On November 4, the time had come for Eighth Army to pursue a
crippled and defeated Axis force. Montgomery was well aware that Rommel’s army
was now gravely damaged and in retreat. He launched two armored divisions, the
1st and the 10th, and the New Zealand Division, with an attached armored
brigade, in pursuit. The Panzerarmee’s withdrawal presented Montgomery with a
priceless opportunity because, according to many German sources, it was poorly
conducted. Afrika Korps’ War Diary reported:
Officers of all ranks
had lost their heads and were making hasty and ill considered decisions, with
the result that confidence had been lost, and in some places panic had broken
out. Some vehicles were set on fire on or beside the road, and guns were
abandoned or destroyed because there were no tractors for them. A large number
of vehicles had left their units and were streaming back without orders.
The Diary also recorded with some surprise, “No contact with
the enemy all day.”
The War Diary of the 90th Light Division chronicled similar
conditions, admitting that there was “very little discipline during the
withdrawal.” It also claimed German transport and supply units were “fleeing in
wild panic.” As a result, its withdrawal from Alamein was “very difficult.”
The pursuit phase of the Alamein battle has been strongly
criticized by many writers who believe that Montgomery acted with undue
caution. The British official history made a perceptive observation that,
“Whether they could have captured or destroyed more of the Panzerarmee than
they did will be argued as long as military history is read.” This has
certainly happened. Alexander McKee accurately stated, “There was no pursuit,
merely a follow up.” Correlli Barnett has been one of Montgomery’s harshest
critics, believing that Montgomery “signally fail[ed] to take advantage of this
astonishing flow of precisely accurate intelligence, which removed all
guesswork from generalship” and that his failure to destroy Panzerarmee at
Alamein “calls in question Montgomery’s generalship at this stage of his
career.” Johnston and Stanley wrote, “The pursuit was poorly planned and
confused, a fact Montgomery never acknowledged.” As early as the evening of
November 3, Freyberg had warned Lieutenant General Herbert Lumsden, 10 Corps
commander, that Rommel “will slip away if they are not careful.” The cautious
pursuit, including by Freyberg, ensured that this happened.
There was one overriding factor, however, that explains and
perhaps excuses Montgomery’s caution. This was the state of his armored corps,
his prized corps de chasse. So far in the Alamein battle, 10 Corps had failed
in every task it had been allocated, had demonstrated excessive caution, and an
inability to follow even the simplest directives. His trust in his armored
commanders, especially in 10 Corps commander Lumsden, was “at an all time low.”
As it was, this Corps that would be used during the pursuit, it was only
natural that Montgomery wanted to keep it on as tight a leash as possible to
ensure that it did in fact accomplish even the most limited of tasks assigned
to it. John Harding, commanding 7 Armoured Division during the pursuit and “in
favour of pressing on all-out, hard as I could go,” thought at the time that
Montgomery was being “overcautious” in restraining his armored formations.
Harding later changed his mind. “Montgomery was very conscious of the fact that
we had already been twice up and twice back and he was determined not to be
pushed back for a third time,” Harding said. A third defeat could have
prolonged the war in North Africa. “Looking back on it all, I think he was
right to be cautious,” was Harding’s conclusion.
And, as John Keegan has pointed out in his history of the
Second World War, with the exception of the Soviets’ Operation Bagration, the
Allies were never able to encircle and destroy retreating German armies.
Montgomery cannot be judged too harshly for not achieving something other
British or American commanders were also unable to do when given the opportunity.
Montgomery initially planned to use the New Zealand
Division, augmented by an armored brigade, as the main pursuit force. He
directed them to the Fuka escarpment some 45 miles to the west. As the New
Zealanders set off for Fuka, the British armor of 10 Corps made a series of
shorter wheels to the coast of some 10 to 15 miles. But there was a
considerable delay before the New Zealanders could get moving. Freyberg
recorded about the lull, “The congestion of vehicles in the forward area would
have done credit to Piccadilly. Fortunately the RAF ruled the skies.”
Montgomery’s fears about his armored formations soon proved justified as the
armor “swanned” about the desert out of coordinated control in several
fruitless encircling movements. Nor did the New Zealand Division, which de
Guingand described as Montgomery’s “mobile shock troops,” demonstrate much dash
or daring. Freyberg was especially concerned not to let his division get mauled
by the Afrika Korps for the fourth time. He still erroneously estimated Rommel
to have a powerful armored force under command. To his subordinate commanders,
Freyberg had stated that “the policy is not to fight but to position our force
to bottle him.” Freyberg, the commander of the three left hooks carried out by the
New Zealand Division, was in no doubt as to the purpose of a left hook and
tended to view it as a substitute for heavy fighting—a way of achieving a
victory with minimal casualties. The New Zealanders made three attempts to
entrap Panzerarmee using the wide encircling “left hook.” All three failed.
Kippenberger informed the New Zealand official historian:
You have one or two
tricky questions to deal with in this volume, particularly the conduct of the
three “Left Hooks” which seem to me to have been clumsily and rather timidly
executed. I thought so at the time and am inclined to the same opinion still.
Ironically, both Montgomery’s and Freyberg’s caution, though
understandable, was to prove more costly in the long run. As Rommel pointed
out, if Montgomery had abandoned his restraint after Alamein, it “would have
cost him far fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on
overwhelming superiority in each tactical action, which he could only obtain at
the cost of his speed.” The failure to prevent Panzerarmee from withdrawing,
especially after the Alamein battle, meant much hard fighting ahead with the
North African campaign dragging on for another six months.
#
There were many reasons for the defeat of the Axis forces at
Alamein, not the least important being their weakness in logistics and
firepower. Rommel devoted nine pages of his papers analyzing “the decisive
battle of the African campaign,” which he had lost. He did this primarily to
counter accusations from the armchair strategists that the Axis troops and
their commanders had performed poorly at Alamein. Rommel wrote that these
accusations came from those whose military careers were “notable for a
consistent absence from the front.”16 Rommel attributed his defeat at Alamein
primarily to his weak logistics, especially in weapons, fuel, and ammunition
and to British air supremacy. The “extreme concentrations” of Eighth Army’s
artillery fire and “locally limited attacks” by infantry with an “extremely
high state of training” was also important.17 He was especially impressed with
the British infantry’s ability to attack at night, writing that “Night attacks
continued to be a particular speciality of the British.”18 Rommel finished his
analysis by stating that the bravery of all German and many Italian troops “was
admirable.” Alamein had been a struggle and a defeat but it was still “a
glorious page in the annals of the German and Italian peoples.” But in the end,
the enemy was just too strong and their own material resources too small. In
this imbalance “lay destruction.”
Other German accounts placed considerable stress on their
material weakness at Alamein when compared to the resources available to Eighth
Army and the DAF. They seldom gave credit to the performance of Eighth Army’s
commanders or soldiers. The War Diary of 15 Panzer Division was especially
critical:
The English did not
win the battle of Alamein by superior leadership or dash. On the contrary,
after their original plan of attack failed they worked their way systematically
forward, always probing ahead with the greatest care choosing limited
objectives. Often, particularly after our withdrawal from the Alamein line, the
enemy failed to perceive or take advantage of good opportunities to destroy
German troops.
The main reasons given for the British victory were Eighth
Army’s overwhelming artillery firepower and the DAF’s air superiority. The War
Diary did admit, though, that Eighth Army’s infantry were stronger and rested
and that this infantry was “superior to the Germans, and still more to the
Italians, in night fighting.” But Panzerarmee, it stated, had been crushed by
the sheer weight of numbers brought against it. Eighth Army’s successful
deception plans had convinced Panzerarmee and German military intelligence that
its opponents were more than 40 percent stronger than they actually were.
The secretly recorded conversation of a German infantry
officer captured on the night of October 29 was particularly revealing about
the state of Panzerarmee’s logistics. The lieutenant from 2 Battalion, 125
Infantry Regiment told his cell mate, an officer from submarine U-559:
We’ve been in FRANCE,
in the BALKANS, and in CRETE. Throughout the whole of the French campaign my
Company only had thirty-five killed and seventy-five wounded. This time there
was no way out for us, it was either death or capture. I was right in the front
line, about fifty metres behind my platoons. When the infantry came along there
was practically nothing more I could do with our 7.65 guns. As for our M.P.’s
[Machine Pistols: the German Schmeisser submachine gun], none of them would
fire because of the magazine. We’ve had them since 1940. All the springs were
bad and we couldn’t get replacements. You can fire one round and that’s all.
Our lack of supplies in AFRICA is appalling.
German intelligence officer Hans-Otto Behrendt believed that
Ultra intelligence “played a major part” in the defeat of the last
German-Italian offensive at Alam Halfa and had played “a crucial part in the
sinking of Rommel’s oil tankers and supply convoys.” For the final October
battle, though, “The decisive factor now was quite simply the sheer British
superiority in tanks, artillery and aircraft for which no amount of tactical
skill and self-sacrifice could compensate.”
Certainly, Eighth Army had superior logistics and firepower,
tanks that could match the Germans, and the DAF dominated the skies above the
battlefield. But it was the way these assets were used that made the critical
difference. The Eighth Army’s artillery was concentrated and its firepower
coordinated with infantry and armor in a master fireplan. In the twelve days of
the battle, Eighth Army’s artillery fired more than one million rounds of
twenty-five-pounder ammunition and throughout the battle “some artillery action
was occurring all the time, and heavy action for most of the time.” The DAF
made extraordinary efforts to support the troops on the ground and was most
effective at disrupting enemy concentrations and their communications. During
the October battle, the DAF flew 10,405 sorties and their American allies flew
1,181. This compares with just 1,550 German and 1,570 Italian sorties. It made
a telling difference and the effect on morale on both sides was critical.
An American study compiled in 1947, written by the German
officer Generalmajor Hans-Henning von Holtzendorff, was adamant that Eighth
Army’s success at Alamein was primarily through its use of tanks. Von
Holtzendorff wrote, “El Alamein was decided by the numerically far superior
Panzer forces of the British, which were not dispersed as before, but were now
concentrated and to some extent were equipped with American material.” All of
these elements made vital contributions to Eighth Army’s victory.
In infantry, though, Eighth Army’s margin was not so
pronounced as many historians have claimed, and the October Alamein battle was
primarily an infantry battle. While it was a considerable advantage having a
materiel superiority over the enemy, it still needed skill, courage, and
determination to effectively apply what you had. One thing Eighth Army did in
this October battle was to keep the fight going for over a week, which
ultimately wore down the Panzerarmee. This was an old-fashioned battle of
attrition, but it produced a decisive outcome. The 9 Division’s Report on
Operations believed that this was the most crucial “lesson” of the battle. It began
this section of the Report with the heading Maintenance of Pressure. Under this
heading it perceived:
So often in military
history, the battle has gone to the side which had the will or the strength to
hang on just long enough to outlast the opponent. By maintaining offensive
pressure, the enemy is forced to use his reserves and if this pressure can be
maintained until these reserves are used up and he has insufficient resources
to meet the new threat, defeat follows.
In this battle, by maintaining pressure by a series of
attacks to the north and to the west, the Axis reserves were drawn in and
steadily worn down until on 4 November—11 days after it had been planned to
occur—penetration was effected.
This pressure was maintained throughout the battle by the
numerous sorties of the DAF, the interdiction of Rommel’s supply line by the
Royal Navy, and the cooperation of all arms of Eighth Army. An Air Ministry
Report recorded that the Alamein battle “demonstrated untold value of good
cooperation between all arms and services.”28 It was an old lesson to learn,
but this cooperation between arms and services was a critical development. It
signified, as Alexander McKee noted, a crucial shift. He wrote of the battle:
“At long last the British were learning how to make war—which is not the same
thing as fighting.”
There was little doubt, though, that the primary
responsibility for breaking the Alamein position had been with the infantry
divisions backed by heavy artillery and air support. Freyberg’s report on the
El Alamein operations concluded that the “value of well-trained infantry,
capable of attacking by night with the bayonet against any form of defence, was
fully proved.” Jonathan Fennell was correct in his assessment that the infantry
units of Eighth Army were “Montgomery’s main offensive force.” Fennell also
observed that in winning this last Alamein battle, “many of the frontline
battalions of Eighth Army suffered over 50 per cent casualties.” Being the Army
commander’s main offensive weapon came with a heavy cost.
It has been argued that Alamein could not have been won
without the contributions of the two elite infantry divisions in Eighth Army
identified earlier by Rommel—9 Australian Division operating in the north, and
two brigades of New Zealand infantry plus supporting units in the center, and
later in the pursuit. That the New Zealanders played a vital role was
uncharacteristically recognized by Montgomery:
The Battle of Egypt
was won by the good fighting qualities of the soldiers of the Empire. Of all these
soldiers none were finer than the fighting men from New Zealand…. Possibly I
myself am the only one who really knows the extent to which the action of the
New Zealand Division contributed towards the victory.
Montgomery sent the Australian commander a similar message
of praise on November 2, just as Operation Supercharge was underway. Montgomery
wrote to Morshead that, “Your men are absolutely splendid and the part they
have played in this battle is beyond all praise.” General Alexander was also effusive
in his praise of the 9th Australian Division when he addressed them at a parade
on the Gaza airstrip on December 22. He pointed out that “The battle of Alamein
has made history, and you are in the proud position of having taken a major
part in that great victory.” Alexander concluded his address by telling the
Australians that “one thought I shall cherish above all others—under my command
fought the 9th Australian Division.”35 Churchill too acknowledged in his
history of the war that it was the “ceaseless, bitter fighting” that the
Australians had endured at Alamein that “had swung the whole battle in our
favour.” Twenty-five years after the battle, Montgomery wrote that “it would
not be right to single out any for special praise” when all had performed well.
But then Montgomery did exactly that, stating, “I must say this—we would not
have won the battle in ten days without that magnificent 9th Australian
Division.”
It was heady stuff and it was entirely appropriate that the
Australians and New Zealanders received high praise for their efforts in the
October battle. No historian could ever dispute their key roles. But Montgomery
was correct when he gave credit to the fighting qualities of the soldiers of
the Empire, although he perhaps should have mentioned the Empire airmen as
well. Throughout the battle Eighth Army had “complete protection from serious
air attack and, at the same time, had the benefit of such close co-operation
and continuous air support as never before.” There were, of course, other
formations and corps that contributed significantly to the outcome of the
battle. All German accounts comment on the weight and effectiveness of Eighth
Army’s artillery. No infantry division made more attacks nor suffered heavier
casualties than 51st Highland Division. And while the armored divisions may not
have performed as well as Montgomery and the infantry commanders wanted, no
formation did more to win the battle than the 9th Armoured Brigade. The New
Zealand official history was correct when it stated that “Finally, tribute for
the victory should be bestowed on all those Allied troops who had a share in
the fighting and behind the lines.”
#
It was surprising that General Alexander, in his Despatch
published in 1948, was somewhat dismissive of the casualties incurred in this
third battle. Alexander claimed that Eighth Army’s losses at El Alamein “were
not unduly severe” and later that: “Our casualties were a negligible factor as
far as the pursuit was concerned.” But Alexander was comparing Alamein to the
attritional battles of the First World War. As he pointed out in his Memoirs,
there was “one rather big difference.” At Alamein, casualties averaged just
over 1,000 a day. On the first day of the Somme they had numbered “some
60,000.”
As with any battle of attrition, the cost of success was high. Eighth Army suffered 2,350 men killed in action; 8,950 wounded; and 2,260 men missing—a total of 13,560. In addition, 500 tanks and 111 guns were put of action and the DAF lost ninety-seven aircraft during the battle. These are not negligible figures and prove, as the British official history stated, “the battle was anything but a walk-over.” Panzerarmee losses were high too. An estimated 1,149 German and 971 Italians were killed in action, with a further 3,886 Germans and 933 Italians wounded. A more precise figure was recorded for the number of Axis prisoners taken during the battle. By November 11, it had reached 30,000.
The breakdown of Eighth Army’s losses indicates its multinational
character. Of the total casualties incurred in the October battle, the
percentages suffered by various nationalities were: UK troops 58 percent,
Australians 22 percent, New Zealanders 10, South Africans 6, Indians 1, Allies
(Free French, Greeks) 3. Two Australian historians have made much of these
figures. They write that:
The Australian
Division, although representing just under a tenth of the Eighth Army’s
strength, had suffered more than one in five of its casualties. Further reports
revealed the scale of the Australian contribution to the battle. Thirteen per
cent of the 9th Division’s men had been killed or wounded, which is exactly
double the British percentage and three times that of the other Dominion
formations.
No one could ever question the contribution of the
Australians to the final outcome of the battle and their heavy casualties are
just one indication of the hard fighting they endured. But using casualty
figures as a yardstick of contribution is misleading. It needs to be remembered
that the UK casualties were not evenly spread across all its formations and
some UK formations, such as the 51st Highland Division and 9 Armoured Brigade,
suffered heavier percentage casualties than the Australians. In fact, 51st
Highland Division, with 2,827 killed, wounded, and missing, suffered the
highest number of casualties during the battle. The bulk of this Division’s
casualties were in its nine infantry battalions, which collectively had a
casualty rate of around 40 percent. The 2nd New Zealand Division losses had
also been heavy, given that it was well understrength before the battle began.
More than 1,700 New Zealanders became casualties during this second battle of
El Alamein. More than a third of these casualties, some 651, had occurred in
the first twenty-four hours of the battle, the highest number suffered amongst
the five infantry divisions used on the opening night. Among the 7,350 graves
of Allied servicemen in the Alamein cemetery are those of 1,049 known and
fifty-six unknown New Zealanders. After the October battle, the New Zealand
Division was now below strength by 3,600 men, a deficiency felt especially
keenly in the infantry, the artillery, and the engineer corps. It had commenced
the long campaign in June with nearly 20,000 men. In November 1942, its
strength had almost reached 13,000 again. Niall Barr was correct in his
assessment of the human cost of the last Alamein battle. He wrote that, “Eighth
Army had finally crushed the Panzerarmee but the human cost to both sides had
been grievous.”
