know. In
addition, what happened to the division of Pre? If most of the Hittite chariots
sped quickly upon the Egyptian camp, then it would appear that they did not
bother to wipe out that division. For if they did, the time element would have
been squandered. From the pictorial evidence we must conclude that the enemy
burst through the marching column of Egyptians, sped north, and although
killing some of the soldiers, did not bother to stop. It was sufficient to give
them a mauling; the aim was not to liquidate the vast majority of the second
division. Strategically, Muwatallis’ goal remained focused upon the camp of
Ramesses.
The attack of the enemy chariotry upon the second division
of Pre took place south of Kadesh. Major Burne assumed that these men were, at
most, about 2.4 km from Ramesses’ camp. This might be discounted as it is based
on his analysis of the size of the king’s main army (20,000 soldiers). More
useful, however, is his argument that the enemy crossed a ford south of Kadesh.
This seems reasonable; otherwise the chariotry could not have easily gotten
through the waters. But should we argue that the front of the Hittite chariot
line was relatively small because of the width of the ford? Most certainly, the
scenes of later carnage at the Orontes as well as those of the Hittite attack
indicate that the passage was not difficult.
The number of Hittite chariots that reached Ramesses’ camp
also remains a thorny issue. Most certainly, the Pharaoh was able to dispatch
some of his high officials south in order to warn the remaining divisions of
what was transpiring. Actually, only the third division (Ptah) is specifically
mentioned; the situation of the fourth (Seth) is left aside. Allowing the
distances assumed by previous historical research, one interesting question is
whether those men reached the actual melee at the Orontes or not. One additional
remark indicates that the enemy forces reached Ramesses with Hittites and
peoples from Arzawa, Masa, and Pidassa (P 85-6). Can we assume that at some
point the enemy had organized itself into four groups?
Yet they were repulsed. Subsequently Muwatallis sent
another, albeit smaller, wave of chariots westward, and we must credit Ramesses
for being able to repel all of them. This might have appeared impossible. But
the Pharaoh, with the troops of the first division and the relief support given
to him by the arrival of the contingents of the Na`arn, found his resources
sufficient to repulse the advancing enemy chariots. His success must have
depended upon three factors. The first was the number of Hittite chariots that
reached the camp, the second the presumed destruction of the division of Pre,
and the third the possibility that many Hittite chariots were still fighting
against those Egyptian troops. Indeed, one relief caption notes that the
Hittite king had also sent forward some of his infantry. The latter would have
arrived at the battlefield somewhat later than the faster-moving chariots, and
they may have ended up only on the immediate west side of the Orontes.
The type of combat appears to have been mainly based upon
chariots. Else, Ramesses could not have repelled the attacks of his enemy. The
roles of the Pharaoh’s footsoldiers and those of Muwatallis are not described.
Because the reliefs show the king’s attack in a chariot, a common theme of New
Kingdom war representations, we cannot evaluate the service that the Egyptian
infantry performed at Kadesh. All that we are left with is an assumption of the
size of both armies, and that is based upon the evidence of the texts (Hittite
chariotry and teher footsoldiers) and the probable size of an Egyptian division
(5,000). All of these figures are open to question.
If Muwatallis sent 2,500 chariots and if Ramesses had the
same number in his first division, then unless the former were held up by the
carnage of Pre, the Pharaoh’s immediate success makes sense. With an additional
1,000 chariots on the enemy side, and the lack of reinforcements from the third
division of Ptah, the Hittites would have had a numerical advantage. Moreover,
the relief captions note the presence of Hittite infantry. All in all, unless
we argue that the second division was not massacred, or that it held up the
Hittite charge, one is thrown back upon the role of the Na`arn in the fifth
division. Earlier Egyptologists had noted their crucial presence, and we cannot
but follow their analyses.
One lengthy caption in five versions refers to a pictorial
representation of arriving infantry and chariotry. These are the Na`arn, and
with them the king was able to charge into the foe. Although they might have
been tired from marching, by no means were they exhausted. In fact, they were
ready to fight like Pickett’s men. Unlike General Lee, Ramesses immediately
used them, and with this advantage in chariots – we assume double that which he
first had – the enemy was repulsed. Did Muwatallis have some idea that the
Na`arn were nearby, and thereby decided to attack the Egyptians as quickly as
possible before these reinforcements could have come into play?
Even though much ink has been spilled in analyzing the
battle, some details can be reconstructed. The account of the second day,
however, has left everyone in suspense. It is only given in the account of the
Poem, but the high-blown verbiage is impenetrable, or not of any use to the
military historian. I believe that further combat took place, “prearranged,”
so to speak. The king was able to marshal his ranks. Hence, at daybreak of the
following day the two armies met once more. Granted that this section of the
Poem is short, it nonetheless provides some support for my contention that
often battles were fought on plains, normally soon after dawn, with the tacit
agreement of both war leaders.
When we turn to the scenes of this battle, many useful
military details can be ascertained. We see the Na`arn arriving. They are
Egyptians, and hold their long shields in the same manner as the natives,
whether on foot on in a chariot. The third men in the enemy chariots hold
spears or javelins. Sherden are present acting as a guard around Ramesses on
the occasion when he ordered the Hittite scouts to be beaten. Clearly, these
men served as an elite guard whose duty was primarily to their liege lord. The
Hittite parallel is the group of teher warriors who surrounded Muwatallis. The
same set-up was carved for Ramesses’ camp except here more specific details are
conveyed, even to the point of indicating the relaxed mood of the Egyptian
troops. In the enemy camp pack animals are shown. The oxen of the Hittites pull
wagons with six spokes; donkeys are also laden with provisions. The similarity
to the Egyptian camp is self-evident.
Returning to the Egyptian army, a series of significant
military aspects can be noted. The army of the Na`arn marched as follows: first
a line of chariots, then soldiers, and then another line of chariots. This
point, hitherto unnoticed, provides a useful estimate for the size of a
brigade. In particular, three chariots lead the force. Behind each of them are
two columns of ten men. There are thus forty footsoldiers and twelve men on the
chariots, making a grand total of fifty-two. Was this the way that Egyptian
armies were organized when marching, or do the reliefs follow artistic license?
Whatever are our conclusions, it appears from the Kadesh scenes, but not from
the literary narrative of the Megiddo battle, that the Egyptian army used oblong
squares.
At Abydos we see a column of fifteen men proceeding in front
of one chariot. Further to the forward position there is another group of
chariots. Clearly, the arrangement is different. Can we assume that the artists
worked to a specific pattern, one that depended upon a predetermined artistic
interpretation rather than solely upon the actual events? Furthermore, in these
reliefs there is a bottom row of marching chariots, apparently serving as a
protective wing for the footsoldiers. But when we survey the approach to
battle, the system alters. Abydos shows the following. When marching in normal
order, normally two men are placed on the side of, or within the protection of,
one chariot. But as we near the expected danger zone the two footsoldiers are
now depicted with shields, and they have raised them for protection. Finally,
there is the charge of the chariots, and, as may be expected, the infantry
disappear because the rapidly moving vehicles have outpaced them. The onslaught
is also indicated by the upward direction of the horses: a true charge into the
fray is present.
Version L1 at Luxor reveals the same pattern but also with a
contrast. The number of Na`arn footsoldiers appears to be six or seven. R1, one
of the Ramesseum variants, has ten men between the two sections of chariots,
yet they are marching with at least seventy footsoldiers. Its companion (R2)
does not help us very much. But all accounts indicate that the Egyptian
counterattack was made up of chariots; the soldiers on foot must have followed
soon after. The precise if limited pictorial subsections dealing with the army
of Ptah likewise are useful for our analysis of Egyptian marching order. Two
speedy officials reach this division, and at Abu Simbel we see two distinct
sectors of the group. One is composed of archers and the others of spearmen.
The latter are identical to the marching Na`arn at Abydos. In a Luxor version (L1)
the lagging division is led by five standard-bearers and the division leader.
Behind all of them are three footsoldiers preceding a chariot.
Other subtle contrasts among these pictorial representations
show that a hard and fast rule concerning the number of combat soldiers per
subsection in a division is impossible to determine. Yet we can notice the
variances in tactics. When marching, for example, the footsoldiers were
protected by chariots. This is most clearly seen with the Na`arn. The advancing
division of Ptah, for example, is shown in a more relaxed mode. Because the
footsoldiers and the standard-bearers are at the head of the division with the
division leader in front of them, it is evident that they did not expect any
danger. So we must separate out those representations that indicate a relaxed
but careful march from the advance to combat, the immediate attack, and the
actual melee.
The mopping up of the Hittite attack is not recorded.
Instead, the oversized figure of Ramesses on his chariot plunges into the
Hittite host of chariots. But there are many ancillary points worthwhile
indicating. Above all is the repulse to the Orontes. This is most evident by
the specific details of Hittite dead in the river and the figure of the
luckless prince of Aleppo rescued from the waters. Evidently, Ramesses’ charge
pushed the chariot divisions of the enemy backward. If the full power of the
first chariot wave had reached the Egyptian camp I feel that this would have
been impossible. It would have taken some time for the Pharaoh to recover from
his initial surprise and to prepare his troops for combat. But with the arrival
of the Na`arn Ramesses had on hand an additional chariot force ready for
battle. They must have seen the attack of the Hittites, and we believe that not
many of the enemy’s chariots had attained their desired aim. In other words,
the king’s division of Amun plus the Na`arn first blunted and then ended the
tactical superiority of Muwatallis. Hence, Muwatallis had to send another wave
of chariots forward in order to hold his own lines.
But this support failed. The evidence of Egyptian success
may be read from the captions that accompany the figures of many Hittites.
There is little doubt that the names and titles of these men were written down
by the military scribes who accompanied the king. Enemy charioteers as well as
troop-captains and a shieldbearer are listed together with two brothers of
Muwatallis and two chiefs of the enemy’s teher. A dispatch-writer and a “chief
of the suite” of Muwatallis may also be found. Note that these are all
prominent men; none are mere footsoldiers. This befits the type of military
action that took place in which high-ranking men were responsible for the
carnage. We can assume that after the battle these men were identified, but
their names and titles could only have been determined with the help of the
enemy. Whether this list was drawn up with the aid of captured Hittites or,
following the melee, with the assistance of Muwatallis, is unclear. Perhaps
after the subsequent fighting on day two an official list of enemy dead on both
sides was determined. As the dead Hittites were prominent men I cannot but
conclude that their bodies were examined, their names recorded, and the corpses
sent back to the camp of the foe.
On the second day the result of the carnage must have been
clear to all. Ramesses had won the battle; his tactics were superb. On the
other hand, he was forced to withdraw from the field because he was unable to
dislodge the Hittites. Losing the strategic aim of the campaign, Ramesses left
the field having failed to take Kadesh. No wonder, then, that the Egyptian
monarch was forced to return to Asia soon thereafter. Hence, additional wars of
Ramesses in Syria are known from various sources in Egypt. The accounts are
mainly pictorial and their representations stereotypical. From the scanty data
that is preserved it is clear that the Egyptian king personally went into Syria
at least twice. He fought there in his eighth and tenth regnal years, but if
the advances of the Egyptian army are impossible to determine, it is easy to
conclude that Ramesses went by land. On one occasion we read that he fought
without donning his armor at Dapur, a very heroic situation that further reinforces
our opinion of the king as a doughty war leader. In addition, there appears to
have been more fighting in the Trans-Jordan. Here as well the evidence is
merely one of place names and generalized artistic representations. Whether or
not a general uprising took place within Egyptian-held territory is a moot
point. A war directed against incursions from the east does not provide
automatic support for this hypothesis. The towns captured by the Pharaoh in
year eight include Palestinian ones, but the presence of Yeno`am again
indicates a zone in the east close to the Trans-Jordan. In year ten a stela was
erected at the Nahr el Kelb, thus once more emphasizing Ramesses’ interest in
Syria or at least at his northwest border. A further one erected in Beth Shan
in the king’s eighteenth regnal year is purely rhetorical. By and large, the
undated war scenes are hard to place into a chronological framework, although
those referring to a Trans-Jordanian war can be securely set into the king’s
early second decade.
Later in the reign of Ramesses II, most probably in his
third decade as Pharaoh, the peaceful relations between Egypt and the Hittites
had grown to such an extent that diplomatic marriages took place. On two
occasions the Hittite monarch, Hattusilis III, sent one of his daughters to the
Egyptian court. The intense political activity between the two states may be
read on the various cuneiform tablets that are still preserved. But within
Egypt, in particular at the Delta capital of Avaris, Egyptian-Hittite interconnections
are overt. Recent archaeological discoveries at Qantir, located just opposite
the capital of Avaris, have allowed us to reconstruct the military setting of
this northeast Delta capital. Shield molds with Hittite motifs explicitly
indicate that a foundry was established there for the production of these
defensive weapons. Archaeologists have concluded that Hittites themselves were
producing and repairing Hittite shields. This leads to the supposition that
there were Hittite “mercenaries” or guards at Avaris. Tools of these
foreigners were also discovered, further proving that the large site of
Avaris-Qantir was the major military center in the northeast. Parts of chariots
such as fittings, harness pieces, bronze foundries, javelins, arrow tips, horse
bits, short swords, projectile tips, scales of coats of mail, and even stables
indicate the warlike nature of the capital. A large number of vast buildings
point to a chariot garrison that contained an exercise (or training) court,
adjoining workshops, and horses’ stables. It has been estimated that, at the
minimum, 350 horses could have been housed. But whether this was done for
contingents within the entire Egyptian army, or solely for the foreigners, must
remain an open question. None of the later battle reliefs of Merenptah or
Ramesses III point to any Hittite sector of the native war machine.
