The raid by Bill McRae and 104 Squadron RAF on Palermo was
just one of many in early 1943 in the elusive search to gain final victory over
Axis forces in North Africa. In late-March and April 1943 the bombing raids on
infrastructure, supply, Luftwaffe bases, Tunisian ports such as Sfax, Sousse,
Bizerte and the capital Tunis, and those in Sicily and southern Italy, were
being intensified.
Over the Tunisian battlefields DAF fighter-bombers were no
less active. On 7 April No. 3 Squadron RAAF of 239 Wing RAF received orders to
undertake bombing and strafing operations against extensive German troop
convoys withdrawing towards Tunis along the road from Gafsa to Mezzouna. The
convoys were believed to include 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions. Flying Officer
Tom Russell and Flight Sergeant Rod McKenzie flew two of the squadron’s
Kittyhawk fighter-bombers on the second of their four missions that day.
We carried six 40lb
anti-personnel bombs. Each had a stick about 18 inches long sticking out from
the nose, so that they would explode above the ground. In the bombing run we
encountered Breda 20mm anti-aircraft gun fire. We claimed four direct hits on
vehicles and three near misses, but it was impossible to be sure whose bombs
did the damage.
We then turned and
came back on strafing runs against the convoys. On my fourth strafing run, just
as I crossed the road, I received some strikes on my starboard wing, and some
on the fuselage just behind the cockpit. I looked down and saw that the
anti-aircraft fire was coming from a gun emplacement. After gaining some height
I dived to attack and after a couple of bursts, the fire from the gun post
stopped. My report shows that I claimed a gun post, and my log book that I also
claimed a troop-carrier.
Squadron Leader Brian Eaton led this mission of twelve
Kittyhawk fighter-bombers, which also included Squadron Leader Bobby Gibbes.
The squadron’s operations record book shows:
Duty: Bombing M/T [motor transport] on road in Maharis area
Time Up: 1045
Time Down: 1150
Details of Sortie or Flight: A/C [aircraft] headed north,
and flew over sea towards Maharis then turned in over land, where 40 M/T were
seen on the main coast road, and bombed accurately at P/P. U6513 – 4 direct
hits and 3 near misses were scored on the road. Slight Breda fire encountered.
No E/A (enemy aircraft) were seen or reported.
One of the other missions that day was led by Squadron
Leader Bobby Gibbes, and the squadron’s Operations Record Book shows:
Duty: To bomb and strafe M/T [motor transport] on
Maharis–Gafsa road
Time Up: 1515
Time Down: 1629
Details of Sortie or Flight: A fair concentration of 40+ M/T
was bombed, getting one M/T flamer, then strafed with the resulting total
strafing claim, 6 M/T destroyed, 16 damaged and 20+ bodies. Medium heavy
accurate anti-aircraft and Breda fire was encountered.
A total of twenty-seven pilots flew on the four missions
that day, in forty-five individual sorties. No pilots were lost.
It is thought that Colonel Count von Stauffenberg, who drove
up to be with the leading tanks and troops of 10th Panzer Division near
Mezzouna, may have been wounded in these strafing attacks. He lost his left
eye, his right hand, and two fingers on his left hand and, after evacuation,
spent three months in hospital in Munich. Later, he was one of the leading
members of the failed plot of 20 July 1944 to assassinate Hitler, for which he
was executed.
From 25 April the squadrons of 239 Wing of the DAF were
thrown into a concentrated anti-shipping campaign, to prevent supplies reaching
the beleaguered Axis forces in Tunisia. The Kittyhawks of 3 and 450 Squadrons
RAAF would dive from up to 10,000 feet to release a 500lb bomb, sometimes as
low as 1,000 feet depending upon the intensity of anti-aircraft fire. Between
mid-April and 9 May 3 and 450 Squadrons made 840 sorties against Axis shipping.
Because of the consequent massive destruction of seaborne
supplies, by the end of March air-transport flights by the Luftwaffe had
increased to around 150 per day between Sicily and Tunis. With a Junkers Ju52
transport able to carry two and a half tons and the giant, six-engined
Messerschmitt Me323 more than ten tons, it was estimated they could provide up
to a third of the Axis’ daily supply needs. To choke off the enemy’s last
remaining lifeline, Operation FLAX was launched at the beginning of April.
Bombers from the North West Africa Strategic, Tactical and
Desert Air Forces intensified their raids on the Axis air bases while fighters
were thrown in to intercept transport aircraft on the air routes. On 10 and 11
April Operation FLAX began to pay huge dividends, when P-38 Lightnings of the
US Twelfth Air Force claimed no fewer than fifty of the Ju52/3m tri-motor
transports. Yet even worse losses for the Luftwaffe were to come.
Over Cape Bon on 16 April Neville Duke was flying with two
other Spitfires of 92 Squadron RAF when he sighted a formation of eighteen
enemy transports flying near to sea level. They were the three-engined
Savoia-Marchetti SM.82s. Duke called his leader and then turned into an attacking
dive. Because of his speed Duke only managed a short burst on his first target
aircraft. He closed on a second Savoia, slowing his speed so that his cannon
shells raked the length of its fuselage.
After pulling his Spitfire narrowly over the top of the
Savoia he saw it quickly plunge into the sea. Duke also claimed a second SM.82,
to reach eight victories in North Africa. Once again Duke’s flying skills were
lethal, and he seemed to be indestructible. While five Savoia SM.82s were shot
down in the encounter, luck ran out for Wing Commander ‘Widge’ Gleed of 244
Squadron who was lost.
Two days later, on Palm Sunday, 18 April, the afternoon did
seem to be drifting, like its name indicated into a day of relative peace and
quiet. Following intelligence reports of German plans to airlift out some of
their key staff of the Heeresgruppe Afrika and non-combat troops, on transports
returning to Sicily, the USAAF 57th Fighter Group sent out successive patrols
through the day to try and intercept any such flights. Pilots continually
returned with nothing to report.
Late in the day, when the last patrol was organized, no
contacts had been made with enemy aircraft. This final operation was a
combination of 57th Group and 244 Wing RAF, whose Spitfires of 92 Squadron would
provide top cover. At 1705 forty-eight Warhawks from all four of 57th Group’s
Fighter Squadrons, 64th, 65th, 66th, and 319th, began lifting off, led by
Captain James ‘Big Jim’ Curl, the experienced flight leader of 66th.
Once they had met up with the Spitfires, Curl led the
formation north-west over Cape Bon. Almost six miles out to sea dusk was
gathering when Curl turned them back southwards to return home. He knew the
light would not last much longer. Then he saw something, maybe 4,000 feet below
them, close to the sea. At first he thought it might be a very large flight of
migrating geese. The shapes became clearer under his gaze. He was looking at
what he estimated to be about 100 of the Ju52/3m transports. They were all in a
camouflage green colour, making them hard to pick out against the sea in the
twilight, and were flying north in a giant ‘V-of-Vs’ formation. What came next
was at first nicknamed by the American pilots as a ‘goose shoot’.
While the Spitfires took on some escorting Bf109s, the forty-eight
Warhawks descended onto the cumbersome Ju52s like falcons swooping on a flock
of fat pigeons. In the mayhem Curl claimed two Ju52s and a 109. He described
the engagement as chaotic, the sky filled with turning, wheeling aircraft. The
Warhawks twisted around in the melee, firing at a mass of enemy aircraft that
had no escape. Captain Roy Whittaker, flight leader in 65th Fighter Squadron,
shot down two Ju52s and two 109s. His four victories took him up to a total of
seven, which made him the highest scoring pilot in the 57th.
Lieutenant Richard O. Hunziker, of the 65th Fighter
Squadron, on only his second combat operation, found himself in a baptism of
fire. He was astounded at the number of enemy aircraft.
The enemy formation
looked like a thousand black beetles crawling over the water. On our first pass
I was so excited I started firing early. I could see the shots kicking up the
water.
Hunziker went after a Ju52 near the front of the ‘V’ and saw
his shots hammer along its tail and fuselage, and simultaneously realized he
was being shot at by two Ju52s on either side of him.
It looked as though
they were blinking red flashlights at me from the windows – Tommy-guns,
probably. The ship I was firing at hit the water with a great sheet of spray
and then exploded. As I pulled up I could see figures struggling away from what
was left of the aeroplane.
Next Hunziker responded to a radio call for help against
some Bf109s 5,000 feet above him. At first he struggled to latch on to the
enemy fighters in the whirling dogfights. Taking evasive action he found
himself crossing over land. Then, with his first burst of fire at one of the
109s, he blew its nose off, sending it into a steep dive to crash into the
ground in flames.
The total losses and damage inflicted by 57th Fighter Group
on the Luftwaffe transports and escort fighters were:
Pptable
Not surprisingly the media reported the one-sided air battle
as the ‘Palm Sunday Massacre’.
However, the clashes between the fighters, the Warhawks and
the Bf109s, were far from one-sided. The Bf109s were able to operate thousands
of feet above the Warhawks, which were ineffective above 15,000 feet. This
enabled the 109s to wait for an opportunity to mount a diving attack, ideally
out of the sun on the American fighters. To counter the German fighters’
advantage, 57th Group pilots, such as Lieutenant Mike McCarthy of 64th Fighter
Squadron, knew that a 109 could not out-turn a properly flown P-40 Warhawk, ‘We
had to know where they were every moment, to time the ‘break’ call, and turn
hard into them so we could bring our guns to bear and shoot.’
On 22 April DAF Spitfires and Kittyhawks pounced upon some
twenty Me323s which were flying a wide V formation. The main cargo of these
six-engined giant transports was fuel. They were escorted by ten Bf109s and
Macchi C.202s. Lieutenant ‘Robbie’ Robinson of 1 Squadron SAAF downed two 109s,
which made him an ace. His fellow pilots sent six more of the 323s, engulfed in
petrol-fed flames, plunging into the sea.
Out of a fleet of around 250 of these huge workhorse planes,
German records show that between 5 April and 12 May 1943, 166 aircraft and
their cargoes of critical supplies were lost. Between 18 and 22 April Allied
fighters claimed to have shot-down some 120 of the Luftwaffe’s Ju52 and Me323
transport aircraft. After 22 April the Luftwaffe was forced to fly air
transports only at night, and with continuing losses to Allied night-fighters,
in ever reducing numbers.
#
In contrast the Allies had no such supply shortages. On the
ground they had more men, more guns, more tanks, and in the sky the decisive
advantage – air superiority. Yet the Germans still held the vital passes
through the hills surrounding Tunis, inflicting terrible losses as they
withstood every Allied attack. In the southern and northern coastal corridors,
it seemed impossible to concentrate sufficient forces to break through. The
Medjerda Valley was blocked by German defences on Longstop Hill. After the
Germans had defeated desperate Allied attacks on 25 December 1942 to retain
Longstop, they had dug in extensive and formidable defences on what was for
them, their Weinachtshügel (Christmas Hill).
At last, in the closing week of April the long-sought
breakthrough came. Eighth Army captured Longstop Hill and other enemy strongpoints
in the Medjerda Valley. Here was the opportunity to concentrate forces for a
hopefully decisive thrust at Tunis. The German generals knew a major offensive
was coming, but not whether it would be Eighth Army from the south-east, First
Army in the centre, or the Americans in the north-west.
The final plan was for a spearhead attack in the centre in
early May by First Army combined with elements transferred from Eighth Army.
Battle-hardened British infantry battalions from the 1st Armoured, 4th and 78th
Divisions would first break the German lines. Then 6th and 7th Armoured
Divisions, after funnelling their way through the Allied-held strategic market
town of Medjez el Bab, would smash their way down the Medjerda Valley through
Massicault and St Cyprien to Tunis.
However, in the redeployment and concentration lead up,
there was great risk. The inherent weakness of the plan was that the tanks and
their support vehicles transferred from Eighth Army in the south would have to
move in open view through the hills north to Medjez el Bab. Then endless
columns of tanks, infantry, and supplies would have to crawl across the one and
only bridge over the Medjerda River at Medjez.
Only then could the attack concentrate across a narrow
3,000-yard front on the valley floor to drive towards Tunis. In the days of
repositioning and concentration, Allied forces would be glaringly susceptible
to German reconnaissance, and consequent ground and air attack. Once again the
question was: how could this be done without the Germans knowing, and
countering with their own troop redeployments? Despite the huge losses imposed
on the Luftwaffe, even late into April, with whatever aircraft they had left,
the Germans had the capability to mount a desperate ‘last throw’ raid.
#
The Axis positions in the hills around Enfidaville were very
strong, and from the air it was difficult to identify targets amongst the
orchards, fields and plantations within the ridges and hilly terrain. It was
very different from the desert and enemy vehicles were avoiding the use of
roads during the day. In one operation the anti-tank Hurricanes of No. 6
Squadron, despite seeing the coloured smoke of Eighth Army positions, were
unable to identify Axis forces hiding amongst olive groves. Rather than visible
targets, pilots had to be briefed with designated areas on air photographs,
which required a new approach and training.
From the sea north of Enfidaville Axis forces had
established a defensive line through the hills north-west to Medjez el Bab in
the Medjerda Valley, then north again through the mountains to the coast about
twenty miles west of the port of Bizerte. The plain in front of Medjez in the
Medjerda Valley was clearly the most favourable for an armoured attack to break
through to Tunis. Alexander and Montgomery agreed that Eighth Army should
restrict its efforts to maintaining pressure on the Enfidaville defences in a
holding operation. On 18 April 1st Armoured Division and the King’s Dragoon
Guards, and later on 30 April the 7th Armoured and 4th Indian Divisions, 201
Guards Brigade and some artillery, moved across to join First Army near Medjez.
A joint planning conference determined that DAF would return
to army/air close support to cover the armoured drive down the Medjerda valley
to Tunis. The first moves of forces from Eighth Army began on 30 April. Because
of DAF pilots not being experienced with the terrain of the battle area, and
communications being channelled through both First Army and Eighth Army HQs,
targets for DAF squadrons were drawn up and agreed in advance. A massive letter
‘T’ 150 yards long was marked out in white on the ground, as well as red and
blue smoke, to assist the pilots’ navigation.
The air support plan and timelines for an ‘air blitz’ on 6
May were:
0540: Eighty-four medium bombers of the Tactical Bomber
Force (TBF) would bomb Axis ground positions directly in front of the Allied
troops advance path.
0730–0800: 126 light bombers of DAF would attack their
pre-selected targets further back.
0830–0930: Eighty-four medium bombers of TBF would bomb
targets a further distance away.
0930–1200: Fighter-bombers of 242 Wing RAF would attack
targets of opportunity in the battle area.
1200 onwards: 108 light bombers of DAF would be in readiness
to hit enemy reserves, while DAF fighter-bombers would look for Axis force
movements in roads and valleys.
Contrary to some expectations, the initial move of the
armoured divisions from the south to Medjez, protected by DAF’s dominating air
cover, was achieved without the knowledge of, or hindrance from, the enemy. It
was a clear demonstration of how air superiority could enable ground forces to
reposition without interference.
The armoured thrust for Tunis began with six divisions, and
all their supplies, in a slow crawl across that single bridge at Medjez. Air
power was tasked with imposing a protective screen, an umbrella over the valley
route to make it impenetrable to any enemy reconnaissance or air attack. It
seemed to scream out for one Stuka dive-bombing raid to hit that one and only
bridge at Medjez, and cut the offensive in two.
On 6 May, day one of the advance through Medjez, Allied
aircraft flew some 2,500 sorties, attacking Axis forces in their rear bases,
and bombing and strafing their defences in the path of the Allied attack. By
0800 on 6 May the British infantry had cleared a path through German positions
and their minefields, taken objectives such as Frendj, and dug in. In an
example of the air-ground support, and in co-ordination with an artillery
bombardment preceding the lead infantry and tanks, DAF light bombers and
Kittyhawks hit Axis positions at Bordj Frendj and St Cyprien, halting a convoy
of 100 enemy trucks.
Then the armoured divisions burst through to take Massicault
before nightfall. On 7 May the armour rolled into Tunis, taking many Axis
forces by surprise. Some enemy troops even emerged from bars and restaurants,
with stunned stares, and surrendered without a fight. Allied air power had made
the skies above Medjez and the Medjerda valley another no-fly zone.
It was the combination of an ‘air blitz’, air support,
artillery and massed armour that, on 7 May, enabled the 7th Armoured Division
to burst through to Tunis. In the north American forces took the port of
Bizerte. Axis air forces were powerless to help their troops on the ground. On
8 May the front lines were advancing so rapidly that First Army only allowed
specific requests for air support.
On 8 May the Luftwaffe could fly just sixty sorties, some
from only two operational air bases they retained in the Cape Bon peninsula. On
9 May there were even fewer Luftwaffe sorties, and on 10 May there were none.
The Germans had fled the Tunisian skies, evacuating what planes, equipment and
personnel they could.
Small boats attempting to evacuate Axis troops by sea were
attacked by fighters. A large evacuation exercise on 9 May, when attacked by
Tactical Bomber Force light bombers and DAF fighters, quickly surrendered.
Large formations of Axis troops were surrendering, but some still moved towards
the coast, despite no ships being able to leave. In the mountains north of
Enfidaville on 10 May, the Italian First Army, including the German 10th
Panzer, 90th Light and 164th Infantry Divisions, was still holding out. The
90th Light Division held the coast road, and was blocking First and Eighth
Armies from joining up.
On 12 May a light bomber raid on 90th Light Division was
planned. Allied troops were only 1,500 yards from the enemy, so an artillery
bombardment of yellow smoke was laid on both north and south of 90th Light’s
positions. The bombings were spot on, and very quickly white flags were
everywhere. It proved to be the last air attack on ground forces of the North
African campaign.
The capture of Tunis brought the Axis surrender and 250,000
prisoners. It was on the same scale as the German defeat at Stalingrad, and
hailed as the turning of the tide. And once again air power had been the
decisive ‘game-changer’.
The success in North Africa of DAF’s support for the army
was based upon gaining air superiority, which in turn rested upon winning the
air war first. The integral foundation of winning the air war flowed from the
RAF’s strategic decision to purchase fighters rather than dive-bombers. And, of
course, the superior performance of the Spitfire in aerial battles of fighter
against fighter was a significant factor.
Perhaps most important were the army/air support control
systems through the AASC groups, pioneered and improved between army and air
force from 1941 to 1943. In the Tunisian campaign, in terrain so different from
the desert, ‘flash’ messages from AASC at Army HQ to ALOs at DAF airfields were
introduced. This much improved the ALOs’ ability to communicate and explain new
developments in the battle area to the pilots. DAF developed a platform in this
area on which air superiority could be won and hopefully sustained in the
planned Allied invasion of Italy.
#
While the Allied armies had over six months struggled for
every inch of ground in Tunisia, not surprisingly the planning for the next
offensive, the invasion of Sicily, or Operation HUSKY, had gone ahead in
parallel. It was seen by some as poorly co-ordinated and riddled with
disagreements. Although the strategic decision was taken in January 1943 by
Churchill and Roosevelt at the Casablanca Conference, the Allies’ military
commanders such as General Montgomery were openly critical of the planning.
Worse still, the Germans fully expected that the Allies would next attempt an
invasion of Sicily, only 100 miles (160 kilometres) from Tunisia, and were
preparing accordingly. Unbeknown to the battlefield commanders this problem had
been foreseen for some time.
In the summer of 1942, in the midst of the planning and
preparations for Operation TORCH, a small inter-Services security committee had
begun to look ahead to what might follow. The Allies were under increasing
pressure from the USSR to open a second front against the Third Reich in
Europe. Once victory was achieved in North Africa the obvious next step would
be Sicily, only some 100 miles from Tunis. The problem was that this would be
obvious to the Germans too.
The Germans must be deceived into believing that Allied
forces from North Africa would next invade Europe at somewhere other than
Sicily. An idea was conceived whereby German intelligence would be provided
with a dead body carrying false, secret documents. A dead body, with the
uniform and rank of a senior staff officer, carrying supposedly secret
documents, would be dumped at sea close to Huelva on the Spanish coast.
It seemed feasible that the officer would be thought to have
died in an air crash at sea while en route to Algiers. The Spanish authorities,
although neutral, favoured the Third Reich and could be expected to make the
papers available to German agents. The documents would be created to convince
German intelligence that an invasion would take place other than Sicily, such
as Sardinia and Greece.
Although medical advice supported the feasibility of the
plan, finding a suitable dead body of an acceptable age proved to be the first
of many practical difficulties. After time-consuming enquiries a body of a
deceased man in his early thirties, who had died of pneumonia arising from
exposure, was obtained and medical opinion sought on its suitability. It was
thought that, as the body would be kept in cold storage, and encased in dry ice
leading up to the time of release into the sea, its subsequent decomposition
would seem to be from drowning, and from immersion in the sea.
In the face of some initial opposition, and debate at the
highest levels, the plan codenamed Operation MINCEMEAT was eventually approved
by Churchill with Eisenhower’s endorsement on 15 April. A letter was written by
the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Archibald Nye, to General
Alexander in Tunis, to be carried on the body to give it the touch of
authenticity. The dead body, in the guise of a senior officer, would also carry
two similar fake letters from Lord Louis Mountbatten, one of which would be
addressed to General Eisenhower. It seemed that much now depended upon a dead
man.
Or did it? For the DAF and the other Allied air forces, the
invasion of Axis-occupied Sicily presented a challenge on a far greater scale
than anything attempted before. It would clearly not be possible without Allied
domination of the skies above Sicily, and the surrounding Mediterranean
airspace. From the decisive triumphs of air power at El Alamein, Ksar Rhilane,
El Hamma, and the capture of Tunis, the lessons learned must be applied to the
largest amphibious landings ever attempted.
