Edited from material
by Mike Yaklich, et al
“Although
its participation in World War II has been ignored by Anglo-American
historians, the defeat of the Regia Marina Italiana (RMI, Royal Italian Navy)
has preoccupied European authors, many of whom have rejected as superficial
assertions that the Italian navy was led by a general staff
“paralyzed” by fear of a British navy that enjoyed a “moral
ascendancy” over its opponent.
Instead, they have attributed the Italian defeat to material
deficiencies and structural weaknesses, as well as to a flawed strategy and
poor command decisions. Although little
of their work has been translated into English, the history of Italian naval
operations by Marc’Antonio Bragadin and Giuseppe Fioravanzo has been available
in an English edition since 1957. Like
other Italian authors, they pointed out that an inadequate industrial base and
an uneven technological development had deprived the RMI of radar, sonar,
electric torpedoes, and reliable shells, while a chronic shortage of fuel oil
had “paralyzed” the Italian fleet and Germany’s rush to war had
caught the Italian navy in the midst of a building program (1).
Admiral Angelo
Iachino, commander of the Italian surface fleet for most of the war, likewise
stressed the problems created by the lack of fuel oil, a weak industrial base,
and the inability to develop radar and sonar. But he also underscored the problems of
coordination between the Regia Aeronautica Italiana (RAI, Royal Italian Air
Force) and the RMI, and thought that “a couple of aircraft carriers and a
good fleet air arm” could have secured the central Mediterranean for
Italy…”
(1)Mussolini
was under the impression that he had an agreement with Hitler not to
precipitate a war before 1942-43, and as late as the second half of May 1939
Hitler personally assured Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, that he had no
intention of going to war for at least another three years– this barely three
months before he actually started the war by invading Poland.
James Sadkovich – The
Italian Navy in World War II
By December 1941, the Italian Navy/Air Force, with, of
course the various Luftwaffe contingent included, were absolute masters of the
Mediterranean. While Japanese
intervention certainly strained the Royal Navy efforts in the Med, the British
Navy was simply unable to even attempt to do anything but harass the Italian
convoy efforts. Throughout 1942, any
British convoy activity took months of planning and involved a massive
commitment of force from several theatres.
While the axis air forces were the primary threat to the merchant ships,
it was the presence of the Italian Fleet units that necessitated the vast
warship commitment to attempt to get the convoys through. In effect, the Italian Navy suckered them in
to air range for the ensuing feast by the air units. The Italian Navy’s problem throughout 1941
and 1942 was the total expenditure, in 1940 (!), to the Fleets strategic oil
reserve, and the consequent inability to commit the fleet, en masse, on any but
special occasions. Further, on these
occasions, the effort was usually fruitless because the aerial recon forces (Italian
and German) did not properly do their job and find the Fleets target or, when
they did, the Royal Navy simply fled the scene (they were, after all, hardly
stupid). Also, while fuel hampered the
heavy forces, the Italian Navy light forces (and submarines) were bold, brash,
and daring and took on the Royal Navy with vigor. Also, their ASW forces got to be very deadly.
Simply put, after 1940 when the lack of oil crippled their
efforts, the Italian Navy (with the Axis Air Forces of course) actually prosecuted
a fleet in being concept that worked.
They forced massive efforts by the Royal Navy to get anything done in
the Med. On the other hand, if you look
at warship commitment in home waters after the loss of the Bismarck, the Royal
Navy basically ignored the Kriegsmarine surface forces. During this time the Germans had Tirpitz,
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Scheer, Lutzow, Hipper, Eugen, Nurnberg, and Koln, yet
the Germans never managed a decent sortie with any of it, and on any day in
1942 (except, perhaps, as the Duke of York, Anson, and Howe worked up) the
Royal Navy Home Fleet certainly wasn’t close to this strong.
The Mediterranean saw less decisive naval battles than one
would expect because for most of war, one side was simply unable to challenge
the other. During the times that either
side had a legitimate shot, the Royal Navy elan coupled with fleet-based
aircraft (something the Italians never had) carried the day. But there was a long time in 1941 to 1942
that the Royal Navy was forced to simply not play. That was an Italian Navy victory.
Naval Balance Mediterranean
1940
England- in
Mediterranean
3 battleships (all Queen Elizabeth Class with 15-inch guns)
1 carrier
3 heavy cruisers
3 light cruisers
France – in Mediterranean
3 battleships
1 carriers
10 heavy cruisers
28 light cruisers
Italy – Total
4 battleships with 12.5-inch guns, 2 15-inch gunned ships
almost complete but not worked up for about 12 more months
0 carriers
8 heavy cruisers
12 light cruisers
The Italians are clearly outnumbered until the fall of
France in June of 1940. After that, they have more cruisers than the British,
but their 4 old battleships are no match for the bigger and stronger 3 British
battleships. And even if the Italians manage to defeat these three, the British
have 7 battleships, 2 battlecruisers, 4 carriers, and 17 cruisers at Scapa
Flow, plus 15 more cruisers in the Atlantic and 2 battleships and 2 cruisers
coming out of refit.
To risk the entire Italian Fleet in a showdown would be
foolhardy. In the game of risk versus reward, the Italians would be risking
their entire navy for the reward of destroying one quarter of England’s. That
is a trade England would make any day of the week.
So now, as the smaller fleet, Italy must play for survival.
The old battleships would not be a great asset in combat, but their loss would
be quite a blow to the nation (look at how the loss of Arizona and Hood rocked
the US and UK, and they were just one ship out of 15). A serious blow like that
would not be conducive to keeping Mussolini in power.
The cruisers can be risked, so they were sent out on
operations to harass the British. But with a serious shortage of fuel oil in
Italy, each harassment mission just reduced the chance that the entire fleet
could sortie if it needed to.
In the end, I guess the Italian navy did all that it could
do: stay alive to tie up the British Fleet and prevent it from being used
elsewhere. As long as the British did not have a free hand in the Mediterranean, the Italians were doing their job.
I think that the Italian High Command was torn between
conflicting strategies. The classic ‘fleet in being’ and need to nullify or
destroy Allied power ‘safely’. So the end result was confused or ambiguous
policy planning and too many caveats on fleet commanders.
There is no question in my mind that the Italian Navy could
fight bravely, which it demonstrated in particular in small-ship actions and
special operations like those of the Decima Flotilla. It is clearly wrong to
attribute Italian failures to innate cowardice, a view that was once common in
English-language histories. However it is my belief that the Italian High
Command was weak and the Navy had severe material and technical deficiencies. I
certainly believe that its achievements fell well short of its nominal strength
and potential.
Italian
“PT” boats
Look at what is available about the Regia Marina (and, after
the armistice, the Decima MAS) activity against the “Allies”. Just
about the Italian fast boat war 1940 until 1945 it’s possible to remember,
speaking only of the most important ships, not only the loss, by MS 16 and 22,
of the British cruiser HMS Manchester, on August 13th 1942 (the biggest ship
sunk by such a kind of vessel [PT boat] during the last world war) but the
serious damage also of the Soviet cruiser Molotov by MAS 568 on August 2 1942
(Black Sea) and another incident which occurred to the British cruiser HMS
Capetown, torpedoed off Massawa (Red Sea) on April 8th 1941. This last success
was obtained by MAS 213, a 14t boat launched on 1918, unable – on 1941 – to do
more than 10 knots for no more than an hour and in such a bad general condition
that it was necessary to repair the hull many times, in 1940-41, using
concrete.
The vintage MAS Flotilla of Massawa and an other one, formed
by seven ex auxiliary motor boats based at Assab, were organized and led by
Commander Paolo Aloisi, a very particular kind of officer and sailor who than
fought in underground way the English in AOI (Italian East Africa)until
September 1943. Cdr Aloisi is at the origin of the idea developed twenty years
later by the famous comic author Ugo Pratt for the character of Corto Maltese.
Bibliography: Erminio Bagnasco, Le motosiluranti della
seconda guerra mondiale, ed. Albertelli, Parma.
Enrico Cernuschi, “Dietro la maschera di Corto
Maltese”, Rivista Marittima (The Italian Navy Staff monthly) Luglio (July)
1977
Damage Inflicted by
Italians On Enemy Naval Units
This applies only to
events in the Mediterranean. Thus nothing in ocean waters, the Red Sea, the
Black Sea, or Lake Ladoga appears.
1940:
June 1940:
British light cruiser Calypso sunk by sub Bagnolini. Tanker (Norwegian but in British service)
Orkanger sunk by sub Naiade. British sub
Odin sunk by destroyer Strale. British
sub Grampus sunk by destroyer escorts Circe and Clio. British sub Orpheus sunk by destroyer
Turbine. British sub Olympus badly
damaged by Italian air attacks while in port at Malta (Italian air raids also
sink Malta’s floating drydock, the only one possessed by the RN in the central
Mediterranean). French
“super-destroyer” Albatros hit by 6-inch shell from Italian coastal
battery during bombardment of Genoa (ten men killed). Small freighter Elgo (1,900 tons) sunk by sub
Capponi while en route to a French North African port.
July 1940:
British destroyer Escort sunk by sub Marconi. British sub Phoenix sunk by corvette
Albatros. British light cruiser
Gloucester hit on bridge by Italian bomb:
captain and 18 others killed (“battle of Punta da Stilo”).
Australian light cruiser Sydney hit by 6-inch shell from Italian light
cruisers, but only minor damage to funnel and one man wounded (“battle of
Cape Spada”). When British convoy
to the Aegean is attacked by SM79 and SM81 bombers, British light cruiser
Liverpool hit by bomb which penetrates two decks but fails to explode, and
Australian light cruiser Sydney suffers minor splinter damage from near misses,
which destroy her on-board aircraft and cause a few non-fatal casualties. Tanker Berne (3,300 tons) sunk by sub
Tarantini off Haifa. Small French
steamer Cheik (1,000 tons) sunk by sub Scire.
August 1940:
British destroyer Hostile sunk by mines laid by Italian
destroyers. British sub Oswald rammed and sunk by destroyer Vivaldi. During Malta convoy operation merchantman SS
Cornwall (10,000 tons) hit by three bombs from SM79s, stopped and on fire, but
makes it to Malta due to superb damage control.
September 1940:
British heavy cruiser Kent damaged by SM79 torpedo planes
(out of action one year). Polish
destroyer Garland damaged by Italian air attack (near misses cause boiler damage,
towed back to port).
October 1940:
British light cruiser Liverpool damaged by SM79 torpedo
planes (out of action six months).
British sub Triad sunk in surface action by Italian sub Toti. British sub Rainbow sunk either by Italian
mine or possibly when rammed by Italian merchantman Antonietta Costa. British destroyer Imperial damaged by Italian
mine near Malta (out of action six months).
British aircraft carrier Eagle suffers hull damage from near misses by
Italian bombers (out of action more than a month, misses Taranto operation).
November 1940:
British heavy cruiser Berwick hit by two 8-inch shells from
Italian heavy cruisers: one hits
officers’ quarters (no casualties), the other one knocks out one of the aft
main gun turrets, killing seven men (“battle of Cape
Spartivento”). British submarine
Regulus sunk, possibly by Italian aircraft (otherwise by Italian mine). British destroyer Decoy damaged by Italian
night air raid on port at Alexandria (one bomb hit, eight killed), freighter
Zamaam also damaged in same attack.
December 1940:
British destroyer Hyperion sunk by Italian mine. British light cruiser Glasgow damaged by SM79
torpedo planes while at anchor in Suda Bay (two torpedoes hit, knocking out two
of four screws: returned to light escort
duties in the Indian Ocean in two months, but not fully repaired until
1942). British antiaircraft cruiser
Coventry torpedoed by Italian sub Neghelli (damage not too serious). British sub Triton sunk, apparently by
Italian mine. Greek sub Proteus rammed
and sunk by Italian destroyer escort Antares (after torpedoing and sinking
Italian troop transport Sardegna).
NOTES:
1. I did not include
the small Greek steamer Roula and the old Greek light cruiser Heli, both sunk
by Italian submarines in August 1940, because Italy was not at war with Greece
at the time, and I therefore consider these to be more in the line of acts of
terrorism than legitimate acts of war (British ships sunk in Greek waters at
the same time I did include, also neutral vessels bound for ports of legitimate
enemy belligerents).
2. In regards to
sinkings from mines, this is another difficult topic. If mines were known or strongly suspected to
have caused the loss, and only Italian minefields existed at that time of the
war or in the area in question, I have credited these to the Italians (of
course, in some cases, such as Hostile or Force K in December 1941, it is
definitely known that the mines were Italian-laid). Mine damage around Malta is a particularly
difficult call. Although the Italians
laid most of the minefields there, German aircraft and S-boats also
contributed. Thus I was pretty lax in some
cases– if I found any source willing to identify the mines as either Italian
or German, without contradicting testimony, I went with that. Thus I am crediting destroyer Southwold to
the Italians, but destroyer Jersey and sub Olympus to the Germans, while making
no call on destroyer Kujawiak…
