In 530 BCE Cambyses inherited a vast empire, far larger than
any previous, and one that had been formulated in just twenty years. Cambyses’
royal pursuits are hard to gauge, however, because the record is even thinner
for his reign. Cambyses’ first order of business would have been arrangements
for Cyrus’ burial at his tomb in Pasargadae. An incomplete structure found near
Persepolis has been identified as an intentional replica of Cyrus’ tomb, and it
was naturally assumed to have been for Cambyses. But some documentary evidence
suggests that Cambyses’ tomb lay elsewhere, southeast of Persepolis near modern
Niriz, and the evidence pointing there indicates a royally sponsored cult,
similar to that associated with Cyrus’ tomb.
Cambyses eventually turned his attention westward, where the
main power was Egypt. Amasis (reigned 570–526 BCE) had conquered Cyprus and
formed an alliance with the Greek ruler Polycrates of Samos, an island off the
coast of Ionia. By the 520s Polycrates had become dominant in the Aegean Sea
region. This alliance was fractured sometime after Cambyses’ accession, and
Polycrates offered ships to Cambyses for the Egyptian expedition. Reasons for
the switch may only be guessed. Perhaps the intensifying Persian hold on Ionia
in conjunction with inducements (or threats?) swayed Polycrates toward Persia.
Cambyses’ efforts to develop a royal navy, mainly through his Phoenician and
Ionian subjects, were no doubt intended for the western front and a planned
Egyptian campaign. The territories of the Levant, geographically at the
crossroads between Greater Mesopotamia and Egypt, had been a point of contention
between rulers of those regions for centuries. Persian control of that region
was bound to inflame tensions with Egypt. With an eye on Persian expansionism,
Amasis had cultivated good relations with many city-states and sanctuaries in
the Aegean world. In 526 Amasis was succeeded by his son Psammetichus III,
whose rule was to prove quite short.
Cambyses’ Invasion of
Egypt
There is no narrative record of the preparations for the
Persian invasion of Egypt in 525 BCE, but they were no doubt extensive. As part
of these preparations, Cambyses fostered relations with the king of the Arabs,
who controlled the desert route across the Sinai peninsula and could thus
enable the successful crossing. The first engagement occurred at the
easternmost branch of the Nile delta, the so-called Pelusiac mouth. The
Persians put the Egyptians to flight, invaded the Nile Valley, and besieged
Psammetichus in his capital, Memphis. There he was protected by fortifications
named “the White Wall,” which could only be taken with support from a fleet.
The city was eventually taken and Psammetichus captured. But he was spared and
treated well, as per the pattern of kings previously defeated by the Persians.
Herodotus even claims that if Psammetichus had comported himself appropriately
he would have been made governor of Egypt (3.15). But Psammetichus subsequently
plotted rebellion and was put to death.
Once Egypt was secure, Cambyses intended further military
actions both west and south, following the paths of many Egyptian pharaohs. The
Libyan oases offered control over strategic western trade routes. Beyond the
First Cataract in the south, the kingdom of Kush had always been coveted for
its gold. The installation of a Persian garrison at Elephantine – an island in
the Nile near modern Aswan – reveals the strategic importance of this area at
Egypt’s southern boundary. This garrison was one of several similar that were
stationed at strategic points throughout the Empire.
Additional Persian expeditions against the oasis of Ammon in
the west and against Nubia and Ethiopia in the south ended badly. The
particulars may seem far-fetched, but the historicity of these campaigns,
including an aborted expedition against the Carthaginians (modern Tunisia),
need not be rejected out of hand. The limits of Persian imperialism had not yet
been reached. It made sense to secure those borderlands that had been problems
for previous Egyptian rulers for centuries. If Herodotus may be believed, the
army dispatched to Libya was swallowed in a sandstorm. Cambyses himself led the
expedition against Nubia and Ethiopia, but it was abandoned en route: desperate
straits culminated in cannibalism among the troops. These misadventures,
replete with divine portents and human warnings that Cambyses was going too
far, serve as case studies for Herodotus’ portrayal of the “mad Cambyses” –
more a literary exercise than a historical one. Herodotus records a litany of Cambyses’
outrages, overreach, and arrogance – directed not only at Egyptians but also at
Persians and even his own family – the paradigmatic example of a stereotypical
oriental despot.
Herodotus’ “mad Cambyses” shows first of all that the Father
of History relied on a negative tradition of Cambyses current in Egypt when
Herodotus visited in the mid-fifth century BCE. Herodotus devotes portions of
his Book 3 to Cambyses’ increasing instability. Cambyses purportedly ordered
Amasis’ mummy to be disinterred, abused, and finally burned – an insult, to
both Persian and Egyptian religions (3.16). Other tombs were opened and cult
statues mocked, particularly in the temple of Ptah, an Egyptian creator god
whose sacred city was Memphis. The greatest outrage to the Egyptians was the
slaying of the Apis bull (3.27–29), a sacred calf that was considered the
earthly embodiment of Ptah. The Egyptian king was a central part of the Apis
cult, which in turn was directly connected to the office of kingship.
When Cambyses returned to Memphis after the disastrous
Ethiopian expedition, he found the Egyptians of Memphis celebrating the birth
of a new Apis calf: a new beginning, their god again made manifest. Cambyses
snapped. He saw their festival as an expression of joy at his misfortune, and
he reacted: stabbing the Apis bull with a knife to the thigh and flogging or
slaying many priests. Herodotus subsequently catalogs a cascade of misfortune
and misery that brought Cambyses to his own end and shook the entire Empire to
its core – the result of Cambyses’ impiety. The slaying of the Apis bull makes
compelling drama, but it is mostly exaggerated if not fabricated. We have some
Egyptian evidence that seems to refute Herodotus’ portrayal. Contrary to
Herodotus’ assertion that the Egyptian priests buried the Apis bull without
Cambyses’ knowledge, a sarcophagus from a bull buried during Cambyses’ reign is
engraved with Cambyses’ own inscription in traditional Egyptian format:
The Horus Sma-Towy,
King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Mesuti-Re, born of Re, Cambyses, may he live
forever! He has made this fine monument, a great sarcophagus of granite, for
his father Apis-Osiris, dedicated by the King of Upper and Lower Egypt,
Mesuti-Re, son of Re, Cambyses, may he be granted long life, prosperity in
perpetuity, health and joy, appearing as King of Upper and Lower Egypt
eternally.
This inscription states that Cambyses, acting as a typical
Egyptian pharaoh, took responsibility for the proper care and burial of the
deceased Apis, which is understood to have died during Cambyses’ fifth regnal
year. If only it were so simple. There are significant problems with our
understanding of this sequence: the death and burial of the Apis bull during
Cambyses’ reign, and the overlap between the birth of a successor bull and the
death of the current Apis. Other inscriptions further complicate matters.
Although the initial inclination is to reject any suggestion
that Cambyses killed the Apis, it cannot be excluded that Cambyses may have
killed a younger calf (the Apis successor) before the death of the one buried
in the sarcophagus. The Egyptian evidence reminds us not to take Herodotus at
face value. Some of the changes Cambyses wrought in the aftermath of the
Persian victory must have been unwelcome, perhaps even unprecedented. For
example, a reduction in support for some Egyptian temples could easily have
given rise to negative stories about Cambyses.
The inscription of Udjahorresnet, a naval commander under
Amasis and Psammetichus III who defected to the Persians, also provides some
balance to Herodotus’ account. Udjahorresnet’s hieroglyphic inscription is
carved on his votive statue from Sais, in the western Delta. The statue holds a
small shrine for Osiris, god of the underworld. The autobiographical
inscription chronicles Udjahorresnet’s career, with special emphasis on his
service to both Cambyses and Darius I. It is invaluable as a window on how one
of the Egyptian nobility secured a place for himself in the new order.
Udjahorresnet’s inscription provides the only surviving
royal titles for Cambyses beyond Babylonian administrative documents. Cambyses
adopted Egyptian titles (e.g., “King of Upper and Lower Egypt”) as would be
expected from a new ruler seeking to place himself in an age-old tradition.
Udjahorresnet himself would have been keen to trumpet his own titles and
achievements – typical in this sort of inscription – and also to justify his
collaboration with the Persians. Udjahorresnet’s inscription, and Cambyses’
titles therein, indicate that Cambyses behaved as did previous kings by
restoring order and respecting religious sanctuaries. Udjahorresnet’s version
is no doubt slanted as well, but the picture it provides runs directly counter
to Herodotus’. It would not be surprising to discover that the respect Cambyses
showed for sanctuaries included those with which Udjahorresnet had been
involved, those in and near Sais, but that is unverifiable. That the Persians
presented themselves as pharaohs in the traditional Egpytian manner is not
surprising. Successful integration into Egyptian tradition would make Persian
rule much smoother. As evidenced by subsequent Egyptian revolts, however, this
integration was not always smooth.
The Death of Cambyses
and the Crisis of 522 BCE
The length of Cambyses’ Egyptian campaign is uncertain, but
various sources indicate that Cambyses was returning to Persia in 522 when he
died. He had been away for at least three years. Babylonian economic documents
reveal that Cambyses died sometime in April and was succeeded by his brother
Bardiya. Bardiya ruled for six months, until he was supplanted by Darius.
Darius conversely related that Cambyses had killed Bardiya sometime previously
and that a look-alike double, whom Darius called Gaumata, rebelled against
Cambyses in March of 522. The crisis of 522 was of epic proportions, and the
stability of the fledgling Empire was at stake. Various ancient sources relay a
story of fratricide; an elaborate cover-up; a body double and impostor on the
throne; and a small group of heroes who discover the truth, slay the pretender,
and set Persia to rights once again. Despite the fundamental interpretive problems
that persist in evaluating the sources, it is clear that the Persian Empire
faced a decisive moment. Darius I’s eventual, and by no means easy, victory was
monumental in its own right and had lasting consequences for the durability of
the Empire. The testimonies for this turbulent time are confusing and often
contradictory. Separate overviews of the main ones – Darius’ Bisitun
Inscription and Herodotus’ account – are warranted before any attempt at
reconciliation.
