Fallschirmjäger of 4./FschJgRgt.1 who have been relieved by forces from
the Heer on the island of Masnedǿ and at Vordingborg await their transport back
to Germany.
In the meantime the command section had cleared the runway
of barbed wire rolls and the canopies of parachutes, and laid out recognition
flags and landing crosses. At the same time the reinforced 5th squad seized a
large house about 500m from the airfield from which it was fired upon. The 6th
squad occupied a beach hotel which had been abandoned by the enemy.
Fifty minutes after the begin of the parachute assault, the
first transport aircraft of KGr z.b.V.104, with soldiers of I./InfRgt.193
aboard, landed on the runway which had survived the preceding air raid intact.
During these initial air-landings another German soldier, a Feldwebel of a
radio team, was killed by fire from a Me 110.
3./FschJgRgt.1 had paid for its successful coup de main
against the airfield at Stavanger-Sola with three killed and eight wounded.
About half of these losses were caused by friendly fire. Of the Norwegian
forces located on or near the airfield, 57 soldiers, among them 4 officers,
were made prisoners of war. By noon the killed and wounded men of
3./FschJgRgt.1 were being flown out to Germany and around 1300 hrs the missing
8th squad arrived from Stade.
By the evening of 9 April the headquarters of InfRgt.193, I.
and II./InfRgt.193, two Nachrichten-Ju, six heavy Me 110 fighters, six dive
bombers of I./StG 1, a squadron of He 111 bombers and an air transport squadron
with aviation fuel had landed at the airfield.
An airfield service company and elements of Luftgau-Stab 200
[Air Region Command 200], which was air-landed by KGr z.b.V.105, were able to
render the airfield fully operational by the afternoon of 9 April.
On 10 April at 0800 hrs, 3./FschJgRgt.1 handed over the
security of the airfield to 1./InfRgt.193 and at 1300 hrs was airlifted back to
Stade. They arrived at 1650 hrs and were transported by rail to
Stendal-Borstel, arriving on 11 April.
On 9 April 0530 hrs. the staff and the 5th and 6th squadrons
from II./KGz.b.V. 1 and an assigned Nachrichten-Ju, altogether 29 Ju 52s took
off from Schleswig with I./FschJgRgt.1, less its 3rd and 4th companies, bound
for the airfield at Fornebu situated about 6 km west of Oslo. The operation
order of Gruppe XXI for the occupation of Oslo, dated 14 March 1940, section
8.(c) stated that the mission for this battalion was to secure after parachuting
the air-landing of the first air transport squadron with follow-on forces
provided by the Heer, thereby gaining a start position for the occupation of
Oslo from the west. The sole responsibility for the seizure of the airfield was
assigned to the commanding officer of I./FschJgRgt.1, Hauptmann Walther. In
Section 8.(f), the operation order contained a possible subsequent mission for
I./FschJgRgt.1. This was the seizure of the airfield at Kjeller, which lay
about 17 km north-east of Oslo, in order to accelerate the air-landings.
Dense and low cloud over the Skagerrak made it necessary,
for security reasons, to break up the flight formation of the two squadrons of
II./KG z.b.V.1 into individual flights of three aircraft each. When some of the
aircraft lost visual contact within the formation its commanding officer,
Oberstleutnant Drews, against the heavy protest of Hauptmann Walther, ordered
his formation to return to Schleswig. Drews reported his decision via radio to
the air transport ground chief but received confirmation directly from the
command of X.Flieger-Korps. All aircraft of the formation were now on their way
back, except the flight of two Ju 52, with the battalion staff aboard, and the
Nachrichten-Ju.
The air movement toward Fornebu was also continued by 8 Me
110 fighters of I./ZG 26 under Oberleutnant Hansen, which were detailed for
close air support during the parachute assault and for protection against enemy
fighters.
About 60 km west of the airfield the cloud cover began to
break up. Plainly visible now, the approaching aircraft received air-defence
fire from Fornebu airfield. Consequently the Nachrichten-Ju now turned away.
The Me 110s which were flying ahead were engaged in a lengthy aerial combat
with nine Norwegian Gloucester Gladiator biplane fighters which had taken off
from the airfield. The fighters succeeded in shooting down one of their agile
opponents and in destroying two more on the ground after these had landed on
the airfield to refuel. Two of the Me 110s were also lost. After the remaining
Gladiators had withdrawn the Me 110s began to suppress the anti-aircraft
weapons on the ground. The crews of two anti-aircraft machine guns at the
northern edge of the airfield quickly abandoned their positions, whereas the
three anti-aircraft guns in the emplacements at the eastern edge continued to
fire, unconcerned.
At 0933 hrs the two Ju 52 carrying the staff of
I./FschJgRgt.1, Oberleutnant Götte, a medical officer, nine non-commissioned
officers and five other ranks touched down on the airfield. The landing was
successful, as the anti-aircraft guns had no view over its western part.
Quickly the soldiers, who had got rid of their parachutes and picked up their
arms from the weapon containers during the approach flight, occupied the
buildings with the direction finder and the switchboard, after they had
overcome the weak resistance of the Norwegians of a searchlight platoon west of
the runway.
About this time the first of 53 Ju 52 of KGr z.b.V.103, with
II./InfRgt.324 aboard, which was following 20 minutes behind I./FschJgRgt.1,
arrived at the airfield. The commanding officer of this group, Hauptmann
Wagner, had also received an order to return to base from the command of
X.Flieger-Korps. As this order was not submitted by the “air transport ground
chief”, as arranged beforehand, Hauptmann Wagner suspected a ruse by the enemy
and had carried on with his original mission.
The first Ju 52, piloted by Hauptmann Wagner, was hit by
anti-aircraft fire during the descent. In this attack Wagner and four of the
plane’s passengers were killed. As a result this Ju 52 left formation, but the
aircraft right behind it managed to land undamaged and unloaded its
infantrymen. In short intervals more and more transport aircraft followed.
In the meantime the first of the Me 110s, which were running
out of fuel, also landed. Their crews joined in the combat on the ground,
firing the rear machine guns of their aircraft at the anti-aircraft guns. These
stopped firing at 1000 hrs because their crews withdrew about 3 km along the
road leading to the north. Here, in positions favourable for defence, they
waited for reinforcements.
By 1100hrs the majority of II./InfRgt.324 was on the ground.
The battalion took over the protection of the airfield from the paratroopers.
In this brief engagement these had captured six Norwegian soldiers and seized
two anti-aircraft guns and two anti-aircraft machine guns and destroyed two
searchlights.
As ordered by the chief of staff of Gruppe XXI, Hauptmann
Spiller, the Luftwaffe attaché at the German embassy in Oslo, arrived and
temporarily took over the function of the airfield commandant. At this time
Spiller had no telephone or radio communication with the embassy and therefore
was not informed of the costly failure of the Navy’s coup de main in the Oslo
Fjord. Here, the cruiser Blücher, which was leading Gruppe 9 into the fjord,
capsized after heavy bombardment from coastal guns and torpedo batteries of the
Norwegian coastal command. It sank in the Døbrak defile. Around 1,500 of the
2,500 soldiers and naval personnel aboard the cruiser perished in this
catastrophe. Among the troops embarked had been elements of the staffs of
Gruppe XXI and 163.Inf.Div. as well as the shock troop who was supposed to
arrest the Norwegian king and government.
Utilizing the considerable confusion on the Norwegian side,
Götte and his men, riding in confiscated motor vehicles, managed to reach the
German embassy around noon. After he had reported the seizure of the airfield
at Fornebu, the embassy’s naval attaché guided his group to a Norwegian
anti-aircraft position at the edge of Oslo in order to seize it. However the
position had already been abandoned by its crew. Two heavy anti-aircraft guns,
two anti-aircraft machine guns, a radio transmitter and a range finder were
captured undamaged. On the way back to Oslo Gruppe Götte met with German
infantry approaching from Fornebu and was informed about the capitulation of
the Norwegian garrison of Oslo.
The shock troop, under Oberleutnant Götte, was tasked with
the pursuit of the Norwegian king and government and was reinforced with a
heavy machine gun half-platoon of an infantry battalion and received marching
orders for Hamar. Its mission was to arrest the political leaders there and
bring them back to Oslo.
About 30 km north of Oslo the shock troop came up against a
Norwegian cavalry unit. An officer and 22 cavalrymen were taken prisoner and
later two motorcycle dispatch-riders were also captured. However when superior
Norwegian forces were detected, Oberleutnant Götte decided to withdraw his
forces. During the ride back he quite unexpectedly met 2./ FschJgRgt.1
accompanied by Hauptleute Walther and Spiller. Hauptmann Walther, who had
received the same mission as Oberleutnant Götte, ordered the latter to turn
around and to take the point of the detachment with his shock troop. Quickly
the question about the sudden appearance of Hauptmann Walther and his 2nd
Company was answered.
After the commanding officer of II./KG z.b.V.1 had ordered
the two squadrons of his command with him to return to Schleswig, his own
aircraft and those with the majority of 2./FschJgRgt.1 aboard had landed on one
of the airfields at Ålborg around 1030 hrs. Upon hearing the news that Fornebu
was in German hands these aircraft were refuelled. At 1300 hrs they had taken
off for Fornebu with Hauptmann Walther and his paratroopers who had left behind
their jump gear and picked up their arms from the weapon containers. Together
with the aircraft transporting III./InfRgt.307, Walther’s detachment landed on
Fornebu at 1500 hrs. 2./FschJgRgt.1 was made up less four squads, as their Ju
52 had joined the aircraft of 1./FschJgRgt.1 and those of the battalion’s
signals platoon back to Germany and finally to Stendal. On this flight one Ju
52 with a squad of 1./FschJgRgt.1 aboard collided with another Ju 52 and
crashed into the sea. Its crew and all 12 paratroopers aboard were killed. With
confiscated vehicles Hauptmann Walther and the reduced 2./FschJgRgt.1,
accompanied by Hauptmann Spiller, drove from Fornebu to Oslo and took billets
in the city hall. Shortly afterwards Hauptmann Spiller conveyed the mission to
Hauptmann Walther to bring back to Oslo the Norwegian king and government, who
were presumed to be still in Hamar. Hauptmann Spiller then stayed with the
detachment.
Due to the priority of the new mission, but probably also in
view of the weak personnel strength of 2./FschJgRgt.1, Gruppe XXI avoided
undertaking the originally planned employment of I./FschJgRgt.1 against the
airfield at Kjeller. The two battalions of InfRgt.324, parts of which were
still on the move to Oslo, were considered indispensable for the occupation of
the Norwegian capital and for the protection of Fornebu. At this time they were
the only fully available units of combat troops after the failure of the coup
de main from the sea. After all, elements of the Norwegian 1st and 2nd
divisions were known to be positioned in the vicinity of Oslo and could well
attempt actions to retake the city.
After some vehicles had been confiscated – the majority of
2./FschJgRgt.1 had to ride on two buses – Abteilung Walther moved out at 1700
hrs in the evening darkness and after a while picked up Stoßtrupp Götte.
Just before midnight on 9 April the point of Walther’s
column was stopped at a barricaded bridge at the southern entrance to Hamar and
was fired on by infantry. Half an hour later the obstacle was removed after the
Norwegian pickets had withdrawn. One squad of paratroopers remained in Hamar,
tasked with the mission to occupy the public buildings and to interrupt
telephone communications from the town to the outside. On 10 April 0045 hrs the
detachment moved on in the direction of Elverum on receipt of information that
the Norwegian king and government had settled down there for the night.
Around 0110 hrs the detachment came up against a road
barrier at the farmstead at Midtskogen, about 4 km south of Elverum. From there
it was fired at with machine guns and rifles. During the advance of
2./FschJgRgt.1 against the road barrier one paratrooper was killed and
Hauptmann Spiller was mortally wounded. The heavily defended farmstead was
taken after half an hour of combat and two Norwegians were captured. Due to the
growing resistance in front of Elverum, Hauptmann Walther decided to break off
the engagement and to return to Oslo. After picking up the squad left back in
Hamar the march continued under sporadic rifle fire from the surrounding
terrain.
About 30 km south of Hamar the detachment encountered a
large column of motor vehicles manned by Norwegian soldiers and approaching
from the opposite direction. By bold and resolute action the paratroopers
succeeded in disarming a few hundred of their surprised opponents, among them
about 30 officers and the commander, a colonel. The Norwegian unit was the 1st
Regiment of Dragoons. Its equipment comprised some field guns. The officers
were taken prisoner and the vehicles were integrated into the column. The
hundreds of Norwegian other ranks were sent away into the adjoining terrain
with some shots fired in the air, after they had shown some signs of resistance
in the face of the few Germans. After that, Walther’s column, now considerably
larger and with many of the captured vehicles being driven by inexperienced
paratroopers, moved on.
Shortly after a Norwegian anti-aircraft position was taken
out, the point of the detachment at about 1100hrs came up against another
column of Norwegian troops in front of a bridge some 30km south of Minnesund.
However, this time the Norwegians were combat ready. A few shots fired in front
of them prevented the leading German vehicles from crossing the bridge. The
commanding officer of the Norwegian force seemed to be well informed about the
low strength of Walther’s detachment and so he dispatched an officer with a
flag of truce. He referred to three infantry regiments and artillery following
close behind the Norwegian column and requested Walther to surrender. However
the German commander refused to believe this ruse. He called a bluff on his
part, making the negotiator believe that three parachute infantry regiments had
been dropped right behind his detachment, poised for attack in the case that
the road was not cleared of the Norwegians. As a consequence he requested their
capitulation. Eventually a mutual silence of weapons was agreed upon and
Walther’s detachment, made up of about 50 vehicles, including the captured
officers, passed the Norwegian column without incident. At around 1700 hrs it
arrived at a German outpost on the edge of Oslo. Besides the previously
captured prisoners and the vehicles, the booty comprised 3 field guns, 7 heavy
and 21 light machine guns, 600 rifles and 220,000 rounds for infantry weapons.
On the way into the city, Hauptmann Walther stopped at the fortress of Akershus
in order to report to the commander of the 162.Inf.Div., Generalmajor
Engelbrecht, who in the meantime had been placed in charge of all troops of the
Heer around Oslo. For the first time Generalmajor Engelbrecht received
information about the recent actions of the paratroopers. Walther’s soldiers,
who had not slept in the past 48 hours and had lived under conditions of
continuous strain, were now able to spend the night of 10/11 April resting in
their quarters in Oslo City Hall.
In the course of the morning of 10 April the remainder of
the troops, who had originally been allocated for the occupation of Oslo from
the sea, had been landed in the city’s port. Some of them were immediately
employed against Norwegian forces identified north and south of the capital.
Abteilung Walther was also drawn upon for reconnaissance. 2./FschJgRgt.1
received a mission early in the morning of 11 April; together with two
companies of infantry it was to advance into the hinterland of Oslo to the
North and East.
The company moved out at 0730 hrs in the direction of
Lillestrøm-Fedsund. At a destroyed bridge across the Vorma River west of Mes
the point platoon, under Leutnant Zuber, met with its first resistance. The
balance of 2./FschJgRgt.1 bypassed the contested area, moved on in a northerly
direction, crossed the Vorma over an undefended bridge at Swanfossen and
advanced along the river. The new point platoon under Leutnant Graf von
Blücher, consisting of two squads, soon encountered an abatis in front of
Bastuolen and was fired at from a nearby hill by riflemen in civilian clothes.
A shock troop, ordered forward by the company commander stormed the hill, where
most of its defenders were killed in the firefight. In the meantime, other
sub-units of the company had overcome the weak resistance in Bastuolen. The two
infantry companies which had been transported in buses took almost no part in
the engagement at Bastuolen. Their transports had continuously broken down and
therefore had not caught up with the paratroopers.
On 11 April 2./FschJgRgt.1 returned to Oslo. During the
mission one soldier was seriously wounded. It brought back 20 Norwegians as
prisoners, two of whom wore civilian clothing. A heavy machine gun with 3,000
cartridges, 10 rifles and various entrenching tools had also been captured.
Leutnant Zuber and 11 other ranks from 2./FschJgRgt.1 were
detailed to an infantry battalion on 12 April, in order to instruct its
personnel about the experience gained so far in combat against the Norwegians.
The infantry battalion was to conduct a reconnaissance in force into the area
of Spyderberg where, it was suspected, there were elements of a Norwegian
division. When the infantry was engaged, Zuber’s men were ordered to outflank
an enemy force which had tied down an infantry platoon. The mission was undertaken
successfully but on their way back the paratroopers were hit by concentrated
machine gun and artillery fire. A Feldwebel and another paratrooper were
seriously wounded. The latter died during his evacuation.
With the reconnaissance mission accomplished Zuber’s
detachment reported back to the company at 1600 hrs.
On 13 April 2./FschJgRgt.1was again employed. It was to
reconnoitre via Dammen and Titusberg against Porsgrunn, about 40 km south-west
of Oslo, and to destroy a broadcasting station there. For the mission the
company was reinforced with the three captured 8.5cm field guns and with 25
artillerymen as crews. The inexperience of the driver caused a truck to
overturn near Dammen, causing two soldiers to be seriously hurt and five others
lightly. Only once had the company come up against a road guard of six
Norwegians, who had been captured. It reached Porsgrunn and destroyed the
broadcasting station, as ordered. In spite of the fatigue of the drivers, the
road march back through partly mountainous terrain was accomplished without
further incidents. The detachment arrived in Oslo on 14 April 0100 hrs. Here
the soldiers had a well-deserved rest.
1./FschJgRgt.1, together with the battalion’s signals
platoon and four squads of 2./FschJgRgt.1, had been flown back to Schleswig as
decided by Oberstleutnant Drews. On order of X.Flieger-Korps these paratroopers
had been airlifted to Stendal on 12 April and had arrived at about 1300 hrs. On
the same day at 1530 hrs X.Flieger-Korps was ordered to convey 1./FschJgRgt.1
and the signals platoon to Oslo. The squad of the company which was lost over
the North Sea had been replaced by one of the four squads of 2./FschJgRgt.1
which were also returned to Stendal. After a stop-over in Schleswig,
1./FschJgRgt.1 and the signals platoon were airlifted to Oslo-Fornebu, where
they arrived on 13 April at 1900 hrs and took billets near the airfield.
On this evening a meeting was convened at the headquarters
of Gruppe XXI in a hotel in Oslo, to which Hauptmann Walther had also been
ordered to attend. The subject of the meeting was a parachute operation in the
area of Dombås. Some time earlier, the OKW had conducted deliberations about
the employment of parachute forces in central Norway. These deliberations were
probably triggered by intelligence about preparations for the landing of troops
of the Western allies at Trondheim and Bergen which had been gathered by German
signal and air reconnaissance.
On the morning of 14 April consultations about parachute
operations in central Norway were continued, but now under the direction of the
liaison staff of the Luftwaffe at Gruppe XXI under Oberst Knaus. The basis for
a decision was a directive from the OKW, which arrived at Gruppe XXI
headquarters in the morning and contained an order for the employment of
Fallschirmtruppen in the area of Dombås. This town, halfway between Oslo and
Trondheim at the northern exit of the Gudbrandsdal and about 250 km north-west
of Oslo, constituted an important traffic hub. Here the railway and the road
from Oslo bifurcated in a westerly direction toward the coast at Åndalsnes, and
in a northerly direction toward Trondheim. Whoever wanted to exercise control
over central Norway therefore had to be in possession of Dombås.
The conference beside Oberst Knaus was attended by the
commanding officer of II./KG z.b.V.1, Oberstleutnant Drews, responsible for the
transport of the paratroopers to the drop zone, Hauptmann Walther; Oberleutnant
Schmidt, the commanding officer of 1./FschJgRgt.1, Oberleutnant Diley from
3./StG 1, which was to fly interdiction against the railway from Åndalsnes and
Hauptmann Flakowski, the commandant of the airfield at Fornebu.
Shortly after noon, the operation order for the liaison
staff was ready. It stated:
1.British naval forces had landed troops at Åndalsnes in the
course of 13 April.
2.Friendly motorized forces advance to Dombås via
Lillehammer. Bombing attacks from Stavanger against British naval forces and
troops around Åndalsnes can be counted upon.
3.In order to prevent the advance of the British landing
force from Åndalsnes to Dombås
I./FschJgRgt.1 (two companies)
II./KG z.b.V.1
3./StG 1
will be employed and placed under command of Gruppe XXI.
4.Execution:
a)3./StG 1 is to destroy the railway Åndalsnes-Dombås at
vulnerable points as far to the north-west as possible;
b)I./FschJgRgt.1 is to seize the traffic hub at Dombås;
c)II./KG z.b.V.1 is to reconnoitre, together with
I./FschJgRgt.1, suitable terrain for the parachuting near Dombås; is to drop
I./FschJgRgt.1 (two companies), and is to prepare to supply the dropped
parachute units from the air.
More precise information about the situation was not
available to the liaison staff. The Germans, however, had also recognized the
landing of British troops at Namsos about 220 km north of Trondheim, during the
night of 13/14 April and probably had also detected the approach of naval
convoys with additional troops toward the Norwegian coast.
As was found out later, the Allied supreme war council,
after some deliberation, had decided to renounce a direct attack against
Trondheim. Instead, by Operation Maurice, the British 146th Brigade (2 bns) and
the 5e demi-brigade of the French 5th Light Division were to be landed at
Namsos. It had been the advance-party of these forces, some 350 British marines
and armed sailors, whose landing in Namsos on the night of 13/14 April was
detected by the Germans. At Åndalsnes, about 350 km south-west of Trondheim,
the British 15th and 148th brigades (3 bns each) were to be landed shortly
thereafter in Operation Sickle. In cooperation with Norwegian troops Maurice
Force and Sickle Force subsequently were to seize Trondheim from two sides.
