Hyazinth Graf Strachwitz Von Gross-Zauche Und Camminetz was
the most decorated regimental commander, and one of the most effective panzer
leaders, in the German Army.
He was one of only 27 men in the entire Wehrmacht to be
awarded the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds. Of these he
was the only one to receive grades of the decoration for both bravery and his
command abilities, which led to the significant outcomes which merited the
award. The other Diamonds recipients received awards for either their bravery
and combat accomplishments, such as Erich Hartmann for his 352 aerial victories,
or for their skill in command, such as Hans Hube and Walter Model. In the
latter cases their men did the actual fighting and the award was as much for
the units under their command as for them.
Von Strachwitz’s rapid rise during World War II from a lowly
captain to a lieutenant general, equivalent to a major general in the UK and US
armies, was nothing short of extraordinary, and this in an army not lavish in
granting promotions.
He fought in nearly all of the major campaigns—the invasions
of Poland, France and Yugoslavia, and the important campaigns and battles in
the east including Operation Barbarossa, the battles of Kiev, Stalingrad,
Kharkov, and Kursk, the Baltic States and finally of Germany and his beloved
Silesia—his service being almost a microcosm of World War II in Europe. In the
course of these battles, not only did he win renown—becoming a legend among
those who fought on the Eastern Front who gave him the title Panzer Graf
(Armoured Count)—but was also wounded 14 times, probably was probably unique
amongst the ranks of Germany’s senior officers and a testament to his leading
from the front.
Such an extraordinary record of courage and command would
have made him unique in any army of World War II. Yet he is a man of mystery,
with very little known about him and nothing of substance yet been written. He
is mentioned in countless books, articles and websites, but at most is only
given a brief biographical outline, and even this is often inaccurate in parts.
Günter Fraschke wrote a German-language biography in 1962, which, if largely
factual, was nevertheless discredited for its inaccuracies and sensationalism
and rejected by the Panzer Graf himself.
Unfortunately the Panzer Graf himself wrote no memoirs; left
no diary, and any notes and papers were lost along with his home in 1945. His
records of service in the 16th Panzer Division were destroyed along with the
division in the battle of Stalingrad in 1943. After a period of distinguished
service with the elite Grossdeutschland Division, he served as commander of
several ad-hoc units, some bearing his name, in a period when records, if kept
at all, were scanty, or lost. It all makes for a rather threadbare paper trail.
His comrades-in-arms have now all passed away, so there are no witnesses to his
many battles and exploits.
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After the Battle of Kursk, it took the Graf several months
to recover from his wound, including weeks of convalescent leave. The question
then arose as to his deployment. It seems clear that he did not wish to return
to the Grossdeutschland Division, and General Hörnlein equally did not want him
back. The two did not got on, and the Graf had not covered himself with glory
at Kursk as he had done in previous battles. Nevertheless the Panzer Graf’s
undoubted talents could not be wasted. A divisional command was the next step
for him, which meant that he was under consideration to take over the Panzer
Lehr Division. This superbly equipped formation had been established from
demonstration and training units trialing and demonstrating new weapons and
tactics. All its infantry regiments were mechanized with armoured personnel
carriers while its equipment tables were far more lavish than that for a
standard panzer division, which for instance only had one battalion equipped
with APCs with the remainder being truck borne, and here also both APCs and
trucks were often in short supply.
He didn’t get this command, which instead went initially to
Fritz Bayerlein. This may have been for several reasons. The least favourable
was that the Graf’s personality, outlook and tactical approach did not make him
suitable for a standard divisional command, which required a great deal of
preoccupation with logistical and administrative matters as well as controlling
a diverse range of formations not necessarily connected with direct combat,
such as signals, transport, supply, medical, engineering and administration.
Perhaps von Strachwitz was considered too much a hands-on front-line combat
commander to have his abilities diverted by the numerous non-combat tasks often
required of a divisional commander. Equally, tying down such an
independent-minded commander to the chains of divisional and corps structures
would not be the best use of his talents. Being independent with a regiment was
a far cry to acting independently with a whole division. Perhaps the deciding
factor was that the Graf could be better used for special missions or in a fire
brigade role. His skill clearly lay in achieving a great deal with very little.
He was one of the few commanders who could make a very real difference through
his sheer presence and ability. Putting it bluntly, any reasonably competent
general could achieve fair results with a well-equipped panzer division.
However, very few commanders could manage a superlative result with little or
few resources.
In any event, he was passed over for Panzer Lehr. The
division was later deployed in Normandy, and had von Strachwitz been in command
it might well have caused the Allies more difficulties than it did under its
actual commander, General Fritz Bayerlein, a dilettante who had established his
reputation as Erwin Rommel’s Chief-of-Staff in North Africa. His handling of
Panzer Lehr during the Allied invasion of France was average, bordering on the
lacklustre. He displayed none of the flair and imagination of von Strachwitz or
other commanders such as Bäke, von Manteuffel or Raus, so that the superb
division underachieved under his control. Later, during the Ardennes Offensive,
Hasso von Manteuffel, Bayerlein’s army commander, went to great lengths, to
avoid promoting him to command the XLVII Panzer Corps after its commander,
General von Luttwitz, had mishandled it, being held up unduly at Bastogne.
Bayerlein, as the senior divisional commander, was next in line to command a
corps but, unwilling to make the promotion, von Manteuffel left well enough
alone, a scathing indictment of Bayerlein.
So in April after being awarded the Swords to his Knight’s
Cross as the twenty-seventh recipient, Graf von Strachwitz was sent to Army
Group North, which had been grossly under-resourced almost since its inception.
Of all the army groups, its performance in achieved objectives could be
considered the most successful, despite getting little in the way of resources
or reinforcements, especially in armoured fighting vehicles. The Russians
themselves admitted after the war that Army Group North had fought the hardest,
especially when compared to Army Group Centre in the later years.
In January 1944 the Soviets launched their
Leningrad-Novgorod offensive, pushing the Germans back to the River Nava. They
hoped to annihilate Army Detachment Narva and sweep through Estonia, utilising
it as a base for a quick thrust into East Prussia. This army detachment, a
euphemism for an understrength army, comprised seven infantry divisions, one
panzer-grenadier division and three Waffen SS divisions of European
volunteers—11th SS Panzergrenadier Division Nordland, 4th SS Panzergrenadier
Division Nederland and the 20th SS Estonian Division—along with sundry smaller
units including Estonian border guards and the wholly German 502nd Heavy Panzer
Battalion under Major Jahde. The foreign volunteer SS divisions performed
heroically at Narva, accumulating no fewer than 29 Knight’s Crosses. The 502nd
Heavy Panzer Battalion, with 70 Tigers, was a highly effective unit with
several tank aces, including Lieutenant Otto Carius (150 tanks destroyed),
Lieutenant Johannes Bölter (139 tank kills), Albert Kerscher (106 kills),
Johann Muller and Alfredo Carpaneto (50 kills each). Its total kills for the
war were 1,400 Russian tanks of all types, for a loss of only 107 Tigers, a
kill/loss ratio of 13.08:1, the second best kill/loss ratio of any Tiger
battalion after Grossdeutschland’s battalion which achieved 16.676:1.3 Bölter
and Carius were originally NCOs who had climbed through the ranks. This was one
of the factors of the German Army’s success, promoting a great number of
officers from the ranks of distinguished NCOs, with officer candidates having
to serve in the ranks to prove themselves.
The Soviets’ winter offensive was successful in breaking the
900-day siege of Leningrad on 27 January, with the Germans making such a hasty
withdrawal that they left behind 85 guns which had been shelling the city. Two
German divisions were destroyed with the Russians capturing 1,000 prisoners and
30 tanks. After a period to regroup the Soviets resumed their offensive in
February, forcing the Germans back to the Panther Line, which was more illusion
than a fortified defensive line. The Germans now stood on the River Narva in
Estonia to await the next Soviet onslaught. Here, the III SS Panzer Corps, led
by the redoubtable SS General Felix Steiner, set up defensive positions across
11 kilometres east of the town of Narva. It would be the scene of intensely
savage fighting.
The Russian Eighth Army did, however, manage to establish
two bridgeheads across the river on 23 February, which became known as Eastsack
and Westsack. These threatened to unhinge the German line. The Germans had very
little in the way of armour to eliminate them, with the 502nd Heavy Tank
Battalion deploying four Tigers against Westsack and two against the Eastsack.
On that day the battalion destroyed its 500th Russian tank. The battalion’s 2nd
Company alone destroyed 38 tanks, four assault guns and 17 other guns between
17 and 22 March.
Although the Germans lacked a large armoured force they did
have the Panzer Graf, who could achieve more with a handful of tanks than any
other commander in the German Army. Hitler also sent General Model to take over
Army Group North without any reinforcements. When asked what he had brought
with him he confidently replied “Why, only me gentlemen.” So the Panzer Graf
was not the only one expected to perform miracles. Perform miracles they both
did. The Graf was initially promised three divisions, which would have made him
feel confident about his task, but they never arrived. Along with the promise
of panzers the Graf was given the grandiose title of armour commander of Army
Group North which would have been more impressive had he any sizeable armoured
formations to command. As it was he had to make do with what was available: the
502nd Heavy Tank Battalion with just 12 Tigers still operational, Battle Group
Böhrendt with a few assault guns and Panzer IIIs, units of the Feldernhalle
Division with a few Panthers, and some Panzer IVs from the SS Nordland
Division. His infantry was supplied by Grossdeutschland’s Fusilier Regiment
mounted in APCs. Grossdeutschland also provided some tanks and Nebelwerfer
rocket launchers. As a last-minute reinforcement Hitler sent over a battalion
from his escort brigade, which was literally the last reserve he had available.
The Russians had entire armoured and infantry corps sitting idly in reserve
while the Germans could only scrape up a battalion that wasn’t urgently needed,
so parlous had the German manpower and weapons situation become.
The Graf’s mission was to eliminate the Soviet Narva
bridgeheads. His actions have been generally categorized as operations
Strachwitz I, II and III. He chose the Westsack for Strachwitz I and spent a
great deal of time preparing for it. As always, good reconnaissance was
paramount along with intelligence from radio intercepts and prisoner
interrogations. Most prisoners, including officers, were willing to talk, as
were German captives, the very real fear of being executed proving a strong
motivating factor. Leaving nothing to chance he also had his troops rehearse
the attack. The training exercises were conducted with live ammunition with
several casualties incurred as a result. Careful reconnaissance led him to give
the Tigers a secondary supporting role due to the marshy nature of the terrain.
He had to rely on his lighter Panthers, Panzer IVs and assault guns for the
spearhead. After careful consideration von Strachwitz decided to attack
Westsack from the west. He reasoned, correctly, that the Russians would be
expecting an attack from the east as this had a good road and the German
artillery had good observation points from the nearby Blue Hills. As well, a
regiment of the German 61st Infantry Division was entrenched in a salient
there, called the boot.
At 5:55 a.m. on 26 March, von Strachwitz launched his attack
on the Westsack. It was preceded by, for what was for this period of the war, a
heavy artillery and Nebelwerfer barrage. The panzers followed, supported by the
infantry of Grenadier Regiments 2,44 and 23 from the East Prussian 11th
Infantry Division, a hard-fighting unit commanded by General Lieutenant Helmuth
Reymann. Eight Tigers had been ordered to support the infantry but they were
forced to withdraw due to the softness of the ground. The Graf’s decision not
to use the Tigers at the forefront had proven correct.
Ferocious fighting took place in the trackless swamps and
forests with heavy casualties on both sides. The German officer losses were
especially severe with all platoons and most companies being led by surviving
NCOs. The Graf led from the front as usual, a familiar figure in his bulky
sheepskin coat, bringing chocolates and cognac to comfort and encourage his
troops. He also brought with him several Iron Crosses Second Class, which he
awarded on the spot to the best fighters. When not accompanying him, his
adjutant Lieutenant Famula was close behind ensuring that ammunition, food and
fuel arrived on time wherever they were needed.
So vital was this operation that the Graf received Stuka
support, a fairly rare event given the stretched resources of the Luftwaffe.
This proved a mixed blessing however, with one bomb landing on the narrow track
on which the German tanks were advancing. One minute later and it would have
wiped out von Strachwitz himself. The Stuka pilots had great difficulty in
finding their targets amongst the trees, and the bombs were less than effective
in the forested terrain.
Early progress was good with a large number of prisoners
taken, but the Russians were not prepared to give ground easily. On 27 March
they counterattacked, pushing the Germans back with their first onslaught. They
continued their attack into the night. This led to some very frightening
close-quarter combat in the pitch-black woods. The next morning the Russians
commenced a sustained artillery bombardment causing heavy casualties, many
caused by the wood splinters from the fractured trees, so that companies of
normally over 100 men were reduced to platoons of fewer than 30. Von Strachwitz
summoned reinforcements, but they too suffered heavily from the Soviet
artillery fire, arriving already badly depleted.
Immediately after the artillery barrage the Russians sent in
their infantry in massed attacks which penetrated the thinly manned German
defences at several points. The Luftwaffe sent in ground-attack aircraft but
failed to dislodge the Russians. Several batteries of Nebelwerfers added their
weight to the fire, blasting the Russian positions in a crescendo of shattering
explosions. The Graf then ordered a counterattack, which threw the demoralised
Russians back with cold steel. He pushed forward with everything he had to
maintain the momentum. The Russians fought back tenaciously, but were steadily
forced to give ground. When driven out of their trenches their resistance
turned into a precipitous retreat with many surrendering. The retreat turned
into a rout. They left behind some 6,000 dead and 50 guns, along with the large
quantities of equipment on the battlefield. In addition, the Germans took some
300 prisoners. Against those Soviet losses the Germans suffered 2,200 dead or
missing. It was a superb if costly victory at a time when the Germans were in
retreat, or barely holding on along the rest of the front.
On 1 April Hyazinth von Strachwitz was promoted to the rank
of major general. For a colonel of the reserve this was a very unusual
promotion, and may have been unique. His monthly salary increased by around
50%. He wasn’t as fortunate as some generals, General Guderian for instance,
who received a large amount each month on top of his ordinary salary as a
personal gift from Adolf Hitler. Other generals and field marshals, such as von
Kluge, also received monetary gifts, as well as landed estates.
The Panzer Graf’s next operation was Strachwitz II, the
elimination of the Eastsack bridgehead. He knew the Russians were expecting him
to attack as he had attacked the Westsack. So he did the opposite, attacking at
East-sack’s northern tip to surprise them. This attack also took meticulous
preparation, which was becoming his trademark. As Otto Carius stated in his
memoir, Tigers in the Mud, regarding the planning for Strachwitz III, “his
careful, methodical planning amazed us once again” and that “the Graf was a
master of organisation.” This would seem at odds with his devil-may-care
cavalrymen’s approach, but it shows that, despite his reputation for dashing
raids and slashing cavalry-style attacks, he was a calm calculating man, and it
was this, together with his boldness, that made him such a formidable commander
and adversary.
