“Voenno-Vozdushnye sily (VVS).” Unlike the Royal Air Force
(RAF) or the Luftwaffe, but like the USAAF and JAAF, the VVS was not a separate
air force organization. VVS bombers and support aircraft were integrated with
various Fronts of the Red Army, while anti-aircraft guns and
fighter-interceptors were organized separately under the PVO, or Air Defense
Force. As a result of being controlled by ground force commanders, and given
experience in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), during the prewar period the
VVS built a nearly exclusively tactical air force of medium bombers, dive
bombers, and heavy attack fighters. It eschewed acquisition of more than a
handful of long-range strategic bombers. Joseph Stalin took a direct interest
in the VVS. His limited prewar thinking about strategic bombing was influenced
by the deep battle attack doctrine developed by the Red Army. In 1939 VVS
“mixed air divisions” were set up that deployed bombers and fighters to each
Front (army group). As a result, when war came VVS aircraft were widely dispersed
among ground formations themselves deployed too far forward, and were not
capable of a coordinated overall response to being suddenly attacked. The
problem of commanded structure and overly wide dispersal was compounded by
weakness in aircraft design. That would not change until 1942, with reforms
forced upon the VVS by extraordinary pressures of catastrophic losses of
aircraft and near-defeat of the whole Red Army in 1941.
The VVS underwent a violent purge that began in 1937,
continuing to mid- 1941, the very eve of the German invasion. In addition to
top officers, many talented aircraft designers were arrested, executed, or
driven to suicide. Aircraft types were miserable in design compared to German
or British models, but had been produced in great volume by the pathologies of
a Soviet economic model that valued sheer numbers over quality. The
inadequacies of the prewar VVS were revealed in extraordinary peacetime losses
to accident: upwards of 800 aircraft per year, or more than the entire prewar
production runs of some RAF models. A paucity of repair facilities, technical
support, fuel supply systems, and ground-to-air or air-to-air radio
communications completed the prewar picture. On June 21, 1941, the eve of the
German–Soviet war, the VVS numbered 618,000 personnel, but not enough
experienced or qualified officers. It deployed over 20,000 military aircraft of
all types. In the first three days alone the VVS frontier Military Districts
lost about 2,000 aircraft. Several top commanders were immediately arrested and
shot, scapegoats for Stalin’s diplomatic and military catastrophe. During the
first weeks of fighting the VVS lost thousands more outclassed planes, many
destroyed on the ground or abandoned in all-out retreats. By the end of July it
was a shattered remnant of its prewar self. Over the first six months of
fighting its losses were even more immense.
New VVS formations had to be created almost from scratch in
early 1942, some formed with Lend-Lease fighters shipped in haste from the United
States or Britain. However, they were eventually supplied with new and
much-improved Soviet warplanes designed by men released from NKVD prisons or
camps, built by men and women working in desperate factory conditions in
hastily moved or erected plants. Starting in May 1942, the Stavka reorganized
the whole structure of the VVS. The largest Soviet air formation became the air
army (“vozdushnaia armiia”), with each attached directly to Fronts or held in a
Stavka reserve. The first air army created on May 5 was followed by 16 more,
with those founded in 1943 and 1944 much larger than the original formations.
All were multipurpose, comprised of varying numbers of subunits of fighters,
bombers, night bombers, and ground-attack aircraft. All units were closely tied
to control by Front commanders and carried out tactical missions only. Some air
armies were held in the Stavka reserve, carefully released to create local
superiority over major offensive operations. More rarely, reserve air armies
were assigned a strategic mission. A special 18th Air Army was formed in
December 1944. A huge force culled from the Stavka reserve, it comprised 18
divisions of long-range bombers and 4 more of regular bombers. It carried out
deep strikes into Germany, including bombing Berlin. Otherwise, revived Soviet
air power was used principally in support of ground forces, matching Luftwaffe
concentration on close support in the east. Nor did the VVS dedicate much of
its resources to bombing the Kriegsmarine, which left German ships in the
Baltic intact and active deep into March 1945. VVS aircraft were superior in
quality and vastly greater in numbers to the opposing, ragged formations of the
Luftwaffe by the end of the war. Yet, systemic problems continued: as late as
1944 some 8,600 VVS fighters were lost to ground or air accidents, compared to
just 4,100 lost to enemy ground fire or fighter interception.
Below the level of air armies were air corps (“aviatsionnaia
korpus”). Soviet air corps were usually single purpose and hence formed
exclusively of either bombers or fighters. The Luftwaffe equivalent was a
Fliegerkorps. Soviet air corps were comprised of two or more air divisions, the
basic VVS tactical fighting unit. The Luftwaffe equivalent was a
Fliegerdivision. Over the course of the war Soviet air divisions conformed to
one of five structures and purposes. Prewar and early war formations were known
as “basic air divisions.” There were 37 in all. Of these, 20 were wholly
destroyed while 14 were converted or redistributed to other air units created
in a series of emergency air force reforms carried out in 1941–1942. An air
regiment (“aviatsionnyi polk”) was the core VVS unit below division-level. Each
comprised fighters or bombers, but not usually both. The prewar VVS had eschewed
organization by aircraft function, though some specialization was allowed. The
core of the VVS was a total of 51 “mixed air divisions,” formed before the war
or created during the first year of fighting. By 1942 all 51 were destroyed or
reformed into the new air armies. Seven all-bomber divisions were in place
before June 22, 1941. Another 59 bomber divisions were added from 1942 to 1945.
This expansion reflected a Soviet wartime shift to uniform aircraft-type
formations. Similarly, 98 all-fighter divisions were added by 1945 to the
original 11 prewar fighter divisions, most of which were decimated or destroyed
in the first weeks and months of BARBAROSSA. The VVS quickly discovered an
urgent need for ground-attack aircraft, as its capabilities were increasingly
directed into direct support of Red Army ground forces, a shift matching
Luftwaffe concentration on close support in the east. Starting from no prewar
divisions of assault aircraft, the VVS created 48 ground-attack divisions by
1944.
The VVS—uniquely among wartime air forces—recruited entire
squadrons of women combat pilots and crew, fielding all-women bomber squadrons
as early as mid-1942. As in other air forces, more women flew transport
aircraft and provided a ferry service from the factories to the front. At the
end of the war the VVS deployed 15,500 frontline aircraft and had established
total domination in the air above the Red Army, lasting throughout its advances
into Central Europe and Germany.
#
The Soviet military had three air arms, the Red Army Air
Force, Long-Range Bomber Aviation, and the Naval Air Forces. The first two were
administered by directorates of the People’s Commissariat for Defense, and the
last by the People’s Commissariat of the Navy. In terms of operations, the
land-based air forces were under the command of the relevant armies or fronts
(army groups), and the naval air forces were subordinated to the relevant
fleets.
The Red Army assigned air armies to Front-commands, enabling
ground forces to take full advantage of the air support. Usually one Front had
one air army assigned. The following air armies were for example in the area
around Kursk summer 1943: 1st Air Army (West Front), 2nd Air Army (Voronezh
Front), 5th Air Army (Steppe Front), 15th Air Army (Bryansk Front), 16th Air
Army (Central Front) and 17th Air Army (South-Western Front).
An air army had as basic unit the air division which
normally controlled three air regiments (resulting in 124 aircraft, unless it
was a bomber division, in which case it had 98 aircraft). Thus an air regiment
usually had 40 aircrafts (except bomber regiments, which had 32 aircraft). When
the war started there existed air divisions that were mixed but later this was
not very common. The division had one category of regiments, fighter, bomber or
attack. Instead the types could be mixed at the air corps level. One air corps
controlled two or three divisions.
Furthermore there existed air-units belonging Long-Range
Aviation (a.k.a Soviet Bomber Command) and PVO (Soviet Air Defense). The former
were assigned to support different sectors during the war while the later
defended the rear. For example on 22 June 1941 the PVO had ca 1500 fighters
aircraft in 40 Fighter regiments. The largest unit was 6th PVO Fighter Corps in
Moscow-area with eleven PVO Fighter Regiment.
At the time of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, in
June 1941, the Soviets had 8,105 combat aircraft, most of them obsolescent and
outclassed by German planes, so that by the end of the year, their numbers had
been decimated to 2,495. Production quickly made up these losses, however, and
by January 1945, the Soviets had some 14,500 operational aircraft. Early
catastrophic losses were due not only to poor equipment, but also to poor
leadership and organization. In 1942, the Soviets introduced the “air army”
system, which greatly streamlined command in the air force, so that one of 13
air armies had responsibility for supporting a particular front. Each air army
typically consisted of a command staff, two or three fighter divisions, a
“Shturmovik” (ground-attack) division, one or two night-bomber divisions, and
reconnaissance and liaison units. The typical air army had 400 to 500 aircraft.
Flexibility was built into the organization of the formation, which could, when
necessary, draw on the Air Reserve for additional aircraft and pilots. By the
end of the war, about 43 percent of all aircraft deployed by the Soviets
belonged to the Air Reserve pool.
By the middle of the war, the Soviets were producing
excellent fighters and well-trained pilots. Far less effective was Long-Range
Bomber Aviation, which suffered catastrophic losses early in the war and never
recovered as fully as the fighter and Shturmovik units did. In contrast to the
American and British air arms, Soviet Long-Range Bomber Aviation did not engage
in strategic bombing. Its missions were exclusively tactical, directed against
Axis concentrations, railheads, depots, and the like.
It is not widely known in the West but the Russians have
always boasted the second or third largest naval air force in the world.
During WWII, the naval air force numbered several thousands
of aircraft including all standard Soviet aircraft and several lend lease types
including B-25s and A-20Gs used in the Mine-Torpedo Air Regiments and the P-39,
P-40 and Hurricane which were used in fighter units. The Soviets received a
couple of hundred P-47Ds, though they saw little use, the Russians actually
preferring the P-39 to the “jug”. However one of the few units to
receive examples of the P-47 was the 255 Fighter Regiment, assigned to the
Northern Fleet during the late stages of the war. Possibly the most unexpected
fighter was the FW-l90D sufficient of which were captured in 1945 to be issued
to a unit of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. More traditionally naval types used a
variety of obscure Russian float planes and flying boats, and several varieties
of the Catalina, both the tall tail PBN received under lend-lease and an early
PBY equivalent manufactured under a 1930s license. They also received 2 OS2U
Kingfishers at the end of the war.
Soviet naval air units were mainly equipped with
conventional land-based aircraft and, although flown by naval officers, were
used principally in support of land operations, typically guarding the flanks
of large ground units. Nearly one-third of naval air sorties were flown on air
defense missions. About a quarter of naval air missions were close ground
support, and 14 percent of sorties were reconnaissance patrols. No more than 10
percent of naval air missions attacked Axis ships or naval bases.
The Russian/Soviet Navy is divided into 4 independent
fleets-the Northern fleet, based at Murmansk; the Red Banner Baltic Fleet,
based at Leningrad; the Black Sea Fleet, and the Pacific Ocean Fleet, each with
its own air unit. There are also independent flotillas for the Caspian Sea,
Amur River and the Polar regions, though I have little indication that they had
any serious air units. During the war each fleet had a Mine-Torpedo Air
Division, primarily equipped with the DB-3/Il-4, a division of fighters, a
division of bomber/dive bombers with the SB-2 or PE-2, one or more recon
regiments and possibly some independent air regiments and air escadrilles. Each
division consisted of three regiments. At the start of the war a Regiment might
range from 40-64 aircraft depending on type in 4 squadrons. By 1942 the
established regiment size had been reduced to 21 aircraft in 2 squadrons. By
the end of the war regimental size was back to 3 squadrons and 30-40 aircraft.
Some anti-shipping strikes were flown against German and
Romanian vessels in the Black and Baltic seas, and of course there was a lot of
ASW activity, particularly by the Northern Fleet. But most Naval air activity
was in defense of bases, support of ground forces in the coastal regions, and
support of a number of tactical amphibious landings. Naval Fighter pilots were
some of the Soviet’s best, and Boris Safonov of the Northern Fleet was the
first Soviet Ace to win the Hero of the Soviet Union twice. Safonov, currently
one of Russia’s more popular air heroes, was also the first Russian pilot to
fly the Hurricane. He commanded the regiment which hosted two RAF squadrons
that were sent to Murmansk in December 1941. This exploration of Soviet Naval
air will continue in future columns.
Further reading:
Green, William, and Gordon Swanborough. Soviet Air Force Fighters. New York:
Arco, 1978; Polak, Tomas, and Christopher Shores. Stalin’s Falcons: The Aces of
the Red Star: A Tribute to the Notable Fighter Pilots of the Soviet Air Forces
1918–1953. London: Grub Street, 1999; Hardesty, Von. Red Phoenix: The Rise of
Soviet Air Power, 1941–1945. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 1991.
