On the eve of the Russo–Japanese War, Russian land forces
were the biggest in the world, numbering 41,079 officers and 1,067,000 other
ranks, and with full deployment of more than 3 million including the reserves.
The sum of Russian troops stationed at that time east of Lake Baikal (the
Priamur and Siberian Military Districts and the Kwantung Fortified Region) was
about 95,000 infantry, some 3,000–5,000 cavalry, and between 120 to just under
200 guns. These were concentrated at Port Arthur, under the command of
Lieutenant General Anatolii Stoessel, and around Vladivostok, under the command
of General Nikolai Linievich. These forces were arranged in 68 infantry
battalions, 35 squadrons of cavalry (mainly Cossacks), 13 engineer companies,
five fortress engineer companies, and four and a half battalions of fortress
artillery.
While it had often been regarded as conservative and
unpolished, the Imperial Russian Army of 1904 was very different from what it
had been four decades earlier. The defeat suffered by Russia in the Crimean War
hastened the abolition of serfdom and stimulated the reorganization of the
Imperial Russian Army. During the 1860s, War Minister D. A. Miliutin carried
out several reforms that created a sufficient number of trained reservists to
deploy a massive army in the event of war. The reform also resolved the problem
of improving the organization of the military administration and the rearmament
of the army. From 1874 military service was compulsory for every male who
reached the age of 21. The length of active military service was set at up to
six years, with nine years in the reserves. The law of 1874 did not extend to
the Cossacks, or to the people of the Trans-Caucasus region, Central Asia, and
Siberia. The benefits of the military reforms became clear during the
Russo–Turkish War of 1877–1878. But despite the ultimate victory, the war also
revealed disorganization, deficiencies in armaments, and weakness in the high
command. Further reforms in the aftermath of the war made the Imperial Russian
Army an awesome force, yet its true abilities were not tested for more than two
decades.
On the eve of the Russo–Japanese War, the Russian national
service consisted of four years of active service and 14 years in the reserves,
with two training periods of six weeks each, for soldiers from the age of 21 to
43. There were few exemptions from service, though several groups, such as the
Cossacks and Finns, were entitled to different conditions of service. The army
had 12 military districts: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Finland, Vilno, Warsaw,
Kiev, Odessa, Kazan, the Caucasus, Turkestan, Siberia and the Amur region, and
the Oblast of the Don Host. Despite the improved deployment, the army suffered
from outdated tactics and old, inflexible, high-ranking officers, who were
often unfamiliar with new advances in technology. The lower-ranking officers
and non-commissioned officers suffered from long periods of being given
unchallenging assignments and a lack of training. The land forces were divided
into regular units and Cossacks. In peacetime, field troops made up 73.4
percent of the entire regular forces, whereas fortress troops were 6.6 percent,
reserve forces 9.5 percent, rear forces 0.7 percent, local troops 2.3 percent,
and auxiliary detachments 7.5 percent. In 1898 the infantry accounted for 74.8
percent of the entire army; cavalry were 8.5 percent (excluding the Cossack
cavalry units), artillery 13.7 percent, and engineering 3.0 percent. Infantry
divisions, consisting of about 18,000 men each, were assembled into corps, and
corps were joined in wartime into armies.
On the eve of the Russo–Japanese War, the forces of the
Imperial Russian Army in Manchuria were organized within the Manchurian Army,
under the command of General Nikolai Linievich. This army consisted of two
corps: the First Siberian Army Corps and the Third Siberian Army Corps. The
rank and file were mainly loyal peasants from eastern Russia, who were regarded
as resilient and accustomed to the harsh conditions of the region, but
uneducated and unused to fighting without a commanding officer to direct them.
Initially the two corps were smaller and less well organized than parallel
European corps. The former, for example, had 32 guns, whereas the latter had 48
or 64 guns. Each corps consisted of two divisions, which in turn comprised two
brigades. The typical Siberian brigade consisted of 3,400 men and 12 artillery
guns in two batteries. A battery consisted of eight Putilov M-1903
76.2-millimeter [3-inch] field guns, as well as a small unspecified number of
117-millimeter [4.6-inch] howitzers and no more than eight Maxim machine guns.
The Siberian infantry brigades grew slowly and eventually evolved into the
Siberian infantry divisions, which did not exist prior to the war.
The Siberian corps had no divisional cavalry and their
infantry soldiers were equipped with the Mosin M-1891 rifle while their
commissioned and non-commissioned officers were equipped also with the Nagant
M-95 revolver. At the outbreak of the war the Russian units of the Manchurian
Army were widely dispersed and disorganized, but as the war progressed their
organization and efficiency increased. During 1904 the Manchurian Army was
gradually reinforced by the First, Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, Sixteenth, and
Seventeenth European Army Corps, consisting of 28,000 rifles and 112 guns each.
Thus army corps, rather than divisions, were the main fighting unit used by the
Russians during this war. Their troops were transferred eastward by the
Trans-Siberian Railway, which could deliver 40,000 men (one and a half corps) a
month. In September 1904 the Manchurian Army was divided into the First
Manchurian Army and the Second Manchurian Army, and in December 1904 the Third
Manchurian Army was also formed.
In the aftermath of the Russo–Japanese War, the Imperial
Russian Army was forced to undertake a series of reforms to strengthen its
forces, and thus initiated the “great military program.” In 1913 it envisaged
an increase in the army’s size by almost 40 percent by 1917, and a large-scale
augmentation of the armaments used by the artillery and the rifle forces.
Changes were made also in the readiness of the army to mobilize and the way it
was staffed. The overall length of service was set at 18 years, of which three
to four years were on active service. On the eve of World War I, Russia’s land
forces were regarded as a potentially unbeatable army, although in reality the
army was still in the midst of a process of reorganizing and developing its
capabilities. In the first months of the war, the Imperial Russian Army
mobilized 3.5 million men. However, at the end of 1917 and early in 1918 it was
demobilized, and the Red Army was created instead.
Infantry
Russian infantry corps in Manchuria numbered by most
estimates about 95,000 men and consisted mainly of peasants, considered hardy,
obedient, brave, and used to the extreme conditions of the region. They won the
admiration of military observers though they were still trained in outdated
tactics. They were conditioned to volley fire on command and used the bayonet
more often than required. These practices largely constricted their individual
marksmanship abilities. They also often suffered from lack of motivation;
during the conflict in Manchuria most of the second-line reservists resented
being called up for duty in this remote area. The main weapon used by the
Russian infantry was the Mosin M-1891 rifle, and infantry units also
increasingly used Maxim machine guns as close fire support for the troops. The
individual’s personal kit weighed about 32 kilograms [70 pounds] and consisted
of two and a half days’ worth of rations in a watertight kitbag, a greatcoat, a
tent sheet, and a shovel. The infantryman carried between 120 and 300 rounds of
ammunition in clips of five.
Maxim Machine Gun.
Main machine gun used by the Imperial Russian Army during
the Russo–Japanese War. It was designed in 1883 by Hiram Maxim, an American
living in Great Britain, and during the following years came into widespread
use. In 1895 the Imperial Japanese Army purchased a number of Maxims but
eventually preferred the Hotchkiss machine gun. The Imperial Russian Army,
however, purchased 58 Maxim machine guns in 1899 and made it its main machine
gun. In 1902 the army concluded a contract with the British firm Vickers to
manufacture the Maxim in Russia, thereby cutting costs by two-thirds.
Manufacture of the Russian version of the Maxim started only in 1910; the
machine gun was designated Pulemiot Maxima. At the outbreak of the Russo–Japanese
War, the Russian war ministry placed a rush order abroad for a total of 450
machine guns for the troops at the front, which were mostly supplied toward the
end of the war. The Maxim’s design was simple though ingenious: it was water
cooled, recoil operated, and fully automatic. Its recoil, caused by the
explosion of the powder, operated to eject the spent cartridge and load the
next round. The Maxim was fabric belt-fed, and it fired the same
7.62-millimeter [.30-inch] ammunition used by the Russian-made Mosin M-1891
rifle.
Technical data: Water-cooled 4 liters; Caliber: 7.62mm; Gun
length: 1.107m, barrel length: 0.72m; Grooves: 4; Wheeled mount weight: 36kg;
Tripod mount weight: 27.6kg, empty fabric belt weight: 1.1kg, loaded fabric
belt weight: 6.1kg (250 rounds); Effective rate of fire: 250r/min.
Mosin M-1891 Rifle.
Russian main rifle during the Russo–Japanese War. It was
first produced following an order of Tsar Nicholas II, and thereafter it was
manufactured in Russia, the Soviet Union, and Belgium from 1891 to 1944 in
several models. It originated as a design of Captain S. M. Mosin and was
favored over a Belgian design by Leon Nagant for its ruggedness and lighter
weight. The Mosin M-1891 replaced the older, heavier, and longer Karle and
Berdan No. 2 rifles. By 1903 the two-phase introduction of the Mosin M-1891 to
the ranks was complete, and both the regular army and the reserves were armed
with the new rifle. The Russian infantry had a bayonet permanently fixed to the
rifle, which hindered accurate shooting to some extent. Versions of the Mosin
were used as frontline rifles until World War II and as practice rifles until
the late 1970s.
Technical data: Caliber: 7.62mm [0.3in.]; Weight: 4.33kg
[9.61bs], with bayonet and sling 4.78kg [10.61bs]; Length: 131cm [51.4in.],
with bayonet: 173cm [68.2in.], barrel length: 80.3cm [31.6in.]; Magazine
capacity: 5 rounds; Rate of fire: 8–10r/min; Maximum sighting range (iron
sights): 2,200m.
Cavalry.
Combat troops mounted
on horses. Their importance in the Russo–Japanese War was limited and often
marginal. After a millennium in which mounted troops were considered the
masters of offensive warfare, the Russo–Japanese War marks a turning point in
the history of cavalry; thereafter this type of warfare was to disappear rapidly
from the modern battlefield. In many respects the limited contribution of
cavalry during the Russo–Japanese War presaged its demise during World War I.
The European armies, however, did not learn this particular lesson, nor the
general lesson regarding the leading role of defense in modern warfare.
Consequently they started World War I with huge cavalry forces without any
effective alternative until the invention of the tank. While both belligerents
in the Russo–Japanese War used cavalry forces, the Imperial Russian Army
employed about three times more cavalry units than the Imperial Japanese Army.
On the eve of war the Russian cavalry numbered more than
80,000 and comprised 25 cavalry divisions, including two Guards, 17 Army, and
six Cossack cavalry detachments. The Russian cavalry in East Asia consisted
mostly of Cossacks, with each cavalry division consisting of 3,400 dragoons
trained in mounted and dismounted combat. Some divisions had their own
artillery support, usually 12 horse-drawn artillery guns. The Russian cavalry
forces in Manchuria were organized in December 1904 in one huge Cavalier Corps.
They were commanded initially by Lieutenant General Pavel Mishchenko until
February 1905, then briefly by Lieutenant General Pavel Rennenkampf during February,
by Lieutenant General Vladimir Grekov until March, and then again by Mishchenko
until September 1905. The tactics of the Russian cavalry were revised several
times during the 50 years prior to the war, their equipment was modernized,
switching from lances to rifles and bayonets, and dragoon training was
instituted combining infantry training with cavalry tactics. Nevertheless, at
the outbreak of the Russo–Japanese War, they were still guided by outdated
notions of attack, with scant regard for the technological and tactical
advances achieved during the 19th century. Foremost among these advances was
the widespread implementation of machine guns in the battlefield, the much more
extensive use of artillery as support during battle, and the change from close
to dispersed infantry formations, which made the infantry an unsuitable target
for formation cavalry attacks.
In the evolution of cavalry warfare, the Russo–Japanese War
is noted for the absence of the lance and sword, which were replaced by the
rifle. The few achievements of the Russian cavalry were made through the effect
of firearms. However, the cavalry units of both armies had little significance
for the overall outcome of the Russo–Japanese War, and their basic weaknesses
were quickly demonstrated. The Russian cavalry often lacked fighting spirit, as
recorded by General Aleksei Kuropatkin in his memoirs: “Until cavalry is
educated to feel that it should fight as obstinately as infantry, the money
expended on our mounted arm is wasted.” Still, spirit was not the only cause.
Horses were costly to maintain and the transport and effectiveness of cavalry
was insignificant in siege warfare, such as in the siege of Port Arthur, or
trench warfare, like that which developed before the battle of Mukden.
Artillery.
The Russo–Japanese War witnessed a massive use of artillery,
but it was not a revolutionary step in the development of this branch. While
the amount of usage and the centralization of control during the war were
without precedent, field artillery reached maturity only during World War I.
The use of goniometers for measuring angles, panoramic sights, field telephones
(especially by the Japanese), and even aerial observation by balloons allowed
the commanding officers in the field to use their artillery firepower against
targets outside the line of sight of the batteries used. These technological
advances, together with the increase in the range and effectiveness of the
guns, made it possible to concentrate the fire of a whole army corps on a
single target. At the battle of Liaoyang, for example, medium and heavy
artillery were massively employed. On the Japanese side alone there were 56
heavy guns and mortars and a total of 470 guns. During the battle of Sha-ho, 48
Russian guns fired 8,000 rounds in 40 minutes; at the battle of Tashihchiao, a
battery fired 500 rounds per gun.
The battle of Sha-ho may furnish a further instance of
successful concentration of the fire of dispersed batteries. The concealment of
batteries in action began to be more fully realized and the impracticability of
close support by guns pushed forward into the infantry firing line under the
enemy’s small-arms fire was demonstrated on many occasions. The advances of
technology, achieved already in the 19th century, made the use of artillery and
indirect fire in the battlefield safer and simpler, and during this war
indirect fire at last became the norm. All in all, the two armies used
unprecedented quantities of artillery ammunition. The Imperial Russian Army,
for example, spent about 900,000 artillery rounds during the entire war, a tiny
proportion of the 65.3 million manufactured and imported by Russia during World
War I, and a fraction of the 360 millions shells and bombs Russia alone
manufactured during World War II.
Still, the Imperial Japanese Army appeared to be more
adapted to the modern use of artillery during the Russo–Japanese War. It used
screens of artillery shelling to cover the advance of its infantry with very
accurate and close support, through the extensive employment of field
telephones and flag signaling. The tactics of advancing, positioning, and
deploying the artillery forces evolved as well. The Japanese used camouflage
and batteries to conceal the positioning of their guns from the Russian troops,
and they watered the roads on which they moved them to prevent dust clouds that
would have given away their position and movements. Until the Russo–Japanese
War, shelling would stop when the attacking troops were still far from their
target to prevent their being harmed, but now Japanese artillery officers often
continued shelling almost up to the Russian trenches and ceased only moments
before the assault began. During the war the Russians displayed improved
gunnery performance and innovation as well. In the fortification of Port
Arthur, for example, they placed most of their guns in batteries outside the
forts of the main perimeter, contrary to common practice, thus eliminating
“dead” ground and forcing the attacker to disperse his fire. Altogether, the
use of artillery in the Russo–Japanese War inaugurated the era of mass
bombardment and close support for the advancing troops, a fact that did not
attract much attention of military observers.
During the Russo–Japanese War the distinction between guns
and howitzers gradually disappeared and both sides employed successfully a
small number of howitzers. Both sides used an increasingly large number of
120-millimeter [4.7-inch] Krupp-design howitzers purchased before the turn of
the century, as well as a small number of 150-millimeter [5.9-inch] Model 38
howitzers (only in Japan). Only the Japanese, however, made full use of this
type of gun by mobilizing 18 gigantic Krupp-made 280-millimeter [11-inch]
howitzers at Port Arthur. Their firepower was exploited to the utmost during
the siege of the fort and was instrumental in razing the Russian defenses. The
Russian artillery corps were equipped with superb quick-firing Putilov M-1903
76.2-millimeter [3-inch] field guns, which replaced the older M-1900. Even
though these guns were most up-to-date, they were still heavier and less
maneuverable than the Japanese guns. In addition, both sides made use of
various older guns of 90 to 120 millimeters, and the Russians also employed
during the siege of Port Arthur naval guns, mainly of 152 millimeters [6
inches] and smaller, which were removed from the warships of the Pacific Fleet.
Both sides made some limited use of heavy mortars, especially in mountain
engagements and around Port Arthur against nearby targets protected by hills or
other obstacles. They were of 90–150 millimeter caliber and could fire up to
30-kilogram [66-pound] shells a short distance.
