The morning after. Altmark aground Jossingfjord.
At first, Lieutenant Halvorsen did not recognise the
approaching ship, but when he did, he hailed Cossack, requesting her to heave
to. Vian obliged and hailed back that he had orders from the British government
to `liberate the 400 prisoners on board Altmark’, suggesting a joint
Norwegian-British team board her via Kjell. Lieutenant Halvorsen answered that
this would not be possible based on the instructions he had from his superiors
and, anyway, his ship could not manoeuvre in the fjord due to the ice. After
some more parleying, Halvorsen reluctantly agreed to come onboard Cossack as an
observer. Entering the bridge of the destroyer at 23:30, Halvorsen was informed
by Vian that he intended to carry out a search of Altmark as soon as possible,
with or without Norwegian consent. Halvorsen, based on the information
available to him, believed that there were no prisoners on board Altmark and
repeated that the British ship would have to leave Norwegian waters forthwith.
The Norwegian lieutenant later held that he asked the British captain: `If
there are no prisoners on board the Altmark – what then?’ to which Vian
answered: `Well, that will be a mistake from my government’s side.’ Vian, on
the other hand, later claimed that during the subsequent discussions with
Halvorsen on the bridge of Cossack he repeatedly suggested a joint
Norwegian-British escort should take Altmark to Bergen for a proper search by
Norwegian authorities, as suggested by the Admiralty. Lieutenant Halvorsen, in
his report to Commanding Admiral, firmly denied this and in a letter dated 25
January 1954 to the War History Department stated he could `definitely not
recall any such suggestions’.
Kaptein Lura of Fireren had his man at the telephone inform
Kristiansand Sea Defence Sector that a British destroyer was moving into the
fjord in spite of protests. The message was forwarded to Rear Admiral
Smith-Johanssen in Horten, who returned orders to keep protesting, but not to
apply any force.
Kapitän Dau had gone to his sea cabin to get some rest when
things settled down in the late afternoon. Now he was called back to the bridge
when a newcomer was sighted between the Norwegian torpedo boats. Dau had his
signalman repeatedly flash `What ship?’ from Altmark’s bridge, but no answer
came back. Suspicious as ever, he ordered the tanker to advance further into
the ice, to a position from where the torpedo boats and the stranger could be
observed in silhouette against the open skyline at the mouth of the fjord. The
distance between Altmark and the other ships increased to some 500-600 yards.
At 23:46, a signal was flashed from the unknown ship in standard international
code, asking: `Do you need assistance?’ followed by `Please hang a ladder over
your side’, repeated several times. Altmark did not answer, but kept asking for
the name of the unknown ship.
At 23:58, Cossack let the mask fall and moved towards the
tanker. A signal was flashed for the German to lie by for boarding, or fire
would be opened. Dau used his searchlights to dazzle the men on Cossack’s
bridge and accelerated back down the channel in the ice at full astern, trying
to ram the destroyer. At the same time he ordered all men not needed in the
engine room, to come on deck and the boats to be prepared for lowering. A
weighted bag containing secret papers was thrown overboard while the water was
still deep enough for it to sink beyond recovery. Altmark had been rigged for
self-destruction with primed demolition charges in the lower hull. Igniting
these would have meant certain death for the 300 prisoners still confined
below, however, and Dau hesitated to give the order. After a while it was too
late and no orders were given to scuttle or open the sea-cocks.
Cossack turned to starboard, attempting to lay her port side
onto the tanker. Altmark had picked up speed, though, and slammed into the
destroyer just abaft the bridge. At an angle of some 30 degrees, the stern of
the tanker scraped down the port side of her much lighter opponent. Cossack was
pressed sideways with her starboard side towards the eastern shore of the fjord
and a very dangerous situation developed. Being crushed between the tanker and
shore would inevitably have meant severe damage to the destroyer and it is not
unlikely that she would have lost seaworthiness. Expert manoeuvring and an
immediate engine response to `full power ahead’ saved Cossack from crippling
damage. The destroyer slipped aft of the onrushing tanker, re-emerging on her
starboard side while the edge of the ice held firm and kept Cossack off the
rocky shoreline, the two ships scraping alongside each other.
When the two ships touched, some of the boarding party took
the opportunity of jumping across to the tanker, in spite of the tremendous
risk. The first was Lieutenant Commander Bradwell Turner, who leapt across in a
6-foot jump, which would make him famous throughout the Royal Navy. Petty
Officer Norman Atkins followed, but was not as lucky. Falling short, he just
managed to grab a railing and was helped on board by Turner, pretty shaken.
Further aft, Sub-Lieutenant Craven jumped across from a torpedo davit, just
moments before it was crushed by the contact with Altmark. A manila hawser was
briefly secured from Cossack’s forecastle and some thirty-three men in leather
jackets and steel helmets scrambled across, armed with rifles and bayonets.
They spread quickly through the ship, while Cossack steered clear, the hawser
having been cut.
Turner and Craven led a group of men towards the bridge at a
trot. Several weather-tight doors barred the route but they eventually managed
to open them and found their way in, cornering most of the men on the bridge at
gunpoint. `Lieutenant Commander Turner [.] ended for me a situation, which
threatened the grounding or loss of Cossack,’ Vian later wrote, continuing:
Having with his
escorts, disarmed such officers who carried revolvers, [Turner] dispossessed
the officer on the starboard telegraphs, which were showing `Full Speed Ahead’
and placed them to `Stop’ The officer got to the port (duplicate telegraphs)
and put them again to `Full Speed Ahead’. Lieutenant Commander Turner dealt
with this too and thereafter held the Germans with hands up until grounding
occurred.
First, the telegraphs in all likelihood showed `Full speed
astern’ as Altmark went sternwards onto the ground. Second, in Kapitän Dau’s
version, the `dispossessed’ officer at the main telegraphs was Third Officer
Walter Schmidt, while he himself manipulated the duplicates, deliberately
grounding the ship to damage its rudder and propellers as much as possible in
an attempt to avoid capture. Whichever way it actually happened, the result was
that Altmark grounded stern first at about 4 knots in Nodavika, close to the
narrow road lining the east side of Jossingfjord.
Meanwhile, on deck, gunfire started. According to Vian’s
report the firing:
commenced when Mr
Smith, Gunner, in charge of the after party was shot from ahead as he advanced
up an alleyway. Several ratings testify to being shot at, one lightly hit.
Later on, when British prisoners were being released, a number of the German
armed guard whom I only discovered after departure were seamen of Graf Spee,
decamped over the stern of Altmark, and making their way across ice, reached an
eminence on shore, from which they opened fire on boarding party on after deck.
[.] Following a most careful examination of witnesses, I have no doubt at all
that the Germans fired first.
Turner wrote in his report that orders were given to the
boarding party:
to use sufficient
force to overcome opposition but not to fire unless fired at (as a safety
measure, magazine cut-offs were closed and the chambers of rifles were not
loaded.). [.] I believe that the captain of the Altmark [.] did not intend to
use firearms; the firing which started on the German side was probably the act
of individuals.
In Dau’s various accounts, including those to the SKL and
the embassy in Oslo, he claims consistently that no German sailors were armed.
Later, this was modified in a report to the SKL where he specified that while
the two 20- mm A/A guns and ten rifles had been locked away before entering
Norwegian waters, a total of eighteen pistols had been available. Some of these
had been carried by those on duty near the prisoners or on the bridge, some by
various officers, while some were stored in lockers or cupboards. The duty
personnel carried 9-mm pistols, the officers 7.65-mms. After the British had
left, seven of the pistols could not be accounted for. One had allegedly been
thrown overboard, the other six, Dau held, had been `stolen by the British’. All
of those carrying the guns swore to Dau they had not used them, not even to
threaten anyone from the boarding party.
Still, it is not unthinkable that one or more of the men
decided to resist the British on their own initiative, particularly the naval
men from Graf Spee. Neither is it unthinkable that some of the British marines
disregarded Turner’s orders and loaded their guns, just in case. Thus, a
situation on the after deck, not seen from the bridge, might have got out of
hand. Turner writes that no immediate opposition was encountered when he jumped
across and later, except for some minor trouble aft, they were met with `sullen
obedience’. Dau, on the other hand, describes the British marines as `nervous
and very scared’. None of the Norwegian reports mentions anything other than
British use of firearms. The people of Jossinghavn later told of a single shot
being heard some time before the main firing started, but Loytnant Halvorsen in
his report is very specific that he did not see any German use of guns –
although arguably he was not in the best position to observe it all. Altmark’s
Dr Tyrolt treated a wounded British sailor for a bullet wound in the shoulder
after the event, but rumour had it he had been shot by one of his own
mates.
It seems that we shall never learn what initiated the use of
firearms that night. Once it had started, though, the result was incontestably
one-sided. Several Germans lowered themselves from the deck and escaped across
the ice towards shore. Unfortunately, they were fired at, several being killed
or wounded. The Norwegian customs officer Odd Egaas was on deck on the
starboard side when the British boarded. He did not observe any Germans with
guns from where he stood, nor did he observe any form of resistance to the
boarding from the German sailors. Egaas wore his uniform, and was held at the
point of two British bayonets until it had been clarified that he was
Norwegian. In the meantime the shooting had started on the other side of the
deck and, finding events to be beyond his normal call of duty, Egaas followed
suit when some of Altmark’s crew lowered themselves onto the ice and ran
ashore.
When the shooting started, Halvorsen approached Vian,
declaring that he had agreed to `observe an inspection, not a gunfight’. After
the events, Vian held that it had been agreed that Halvorsen should join the
boarding party, while Halvorsen maintained he had agreed to join an inspection
as an observer but never agreed to `board the Altmark for an armed
intervention, against German opposition’. Halvorsen returned to Kjell, which
was called alongside the destroyer. From his ship, he could see the boarding party
firing at Germans escaping over the ice. Overminor Olav Rindseth, who had
command of Kjell while Halvorsen was on board Cossack, saw one German sailor
who had fallen into the water being shot several times as he climbed onto the
ice.
Civilians watching the events from shore had to duck into
the cellars of their houses to avoid stray bullets and experienced the shooting
as `rather wild’. At least two bullets hit the wheelhouse of Fireren, and a
Norwegian rating, who had been at the telephone exchange with a message, got a
bullet through the hand as he ran back. In spite of several bullets hitting the
houses, there were no other Norwegian casualties. Confusion reigned for some
time, and a couple of the Germans fled for several miles into the mountains.
Six Germans were killed outright and a seventh died two days
later in Kristiansand hospital. Five were seriously wounded and another five
had lighter wounds. Eventually, the shooting died down and sailors from Cossack
started rescuing Germans who had gone through the ice and were struggling in
the icy water. Lieutenant Commander Gerald Ormsby and Paymaster Lieutenant
Edmund Burkitt even jumped into the water to save one sailor near Altmark’s
bow. Unfortunately the attempts were unsuccessful and the man died, bringing
the German dead to eight.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Commander Turner began the search for
prisoners on board Altmark, bringing along Kapitän Dau, who had by now been
identified, and a duty officer named Weichert. Some of the doors and hatches
were locked while others had been lashed with wire. Eventually, they were all
opened, and Turner allegedly shouted, `Any Englishmen down there?’ A clamorous
response greeted him – `Yes, we’re all English’ – to which legend has it he
answered, `Come up then. The Navy’s ‘ere!’ The 299 captives were released from the holds
and taken on deck for transfer to Cossack.
Whilst the search for the prisoners was undertaken,
Paymaster SubLieutenant Craven remained on the bridge with some British guards
and about ten Germans. After a while, the latter became rather anxious and
requested permission to put on their lifebelts. Permission was refused, but
Craven, who spoke reasonable German asked what the matter was. They replied
that they believed Dau had ordered the demolition charges around the ship to be
set `to detonate at 00:30′. This was forwarded to Cossack, which hurriedly came
alongside to embark the prisoners. Some of the British officers believed the
scuttling might be a bluff, but Vian decided not to take any chances. Just as
Sub-Lieutenant Craven ordered all men off the bridge of Altmark, a faint, dull
sound was heard by some and believed to be an explosion. Dau, on the other
hand, claimed that things happened so fast that he was never able to initiate
any scuttling, and that this was the reason he ran his ship aground.
Once the embarkation of the prisoners and the boarding party
was concluded, Vian backed Cossack off and at midnight (BrT) gave the order to
head back down the fjord. A medical officer was embarked from Sikh to attend
the liberated prisoners, but, apart from one case of leprosy among the Lascars,
they were all found to be in a good condition, considering the circumstances.
To their surprise and immense relief, the Germans were all
left behind, including Kapitän Dau. No attempt was made by the British to
damage or sink the tanker, neither was the radio room put out of action.
With Arethusa and the destroyers closing up, Cossack headed
west at 25 knots. A signal was sent to the Admiralty and the C-in-C Home Fleet
at 01:50 (BrT) stating that the prisoners had been freed, Altmark was
unseaworthy and that the Norwegians had refused to cooperate but remained
passive. At 02:50 (BrT) this was augmented by a second signal informing that
fighting had taken place with one British and several German casualties and
that Cossack was now `somewhat battered’. It was also conveyed that the
prisoners stated they were not impressed by the Norwegian Navy’s search of the
Altmark when she had been stopped. At 03:40 (BrT) came the reply: `Well done
Cossack’, but it was followed some twenty minutes later by a sombre request for
details of what had taken place between Cossack and the Norwegian ships, more
facts on the use of weapons and the treatment of the prisoners on board
Altmark.
It is interesting to note that Vian initially reported the
treatment of the prisoners on board Altmark to have been `satisfactory’ in
spite of later claims that the tanker had been a `slave ship’. Furthermore,
Vice Admiral Gordon Campbell, who interviewed Captain Starr, master of Taiora,
and Captain Brown, master of Huntsman, after their release from Altmark,
concluded that – except for the sanitary situation – the conditions had given
few grounds for complaint. The two masters also confirmed that, as far as they
were aware, they had received the same rations as the Germans on board. Later,
a series of statements were made by the prisoners or those who interviewed
them, concluding that although their treatment was harsh it was rarely brutal
and `a considerable way short of justifying the allegations and charges against
[Captain Dau and his crew] that were unfortunately given wide circulation after
the release of the prisoners by HMS Cossack’. In the name of morale and
propaganda, Churchill preferred to keep the impression that Altmark had been a
`hell ship’ and saw no reason to exonerate a German naval master.
