Further south, Britain’s most important ally was also in
trouble. Since 10 May, French reconnaissance planes had been monitoring the
powerful armoured forces moving through the Luxembourg Ardennes towards the
French defences on the Meuse, and more were moving across southern Belgium
towards Gembloux. Initially, the latter seemed the greater threat; there was no
natural obstacle to aid the defence in the 30-mile gap between the BEF on the
Dyle and the French forces on the Meuse. The well-equipped French 1st Army had
the task of plugging this gap. The 2nd and 3rd Light Armoured divisions pushed
as far east as possible to buy time for the French infantry to dig in.
Before the German forces could even think about breaking
through the ‘Gembloux Gap’, they had to cross the River Mass, which ran through
the Dutch town of Maastricht. Just a couple of miles beyond that, in Belgium,
there was another major obstacle—the Albert Canal. The Maastricht crossing was
not important to Dutch defences, but the local troops did their duty and
destroyed the bridges over the Maas before the Germans could seize them. German
forces had more success just over the frontier, in Belgium. Troops in gliders
landed near the three bridges over the Albert Canal and the fort at Eben-Emael,
which was supposed to cover them. Belgian engineers blew one of the bridges,
but those at Vroenhoven and Veldwezelt were captured intact and Eben-Emael was
quickly neutralised.
With the Maastricht bridges blown, the Belgians had the best
part of a day before any major reinforcements could reach the lightly armed
German airborne troops holding the Albert Canal bridges. The German forces,
however, had the firepower of the Stuka dive-bombers to help them fend of the
Belgian counterattacks. The Belgian troops had no air support or fighter cover;
apart from escorting the odd reconnaissance mission, Belgian fighters stayed on
the ground. The Fairey Fox was as capable of carrying bombs as the Fokker C.V
and C.X, but these and the Belgian Battles did not intervene. The blown bridges
at Maastricht caused a huge bottleneck as German columns waited for the
engineers to construct the pontoons. It was one of those rare occasions where
there was no alternative route. The backed-up columns made an attractive target
for the eleven unemployed Hampden and Whitley squadrons, not to mention the two
Whitley squadrons attempting to hit less vital communication targets further
north.
Sifting through the reports coming from the front, it was
not German bottlenecks the Air Staff was looking for, but rather any evidence
that the Luftwaffe was bombing civilians. The cabinet meetings that day spent
much time discussing whether there was justification for unleashing Bomber
Command on the Ruhr, but they reached no final decision. Apart from Wellington
and Whitley attacks on Waalhaven and communication targets west of the Ruhr, no
other missions were flown on the night of 10–11 May. This is not to say that
the French effort was more intensive—only two of the six night bomber squadrons
flew. Twelve aircraft made some rather ineffectual attacks on German airfields.
Five reconnaissance Blenheims, flying singly and unescorted,
were dispatched during the course of 11 May to find out what was happening in
the Maastricht/Albert Canal region. Three were lost and the two that made it
back were badly damaged. They confirmed the Belgian frontier defences had been
breached and armoured forces were heading for Gembloux. These missions also
confirmed that using unescorted Blenheims for reconnaissance was not an
efficient way of acquiring information; even the Belgians were escorting their
reconnaissance planes. Only the photo-reconnaissance Spitfires could operate
unescorted, but No. 212 Squadron had so few planes that it rarely managed to
fly more than two sorties a day. The most important role of any air force has
always been and probably always will be reconnaissance. A few more
reconnaissance Spitfires would have been a very good investment.
Early on the morning of the 11th, Belgian Air Force Battles
attempted to destroy the two intact bridges over the Albert Canal. The
Gladiator escort was intercepted before it met up with the bombers, and only one
of the eight Battles returned. No bombs had hit the bridges, and the 50-kg
bombs they were carrying would not have made much impression anyway. The
Belgians appealed to their British and French Allies to try.
In fact, Maastricht was the more rewarding target. The
bridges high over the Albert Canal could not be easily replaced, but nor could
they be easily destroyed. The pontoons the Germans had thrown across the Maas
were far more vulnerable and any damage to the town itself would block roads.
No. 2 Group Blenheims attacked the pontoon bridges in Maastricht (eleven
sorties) and enemy columns pushing towards Tongres (twelve sorties). Twelve
French LeO 451s, the first of the new French bombers, also bombed Maastricht.
The French bombers had a close escort of M.S.406 fighters, while the Blenheims
had to rely on Hurricanes operating in the general area, but it would seem the
air defences were not that strong on the 11th. Two Blenheims were lost—one to
fighters and one to flak.
Instead of continuing the attack during the night, Bomber
Command stuck rigidly to its pre-offensive plane to bomb communication targets
west of the Rhine in Germany. Nineteen Hampdens and eighteen Whitleys bombed
Mönchengladbach. It was the first time Bomber Command had attacked a German
city. Four civilians were killed. How the Germans were supposed to distinguish
between this and attacks on German industry east of the Rhine is not clear; nor
would it have been clear to the Germans why Mönchengladbach was chosen as the
crucial tactical target that merited Bomber Command’s only effort that night.
Lines of communication from the city led into southern Holland and to
Maastricht, but it was too far from either front line to be crucial. All the
French could put into the air was five ancient Amiot 143s, but at least they
were in a more relevant area, bombing Maastricht and targets around Aachen.
Fairey Battles: 12 Squadron aircraft going in against the bridges over
the Albert Canal.
The fifty bombing sorties flown in the Maastricht area on
the 11th were dwarfed by the number of bomber and dive-bomber sorties flown by
the Luftwaffe. Nevertheless, they made sufficient impression for German Army
commanders to demand better air cover. In response, on 12 May German fighter
squadrons maintained a permanent watch, operating from airfields just a few
minutes’ flying time from Maastricht. Operating without a close escort was now
going to be very dangerous. To make matters worse, while the Luftwaffe was
stepping up its efforts in the Maastricht area, Air Component Hurricanes had to
divide their resources between Maastricht and the Belgian forces falling back
on Antwerp. The bombers paid the price. Nine AASF Blenheims were intercepted
just after attacking German troop columns and seven were shot down. Five
Battles from No. 12 Squadron attempted to destroy the Vroenhoven and Veldwezelt
bridges. Two squadrons of Blenheims bombing Maastricht from medium altitude
were supposed to distract the defenders, but they arrived too late and the
bridges were not destroyed. Ten of the twenty-four Blenheims were lost to
fighters and flak, and all five Battles were also shot down.
An irate German officer scolded one of the shaken survivors:
You British are mad.
We capture the bridge early Friday morning. You give us all Friday and Saturday
to get our flak guns up in circles all round the bridge, and then on Sunday,
when all is ready, you come along with three aircraft and try and blow the
thing up!
It was a fair point. If they had struck quickly, before the
defences were ready, the chances of surviving were much greater.
Other attacks on troop column heading for Tongres brought
the total number of No. 2 Group sorties to forty-five for the loss of eleven
Blenheims. This was an unsustainable loss rate. Fighter escorts helped the
French medium bombers avoid heavy losses, but no escort could prevent eight of
eighteen hedge-hopping Breguet 693 ground-attack bombers from being shot down
by flak. Like the Battle aircrews, the French were flying their first mission,
and they were equally taken aback by the lethality of the light anti-aircraft
defences. The Breguet 693 was smaller and much faster than the Battle, but the
French aircrews were no more experienced than their RAF counterparts.
Three more RAF Hurricane squadrons flew to France on the
evening of the 10th, and the promised tenth squadron arrived on the 12th. Even
so, the number of RAF fighters available was still inadequate for all the tasks
they were required to carry out. RAF fighters were not being used as bomber
interceptors deep in the rear, as Slessor and Dowding had anticipated; they
were inevitably drawn to where the fighting on the ground was taking place, and
the further east they went, the more frequent were encounters with Bf 109Es.
Galland describes how he almost felt sorry for what he thought was a formation
of Belgian Hurricanes he came across; it was actually an RAF squadron, probably
No. 87. The German ace shot down two with an ease that he found embarrassing.
The Battle and Blenheim raid on the Albert Canal/Maastricht bridges was
supposed to be covered by three fighter squadrons, but they were committed
piecemeal and engaged by German fighters over a wide area. Only the eight
Hurricanes of No. 1 Squadron were in the Maastricht area, and only three of
them returned intact, although all the pilots eventually made it back. Thirteen
French-based Hurricanes were lost on the 12th, marking the first serious pilot
losses—four killed and two wounded.
The 100-odd bomber sorties flown by the Allied air forces on
11 and 12 May in the Maastricht region caused delays, especially to the 4th
Panzer. This could only help the French racing to meet them, but it was only
partial compensation for the far more powerful blows that were delaying the
French. These were spearheaded by the 300 Stuka dive-bombers of Fliegerkorps
VIII. This mobile close-support unit had helped smash a way through the Dutch
Peel Marshes defences, had beaten off the Belgian counterattacks around
Eben-Emael, had forced the French tanks advancing on Breda to retreat, and was
now supporting the drive on Gembloux. The idea that German Army commanders
could radio for help whenever they needed it was perhaps an exaggeration, but
the Germans were very good at concentrating their air resources where they were
needed.
The French 2nd and 3rd Light Armoured divisions first
clashed with the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions on 12 May. From the 13th to the
15th, a fierce tank battle raged east of Gembloux. The French suffered heavily
at the hands of their more experienced opponents, but the German Panzers failed
to break through. In a hard-fought and close battle, by imposing some delays,
the Allied day bombers could claim to have made a small but useful
contribution. Perhaps significantly, for most of the battle the French tanks
were spared the full attention of the German Stukas. On the 13th, most of
Fliegerkorps VIII moved south. The French thought they were dealing with the
most serious threat; in fact, the heaviest German blow was to fall on the
Meuse.
Since the first day of the offensive, the French had been
following the progress of the Panzers heading through Luxembourg and southern
Belgium towards the Meuse. On the 11th, two flights of four AASF Battles were
involved in a rather ambitious attempt to bomb roads around Prüm, in Germany.
Only one returned. The survivors reported that the three other planes in their
flight had been shot down by flak before reaching the target. In view of the
heavy losses to ground fire, Barratt suggested that the Battles should be used
from a higher altitude. Playfair argued that the highest altitude for accurate
bombing would still be within range of light flak, and flying as low as
possible was still the best option. This seemed to be borne out in further
raids on the 12th, when a first wave of three attacking from 20 feet suffered
no losses, a second wave of six attacking from 100 feet lost two, and a third
wave of six attacking from 1,000 feet lost four. There had been eight months of
phoney war and a campaign in Norway to try out different tactics. The middle of
a crucial battle was an unfortunate time to be debating solutions.
As far as the Air Staff was concerned, the losses proved
they had been right all along. Portal had predicted 50 per cent losses and that
was what was happening. In fact, the losses in tactical operations had been no
more disastrous that those suffered in the Wilhelmshaven raids. The Air Staff’s
response, however, was very different. The heavy Hampdens and Wellington losses
had not been allowed to throw into doubt the validity of strategic bombing;
they had just hardened Air Staff resolve to find ways around the problem. The
heavy losses in tactical operations were gratefully accepted as proof that Army
air support did not work.
The only problem was that the Luftwaffe was proving the
contrary. The Air Staff were left sticking gamely to their argument that direct
air support for ground forces only worked for armies going forward; only armies
that were advancing knew what needed to be attacked, whereas armies that were
retreating would always be less sure. The Air Staff liked to conjure up the
image of bombers desperately scouring the countryside, looking for a particular
enemy column the Army wanted bombed. In fact, in such a large-scale offensive,
the bombers had no problems finding suitable targets. Their losses to
anti-aircraft fire were a testament to that. Two of the raids on 12 May were
actually witnessed by Guderian, the commander of the German tank forces heading
for Sedan. The bombers were in the right areas.
The problem was the losses they were suffering. In critical
situations, the AASF was supposed to fly repeat missions every two hours. If
his had been possible, even the relatively small AASF could have had a major
impact on the German columns winding their way through the Ardennes. This was
what the German commanders had most feared. As it was, repeat missions were out
of the question. Indeed, there were doubts about continuing to use the Battle
at all in the low-level attack role. Much to their relief, the Germans were
able to complete their three-day approach march to the main French defensive
position along the Meuse relatively unscathed.
On Newall’s orders, Barratt instructed Playfair not to fly
any missions on the 13th—the Battles had to be conserved for the decisive phase
of the battle. Given the losses so far suffered, the decision was
understandable. Unfortunately, the 13th was to be the decisive day of the
entire campaign. This was far from obvious to the French that morning; the
Germans had reached the Meuse, but all the bridges had been blown and French
artillery dominated the battlefield. The French expected a pause of a few days while
the Germans brought their artillery up to support a crossing of the river, and
the situation seemed far more critical elsewhere. The tank battle at Gembloux
was about to begin, and the French 7th Army was in difficulty around Breda, in
the Netherlands. The only mission flown by the AASF on the 13th was an attempt
to slow down the German advance by blocking roads in Breda. While Battles were
flying all the way from Reims to support the French Army in the Netherlands,
the real danger was much closer to hand.
Events on the Meuse were moving far faster than the French
had anticipated. The German forces had no intention of waiting for artillery to
move up. Instead, the Luftwaffe gave a classic demonstration of how airpower
could substitute for artillery. Throughout the 13th, the French positions at
Sedan, in the front line and artillery to the rear, were subjected to waves of
medium bombers and dive-bombers. Under the cover of this continuous air
bombardment, German infantry established bridgeheads on the west bank of the
Meuse. So fierce was the aerial bombardment that some French troops holding the
front line panicked and fled. There could be no doubt now about the impact
tactical bombing could have on the battlefield. It was, however, still only
German infantry on the west bank. The Panzers would have to wait until the
German engineers could get their pontoon bridges across the river.
Further north, at Dinant, the German forces had nothing like
the same air support. Nevertheless, at Houx, just north of Dinant, Rommel
managed to get a small party of infantry across the Meuse and establish the
first tiny, precarious bridgehead on the west bank. The German troops were
spotted by a French reconnaissance plane. The pilot appreciated the
significance of the discovery and knew what to do; following the guidelines
established before the offensive for dealing with important fleeting targets,
he headed for the base of No. 12 Battle Squadron. On 13 May, there could be no
more important a target of opportunity than German forces on the west bank of
the Meuse. Playfair wanted to strike, but Barratt, anxious to avoid unnecessary
losses, denied permission. Perhaps a single strike by a squadron of Battles
would not have been enough to defeat Rommel’s first attempt to cross the Meuse,
but the Allies would never find out. By the evening, the bridgehead was large
enough to allow work to begin on a pontoon bridge.
The French planned to retrieve the situation at Sedan by a
counterattack by two tank battalions. These slow-moving infantry support tanks
were quite capable of dealing with lightly armed infantry. If bridges enabled
German Panzers to cross the river, the odds would swing heavily against the
French. The counterattack was supposed to be launched at dawn on the 14th, but
it had to be put back because of the confusion caused by retreating troops. The
French desperately needed a little more time.
At 10 p.m. on 13 May, General Billotte, the commander of all
Allied armies on the North-Eastern front, instructed D’Astier and Barratt to
take immediate action against the bridges the Germans were building. He wanted
the attacks to begin that night if possible. D’Astier immediately switched his
four night bomber squadrons from the Maastricht region to the Ardennes and
prepared to launch every available bomber against the bridges the following
day. Barratt was more cautious. He committed himself to just one small raid at
dawn.
The Meuse crossings were a much easier target for the Allied
air forces than the Maastricht/Albert Canal bridges. The German fighter pilots
would now be operating much further from their bases. The bridges were only
temporary pontoons and they were only a short distance from Allied airfields.
As Billotte appreciated, the attacks had to be launched quickly, not just
because of the urgency of the situation, but to deny the Germans time to
organise their air defences. On the morning of the 14th, the Germans were still
desperately trying to extract flak units from the miles of columns queuing back
from the Meuse.
As promised, early on the 14th, six Battles attacked the
Sedan crossing points. All made it back to their base, although one wounded
pilot had to force-land. Encouraged by this relative success, another flight of
four was dispatched. They reported light flak, but all four returned. At 9
a.m., eight French Breguet 693s attacked armoured units spotted by the Battle
crews, losing one plane. At this point, no Panzers had yet crossed the Meuse
and the anti-aircraft defences were still relatively disorganised. A more
substantial effort might have brought a greater reward at less cost than the
British bombers were about to suffer.
Soon after these raids, the French launched their
counterattack. Almost simultaneously, the 1st Panzer Division started crossing
the Meuse. The French tanks advanced until they ran into the German Panzers, at
which point they were quickly scattered. The situation at Sedan had suddenly
become extremely critical.
French hopes of restoring the situation rested with General
Flavigny’s XXI Corps, a substantial force with motorised troops, light tanks,
and one of the three French heavy armoured divisions. This was moving north
towards the Sedan bridgehead, with instructions to strike as soon as possible.
To buy time for these reinforcements to move into position, all bombing effort
was to be focused on Sedan. Barratt was persuaded to join the French in one
all-out effort. At around midday, he instructed the AASF to launch every
available Battle and Blenheim against the Sedan bridges that afternoon.
The French would attack first, followed by the AASF bombers.
Both forces would rearm, return, and attack again. Blenheims from No. 2 Group
would round off the assault. The first AASF attack would consist of three
waves, with two escorted by Hurricanes and the third by French fighters.
Hurricanes and French fighters would escort No. 2 Group Blenheims in the final
attack. Five Hurricane squadrons would be involved; it was the first time
Hurricanes had been switched from Belgium to the French front. They were joined
by around fifteen now somewhat under-strength French fighter squadrons. Two of
them, however, were equipped with the new Dewoitine D.520.
The RAF escorts were again indirect. At least three of the
Hurricane squadrons were distracted by formations of Ju 87 dive-bombers. These
were very worthy targets and the Hurricanes inflicted heavy losses, but this
was little consolation to the AASF bomber crews they were supposed to be
protecting. The Bf 109Es of JG 53 alone claimed thirteen Battles. Arguably, the
Dutch tactics of providing a close escort, with the fighters joining in the
attack if possible, would have been more successful.
It seems the French ‘escorts’ were not the standard close
escort they were providing for their own bombers. At least some of the French
fighters were actually escorting a French reconnaissance plane. The Bloch 152
that were supposed to be escorting the Blenheims of No. 2 Group were covering
Flavigny’s forces moving up from the south. It seems the RAF was happy to accept
French fighters operating in the area on other duties as an escort.
By the time the first French bombers appeared, German
fighter and flak defences were ready. This first wave consisted of just
twenty-one bombers, thirteen of which were Amiot 143s—obsolete, ungainly medium
bombers that previously the French had only dared use by night. They did at
least get a substantial escort; twelve M.S.406s flew with the bombers, while
Bloch 152s and Dewoitine D.520s provided cover at a higher altitude. The French
fighters fought valiantly to protect their vulnerable charges and were
reasonably successful. Two Amiots were shot down by Bf 110s and another two
were lost to flak, while one of the eight LeO 451s was also shot down. It could
have been a lot worse.
For the AASF bombers that followed, it was a lot worse.
Forty of the seventy-one Battles and Blenheims were lost to fighters and flak.
So many of the returning French and British bombers were damaged that the
repeat attacks had to be abandoned. Twenty-eight Blenheims of No. 2 Group
attacked in the evening; only five Hurricanes could be mustered for the RAF
element of the escort, and even these got side-tracked by German observation
planes. Again, these were very worthy targets, but shooting down reconnaissance
planes was not the role of the fighters on this occasion. Given their rather
vague instructions, the pilots can scarcely be criticised for attacking any
enemy aircraft they came across, but another six bombers were lost.
The dive-bombers and observation planes shot down by the
Hurricanes did not help the bombers, but these successes did underline how many
very vulnerable German planes there were in the battlezone. It was not
surprising that Pownall was fuming at the ‘the thirty-four squadrons at home
where there is no attack’. There would have been plenty of targets for them in
France. Even the fighters that were available were affecting German operations.
On 15 May, Guderian’s XIX Corps reported its aerial reconnaissance was
‘severely impeded’ by Allied fighters and it was no longer possible for
squadrons ‘to carry out vigorous, extensive reconnaissance, as, owing to
casualties, more than half of their aircraft are not now available’. It was
fortunate for the Luftwaffe that so many RAF fighter squadrons were still in
Britain.
During the course of the 14th, twenty-eight French-based
Hurricanes were shot down. Nearly all these were victims of Bf 109s and 110s.
Nineteen pilots were killed or wounded. The Hurricane was effective enough
against German bomber and reconnaissance planes, but it was losing the battle
with the Messerschmitts. Total Battle losses since the start of the offensive
had risen to seventy—over half of the force. The AASF was withdrawn from
daylight operations once again.
The French did their best to maintain the pressure on the
Sedan bridgehead. During the night of 14–15 May, huge four-engine long-range
Farman 222 bombers were ordered to join the tactical night offensive, but the
two groups only had six serviceable machines. The four Amiot 143 bomber groups,
after flying the previous night and in the daylight attack, were in action
again on the night of 13–14 May; in the circumstances, the tired crews did well
to manage sixteen sorties. Still the ‘heavies’ of Bomber Command remained idle.
After the thirty-seven sorties flown on the night of the 11–12 May, the Air
Ministry instructed Bomber Command to conserve its strength as cabinet
permission for the bombing of the Ruhr was believed to be imminent. On 12–13
May, just twelve sorties were flown by the 250-strong force, and these were
mainly near the Dutch/German border. On the 13th–14th, another twelve operated
rather vaguely in the Eindhoven-Aachen-Maastricht region.
Bomber Command stepped up its efforts on the night of 14–15
May, but not over the Meuse. The French assured Barratt that the heroism of RAF
crews had saved the day by allowing time for a French counterattack to restore
the situation. Perhaps the French were slightly too enthusiastic with their
appreciation; they convinced Barratt that the danger had passed. The French Air
Force continued to focus on the Meuse crossings, but Barratt suggested that
Bomber Command should concentrate on Breda and Maastricht. Always anxious to
bomb something inside Germany, Portal added Aachen and Mönchengladbach. Twelve
Hampdens attacked targets in and around Breda in support of the retreating
French 7th Army, and eighteen Wellingtons bombed Aachen and Maastricht in
support of the 1st Army. Twelve Whitleys revisited Mönchengladbach in support
of no one in particular.
The Allied bombing at Sedan might well have helped restore
the situation—if Flavigny had actually launched his counterattack. The 150
bomber sorties the Allies had flown against the Meuse bridgehead on the 14th
had caused delays. Guderian’s XIX Corps reported: ‘Throughout the day all three
divisions have had to endure constant air attack—especially at the crossing and
bridging points. Our fighter cover is inadequate.’ These delays could have been
significant. While the attacks were taking place, Guderian had decided to push
his 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions as far west as possible, despite their rather
precarious base. The 10th Panzer division was supposed to cover the left flank.
This began crossing the Meuse on the morning of the 14th, but the air attacks
meant it was not fully deployed on the west bank until the 15th. Had Flavigny’s
corps attacked on the evening of the 14th, as had been the original intention,
he might well have sliced between the Panzers pushing west and the delayed 10th
Panzer. Unfortunately, the French could not really decide if Flavigny should
attack the bridgehead or secure the left flank of the Maginot Line. Flavigny
went on to the defence and the opportunity was missed.
The situation on the ground now went from bad to worse. The
French forces at Dinant tried to pull back to the frontier positions they had
held on 10 May, but under incessant air attack, the retreat turned into a rout.
The two remaining French armoured divisions in the rear were taken by surprise by
the advancing Panzers and scattered. By the morning of the 16th, the Germans
had achieved a complete breakthrough along a 60-mile front. No substantial
Allied units stood between the Panzers and Paris—or the English Channel.
The situation was remarkably similar to March 1918, when the
Germans had also broken through on a 60-mile front. It was the scenario that
the Air Ministry and Air Staff had so frequently mentioned as the only
circumstances justifying the use of the ‘heavies’ in support of the Army. It had
worked in 1918, when the intervention of the RFC and French Air Force had
bought the Allies sufficient time to bring reserves into position. This,
however, was not 1918. The Germans were now exploiting their breakthrough with
fast-moving armoured and motorised forces. The Allied air forces in 1918 had
been battle-hardened formations, but in 1940 they were still inexperienced. In
1918, the RFC had not suffered horrendous losses. The British and French had
excellent SE5a, Camel and Spad fighters. In 1940, however, it was the German
Air Force that had the best fighter operating over the battlefield. Perhaps
most significantly of all, in 1918, most of the RFC was in France; in 1940,
most of the RAF was in Britain.
Still, the battle was far from lost. Indeed, in the period
following the breakthrough, the German forces were probably at their most
vulnerable, both to counterattacks on their weakly held flanks and air attack
on their lengthening supply lines. The Bf 109 had a very limited range, and the
Meuse was already some way from German airfields. The Panzer forces were now
racing even further west. Bf 109 squadrons began moving westwards, but the
number that could be maintained so far forward was limited, and protection
against Allied bomber attack could not be so effective. The French were doing
their best to bring up air reinforcements to take advantage; bomber squadrons
in the process of converting to modern equipment were rushed to the front.
Those that were not ready were told to use their old equipment by night. French
naval bombers were ordered to operate against the advancing German forces.
However, the largest single untapped bomber resource
available to the Allies was the 250 Whitleys, Wellingtons, and Hampdens of
Bomber Command. It seemed it was time for the Air Staff to deliver on its
promise to intervene if a crisis arose.
