The Gang of Four at their trial in 1981
The collapse of the Guomindang regime and Jiang’s flight to
Taiwan did not end China’s civil war. Mao proclaimed the People’s Republic
(PRC) in Beijing, but Jiang still insisted that his regime was the legitimate
government of the Republic of China (ROC). Both sides refused to view Taiwan as
a separate state. To the PRC, Taiwan is simply a rebellious province, over
which it claims sovereignty. To the ROC, the entire mainland consisted of
rebellious provinces.
American policy might have favoured a partition of China, as
had happened in Germany and Korea. But this was as repellent to Jiang as it was
to Mao. Jiang appears genuinely to have believed that Mao’s regime would prove
too incompetent and brutal to survive long. The chaos of the Great Leap Forward
in 1958 and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 suggest that this view was not entirely
fantasy. But more realistically there was always the hope that the USA might
defeat the PRC and reinstall his regime. To Mao, who was far more of a
nationalist than most Americans realised, the existence of a separate regime in
Taiwan was intolerable. There also was the danger that America would indeed
attack the PRC from Taiwan. He wanted to invade the island and complete the
reunification of China.
The situation was therefore unstable. Other powers were
required to choose which to recognise as the legitimate government. Also, given
the danger of renewed fighting, how deeply committed dare the USSR and USA
become to either side? Britain had always been pragmatic on such questions: the
Communists ruled China and were therefore the government. Britain’s only
interest was Hong Kong, and the PRC found the status quo there useful. Britain
recognised the PRC almost immediately. America could not do this. Americans had
long held unrealistic views on China, and Truman was widely criticised for `losing’
China. Also, at American insistence, China had been awarded a permanent seat on
the UN Security Council. They had no wish to see the PRC inheriting that seat.
They continued to recognise the ROC, but hesitated to enter into security
commitments that might allow Jiang to drag them into a war in China.
US attitudes changed through the Korean War. Still certain
that the Communist world was monolithic; they saw this as part of a global
Soviet strategy. The USA decided that their interests would not allow a
Communist take-over of Taiwan. It might lead to Communist domination of the
western Pacific, and ultimately the entire ocean. Other states, fearing being
drawn into a major war, declined to extend collective security to Taiwan via
SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation). America therefore reached a
bilateral security agreement with Jiang in December 1954.
This was a risky step. Mao had planned to invade Taiwan, but
his resources had been diverted to Korea. With that war over he could return to
Taiwan. The immediate issue was that the Guomindang had clung on to a number of
islands off the mainland. They included the Taschen Islands, Matsu and Quemoy –
the latter being less than three kilometres from the mainland. They had no
military value, but Jiang refused to abandon them. Mao was deeply offended at
the PRC’s exclusion from the Security Council and the Taiwan-USA security
negotiations. He ordered the shelling of Quemoy in March 1954, which suddenly
became a massive barrage in September.
Eisenhower realised these islands were worthless but was in
a quandary. He did not wish to go to war, but the ROC lobby was clamouring for
strong action. Also the loss of these islands would reflect badly on the USA as
Taiwan’s supporter, which might undermine America’s other alliances. It might
suggest that America could not stop the advance of Communism in Asia.
Eisenhower’s European allies, however, had no intention of fighting a war over
such a trivial issue. He still hurriedly concluded the security agreement with Taiwan
and hinted that America was prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons to defend
the islands. The PRC scoffed at these steps, but along with Soviet pressure to
avoid escalating tensions they had their effect. The shelling died down. But
not before the PRC stormed Yijiangshan Island. This convinced America that the
Taschens were untenable and they forced Jiang to evacuate them.
After this, for America to allow the loss of Matsu and
Quemoy would be too great a humiliation. Also, as Jiang had crammed them with
his best troops, their loss could lead to the loss of Taiwan. When Mao renewed
the shelling in 1958, Eisenhower felt he had no choice but to offer US support.
His renewed talk of tactical nuclear weapons shocked his allies. Again tensions
died down. Jiang was required to make a statement repudiating the use of force
in regaining the mainland. Mao responded by shelling Quemoy only on alternate
days. This gave the crisis a surreal quality, and one difficult to take too
seriously.
As a result of these crises America had made a comprehensive
commitment to Taiwan. America was angered at European hesitancy over Taiwan.
But the PRC was also deeply angered at the timidity of the USSR, who found the
islands a ludicrous issue over which to risk war. This would put far greater
strains on Soviet alliances than on American.
The Cultural
Revolution
In September 1949 Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). He had united China, restored effective central
government and freed it from foreign domination. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
he led was effective and feared, but also generally respected. His personal
stature was massive. He towered over his associates and had a `cult of
personality’, presenting him as a demigod. But he was not necessarily satisfied.
He had not won power for its own sake, but to fundamentally transform China. He
felt he had cause to worry that he was failing in this.
Feeling his regime secure, in 1957 he launched the `hundred
flowers’ movement: promising immunity to those offering constructive criticism
of his state. Instead of the minor complaints he expected, intellectuals
actually questioned the very foundations of Communism. Shocked at the scale of
opposition, Mao concluded his revolution was not secure after all. He lashed out
viciously at the critics. But worse was to follow. With the PRC’s friendship
with the USSR breaking down, Mao decided that China must race towards
socialism, industrialisation and modernisation, lest his revolution fail. In
1958 he launched the `Great Leap Forward’. The idea was instant modernisation
via mass mobilisation. Agricultural collectivisation was completed and peasant
communes ordered to produce vast quantities of steel in homemade furnaces. The
result was catastrophic. Millions died in the resulting famine. The prestige of
the CCP was badly undermined.
Mao could not accept the failure was due to his entire
approach being an unrealistic fantasy. The fault, he concluded, was in the CCP
and its failure to really change China. The CCP must have lost contact with the
proletariat and peasantry. Far too many recruits had been permitted to join the
CCP without repudiating fully their bourgeois attitudes. They had sought the
privileges of rank, become authoritarian and felt themselves superior. In fact,
Mao believed the CCP was in danger of the same failings he perceived in the
Soviet Communist Party. It was ceasing to be revolutionary. His achievements
would be quietly eroded after his death.
The only solution Mao could see was to launch a new
revolution. This revolution would not be led by the Party, but be directed
against the bourgeois elements within it and within the government system.
Feeling that the young were truly revolutionary, he aimed to mobilise them to
this end. The first rallying call to a new revolution came in June 1966, when
posters appeared criticising academics at Beijing University. Students, and
soon schoolchildren, were urged to defy authority. The Red Guards soon emerged
to be the vanguard of Mao’s new revolution. They were urged to denounce
academics, writers, indeed any in the arts, who might be peddling bourgeois
ideas. Denunciation soon turned to punishment. Some of China’s most renowned
figures were humiliated, imprisoned, tortured and even murdered. When
authorities attempted to restore discipline, they were themselves denounced as
counterrevolutionary.
The CCP attempted to defend itself by taking control of the
movement. The Red Guards soon became split into hostile factions:
`conservatives’, often children of Party members and those with a stake in the
existing order, and `radicals’, generally of unprivileged backgrounds. Both
claimed to be pursuing the Cultural Revolution in the name of Mao. An element
of civil war was introduced into the crisis. By August 1967 the factions were
fighting pitched battles in many areas. Mao clearly wanted the radicals to
seize power and put his revolution back on course. But given their youth, they
were hardly suited for such a role. Also the growing chaos was alienating the
Chinese people. There was a danger that the PRC would collapse.
With the Party and the state paralysed, the only institute
able to supply any stability was the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Troops had
to be deployed to protect essential services and industries from destruction.
Mao wanted them to support the radicals. But generally PLA commanders were
hostile to the radicals, often arming and supporting conservatives. Clashes
between the PLA and radical Red Guards spread across China. The violence in
Sichuan was especially severe, but in many places civil strife left hundreds of
thousands dead and injured. Having done so much damage, however, Mao could not
afford to turn the Red Guards loose against the PLA. From September 1967 the
PLA gradually restored a semblance of order in the PRC, for example, disarming
fighting factions in Guangxi and Shanxi. Millions of Red Guards, their
educations curtailed and lacking any skills, were dispatched to the countryside
to be labourers. This did not end the Cultural Revolution. A witch-hunt for
class enemies was launched reminiscent of Stalin’s purges. Though without the
earlier mayhem, it destroyed millions of lives through denunciation, forced
confessions and brutal punishment.
The Cultural Revolution only really ended with the defeat of
the `Gang of Four’ in the power struggle following Mao’s death in 1976. By then
China and the CCP were desperately weary of it. In his efforts to reinvigorate
the revolutionary spirit of China, Mao in fact destroyed what was left of it.
His own image was badly tarnished. The CCP was left divided and weakened and
had lost the respect of the Chinese. Thereafter Communist rule in China was
endured rather than supported
