The final and decisive Egyptian battle in Asia, a turning
point equal to that of Megiddo under Thutmose III, took place in year five of
Ramesses II at the city of Kadesh in central Syria. Yet this was the second
northern campaign of Ramesses II because a preparatory advance had occurred one
year earlier. A stela of the king, set up at the Nahr el Kelb on the southern
coast of Lebanon, probably bears witness to Ramesses’ first preparations for
the major war. We can presume that the Pharaoh followed the earlier practice of
his father (and Thutmose III) in first assuring control over the coast before
marching inland. Noteworthy is the presence of Sherden “mercenaries”
within the Egyptian army at Kadesh [Qadesh]
in the king’s fifth regnal year. They are referred to in the main inscriptions
that recount this war as well as in the reliefs. The latter differentiate these
warriors from the Egyptians by means of their round shields, long swords that
are wide close to the haft, and their cap-like helmets surmounted by two prongs
and a small sphere. Because the Egyptians had fought some of these sea pirates
at the mouths of the Nile earlier than the fourth year of Ramesses, it seems
reasonable that not a few had now become a staple ingredient within the Egyptian
military. Their absence in the battle reliefs of Seti supports this contention.
Ramesses II ordered an account of the Battle of Kadesh to be
inscribed and drawn on the walls of various temples. Abydos, probably the
earliest, reveals only the lowermost portions of the war owing to the
fragmentary condition of the temple. At Karnak two versions are still extant
while at Luxor three may be found, although one of them presents only the two
main narrative accounts. The king’s mortuary temple to the west of Thebes, the
Ramesseum, has two versions as well, and Abu Simbel in Nubia presents a more condensed
version.
The importance of the detailed account, the so-called
“Poem,” and its shorter companion, the “Bulletin” is
balanced, if not dwarfed, by the pictorial record. Indeed, the latter may be
said to provide the fullest visual information concerning the Egyptian military
in Dynasty XIX. As noted earlier, all campaigns were divided into various
portions. By and large some of these episodes are present in all of the
temples. On the other hand, Ramesses wished to highlight four main events in
this campaign: the camp and the war council, the battle itself, the spoils and
captives, and the second presentation at home to the gods.
Note once more the war council. In the narrative of the
Megiddo battle this was a prominent portion of the account, and the same may be
said for the opening section of Kamose’s war record. But the reason for
Ramesses’ interest lies in the fact that, after the king settled down in his
camp to the west of the city of Kadesh, he received news that the Hittites were
close by and not far away in Aleppo as he had originally thought. After the
spies of the Hittites were beaten and forced to tell the truth, the attack of
the numerous enemy chariots occurred. The pictorial representations cover these
two interlocked events as well as the arrival of the Pharaoh’s fifth division,
the Na`arn. The latter traversed southern Syria by foot, undoubtedly leaving
the ports of the Lebanon in order to meet up with the king and his four main
divisions, all of which had advanced northward through the Beqa Valley. If this
elite division left Tripoli, to take a case in point, then approximately 121 km
would have been traversed before they met up with Ramesses. Hence, it would
have taken them more than 9 1/2 days to reach their destination, providing that
there were no delays. Although this is not a long duration, the coordination of
the Na`arn with the king’s other four divisions is remarkable, and one is left
with the feeling that Ramesses earlier had been in communication with these
additional troops, probably by messenger, in order to effect the juncture of
the Na`arn with his army. If these men had arrived earlier they would have been
isolated. If they came later, then the entire composite army would been
prepared as a large unit at least one day after Ramesses’ arrival at Kadesh. The
coincidence is too great to allow for chance.
The second episode draws together the attempt of the king to
hasten his other divisions that had followed the first where he was at the
front. The all-mighty king is carved in superhuman size charging on his chariot
against the foe and, of course, shooting his arrows. Since this portion is
highly detailed, I shall leave it for a more detailed analysis below. The
remaining two episodes are more straightforward but present interesting details
of their own.
Globally, Ramesses II intended to retake the city of Kadesh
which had switched sides after the withdrawal of the large Egyptian army under
Seti I. His strategy was a simple one: march to the city and take it. From the
background to the eventual combat it is clear that Ramesses with his four
divisions did not intend to meet the Hittites. The “Poem” begins the
narration at the departure from Sile, and then continues with the arrival at a
royal fortress in the “Valley of Cedar.” There was no opposition in
Palestine; combat was expected only in Syria. He is then described as crossing
the ford of the Orontes, which was south of the city and at a point where the
river coursed in a westward direction, perpendicular to the march of the king.
Earlier, Ramesses had received false information from two
Shasu at the town of Shabtuna (modern Ribla), who stated that his Hittite
opponent, Muwatallis, with his army, was in Aleppo, north of Tunip. In other
words, the king felt that he could reach Kadesh unopposed and settle for a battle
or a siege. A series of background points can now be made. The first is the
simplest, and one that I have referred to on more than one occasion. The war
was known to all and sundry. Both the local princes in Palestine and Syria as
well as the leaders of the two great states of Hatti and Egypt could not hide
their feelings, their war preparations, indeed their war aims. The journey of
Ramesses, though not rapid by today’s standards, nonetheless covered the same
number of miles per day as, for example, Thutmose III did when approaching
Megiddo. The march was thus ca. 12.5 miles/day and no lengthy delays occurred.
If we allow about 10 days from Sile to Gaza, and then about 12 days to get to
Megiddo, we can place him in central Palestine about three weeks after his
departure from Egypt. He left Egypt approximately at the close of March to
early April, following the practice of his Dynasty XVIII predecessors. On day
nine of the third month of the harvest season he was at Shabtuna south of
Kadesh, and about one month had passed. (The departure from Sile is dated
exactly one month before the arrival at Shabtuna.) At this point he received
the false news that the Hittites were not around the city of Kadesh. The
Egyptians were approximately 14 km from Kadesh. Ramesses then advanced, and it
would have taken at most half of a day for the first division to set up camp
opposite the city.
More details help to elucidate the final stages of the march
to Kadesh. In the morning the king awoke and prepared his troops for the march.
Sometime after that the army reached Shabtuna. This would have taken time.
Ramesses’s extended army was composed of four divisions, all marching
separately and behind one another; the advance would have been slow. The
temporary halt at Shabtuna did not last long. Moreover, the king discussed with
his commanders the oral evidence of two Shasu “deserters” who falsely
reported that the Hittites were not at Kadesh but away in the north. Again, we
can assume the passing of time, at least one hour, but probably more. One line
of the “Poem” (P 60) states that a distance of 1 Egyptian iter
separated that ford south of Shabtuna from the position of Ramesses when the
second division (Pre) was crossing the Orontes. The distance from the ford to
the camp, or even to Kadesh, was at most 16.5 km. To march it would have taken
3/5 of a day. We cannot but assume that the time when Ramesses settled
peacefully in his camp must have been in the afternoon. One final point needs
to be brought into the discussion; namely, the length of the Egyptian iter.
There were two: a larger one of about 10.5 km and a smaller, of approximately
2.65 km. It is evident that the former was employed here.
We can perhaps better understand why the Egyptian monarch
failed to take cognizance of the Hittites. According to the Poem the latter
were “concealed and ready to the northeast” of Kadesh. The first
division of the Egyptians was at the northwest of the city, settled beside a
local brook that was so necessary for the animals and men. They had pitched the
tents, and from the scenes of relaxation the army had already settled down for
the day. However, as one relief caption indicates, they were not completely
finished with the preliminary tasks of pitching the camp (R 11).
But no attack by Ramesses was planned on day nine. The city
of Kadesh was not directly approached. Indeed, the king settled down on the
west, across the Orontes, and arranged his camp for the arrival of the
following divisions. We must assume that either he expected a military encounter
with the enemy forces stationed within Kadesh on at least the following day or
that he intended a siege of the citadel. The second alternative is a secure and
economical way to victory, provided that time is not of the essence. Such a
blockage prevents additional men from supporting the enemy, and eventually the
lack of food and water becomes a major problem for the defenders. Yet in this
case there is no evidence that Ramesses immediately proceeded to invest Kadesh.
Indeed, he was somewhat removed from that citadel. The topography of the region
indicates that west of the city and around the Orontes there was a relatively
level plain, one suitable for chariot warfare. The Egyptian camp and the
advancing three other divisions were well placed to suit their purposes. If
this analysis is accepted, then we may very well wonder if once more the
possibility of a “pre-arranged” battle was understood. That is to
say, soon after dawn on the following day, the clash of the Egyptians and the
foes within Kadesh was expected, provided that no surrender took place.
The Hittites, as all now know, were hidden. The less
detailed but highly useful account of the “Bulletin” twice says
“behind” Kadesh whereas the “Poem” is more specific,
locating Muwatallis, the Hittite monarch, and his army at the “northeast
of the town of Kadesh.” This report also uses the word “behind”
but adds that the enemy’s chariots charged from the “south side of
Kadesh” and broke into the second division of Pre that was still marching
north to meet Ramesses. Either the Pharaoh had not used advance chariotry or
scouts of his own to size up the strategic situation at Kadesh, and this
appears the correct solution, or the Hittite king arrived after any Egyptian
scouts had left. Considering the location of the enemy, the depictions of their
camp, and the prepared state of Kadesh, the second alternative must be
rejected. But the crucial question remains: how could Ramesses have not seen or
heard the enemy?
Armies such as Muwatallis’ had horses, and we know that his
chariots and troops were prepared. Do not horses neigh and create dust clouds
by their moving hooves? How can one hide them? Was the grass very high? Or was
the enemy simply too far away for traces of their presence to be noted?
Evidently, the Egyptian king had not sent a reconnaissance party across the
river to the east. This may have been due to the fact that his first division
was just on the point of settling down, and that the sun had begun to dip
faster in the mid afternoon. Nonetheless, Ramesses thought that the coast was
clear because the two Shasu had deceived him concerning his opponent’s
whereabouts. Was the hour of the day a factor? We have calculated, albeit in a
tentative way, that before Ramesses reached his desired spot a considerable
amount of time had passed. Sunset occurred around 6 p. m. local time, and we
would doubt if evening twilight had already occurred at the point when the
Hittite chariots were sent directly across the Orontes. The Poem helps us
further when it states that Muwatallis and his soldiers were hidden
“behind” Kadesh. The mound and the city itself therefore provided the
necessary cover.
A few additional remarks concerning this deception can be
offered, not in order to excuse the mistake of the Egyptian monarch, but rather
to indicate how armies that are at close quarters are unable to perceive each
other. It may be possible to surprise small forces but with large ones it
becomes increasingly difficult to obtain. The Baron de Jomini observed “As
armies at the present day [1838] seldom camp in tents when on a march,
prearranged surprises are rare and difficult, because in order to plan one it
becomes necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the enemy’s camp.”
Surprisingly, this sentence fits neatly with the tactics of Muwatallis. He
allowed Ramesses to settle down, or at least to begin pitch the tents, before
he moved his forces across the river. In addition, he waited for the second
division of Ramesses to advance sufficiently so that he could smash it and hence
isolate the first division at the camp.
Muwatallis must have known about the Na`arn, the fifth
division, when he sent his chariots ahead. As stated before, these armies had
reasonable knowledge of the strategic goals of their enemy. In the case of the
Hittites, their basic situation was better than the Egyptians. They already
held the area and had sufficient reconnaissance to enable them to understand
the enemy’s advance. If so, they should have known of the incoming fifth
division. Muwatallis was also able to send two Shasu south to meet up with the
main Egyptian force. He realized that his plans had succeeded. Otherwise,
Ramesses would not have acted the way he did.
The numbers of chariots said to have been employed by
Muwatallis belie the truth. Once more we meet nice rounded integers: 2,500 in
the first wave, the one that reached the Egyptian camp, and another 1,000 later
on. We could add the 19,000 and an additional 18,000 teher warriors said by the
Egyptian account to have remained with their leader. But let us return to the
force of chariots. As the Hittites followed a system of three men to a chariot
in this battle, 7,500 men are implied. Following the data, we arrive at an area
of 27,941 m2; in a square the sides would be 167 m or about 548 feet, 10
percent of a mile.
These calculations have avoided any other soldiers in the
Hittite army. Even though the Hittite chariots were somewhat different from the
Egyptians’, their length (including the horse) was about the same. The only
other problem is that with three men in the vehicle the width would have been
greater. Hence, we ought to increase our result by a few meters although we
cannot assume that the chariots were set up neatly in a square. The type of
fighting as well as the width of a chariot arm would have depended upon the
area in which they could maneuver. We cannot assume that the chariots attacked
en mass with no depth. For the original 2,500 the space would not have allowed
it.
If a camp for a Roman legion totaled 6,000 men, then the
area would be approximately 60 acres. For a mere 7,500 men we have 75 acres or
.12 miles2. Muwatallis certainly did not require such a large area because the
city of Kadesh could have supplied him with provisions. The Hittite monarch had
already camped there before Ramesses arrived, and his tactical situation was
excellent. But given the figures of the enemy troops in the text, especially
those of the 37,000 teher warriors, it would have been remarkable if the
Hittite king could have not been observed from a distance. We must discount all
of the numbers in Ramesses’ account of the battle of Kadesh.
Yet this does not mean that the battle cannot be analyzed.
In particular, we have to ask ourselves: what was the original intention of
Muwatallis when he sent his chariots across the Orontes? The lack of
footsoldiers is the key. He did not intend to fight for a long time. The
infantry were kept behind. Hence, the purpose of the attack was to run through
division number two, that of Pre, and to get to the camp of his foe as soon as
possible. Muwatallis also knew that the Pharaoh was just settling down. He did
not delay, for that would mean that the Egyptians could assemble with double
the number of troops. Considering his action, we may suppose that he felt, with
about 75 percent of the enemy army still marching north, the odds were
certainly in his favor. Nonetheless, he did not commit himself to full force:
additional chariots were left behind.
