In a scene reminiscent of the Second World War or the Arab–Israeli
Wars, an American column protected by Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting
vehicles (IFVs) prepares for the offensive.
A pair of AMX-30 main battle tanks and a truck belonging to the French
6th Light Armoured Division pause outside Al-Salman. The tanks have a sand and
olive-green camouflage scheme that does not extend to the road wheels.
This M60A1, serving with the US Marines Company D, 2nd Tank Battalion,
formed part of Task Force Breach Alpha. The tank is fitted with reactive armour
and an M-9 bulldozer kit.
General Schwarzkopf knew that speed was of the essence in
the ground war. He had to conduct two envelopments, the first around Kuwait to
prevent the Iraqi garrison escaping, and a second much larger one to prevent
reinforcements reaching Kuwait. He also needed to secure Kuwait’s vital
oilfields as quickly as possible – there were three major areas in the
north-east and four to the south. Saddam’s generals planned to use oil as an
environmental weapon that would enhance their defences and funnel their enemy’s
tanks into predetermined killing zones. Once Schwarzkopf’s attack started,
there was every chance that Saddam’s generals would open up the valves in
Kuwait’s oilfields to form vast oil lakes and dynamite the oilheads to create
seas of fire and choking smoke. This would greatly impede the Coalition’s tanks
and jets; it would also hide any Iraqi troops massing for a counter-attack. Oil
industry experts anticipated that up to 150 oil wells would be destroyed during
the fighting.
Schwarzkopf and his commanders had every reason to be
concerned about the fate of Kuwait’s oilfields. Saddam’s generals had in place
a massive scorched earth plan that would set fire to over 600 oil wells in the
face of Schwarzkopf’s offensive. This would result in the loss of six million
barrels of oil a day and billowing smoke rising to over 10,000ft. The oil that
was not burned off would create 300 oil lakes holding up to 50 million barrels
of oil. The sand, gravel, oil and soot would result in almost 5 per cent of
Kuwait covered in a layer of ‘tarcrete’, which would clog up the tracks of
Schwarzkopf’s tanks. For good measure the Iraqis also sowed minefields around
the oilfields so that firefighters would not be able to reach the blazing
wells. This represented an appalling environmental disaster and would create a
hellish battlefield straight from Dante’s Inferno.
Schwarzkopf fully understood that his tanks had to dash
forward as fast as possible to try to prevent this, but ultimately it would
prove to be an impossible task. Even before the ground war commenced in late
January, Saddam’s men had sabotaged Kuwait’s main supertanker loading pier,
dumping 460 million gallons of crude oil into the Gulf. They also set fire to
the oil wells and storage tanks at Wafra. By mid-February about fifty oil wells
were damaged or on fire due to coalition air attacks on Iraqi forces stationed
in the oilfields. Then on 16 February, perhaps anticipating the attack, the
Iraqis began systematically wrecking hundreds of Kuwaiti oilfields, as well as
sinking five oil tankers anchored off the Kuwait coast. It was clear that once
the Iraqi Army was being driven from Kuwait, the destruction would only get
worse.
Therefore Schwarzkopf’s ground offensive, dubbed Operation
Desert Sabre, envisaged an enormous encircling operation that would encompass
not only Kuwait but also a vast area of southern Iraq stretching up almost to
the city of Basra. Although King Fahd was commander-in-chief SAAF, operational
control of all Arab forces came under his nephew, His Royal Highness Lieutenant
General Prince Khalid bin Sultan (the son of Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, the
Saudi Defence Minister). Egyptian and Syrian forces were also committed to the
offensive, on the proviso they were not used inside Iraq.
Three commands were deployed on the eastern third of this
enormous front. These consisted of the Joint Forces Command North, made up of
the units from Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, led by Lieutenant General Prince
Khalid bin Sultan, which held the portion of the line east of VII Corps. To the
right of these forces was Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer’s US 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force, which included the 1st (Tiger) Brigade of the Army’s US
2nd Armored Division, as well as the US 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions. On the
extreme right Joint Forces Command East, anchoring the line on the Gulf,
consisted of units from all six member states of the Gulf Co-operation Council.
Like Joint Forces Command North, it was under General Khalid’s command.
The two US Marine divisions, with the US Army’s Tiger
Brigade, and coalition forces under Saudi command were to push directly north
into Kuwait. These forces would hold the enemy’s tactical and operational
forces in place by breaching the Iraqi defences in Kuwait and encircling the
Iraqi forces in the heel of Kuwait and Kuwait City. Once Kuwait City was
encircled and Iraqi forces were driven out or defeated, the Arab forces would
then liberate Kuwait City itself.
To the west the XVIII Airborne Corps was to attack deep into
Iraq to control the east–west lines of communication along the strategic
Highway 8 and cut off Iraqi forces in the Kuwait Theatre of Operations. Even
further west, the French 6th Light Armoured Division and the US 101st Airborne
Division were to conduct a massive western envelopment, with a ground assault
to secure the coalition’s left flank and an air assault to establish forward
support bases deep in Iraqi territory. The US 24th Infantry Division had the
central role of blocking the Euphrates river valley to prevent the escape north
of Iraqi forces in Kuwait, and then attacking east in coordination with VII
Corps to defeat the armour-heavy divisions of the Republican Guard.
In the centre of the coalition line, along the Wadi
al-Batin, Brigadier General John H. Tilelli’s US 1st Cavalry Division was to
strike north into a concentration of Iraqi divisions, whose commanders remained
convinced that the Coalition would use Batin and several other wadis as avenues
of attack. In the meantime VII Corps would conduct the main coalition effort,
attacking east of XVIII Airborne Corps and west of Wadi al-Batin, driving first
north and then east to find and destroy the heart of Saddam’s ground forces,
the armour-heavy Republican Guard divisions.
Desert Sabre was unleashed at 0400 hours on 24 February
1991. The Iraqi Army in the KTO knew that Saddam had abandoned them, and many
soldiers had little desire to fight for him once the enemy armour came into
their sights. The relentless air attacks had already taken a terrible toll on
Iraqi morale. Washington assessed that at least 150,000 Iraqi troops had
deserted before Desert Sabre even commenced. Two Iraqi divisional commanders
subsequently informed their British captors that they had received no orders
for almost two weeks.
As instructed, Joint Force Command East (comprising Saudi,
Kuwaiti, Omani and UAE forces) pushed towards Kuwait up the coastal route to
form the anvil for the American, British and French hammer-blow assault into
Iraq, which was to trap the bulk of the Iraqi forces in the KTO. The Saudis
came up against the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division, still recovering from the
Khafji encounter, while Commander Marine Central (MARCENT) breached Iraqi
defences further inland.
To the far west, as planned, General Mouscardes’s French 6th
Light Armoured Division, reinforced by the 2nd Brigade of the US 82nd Airborne
Division, advanced to protect the far western flank. The 82nd was bolstered
with forty-three M551A1 Sheridan light airborne assault vehicles in its
air-droppable tank battalion. The French 4th Dragoon Regiment, normally part of
the French 10th Armoured Division, was augmented by elements of the 503rd
Combat Tank Regiment. French reconnaissance units consisted of the 1st Foreign
Legion Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Spahis Regiment; both were capable of
conducting such offensive operations as they had strong anti-tank capabilities.
They consisted of three squadrons equipped with AMX-10RC 6×6 armoured cars,
armed with the 105mm gun, plus the Véhicule de l’Avant Blindé (VAB) 4×4
armoured personnel carrier. Both were ideal for the mad dash across the Iraqi
desert. None of the newer tracked AMX-10P infantry combat vehicles was deployed
to the Gulf. Mouscardes’s men moved to successfully secure the Al-Salman air
base. Pushing almost 65km into Iraq, they destroyed the Iraqi 45th Infantry
Division, then formed a screen to protect the left flank of the XVIII Airborne
Corps assault. Fortunately for the French they suffered few casualties, with
only three fatalities in combat.
To their east some 2,000 men of General Peay’s US 101st
Airborne Division were moved forward in a massive air-lift involving 400
helicopters. Some 110km inside Iraq they established a forward operating base
named Cobra. A further 2,000 men arrived by vehicle, then the division moved to
secure vital roads along the Euphrates and Tigris valleys to isolate the Iraqi
forces in Kuwait. Meanwhile, XVIII Corps’ US 24th Infantry Division under
General McCaffrey, supported by the US 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment, raced
north to link up with the 101st, and on 25 February swung right to attack the
northernmost Iraqi Republican Guard positions. The 3rd Cavalry was the only
tank unit equipped with the M1A1 Abrams, and was the first US unit to take on
the Iraqis in an engagement on 22 January 1991.
Saddam Hussein, probably realizing that defeat in Kuwait was
inevitable, sought to protect his regime, but this hampered his generals. Key
units were held back and he was reluctant to risk either the Republican Guard
or his air force. In senior circles the Iraqi Army probably understood that it
was not to make a last stand in the deserts of Kuwait and southern Iraq, but
rather retreat to try to save Saddam’s regime. Saddam may have also
underestimated the defensive abilities of the Iraqi Army as a result of the
Iran–Iraq War. The Iranian Army had been ill-equipped and poorly trained and
led, resulting in appalling casualties for little ground gained. Saddam
initially hoped that his forces would inflict unacceptable casualties on the
Coalition and score a propaganda coup as well as an early cessation of
hostilities.
In the meantime US armoured columns raced to trap the
Republican Guard and prevent them escaping northwest towards Baghdad with their
armour. Initially the Iraqi commanders thought VII Corps was driving on Kuwait
City, not against the Guard itself. The intention had been that the Iraqi 12th
Armoured Division would act as the immediate tactical reserve, while the Guard
forming the strategic reserve came to the rescue. When the Guard realized what was
happening, they desperately attempted to stop VII Corps from breaking through
to their rear. Three elite divisions, the Medina, Hammurabi and Tawakalna,
deployed by the road running parallel to the Iraqi–Saudi pipeline.
The scene was set for the battle for Kuwait City and the
battle of the Basra pocket.
The Basra Pocket
While the Coalition fought to free Kuwait City, up to 800
American tanks from the US VII Corps’ 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions and the 2nd
Armoured Cavalry Regiment launched attacks on a Republican Guard division
inside Iraq, which lost 200 tanks. They then moved forwards and engaged a second
division. American Apache attack helicopters and A-10 Thunderbolt tank-busters
also played a significant role. One Apache alone destroyed eight T-72s, and on
25 February two USAF A-10s destroyed twenty-three Iraqi tanks, including some
T-72s, in three close air support missions.
In the envelopment the US M1A1 tanks easily outgunned the
Iraqi T-72s, and in a night engagement on 25/26 February the Guards’ Tawakalna
Armoured Division was largely destroyed without the loss of a single US tank.
The Republican Guard, unable to stem the American armoured tide, tried to
retreat, and the next morning a brigade of the Medina Division, supported by a
battalion from the 14th Mechanized Division, attempted to protect the
withdrawal. The Medina troops found themselves under attack from the US 1st and
3rd Armored Divisions, while the remnants of the Tawakalna were finished off by
air attacks.
Caught as they were being loaded onto their tank
transporters, the Medina Division’s armoured vehicles were bombed by USAF A-10s
and F-16 fighters. Apache attack helicopters caught another eighty T-72 tanks
still on their transporters along Route 8. Although not all the roads out of
Basra were closed, the Coalition was determined that Iraqi tanks and artillery
should not escape. The US VII Corps’ armour also fought the Hammurabi
Republican Guard Division 80km to the west of Basra.
The US 24th Mechanized Division, having made a dramatic
150-mile drive northwards to join the US 101st Airborne Division on the
Euphrates, now swung to the right to block the Iraqi escape route. The six
remaining Republican Guard divisions had been trapped overnight in a swiftly
diminishing area of northern Kuwait and southern Iraq, with their northward
line of escape largely severed.
On 27 February the US 24th Mechanized Division attacked the
Guard’s Hammurabi Armoured Division, the al-Faw and Adnan Infantry Divisions
and the remnants of the Nebuchadnezzar Infantry Division. They fled, with the
Nebuchadnezzar Division possibly escaping over the Hawr al-Hammar Lake
causeway. The 24th Mechanized Division also captured fifty Republican Guard
T-72 tanks as they were fleeing north along a main road near the Euphrates. It
was all but over for the Guards.
Six disparate brigades with fewer than 30,000 troops and a few
tanks were now struggling back to Basra. The Iraqis agreed to a cease-fire the
following day, whilst the British 7th Armoured Brigade moved to cut the road to
Basra just north of Kuwait City. However, some troops continued to escape
across the Hawr al-Hammar and north from Basra along the Shatt al-Arab
Waterway. Brigadier Cordingley, Commander of the 7th Armoured Brigade, noted,
‘By 28 February it was clear that General Schwarzkopf’s plan to annihilate the
Republican Guard with a left hook through Iraq had failed … The majority of the
Iraqi soldiers were already on their way back to Baghdad.’
Firmly in control of Iraq’s state media, Saddam had no need
to acknowledge this terrible defeat, and instead victory was given as the
reason for abiding by the ceasefire. Baghdad Radio announced, ‘The Mother of
battles was a clear victory for Iraq … We are happy with the cessation of
combat operations as this would preserve our sons’ blood and people’s safety
after God made them triumphant with faith against their evil enemies.’
Only a residual Iraqi threat remained by 30 February. Two
Iraqi tank brigades were south-west of Basra, another brigade with forty
armoured vehicles was to the south and an infantry brigade was on either side
of the Hawr al-Hammar Lake. In total, about eight armoured battalions, the
remnants of those Iraqi forces deployed in and around Kuwait, were now trapped
in the ‘Basra Pocket’. Basra itself lay in ruins, and marshes and wetlands to
the west and east made passage impossible.
Despite the cease-fire, the US 24th Division fought elements
of the Hammurabi Division again on 2 March after reports that a battalion of
T-72 tanks was moving northwards towards it in an effort to escape. The Iraqi
armoured column foolishly opened fire and suffered the consequences. The
Americans retaliated with Apache attack helicopters and two task forces,
destroying 187 armoured vehicles, 34 artillery pieces and 400 trucks. The
survivors were forced back into the ‘Basra Pocket’. By this stage Iraq only had
about 700 of its 4,500 tanks and 1,000 of its 2,800 APCs left in the KTO and,
with organized resistance over, the Iraqis signed the cease-fire on 3 March
1991.
In the wake of Desert Sabre, only the Iraqi Army Air Corps
and the Republican Guard Corps secured favour with Saddam Hussein, by swiftly
crushing the revolt in the south against his regime and containing the
resurgent Kurds in the north. In contrast the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Air Force
had fled Desert Storm and remained under a cloud. Subsequently the IrAF found itself
grounded by the Coalition’s ceasefire terms, while the army was left face to
face with the barrels of the Republican Guard Corps’ remaining tanks. After a
brief stand-off, the Iraqi Army opted for the status quo, but its loyalty and
competence remained tarnished by its collapse and by the actions of thousands
of deserters.
In 1991 the Coalition accounted for just six Iraqi
helicopters (one Mi-8, one BO-105 and four unidentified) in the air and another
five on the ground. General Schwarzkopf had cause to regret that they did not
destroy more. During the ceasefire talks on 3 March 1991 the Iraqis requested
that, in light of the damage done to their infrastructure, they be allowed to
move government officials around by helicopter. Without fully realizing the
consequences, Schwarzkopf agreed not to shoot down ‘any’ helicopters flying
over Iraqi territory. Thus, by using his helicopter gunships Saddam was able to
crush the rebellion in Iraq’s cities and the southern marshes and Kurdish
advances in the north with impunity, despite his defeat in Kuwait.
In hindsight, Schwarzkopf felt that grounding Iraqi
helicopters would have made little difference. In his view the Iraqi armour and
artillery of the twenty-four remaining divisions, which had never entered the war
zone, had a far more devastating impact on the rebels. This was a little
disingenuous, for while tanks and artillery were instrumental in crushing the
revolts in the predominantly Shia cities of Basra, Karbala and Najaf (the scene
of Shi’ite unrest in 1977, resulting in 2,000 Shia arrests and another 200,000
being expelled to Iran), in the southern marshes the Republican Guard’s T-72
tanks could not operate off the causeways and artillery was only effective
against pre-spotted targets. In fact the Iraqi Army Air Corps played a pivotal
role over Iraq’s rebellious cities, the southern marches and the Kurdish
mountains.
Over the cities helicopter gunships were used
indiscriminately to machine gun and rocket the civilian population in order to
break their morale. Although there was no evidence of the use of chemical
weapons (Saddam did not want to provoke further coalition intervention so
stayed his hand), on at least one occasion residential areas were reportedly
sprayed with sulphuric acid. This was corroborated by French military units
still in southern Iraq, who treated Iraqi refugees with severe acid burns.
Although the rebellion was mainly a spontaneous outburst by
defeated and disaffected troops returning home, its religious Shia basis meant
that it was ultimately doomed. America stood by, as a Shia victory would only
serve radical Shia Iran, and as a result the rebels did not even receive
airdrops of manportable anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles with which to fend
off Saddam’s helicopters and tanks. The Iraqi military, dominated by the Sunni
minority, went about their business unhindered.
After authority had been brutally reasserted in the cities,
thousands fled into Iraq’s southern marshes seeking sanctuary. Here the IAAC
was even more instrumental in the destruction of those forlorn forces that the
West had vaguely hoped would unseat Saddam. IAAC pilots knew what lay in store
for them if they failed, as General Ali Hassan al-Majid, who was commanding the
operation, warned at least pilot not to return unless he had wiped out some
insurgents obstructing a bridge.
The whole operation in the marshes was largely a repeat of
March 1984, when Iraqi helicopter gunships mercilessly hunted Iranian troops
round the two important Majnoon Island oil facilities. This time they refrained
from using mustard gas or any other chemical agents, but once again the
unburied dead were left to become carrion for the jackals, and those foolish
enough to surrender were shot at point-blank range. The IAAC contributed to the
deaths of an estimated 30,000 rebels. Additionally 3,000 Shia clerics were
driven from Najaf and fled to the Iranian town of Qom.
In the north the fear of another Halabja was sufficient to
scatter the Kurdish population at the first sight of an aircraft. The IrAF and
IAAC once more refrained from deploying chemical weapons, but callously
contented themselves with dropping flour on the refugees, who instantly
panicked. Once more the Iraqi military made use of their helicopters and
artillery to eject the lightly armed Kurdish guerrillas from their recent
conquests.
Whilst the IAAC had continued to fly after 1991, in defiance
of the cease-fire terms the IrAF resumed operational and training flights with
its fixed-wing aircraft in April 1992. The IrAF claimed it was responding to
the provocation of an Iranian Air Force attack on an Iranian opposition force’s
base east of Baghdad. In response to these violations, and the repressive
military operations, the UN imposed two separate no-fly zones in the north and
south of the country.
Due to UN sanctions and financial restrictions, the Iraqi
Air Force could only manage about a hundred sorties per day, down from 800 in
the heyday of the Iran–Iraq War. Residual IrAF capabilities remained in the
Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk areas, protecting Saddam from dissidents and the
Kurds. Throughout most of the 1990s the IrAF spent much of its time dodging the
northern and southern no-fly zones, though at least two fighters (a MiG-23 and
a MiG-25) were lost for violating these zones.
