There is some evidence of possible exploratory expeditions during the
time of Gnaeus Julius Agricola, although the interpretation of this is a matter
of debate amongst historians. In places like Drumanagh (interpreted by some
historians to be the site of a possible Roman fort or temporary camp) and
Lambay island, some Roman military-related finds may be evidence for some form
of Roman presence. The most commonly advanced interpretation is that any
military presence was to provide security for traders, possibly in the form of
an annual market where Romano-British and Irish met to trade. Other
interpretations, however, suggest these may be merely Roman trading outposts,
or native Irish settlements which traded with Roman Britain. Later, during the
collapse of Roman authority in the 4th and 5th centuries, Irish tribes raided
Britain and may have brought back Roman knowledge of classical civilization.
Ireland had never been conquered by the Romans and she
somehow remained aloof from the changes that radically altered British society.
It was Julius Caesar who invented the myth of Hibernia, a land of winter into
whose mists civilized men dared not venture. There may have been a self-serving
element to this, the future emperor of the Romans justifying his own reluctance
to embark on a potentially costly conquest. And while there is no evidence of
any large Roman military operation against Ireland, there were plenty of
traders willing to ignore the grim warnings and visit Ireland’s east coast.
Harbours grew up to service the boats that carried Irish leather to clothe the
Roman legions. The Irish cattle barons of the plains became rich in the
process. As Ned Kelly, keeper of antiquities at the National Museum of Ireland,
told me: ‘The cattle barons start getting notions of grandeur and they become
the important provincial kings of early medieval Ireland. You have the
establishment of dynasties at that time, and they continued in power for
hundreds of years afterwards. They were looking to model themselves on the
Roman emperors.’
The traffic in goods and ideas was a two-way process and the
greatest Roman export to Ireland was spiritual. The faith that would come to be
seen as an indivisible part of Irish identity was carried across the seas from
Roman Britain, where it had become the state religion on the orders of the
Emperor Constantine. Through the efforts of saints such as Patrick, Declan of
the Decies and a host of others, the Roman faith was spread through the island,
creating monastic centres around which faith and commerce could thrive, and
where an aesthetic revolution would take place. Scholars came from the
continent to be educated at the great monastery of Clonmacnoise in County
Westmeath.
In AD 79 Agricola turned his attention to the north,
advancing on both the western and eastern sides of Britain, laying out a series
of roads and forts aimed at suppressing any resistance. He then offered
reasonable peace terms to win over hostile tribesmen. Succeeding campaigns took
him as far north as the Tay estuary by AD 81 and a series of forts were laid
out along the Forth–Clyde isthmus. In doing this Agricola was intent on
subduing the more northerly tribes, the Votadini, Selgovae and Novantae. His tactics
were again to lay out a network of roads and forts. He tried to win over the
tribes but his efforts had little success and he was forced to rely on military
control.
About this time Agricola contemplated an expedition to
Ireland, urged on by the arrival of an exiled Irish prince. Tacitus said that
Agricola remarked that Ireland could be reduced and held by a single legion or
a few auxiliaries. Given the warlike nature of the Irish tribes this would have
been improbable and Agricola’s reputation was saved by the fact that such an
invasion was never undertaken. Roman troops were never based in Ireland
although a 16-hectare (40-acre) fortified promontory at Drumanagh near Dublin
has been claimed to be a Roman fort. It could equally well have been a trading
settlement. Other Roman finds in Ireland also indicate that there was some
trade between the two areas.
In his biography of Agricola, the historian Tacitus writes:
“In the fifth
campaign, Agricola, crossing over in the first ship, subdued, by frequent and
successful engagements, several nations till then unknown; and stationed troops
in that part of Britain which is opposite to Ireland, rather with a view to
future advantage, than from any apprehension of danger from that quarter. For
the possession of Ireland, situated between Britain and Spain, and lying
commodiously to the Gallic sea, would have formed a very beneficial connection
between the most powerful parts of the empire. This island is less than
Britain, but larger than those of our sea. Its soil, climate, and the manners
and dispositions of its inhabitants, are little different from those of
Britain. Its ports and harbors are better known, from the concourse of
merchants for the purposes of commerce. Agricola had received into his
protection one of its petty kings, who had been expelled by a domestic
sedition; and detained him, under the semblance of friendship, till an occasion
should offer of making use of him. I have frequently heard him assert, that a
single legion and a few auxiliaries would be sufficient entirely to conquer
Ireland and keep it in subjection; and that such an event would also have
contributed to restrain the Britons, by awing them with the prospect of the
Roman arms all around them, and, as it were, banishing liberty from their
sight.”
During the republic the Romans had created an efficient
fighting machine, which resulted in the inexorable expansion of Rome until the
second century ad. The Emperor Augustus, aware of the power of this force,
began a series of reforms which created a professionally paid army, loyal to
the emperor, and provided an officer class drawn from the senatorial and
equestrian orders, following a career structure (cursus honorum) that included
holding successive military and civil appointments. The underlying assumption
was that Rome’s military might was superior to any opposing force, both in her
fighting techniques and by the fact that Rome was destined to rule the known
world.
The Romans were a practical people. Military superiority was
achieved by adapting and changing tactics, and by utilizing the manpower of
other areas. Thus men from the provinces were enrolled into the army either
individually or in tribal groups, some keeping their own methods of fighting so
that in the auxiliary forces provincial customs and habits were accepted.
Cavalry units especially were recruited from such sources and provided an
essential complement to the legions, which were almost entirely composed of
infantry. Native forces were recruited as professional troops and this subtly
began to alter the relationship between the military and the civilian. This
could be both a strength and weakness as it was uncertain where loyalties would
lie. This polyglot force had to be moulded into one serving emperor and empire.
In addition, it was relatively unusual for ordinary soldiers to change units
and, if a unit stayed too long in one area, the men might become embedded in
the community. Legion XX was established at Chester about AD 87. Although
vexillations were sent to build the Hadrian and Antonine Walls and to keep
order in the north, the legion remained at Chester until probably the fourth
century AD. Some of the wall garrisons remained in place for many years.
The Roman military force at its greatest in Britain has been
estimated to be between 50,000 and 55,000 men. Aulus Plautius had arrived with
20,000 legionaries and auxiliary soldiers with nominal strengths of 500 or
1,000 men. But legions and auxiliary forces were brought into or removed from
Britain as circumstances demanded. The largest number of troops was stationed
on Hadrian’s Wall, and the Wall itself and the associated military zone
contained perhaps 20,000 men. The number of troops stationed in Britain
indicates that the province had to keep one of the largest provincial
garrisons, probably the result of the hostility of its Celtic inhabitants and the
fact that the Romans never succeeded in conquering the whole island. Hostile
tribes in Scotland were never entirely subdued, although finds of Roman
artefacts suggest that there may have been interaction between Romans and
natives. Nor did the Romans conquer Ireland, which might have prevented later
Irish raids on the western shore areas.
