Routes of the Three Manned Torpedoes (Petroliera is the tanker Sagona.)
From de Risio, I Mezzi d’Assalto, 123
Critique
Were the objectives worth the risks? The Italian navy,
although beaten badly in the months prior to the attack on Alexandria, was in
the process of commissioning three new battleships, Doria, Vittorio Veneto, and
Littorio. The British had also suffered several naval defeats with the loss of
the aircraft carrier Ark Royal and the battleship Barham in November 1941. If
the Italians could destroy the remaining two battleships, Queen Elizabeth and
Valiant, they, along with the Germans, could dominate the Mediterranean. As it
stood, however, even with its numerical superiority, the Italian fleet was
insufficient to challenge the British in the eastern Mediterranean. With the
British still controlling the vital sea-lanes, the Italians had to struggle to
resupply Rommel’s forces in North Africa. By using the manned torpedoes to
conduct underwater guerrilla warfare, the Italians were able to make maximum
use of their maritime resources. With the destruction of two battleships and a
destroyer, the Italians had an opportunity to control the maritime playing
field and propagandize about the “weakness” of the British. Unfortunately, they
did neither. Nevertheless, when one considers that only six men and three
manned torpedoes were used to destroy the targets, the objectives were undeniably
worth the risk.
Was the plan developed to maximize superiority over the
enemy and minimize the risk to the assault force? The development of the manned
torpedoes was a technological revolution in underwater warfare. It allowed the
Italians to circumvent the conventional submarine marine defenses protecting
the capital ships and to bypass the picketboats that were specifically designed
to stop frogmen and divers. Superb operational intelligence allowed the
planners to tailor the rehearsals to the mission and thereby ensured that the
manned torpedo crews were properly prepared to overcome most obstacles.
Although the plan maximized the possibility that the battleships would be
destroyed, it did not minimize the risk to the divers. Unlike the attacks on
Gibraltar, in which the divers could hit the target and swim to neutral Spain,
there was little chance the Alexandria divers would return from a trip deep in
enemy territory. The Scire, which would have provided the best extraction
platform, departed immediately after launching the torpedoes. This reduced the
submarine’s vulnerability, but certainly did not help the manned torpedo crews.
There was an escape and evasion plan, but it was not well thought out and the
divers did not truly expect to return.* Although this one-way trip may seem
unacceptable by today’s standards, the Italians were able to maximize their
combat effectiveness by eliminating the extraction phase. The torpedo’s battery
power, the air in their Belloni rigs, and their physical endurance were all
dedicated to mission accomplishment and not saved for escape.
Was the mission executed according to the plan, and if not,
what unforeseen circumstances dictated the outcome? With some minor exceptions,
the plan was executed exactly as rehearsed. Schergat said later, “From my point
of view, the mission looked just like further training.” However, several
problems arose that typify the frictions of war. Durand de la Penne lost his
second diver, Bianchi, when the petty officer fainted and floated to the
surface. One of the three manned torpedoes took on too much ballast and sank to
the bottom of the harbor. One of the officers, Martellotta, got violently ill
and had to direct the actions of his torpedo from the surface. All of these
incidents were happenstance, but that is the nature of war. Regardless of how
well the planning and preparation phases go, the environment of war is
different from the environment of preparing for war. But, by being specially
trained, equipped, and supported for a specific mission, special forces
personnel can reduce those frictions to the bare minimum and then overcome them
with courage, boldness, perseverance, and intellect—the moral factors.
What modifications could have improved the outcome of the
mission? The success of the mission speaks for itself. However, it is
conceivable that had a more thorough escape and evasion plan been arranged, two
of the crews might have escaped. By prepositioning an agent and a small boat
outside the harbor, the evading crews could have quickly linked up and sailed
away from the scene before the demolitions exploded. Apparently, this was never
addressed. The Italians did have an agent in Cairo who was supposed to assist
the divers in their escape, but the Italians, being unfamiliar with the city
and unable to speak the language, had little chance of reaching this
individual. This part of the plan notwithstanding, the operation was extremely
well planned and coordinated, and there are very few modifications that could
have improved the outcome.
Relative Superiority
Operations that rely entirely on stealth for the successful
accomplishment of their mission have inherent weaknesses; however, they have
one overwhelming advantage. As long as the attacking force remains concealed,
they are not subject to the will of the enemy. Therefore their chances of
success are immediately better than 50 percent because the inherent superiority
of the defense is lost. The attacking force has the initiative, choosing when
and where it wants to attack, and if the mission is planned correctly, the
force will attack at the weakest point in the defense. Consequently, if the
will of the enemy is not a factor, only the frictions of war (i.e., chance and
uncertainty) will affect the outcome of the mission. Clearly the frictions of
war can be detrimental to success, but through good preparation and strong
moral factors, the frictions can be managed. The inherent problem with special
operations that rely entirely on stealth is obvious. If that concealment is
compromised, the mission has little or no chance of success.
Although there were some differences in the individual
profiles, basically all three torpedoes reached the critical points at
approximately the same time. At midnight on 19 December 1941, all three
torpedoes entered the harbor and passed by the antisubmarine net. This was the
point of vulnerability, but because the British did not know the torpedoes were
in the harbor, the Italians began with relative superiority, albeit not very
decisively. As the manned torpedoes continued into the harbor, circumventing the
picketboats and pier security, their probability of mission completion improved
marginally. Their decisive advantage came when they penetrated the antitorpedo
nets. After this point, there were no other defenses that could prevent them
from successfully fulfilling their mission. However, as the graph depicts,
there was still an area of vulnerability even after overcoming the antitorpedo
net. Had the Italians been detected (for instance, when Bianchi floated to the
surface), the British crews could have dropped concussion grenades and possibly
stopped the attack. Fortunately for the Italians, they were able to set their
charges before the British detected them. Three hours later the charges
exploded, and the mission was complete.
The Principles of
Special Operations
Simplicity. This mission had several advantages not normally
associated with a special operation. Although the target was clearly strategic,
with the balance of the naval forces in the Mediterranean hinging on the
mission success, the execution was almost an extension of routine training and
wartime operations. Under Borghese’s command the Scire had previously conducted
three missions that paralleled the attack on Alexandria. Durand de la Penne and
Bianchi were also veterans of a previous attempt to attack the British. This
experience helped mold the approach the Italians took in planning and preparing
for Alexandria.
The lessons of the disaster at Malta convinced Borghese, who
was the overall mission commander, not to create a complex plan of operation.
Borghese limited the objectives by reducing the forces assigned to attack
Alexandria. He could just as easily have incorporated another three manned
torpedoes and several E-boats to overload British defenses and ensure the
Italians of some success. Additionally, although each manned torpedo had only
one warhead, it was possible, and often rehearsed, for each crew to hit
multiple targets by placing the smaller limpet mines on as many ships as
feasible. Borghese chose to avoid both these pitfalls and limit each manned
torpedo to only one target with “all other targets consisting of active war
units to be ignored.” Although not involved in the planning, Bianchi recognized
the need to limit the number of targets. He said later, “In limiting the attack
to one objective [per crew] the commander considered having the offensive power
increased.” Even attacking one target became difficult. In each of the three
cases the frogmen were able to execute their assigned tasks, but only after
overcoming significant physical problems (vomiting, unconsciousness, headaches)
and equipment failures (dry suit leaks, flooded torpedoes). Had the mission
called for more than one target per dive pair, it is unlikely the divers would
have had the physical or technical resources to complete it. Also, with
multiple targets, the fuses on the charges would have to have been set for more
time to allow the divers time to attack their other targets and escape.
Arguably this might have allowed the British to find the charges or move the
vessels from their anchorage (in Durand de la Penne’s case, moving the vessel
would have prevented any damage to the Valiant). In either case, limiting the
objectives clearly simplified the plan and allowed maximum effort to be applied
against the primary targets.
Borghese knew the value of accurate intelligence, and he
consistently used it throughout the operation to reduce the unknown variables
and improve the divers’ chances of success. Knowing the physical limitations of
divers exposed to cold water, Borghese insisted on getting his submarine as
close to the harbor entrance as possible. Italian agents in Alexandria provided
the 10th Light Flotilla with a clear picture of the British defenses and in
particular the minefields off the coast. Borghese wrote later, “I had therefore
decided that as soon as we reached a depth of 400 meters [which was probably
where the minefield started], we would proceed at a depth of not less than 60
meters, since I assumed that the mines, even if they were anti-submarine, would
be located at a higher level.”
This information eventually allowed the Scire to maneuver to
a point only 1.3 miles from the entrance of the harbor. So close, in fact, that
after launching the torpedoes, Durand de la Penne stopped his assault crews for
a sip of cognac and a tin of food.
The torpedo crews were also provided the latest human
intelligence and aerial reconnaissance photos to allow them to plot courses and
find the simplest approach to the target. Borghese noted during the preparation
phase that the divers’ desks “were covered with aerial photographs and
maps … daily examined under a magnifying glass and annotated from the
latest intelligence and air reconnaissance reports; those harbours, with their
moles, obstacles, wharfs, docks, mooring places and defences, were no mysteries
to the pilots, who perfectly knew their configuration, orientation and depths,
so that they, astride the ‘pig’, could make their way about them at night just
as easily as a man in his own room.”
The accurate intelligence had simplified the problem of
negotiating minefields and navigating in an enemy harbor. Alexandria Harbor was
thirty-five hundred miles from Italy. It was ringed with antiaircraft guns and
supported by Spitfires from the Royal Air Force. It seemed impenetrable from
the air. On the other hand, the Italian navy, which had almost no presence in
the eastern Mediterranean, posed no significant threat to the more than two
hundred vessels (merchant and warships) tied up in Alexandria. The only major
fears the British had were from submarines and saboteurs, and extensive
precautions had been taken to overcome both these possibilities. Until the
establishment of the 10th Light Flotilla and the innovations that followed
(i.e., the manned torpedoes, diving rigs, limpet mines, Belloni dry suits, and
submarine transport chambers), the difficulty of penetrating the static
defenses of Alexandria was not worth the risk in human lives or equipment.*
These innovations allowed the Italians to reconsider the possibility of a
direct assault.
The most significant tactical innovation was the use of
disposable torpedoes. Having to plan for only a one-way trip meant enhanced
time on target for the divers and reduced the threat envelope for the submarine
Scire. Obviously one-way trips have their drawbacks for the individual
operators, but from a mission accomplishment standpoint they improve the
possibility of success by reducing the extraction variables. The technological
innovations allowed the divers to completely bypass the British defenses. The
small visual signature of the manned torpedo provided the Italians a host of
tactical advantages. It allowed them to surface unobserved and ride out the
depth charges. They were able to navigate around the harbor undetected by ballasting
the submersible just under the surface. These actions would not have been
possible with either a midget submarine or a conventional submarine. The ease
of handling the torpedo also allowed the crews to climb over antitorpedo nets
and allowed Durand de la Penne to physically move his flooded machine to a
position under the Valiant’s keel. Innovation simplified the assault plan by
eliminating the defensive threats posed by the nets and depth charges, and it
was without question the dominant factor in the success of the mission.
Security. The raid on Alexandria again demonstrates how the
importance of security was not a function of hiding the intent of the mission
but of the timing and the insertion means. By December 1941 British
intelligence was fully aware that the Italians had manned submersibles capable
of penetrating their harbors. The second Italian attack on Gibraltar had
provided the British with one torpedo and its crew. The attack on Malta had
also resulted in the capture of Italian frogmen. And the sinking of the Gondar
resulted in the capture of Elios Toschi, the designer of the original manned
torpedo. With all this information, the British unquestionably knew the kind of
operations they could expect from the 10th Light Flotilla. As Winston Churchill
later said in his speech to the House of Commons, “Extreme precautions had been
taken for some time past against the varieties of human torpedo or one-man
submarines entering our harbours.” Even with all these precautions, however,
the Italians still managed to sneak in and destroy the fleet.
The security employed by the Italians was tight but not
overbearing. It did not prevent Borghese from asking for volunteers from among
all the members of the 10th Light Flotilla, nor did it prevent the crews from
conducting several full-mission profiles in and around La Spezia Harbor,
although in both cases it is believed that the actual target was not made known
to the general participants.
Borghese was, however, cognizant of the need to conceal the
timing of the operation. Upon departing La Spezia for the final voyage, he
ensured that the Scire’s transport chambers were visibly empty, and he did not
load the manned torpedoes until he was out of sight of the harbor. He took
these actions to convince possible onlookers that the Scire was out for just
another routine operation. Borghese kept up pretenses when he arrived in Leros.
While in port he had the transport chambers covered to reduce speculation about
the submarine’s mission, and he refused an admiral’s order to conduct another
exercise for fear of compromising the impending mission.
Borghese also understood that all things being equal,
operational needs were more important than security. Throughout the mission he
maintained radio contact with Athens and Rome. Although interception of the
message traffic could have compromised the mission, Borghese obviously felt the
need for updated intelligence outweighed that concern. In the end, Italian
security was instrumental in preventing the enemy from gaining an advantage by
knowing the timing of the mission. A good special operation will succeed in
spite of the enemy’s attempt to fortify his position, provided security
prevents the enemy from knowing when and how the attack is coming. In the case
of the Italians’ attack on Alexandria, security achieved its aims.
Repetition. The principle of repetition as it applies to the
attack on Alexandria can be viewed in both the macro and the micro senses of
the word. The manned torpedoes of the 10th Light Flotilla had a very limited
role: to conduct attacks on ships in port. Every mission profile was similar:
launch from the submarine, transit to the objective, cut through the nets,
place the charge, and withdraw. Because of this narrowly defined role every
training exercise added to the base of knowledge of the operator regardless of
what specific mission he would eventually undertake. If one considers that each
of the six divers had been on board the 10th Light Flotilla an average of
eighteen months (Durand de la Penne and Bianchi almost two years), during which
time they had dived at least two times a week, then each man had over 150
dives. In addition, three of the divers (Durand de la Penne, Bianchi, and
Marceglia) had previously conducted wartime missions, and all of the divers had
at one time or another been designated as reserve crewmembers and undergone a
complete mission workup. So, in the macro sense, the only aspect of the
Alexandria mission that had not been rehearsed well over one hundred times was
the exact course the divers would take.
The operational and reserve crews for the Alexandria mission
were assembled in September 1941 to begin mission-specific training. It was
during this preparation that the crews conducted exact profiles of the
Alexandria mission. Borghese reported that this training “became highly
intensified, this being the key to secure the greatest possible efficiency in
the men and materials composing the unit. The pilots of the human
torpedoes … travelled to La Spezia twice a week and were there dropped
off from a boat or, in all-around tests, from one of the transport submarines,
and then performed a complete assault exercise, naturally at night; this
consisted of getting near the harbour, negotiating the net-defences, advancing
stealthily within the harbour, approaching the target, attacking the hull,
applying the warhead and, finally, withdrawing.”
Although exact numbers are not available, Spartaco Schergat
indicates that a total of ten full-mission profiles were conducted by all three
crews and the reserves. Other limited dives concentrated on specific aspects of
the mission, such as net cutting or charge emplacement. In the end, however, it
was repetition that provided the divers familiarity with their machines and
their environment. The training became so routine that Schergat later remarked,
“Being in Alexandria or La Spezia was the same. For me it didn’t make any
difference.”
The raid on Alexandria presents a broader view of the
principle of repetition. It shows that repetition must be measured in terms of
both experience and mission-specific training. Special operations forces that
are multidimensional will require more rehearsals and more time during the
preparation phase than a unit whose sole mission encompasses this training on a
daily basis.* However, no amount of experience can obviate the need to conduct
a minimum of two full-dress rehearsals prior to the mission.
Surprise. In an underwater attack, unlike other special
operations, surprise is not only necessary, it is essential. As illustrated in
the relative superiority graph, special operations forces that attack
underwater have the advantage of being relatively superior to the enemy
throughout the engagement as long as they remain concealed. Owing to their
inherent lack of speed and firepower, however, once surprise is compromised,
underwater attackers have little opportunity to escape. Although many
commanders may find this risk unacceptable, experience shows that this type of
operation is mostly successful. During World War II the Italians sank over
260,000 tons of shipping and lost only a dozen men, while the British had
similar successes in both the European and the Japanese theaters. The reason
for this paradox is that it is relatively easy for divers or submersibles to
remain concealed, up to a certain point. Alexandria was a huge harbor with
approximately two hundred vessels anchored out, and wartime conditions called
for all vessels to be at darken ship. Consequently, a small black submersible,
even on the surface of the water, would have been detected only by chance.
However, once the manned torpedoes got within close proximity of the target,
the chance of detection was greatly increased. This is true of all underwater
attacks. The fatigue of the divers, the vigilance of the crew, and the
uncertainty of the situation combine to make the actions at the objective
exceedingly difficult. This is why relative superiority remained only marginal
in this operation until the Italians actually overcame the final obstacle, the
antitorpedo net. Beyond the antitorpedo net the British were least prepared to
defend themselves, and now the Italians had all the advantages.
The antisubmarine and antitorpedo defenses at Alexandria
also show that, contrary to the accepted definition of surprise, the enemy is
usually prepared for an attack. To be effective, special operations forces must
either attack the enemy when he is off guard or, as in the Italians’ case,
elude the enemy entirely. But to assume that the enemy is unprepared to
counterattack is foolhardy and might lead to overconfidence on the part of the
attacker. It is the nature of defensive warfare to be prepared for an attack.
Consequently, if the attacker is compromised, the enemy will be able to react
rapidly and the attacker’s only hope for success lies in quickly achieving his
objective.
Speed. Underwater attacks are rarely characterized by speed.
A quick review of the relative superiority graph shows that it took the manned
torpedoes over two hours from the point of vulnerability until they reached the
antitorpedo net. Throughout this time they were subject to the frictions of
war, and by moving slowly and methodically they only increased their area of
vulnerability. However, as long as the will of the enemy is not infringing on
the relative superiority of the attacker, speed is not essential, although it
is still desirable. Speed becomes essential when the attacker begins to lose
relative superiority. Two of the torpedo crews reached their objectives and
calmly proceeded to attach the explosives and depart. Durand de la Penne,
however, reached his target and immediately began to have difficulties: his
torpedo sank to the bottom, he lost his second diver, his dry suit filled with
cold water, and he was fatigued to the point of exhaustion. As he said in his
after-action report, at that point speed was essential. Durand de la Penne was
rapidly losing his advantage and knew that if he didn’t act quickly “the
operation … would be doomed to failure.”50 The closer an attacker
gets to the objective, the greater the risk. Consequently, speed is still
important to minimize the attacker’s vulnerability and improve the probability
of mission completion.
Purpose. Commander Borghese, who was in overall charge of
the attack on Alexandria, ensured that the purpose of the mission was well
defined and that the divers were personally committed to achieving their
objectives. This was a straightforward mission without any complicated command
and control issues; therefore, defining the goals and objectives—the purpose—was
relatively easy. Each manned torpedo had only one warhead and one target.
Therefore it was essential not to waste the warhead and the effort on an
undesirable objective. Borghese ordered Martellotta and Marino to attack the
aircraft carrier Eagle if she were in port, and if not, the tanker Sagona. Once
inside the harbor, however, the pair accidently attacked a cruiser.
Fortunately, before they could detach the warhead, they realized it was not
their target, and as Borghese notes, “with great reluctance, in obedience to
orders received, abandoned the attack.” Their orders were clear; they
understood the purpose of the mission. They were not to waste their effort on a
small cruiser, but instead were to seek out a larger target, which they
eventually found and destroyed.
Men who volunteered for the 10th Light Flotilla were typical
of special forces personnel everywhere. Each was a combination of adventurer
and patriot. They understood the risks involved in penetrating the enemy’s
harbor and fully accepted the consequences. They did so out of a love for
excitement and the understanding that their missions were important to the
country. Teseo Tesei, who, at Malta, detonated his torpedo underneath himself
in order to achieve his objective, said, “Whether we sink any ships or not
doesn’t matter much; what does matter is that we should be able to blow up with
our craft under the very noses of the enemy: we should thus have shown our sons
and Italy’s future generations at the price of what sacrifice we live up to our
ideals and how success is to be achieved.”
Although Tesei, who had died three months earlier, did not
participate in the Alexandria attack, his inspiration was apparent in the
attitudes of the Alexandria crews. All six divers knew they would be either
captured or killed, and yet Borghese says the difficulties and dangers merely
“increased their determination.” This personal commitment to see the mission
completed at any cost is, as Tesei said, how success is achieved.
