Men from FschJgRgt.1 at the airfield of Fornebu near Oslo, Norway,
April 1940.
However the resupply drop had also alerted the Norwegians.
In the afternoon they commenced another attack and for the first time a heavy
gun was employed. The defenders of Lindsø were forced back to their ultimate
positions. After another paratrooper was killed and some more had been wounded,
the number of combat effectives was reduced to about forty. As a result the
prisoners had to be guarded by the less seriously wounded men. There was also
the problem of about 50 inhabitants from the farmsteads who were still present
in the defended buildings.
At 1700 hrs a Norwegian officer under a flag of truce
delivered a demand for surrender. When this was turned down again the commanding
officer of the Norwegians let Oberleutnant Schmidt know that the Norwegians
would from now on shell the position without regard for the prisoners and the
civilians. During the negotiations a Norwegian medical doctor, who had arrived
together with the officer, treated the most seriously wounded of both sides.
The shelling was maintained through the night of 18/19 April
and in the morning the Norwegians, supported by artillery and mortars, attacked
Lindsø from three sides. Yet again, ultimate success was denied to them. A new
demand for surrender was again refused by Oberleutnant Schmidt, who gambled for
time by the announcement that a German bombing attack was underway.
In the course of the renewed battle, a Ju 52 with resupply
stores once more approached Lindsø. However, the aircraft was directed by the
radio on the ground to turn away, as the ring of enemy around the position was
considered too tight to allow for the recovery of dropped material.
After two more paratroopers were killed and three wounded by
the increasingly precise fire of the enemy, their ammunition running out and a
successful breakout considered impossible, Oberleutnant Schmidt, in agreement
with his two platoon leaders, around noon decided to end the fight. After the
remaining ammunition was used up, the radio and the weapons were destroyed and
the position was handed over to the Norwegians at 1400 hrs.
The paratroopers at Lindsø were taken prisoners. Initially
they were taken to Dombås, where they were also interrogated by British officers.
In the evening the men who were considered fit for transport were brought to
Åndalsnes. There they joined the previously captured paratroopers. During the
transport to Åndalsnes, an Oberjäger and a private managed to escape, however
they were caught by British soldiers and were later sent to Canada under
British custody.
The 3 officers and 126 other ranks of reinforced
1./FschJgRgt.1 deemed fit for transport were then loaded on a trawler and
brought to Kristiansund, an island about 60 km north of Åndalsnes. There they
were confined in a school building under strong guard. When Kristiansund was
completely destroyed by a German bombing attack on 28 April, the paratroopers
were moved to a heavily guarded prison camp on the isle of Averøy, not far from
the previous location. There one of the men was shot in the camp, without any
reason, by a soldier of the guard from outside the camp. His was the twenty-
fourth death since the start of the company’s commitment in the Dombås mission.
On 5 May a detachment of motorcycle infantry from Regiment
General Göring reached Averøy and liberated their fellow soldiers. The
paratroopers, who by this action had been saved from being shipped to Great
Britain, were brought back to Oslo, where they arrived on 9 May. Still marked
by the past combat and captivity they were ordered, quite incomprehensibly to
them, to remain there. A few days earlier the seriously wounded of the company
had arrived by means of a medical transport, but had immediately been moved to
military hospitals in Germany. They had been taken care of by Norwegians in a
medical installation in Alesund (about 80 km west of Åndalsnes) until the
arrival of German troops.
Abteilung Walther was airlifted back to its home garrison at
Stendal on 18 April, after Gruppe XXI had launched the offensive into central
Norway and the operations against remaining Norwegian forces in north-eastern
Norway.
Upon the return of Abteilung Walther to Stendal the
employment of I./FschJgRgt.1 in the initial phase of Weserübung had officially
been terminated. The 3rd and 4th companies of the battalion had accomplished
their tasks as had been planned. Their commitment had been totally unexpected
by the enemy. Therefore, almost no defensive measures had been prepared at
their objectives. The losses in personnel of the staff and of 2nd and 3rd
companies were replaced and all units which returned to Stendal were refitted
as required. Immediately upon notice of the fate of reinforced 1./FschJgRgt.1
the rebuild of the company and the signals platoon was initiated.
The parachute assault foreseen for the 1st and 2nd companies
of I./FschJgRgt.1 at Fornebu, would have been as successful as those of its
sister units. However it had failed because of the weather or, to be more
precise, due to lack of preparation in allowing the air transport to the
objective independent of weather conditions.
To the same degree as Operation Weserübung as a whole, the
successful employment of parachute troops had been a matter of achieving
surprise as well as trust in the lack of appropriate preparations of the enemy
for the defence and in his irresoluteness in waging war. With reference to
Denmark, the risks for airborne actions had been rather low as relief forces of
the Heer had already been close to the objectives at the time of their
execution. These objectives could probably have been taken from the ground as
well. Organized resistance by Danish troops or the interference of British air
forces could, however, have threatened the quick success of the airborne operations
against the airfields at Ålborg, the early utilization of which was necessary
for initial air operations against Norway.
The seizure of the airfield at Stavanger-Sola by parachute
assault had allowed for the unhindered air-landing of combat and service
support troops, following close up with the initial units. These had been
required for two highly important reasons:
- The fast occupation of the seaport of Stavanger
and its hinterland, as fast warships of the Navy for the transport of troops
had not been available; - The build-up of the spacious airfield as a main
base for the interdiction of the Luftwaffe against British and French naval
forces operating in the sea regions along the coast of southern and central
Norway, and as a stopover for short-range combat and transport aircraft
destined to operate over and from Trondheim.
3./FschJgRgt.1 had accomplished its mission with relatively
low losses as the enemy had not been prepared to counter a parachute assault.
Nevertheless, by the high standard of their training and vigour these men had
fully confirmed the confidence placed in them.
Fornebu, too, had been more of an example of incomplete and
belated defensive preparations, in conjunction with a Norwegian lack of
equipment for modern warfare, than of a well thought of contingency plan on the
German side. A single unit the size of a battalion, equipped with adequate
numbers of automatic weapons, fighting resolutely, could have defeated the
improvised initial air-landing of German troops. Thereby, as the coup de main
of German naval forces in the Oslo Fjord had failed, an extremely unfavourable
situation for southern Norway could have developed for Gruppe XXI.
The parachute attack at Dombås was ordered by the OKW after
the intention of the Allies to land troops on the coast of central Norway had
been detected. This measure had to be regarded as expedient, as, under the
prevailing circumstances, it was the only one promising to delay the
anticipated (and then executed) thrust of Allied troops into central Norway and
their uniting with Norwegian forces sufficiently long to allow for the
interference of German divisions from Oslo. In the light of the OKW’s
intention, the question needs to be answered as to why X.Flieger-Korps, upon
receipt of the OKW directive, dated 14 April, had not moved the 3rd and 4th
companies of I./FschJgRgt.1 to Norway for commitment in Dombås, thereby
complying with number 3.(c) of the directive? One reason may have been that, by
the time the directive was received and exploited, reinforced 1./FschJgRgt.1
had already been underway to Dombås or, possibly, had even jumped there. The
principal reason for denying the commitment of these companies at Dombås,
however, must be seen in the fact that about this time the start of the
offensive in the west was ordered for 13 May. Every man was now required to
accomplish the tasks planned for the parachute force in Holland. This was also
true for the aircraft of I. and II./KG z.b.V.1. Moreover X.Flieger-Korps may
have considered itself no more competent for the commitment of parachute forces
in the Norwegian area of operations, as it had been placed under command of
Luftflotte 5 which in the meantime had been generated in order to direct all
air operations in Norway, in cooperation with the likewise formed Luftwaffe
territorial command for Norway.
The reason why the Luftwaffe liaison staff with Gruppe XXI
had bent its own order as to the number of parachute units to be committed at
Dombås, has already been mentioned. That Generalmajor Süßmann had insisted on
the execution of the operation on 14 April may have been based on additional
information about the enemy and the operational intentions of Gruppe XXI which
he may have brought along from Oslo. In view of the approaching darkness, he
had obviously seen no more opportunity to meet the missing prerequisites for
the undertaking and therefore had taken the risk to neglect them. His attitude,
as the events had shown, had decisively contributed to the failure of the
mission. On the other hand, the fact that all transport aircraft had managed to
take off safely from Fornebu despite the inclement weather had spoken for the
General, who had based his order to fly on his experience as commander of an
aviation formation in his previous position.
The narrow time frame between the order to conduct a
parachute attack at Dombås and its execution clearly indicates that the higher
commands involved still lacked experience about the lead time which was
required for operations of this kind. Generalleutnant Student, too, seems to
have been ignorant about the importance of the prerequisites for successful
airborne operations and even more so about the inevitable head-start in time
for the technical and logistical preparations of such operations. This had become
visible during the course of the prosecution against Generalmajor Süßmann, who
was suspected of a dereliction of the duties of a superior after the operation
at Dombås. When called up, Student, as an expert witness, had stated that
mission and time pressure could make it necessary to conduct a parachute attack
without prior complete intelligence-gathering, and reconnaissance of the drop
zone.
The views of the staff of Fl.Div.7 differed from those of
Student; they had raised a warning about the operational shortcomings during
the commitment of parachute and air-landing troops in Norway, with a view on
the future commitment of forces of this kind. Its secret report about the
experiences of the employment in Scandinavia, dated 23 April 1940, had requested
binding orders by the highest command involved and had stated verbatim that it
was impossible to place the responsibility for the take-off of transport
aircraft or its cancellation into the hands of individual commanders by phrases
such as “according to the weather conditions.” In subsequent sections of this
report the warnings were even more drastic, pointing out that the employment of
parachute troops in unknown terrain without preceding reconnaissance would
result in failure and in high losses. It had also requested that parachuting in
the immediate vicinity of an enemy airfield had to be the exception.
As to what extent the commander of the parachute force and
his superiors paid attention to these statements in future operations?!
The first performance of the German parachute force in its
very own mode of employment during the initial phase of Operation Weserübung
had shown that the aims intended for it had been achieved. All of them had been
operational-level in nature. The Norwegian and Danish armed forces had been
totally unprepared for the dimensions of the use of air power on the German
side as well as for parachute attacks and air-landings of ground forces. After
Weserübung, however, the secret about the parachute force, which had still been
guarded during the campaign in Poland, was lifted with the exception of that of
the glider. The principal opponents of Germany and the military commands of
Holland and Belgium had been provided with the opportunity to take precautions
against this kind of warfare. Whether this opportunity was used will also be
examined later.
The actions of the paratroopers in Denmark, at Stavanger and
around Oslo but also the dogged endurance of the still combat ready elements of
1./FschJgRgt.1 after the unfortunate start of the undertaking at Dombås, gave
proof to the superior military commands, that the newly created troops had
confidence in themselves to master the tasks presented. There had been no lack
in resoluteness, ingenuity and will to fight among both, leaders and men.
Therefore the high command could confidently look forward to more missions for
the parachute force.
The risky employment of almost all of the surface craft of
the German Navy and the airborne undertakings at Stavanger, Fornebu and Trondheim
had resulted in the desired surprise success, but had not ended the fighting in
Norway. Only after the lines of communication into central Norway had been
opened against Norwegian and British troops, forcing the latter to hastily
embark again, did the German command consider its gains in the Norwegian
theatre of war safe up to Trondheim. However, the situation in northern Norway,
where a task force of about 2,000 soldiers from the 3.Gebirgs-Div. under
Generalmajor Dietl had been landed by ten destroyers at Narvik, remained
critical. After successful actions by British naval forces against the German
destroyers in the fjords at Narvik, the loss of most of the vessels with
supplies and heavy weapons on the way to Narvik and the closure of the sea lanes
around the Lofoten and Vesterålen islands by the British Home Fleet, Dietl
stood isolated and inadequately supplied. Units of the Norwegian 6th Division
moved toward Narvik from two sides through the mountainous terrain. Moreover,
since 16 April strong Allied ground forces were landing at the port of Harstad,
on the northern tip of the Hinnoya islands, about 60 km north-west of Narvik.
Preliminary operations of both Norwegian and Allied troops aiming to retake
Narvik and to eliminate Kräftegruppe Dietl were launched on 24 April. Allied
warships entered the fjords and fired in support of the ground forces, thereby
considerably hampering the movements of the defenders.
After 13 April Hitler saw the operation against Narvik as a
failure and looked for possibilities to rescue Kräftegruppe Dietl. The resolute
attitude of Generalmajor Jodl and the confidence displayed by Generalmajor
Dietl, however, had won over Hitler’s fears, so that the operation had been
carried on despite tremendous difficulties.
Since the end of April it had become possible to resupply
Dietl from the air and to provide air support, although to a very limited
extent due to the distance of more than 600 km between Trondheim and Narvik,
the adverse weather, the air threat from the airfield at Bardufoss and from
British carrier groups, which turned out to be most obstructive.
For relief operations on the ground, elements of
2.Gebirgs-Div., under Generalmajor Feurstein, were brought to Trondheim.
However for the relief to become effective several weeks of waiting had to be
reckoned with.
Of the air transport formations, only KGr z.b.V.107 and 108
remained in Norway, primarily for the support of the garrison at Narvik. KG
z.b.V.1 and 2 were speedily refitted in Germany for the campaign in the west.
Two of the special purpose air transport combat groups were returned to the
training command of the Luftwaffe in order to again enlarge the training
capacity for pilots and aircrews.
After his strongest doubts about Narvik had been dispersed,
Hitler turned his attention fully back to Fall Gelb. British documents, dated
early April 1940, which had been captured in Norway, were considered extremely
useful for political action. They clearly laid open the planning of the Allies
to occupy ports in Norway, to get ahead of similar German actions. These
documents were now widely used for propaganda purposes and Ribbentrop, the
German minister of foreign affairs, published a white paper in order to
convince the German people and the world at large that the Allies were
unwilling to respect the neutrality of smaller European countries. The deeper
idea behind this step obviously had been to make the impending military actions
against the Benelux states appear to be preventive measures upon their
execution.
On 27 April Hitler disclosed his intentions to his personal
entourage to begin Fall Gelb between 1 and 7 May. He passed the command of the
Norwegian theatre of war entirely to Gruppe XXI, Luftflotte 5 and the Office
for Naval Warfare. On 29 April he determined that the Luftwaffe had to be ready
for Fall Gelb on 5 May. The following day he ordered that from the 4 May the
Wehrmacht, as a whole, must be able to commence the attack on 24 hours’ notice.
The decisive factor for the beginning of the offensive in
the west now became the weather. It remained unfavourable for the employment of
the Luftwaffe, which was regarded as the key to success in the initial phase of
Fall Gelb; consequently the date for the attack was moved back on a day-to-day
basis. As the weather forecast was more favourable on 9 May, and Holland,
because of serious warnings, had commenced with measures for civil defence,
Hitler decided to fix the ultimate date for the attack as 10 May. Announced to
the public as a visit to Oslo, on the evening of 9 May he and his personal
staff travelled in his special train to the command post for the campaign in
the west, which had been prepared near Münstereifel.
The attack forces of all three services of the Wehrmacht
had, like in the preceding days, again received two code words for 10 May, one
for the beginning of the attack and the other for its cancellation.
Sturmabteilung Koch and the Luftlande-Korps stood ready at their jump-off
airfields with the highest degree of readiness.
