Post WWII Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily [VVS]

The Red Army Air Force played an important role in World War
II. During the war, Soviet pilots reportedly flew 3.125 million sorties. By
1943, Soviet aircraft production surpassed that of Germany. With more than
36,000 built, the Soviet Ilyushin Il-2 ground support aircraft was the
most-produced plane of the war by any nation. The effectiveness of Soviet
aviation was enhanced by the country’s receipt of some 20,000 U.S. and British
aircraft. Nonetheless, the Soviet air arm operated primarily in a ground
support role. The Soviets had nothing that approached U.S. or British strategic
bombing capability.

The Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily (VVS, Soviet Air Force) became
an entirely independent military service in 1946. Soviet concerns over U.S.
strategic bombing and nuclear weapons also led to the establishment of a
separate Soviet Air Defense Service as an independent branch with its own
interceptor air arm in 1954. In addition, the navy retained its own air arm,
and the rise of nuclear weapons led to the creation of a separate strategic
striking force to control long-range strategic nuclear missiles. Nonetheless,
their World War II experience caused the VVS to place primary emphasis on
support of ground forces.

The VVS was composed of three major operational branches,
the most important being the theater support arm, Frontovaya Aviatsiya (FA,
Frontal Aviation). The other two components were Voenno-Transportnaya Aviatsiya
(VTA, Military Transport Aviation) and Dal’naya Aviatsiya (DA, Long Range
Aviation), both of which supported theater operations but also served as
strategic national resources under the Soviet General Staff.

FA units provided tactical air support for Soviet theater
operations, with responsibility for defensive and offensive counter-air
operations, deep attacks on critical theater targets, fire support for ground
units, reconnaissance, and electronic combat operations. During the 1950s, the
FA component numbered as many as 12,000 aircraft.

Compared to Western systems, Soviet aircraft designs tended
to be less technologically advanced. Building on German jet engine design, in
1946 the Soviets placed into production their first jet fighters, the
Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-9 and Yakovlev Yak-15. For their strategic bomber, on
Soviet leader Josef Stalin’s order the Soviets produced a carbon copy of the
U.S. Boeing B-29, some of which had been forced to land on Soviet territory
during the war. The result, produced by reverse engineering, was the Tupolev
Tu-4. The first Soviet jet bomber, the handsome and versatile twin-engine
Il-28, entered service in 1950.

During the Korean War (1950–1953), the Soviets sent
substantial air units to southern Manchuria to fight on the side of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). Soviet pilots dueled with United Nations Command (UNC)
aircraft in far North Korea. They also trained units of the Chinese air arm and
then turned over their aircraft to them, creating the Chinese Air Force.

Soviet fighter attacks did force the UNC to end daytime
raids by B-29 bombers, but the Soviets refused to supply air support to
communist ground units in Korea. Reportedly, the Soviets lost 120 pilots and
335 aircraft in the war. Their MiG-15 aircraft was one of the most successful
of Soviet jet fighters and a close match for the North American F-86, which was
hastily rushed to the Korean theater to meet the Soviet MiG-15. In dogfights
with the MiG- 15, the F-86 generally prevailed, thanks largely to superior
American pilot training.

In aircraft design, the Soviets continued to emphasize
maneuverability and interception capability in their fighter aircraft. Their
MiG-19, entering service in 1955, was the first Soviet supersonic fighter
aircraft. That same year, the turboprop Tu-95 entered service. It was the
world’s fastest propeller-driven aircraft and the first true Soviet
intercontinental bomber. Already in 1950 the Soviets had in service their first
military helicopters.

The progress of the Cold War and the threat posed by nuclear
and thermonuclear war as well as the development of missile technology led to
major changes in the VVS. Beginning in the 1960s, the Soviets modernized their
fleet of strategic bombers. In 1961, the Tu-22 entered service as the Soviets’
first supersonic strategic bomber. This process reached its culmination with
the 1987 appearance of the Tu-160. With a gross weight of some 590,000 pounds,
the Tu-160 is the heaviest warplane ever built. Capable of carrying a payload
of 36,000 pounds, the Tu-160 carries a bigger payload and is faster than its
rival North American/Rockwell B-1B. Although only fourteen Tu-160s were
delivered by 1991, when combined with the extensive development of cruise
missiles it gave the Soviets the capability to carry out deep strikes around
the world.

Strategic bombers nonetheless played a less-significant role
than land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), especially
compared to the American triad structure. The Soviet bomber program was
relatively small compared to that of the U.S. Air Force, reaching a high point
of more than 800 aircraft and an average inventory in the 600s, with fewer than
200 truly intercontinental-ranged bombers.

At the same time, the Soviets continued to develop their
fighter and interceptor capability, bringing on-line a wide range of fighter
aircraft with the MiG-21, MiG-23/27, MiG-25, MiG-29, and MiG-31 as well as the
Sukhoi Su-9, Su-11, Su-15, and Su-27. Ground attack aircraft appeared in the
form of the MiG-27, Su-7, Su-17, Su-24, and Su-25. With the increasing
importance of helicopters, in 1973 the Soviets introduced the superb Mikhail
Mil– designed Mi-24 attack helicopter, prompted by U.S. development of the Bell
AH-1 Cobra. The heavily armored Mi-24 saw wide service in Afghanistan.

The VTA component of the VVS performed long-range air
transportation functions. The VTA controlled tactical—parachute and airfield
assault landing and resupply—and international or strategic airlift. With a
peak strength of 1,500 aircraft, the VTA was also charged with the delivery of
Soviet airborne forces, which were also controlled as a strategic national
asset. Transport aircraft extended their range and capabilities in the Antonov
An-22, An-24, and An-26 and the Il-76. Entering service in 1987, the An-124
Ruslan, with a gross weight of nearly 893,000 pounds, surpassed the U.S.
Lockheed C-5A as the world’s largest aircraft to achieve production status. In
1988 it was edged out by a stretched version, the An-225. Although only two of
the latter have been built, they are the largest aircraft in world history.

Unlike the U.S. structure of assigning intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) along with the bombers to the Strategic Air Command
(SAC) of the U.S. Air Force, the Soviets’ land-based missile forces were not
assigned to the VVS but rather to the separate service of the Raketnye Voyska
Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya (RVSN, Strategic Rocket Forces). The RVSN was
created in 1959 to control the newly developed ICBM capability as well as
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and medium-range ballistic
missiles (MRBMs). The Soviet military considered the RVSN to be the elite
service of their force structure, with responsibility for ensuring Soviet
security through the capability to conduct effective nuclear strikes at the
beginning of any conflict, setting the stage for victory.

The nuclear capabilities of the DA and RVSN were further
supported by the SLBM component of the Soviet Navy. The navy maintained a
sizable long-range aircraft capability that provided maritime reconnaissance,
antiship, and antisubmarine capabilities as well as air-to-surface missile
strikes against land targets. Aircraft included the VTOL (vertical takeoff and
landing) Yak-36, which entered service in 1976 on the first Soviet aircraft
carriers. The Soviets also introduced the Kamov Ka-25 helicopter with an
antisubmarine warfare capability.

The final component of the Soviet airpower force structure
was the Voyska Protivovozdushnoy Oborony Strany (PVO Strany, Troops of National
Air Defense). The Soviet leadership created the independent PVO Strany in 1948,
giving it responsibility for the integrated air defense system of the homeland.
The PVO Strany organization controlled the substantial air defense system through
early warning radars, weapons control systems, and a communications network.
The technical systems were operated by the Radiotekhnicheskiye Voyska (RTV,
Radio-Technical Troops). The extensive interceptor force assigned to PVO Strany
was organized as the Istrebitel’naya Aviatsyiya PVO (IA PVO, Fighter Aviation
of Air Defense). The interceptors were tightly controlled by the overarching
command and control structure, which also integrated fighters that could be
assigned to the national air defense role in an emergency. The Soviet
interceptor inventory peaked at more than 5,000 aircraft in the late 1950s. PVO
Strany also integrated the interceptor activities with the thousands of
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that it controlled through the Zenitnyye Raketnye
Voyska (ZRV, Zenith Rocket Troops) organization. These strategic SAMs could
also be supported by the numerous tactical SAM systems that were deployed in
the military districts across the Soviet Union as part of the Voyska
Protinvovozdushnoy Oborony Sukhoputnykh Voysk (PVO SV, Troops of Air Defense of
the Ground Forces). When ICBMs became a significant component of the U.S. force
structure in the early 1960s, the Soviets reacted by expanding the PVO Strany
organization to include an antimissile defense component (designated PRO).
Active antimissile sites were deployed around Moscow. Likewise, as space
systems were developed by the United States and the Soviet Union in the early
1960s, the Soviet military added an antisatellite component (designated PKO) to
PVO Strany.

During the 1980s, the Soviet military developed the air
operation concept, an aggressive offensive use of airpower at the start of a
theater campaign, designed to seize the initiative and create conditions for a
rapid ground victory. The air offensive was intended to reduce an enemy’s
offensive striking power—especially nuclear delivery systems and air, missile,
and heavy artillery firepower—and establish at least localized air superiority
over the main axes of attack. Additionally, the air attacks would help soften
enemy defenses at and behind the points of attack and would limit enemy
maneuvering capability in response to Soviet advances. Soviet theater
operations would also include parachute and helicopter assaults to seize key
enemy targets and support the rapid advance of the main ground assault.
Reflecting their support role, FA units were assigned to the theater or front
commander (in peacetime to the Military District commander in the USSR or to
the Soviet Group of Forces outside the USSR).

By the mid-1980s, the VVS deployed some 6,000 tactical
fighters, ground support, and reconnaissance aircraft as well as 670 strategic
bombers. The Soviets also fielded 1,300 fighter interceptors. The VVS possessed
some 3,500 helicopters and 650 transport aircraft. Soviet naval aviation added
another 1,100 airplanes and helicopters.

Soviet air forces were an important component of Soviet
theater war capabilities and operational concepts during the Cold War era. VVS
units served during the Cold War not only in the Soviet Union but also in
Central and Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. Noteworthy Cold War
service came during the Korean War, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and
especially the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).
Soviet instructors and pilots saw air combat in the Korean War and the Vietnam
War. They also served with the Egyptian Air Force during the War of Attrition
(1969–1970), in Angola (1975–1990), and in Ethiopia (1977–1979). Such service
demonstrated the wide reach of the VVS and provided much useful training, but
it also revealed serious shortcomings in equipment, logistics, and organization
and could not conceal that the Soviets placed reliance on numbers and tight
control rather than on more flexible training and innovation.

References
Epstein, Joshua M. Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. Higham, Robin, and Jacob W.
Kipp. Soviet Aviation and Air Power: A Historical View. Boulder, CO: Westview,
1977. Mason, R. A., and John W. R. Taylor. Aircraft, Strategy and Operations of
the Soviet Air Force. New York: Jane’s Publishing, 1986. Murphy, Paul J., ed.
The Soviet Air Forces. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1984. Scott, Harriet Fast, and
William F. Scott. The Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. 4th ed. Boulder, CO:
Westview, 2002. Whiting, Kenneth. Soviet Air Power. Boulder, CO: Westview,
1986.

VVS orders of battle

Gril’ev, A.N. “Boevoi Sostav Sovetskoi armii”.
Volumes I – V. Voenno-nauchnoe upravlenie general’nogo shtaba. Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1963, 1966, 1972, 1988 and 1990. Gril’ev is listed in the U.S.
Library of Congress On-Line Catalog as follows (note the different spelling of
the last name):

Grylev, A. N. (compiler and editor). “Boevoi Sostav
Sovetskoi armii”. Voenno-nauchnoe upravlenie general’nogo shtaba,
voenno-istoricheskii otdel. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963 – 1990. 5v. LC Control No.
98146424. Call No. Microfilm 98/4 (D). Microfilm Reading Room (Jefferson
Building, Room LJ129B). This is a massive OB work that covers the Red Army,
VVS, Navy, NKVD and para-military forces from 1 Jun 41 to 1 Sep 1945. The
5-volume study was prepared for the Soviet General Staff and was originally
classified SECRET. If you are British, then you may be able to find it in the
British Library or in the university libraries at Oxford or Cambridge. It is
the definitive work on the subject and the only one that’s been done.