The use of the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s tank forces during the
March 1945 battles is of interest. It had been planned beforehand to use the
tanks and self-propelled guns in order to strengthen the defense on prepared
lines, and with the start of the German offensive, the tank formations were
moved up to these lines.
The tactics of strict defense were adopted by the tank and
self-propelled guns – the armored vehicles were dug into the ground among the
infantry’s combat positions, or else kept concealed in ambush. In order to
facilitate a more responsive command arrangement over the tank formations, they
transferred from subordination to the Front to the control of the army
commanders.
The tank’s combat formations on the defensive depended on
the situation and the assignment. For example, the 18th Tank Corps, having
taken position among the combat positions of the infantry south of Seregélyes,
assigned each tank brigade its own sector of defense, while the motorized rifle
brigade was distributed by battalion among the tank brigades. The defense was
organized around individual strongpoints, each of which had 2-5 tanks, a
platoon of motorized infantry, and 2-3 guns.
The 18th Tank Corps was reinforced with the 207th
Self-propelled Artillery Brigade of SU-100 tank destroyers, which took up
positions by battery in the second echelon of defense. At the same time, the
tank destroyers had prepared firing positions in the first echelon, to which
they moved up during enemy tank attacks. All of this allowed the creation of a
dense wall of anti-tank and antipersonnel fire in front of the 18th Tank Corps’
positions, and in the course of 10 days of savage fighting, the enemy was in
fact unable to break through the defense in this sector.
Thus, on 7 and 8 March alone, units of the 18th Tank Corps
knocked out or destroyed 33 German tanks and self-propelled guns. In return,
their own losses amounted to a total of 16 tanks or assault guns, including 2
T-34, 2 ISU-122 and 3 SU-76 knocked out, and 6 T-34 and 3 ISU-122 burned out.
Part of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps occupied positions
in the Heinrich Estate, Sárkeresztúr, Cece, Sárbogárd area. Here the defense
was organized around company-sized strongpoints, each of which contained 5 to 8
tanks or self-propelled guns. The strongpoints had standard trenches,
machine-gun nests, dug-in combat vehicles, and anti-tank gun positions. The
anti-tank guns moved up into their positions only in order to conduct fire, but
spent the rest of their time in shelters. The SU-100 tank destroyer batteries
were positioned in the second echelon, and with sudden counterattacks they
would destroy the enemy’s tanks and halftracks.
Tank ambushes were widely and successfully employed. For
these, groups of tanks and selfpropelled guns would take concealment on the
flanks of the anticipated axis of advance of enemy tanks, calculating to take
shots at their side or rear facing. Artillery guns were usually positioned in
order to protect the tanks that were waiting in ambush. Combat experience
demonstrated that when organizing tank ambushes, it was useful to use decoy
tanks, which by their actions were supposed to lure the enemy armor into the
flanking fire of the tanks concealed in ambush.
The 18th Tank Regiment of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps,
which was defending in the Sárkeresztúr area, adopted a rather curious tactic.
When the regiment’s positions were attacked by up to a battalion of infantry,
in order not to reveal the locations of the tank ambushes, the regiment
commander Lieutenant Colonel Lysenko decided to counterattack the enemy with
T-34 recovery tanks and armored halftracks. In this fashion, the tankers
repelled two attacks by German infantry and took 35 Germans prisoner.
The SU-100 self-propelled artillery guns showed themselves
to be quite effective in the March battles. In addition to the SU-100s of the
208th Self-propelled Artillery Brigade and of the two regiments in the 1st
Guards Mechanized Corps, with which the 3rd Ukrainian Front started the battle,
on 9 March the 207th (62 SU-100, 2 T-34, 3 SU-57) and 209th (56 SU-100, 2 T-34,
3 SU-57) Self-propelled Artillery Brigades arrived to join the Front. Upon
their arrival, the 207th Brigade was sent to the 27th Army, and the 209th
Brigade went to the 26th Army. Thus, by 10 March 1945, the total number of
SU-100 tank destroyers in the area of Lake Balaton (after deducting the combat
losses) amounted to 188.
These self-propelled guns were actively used on the defense
in cooperation with the infantry in order to repel enemy tank attacks, as well
as to cover the bridges across the Sárviz and Sió Canals. They proved quite
effective in these tasks. For example, the 208th Self-propelled Artillery
Brigade over the course of 8 March and 9 March knocked out 14 German tanks and
self-propelled guns, as well as 33 enemy halftracks, while losing 8 SU-100
destroyed and 4 disabled.
In order to combat enemy tanks, the SU-100s primarily
operated out of ambush positions. SU-100 batteries were deployed in covered
positions, camouflaged in woods, or on the reverse slopes of hills and ridges.
In front of them, at a distance of 100-200 meters, firing positions with good
visibility and good fields of fire were prepared, and as a rule, they offered
360° of fire. In the positions or next to them, observation posts were set up, in
which there would be an officer who had a communications link with the battery.
Whenever German tanks appeared at a distance of 1,000 to 1,500 meters, the tank
destroyers would move up into their firing positions, fire several rounds, and
then use reverse drive to pull back into cover. Such a tactic justified itself
when repelling enemy attacks in the areas of Sáregres and Simontornya. For
example, on 11 March, a battery of the 209th Self-propelled Artillery Brigade’s
1953rd Self-propelled Artillery Regiment, having taken up an ambush position in
a dense patch of woods west of Simontornya’s train station, repelled an attack
of 14 German tanks, three of which were set on fire at a range of 1,500 meters.
The normal range for firing from the SU-100 at heavy German
tanks was 1,000 to 1,300 meters, but out to 1,500 meters, and sometimes even
longer, when firing at medium tanks and self-propelled guns. The SU-100s as a
rule fired from fixed positions, but sometimes from short halts. From the
indicated ranges, the SU-100 could inflict damage to all types of German armor,
and as a rule, with the very first on-target shell.
Cooperation between the self-propelled guns and other units
was implemented in the following fashion. The commander of the self-propelled
regiment and the rifle regiment commander as a rule were located in the same
observation post or had telephone contact with each other. The commanders of
the rifle battalion and of a self-propelled gun battery would personally work
out all questions of cooperation on the spot, and in case of need, also had
telephone communications. The commander of the SU-100 brigade maintained
constant radio contact with the commander of the rifle division to which his
brigade was attached. This allowed the transmission of information regularly in
the course of fighting and the reaching of necessary decisions.
Nevertheless, during the battle, a number of genuine
miscalculations in the organization of cooperation with the SU-100s were
revealed. For example, fire cover provided by the field artillery for the
self-propelled guns was poorly organized, the infantry didn’t render assistance
to the crews when attempting to pass through swampy areas of terrain, and
several of the all-arms commanders tried to use the SU-100 in the role of infantry
support tanks. For example, the commander of the 36th Guards Rifle Division
ordered a battery of tank destroyers to lead an infantry attack. Because of the
absence of infantry and artillery cover, the SU-100s came under the fire of
German antitank guns, as a result of which three of the tank destroyers were
left burning.
A substantial shortcoming of the SU-100, which was revealed
in the course of fighting, was its absence of a machine gun. Because of this,
the vehicle had no close range defense against infantry and proved defenseless
against assaulting German infantry. As a temporary measure, it was proposed to
give each crew a light machine gun, and to give 8-10 light machine guns to the
company of submachine gunners in the SU-100 self-propelled artillery regiments.
