In the mountains of northern Tunisia First Army continued
its fight to gain control of the eastern dorsals of the Atlas range. They were
still suffering from enemy bombing and strafing, since the Luftwaffe and Regia
Aeronautica were flying readily from local airfields around Tunis. During the
day Bf109 fighters and Ju87 Stuka dive-bombers often careered through the
valleys, seemingly at little more than tree-top height, shooting up transport
and anything that moved.
In contrast, in the south, because of DAF forcing the German
armour to turn back and withdraw from Ksar Rhilane, the next day, 11 March, the
French were able to move up to their positions. From the Mareth Line 2nd New
Zealand Division with other forces went westwards also without suffering any
enemy strikes, despite the many miles of redeploying traffic, which would have
been easily observed by Axis positions in the hills. The increasing dominance
of DAF, due to its ability to operate from hastily prepared airfields close
behind Eighth Army’s front lines, was allowing the repositioning of ground troops
with impunity. It was a significant advantage over Axis forces, and meant that
Eighth Army’s plans for an attack outflanking the Mareth Line, through the
Matmata Hills, were falling into place.
After the success of DAF at Ksar Rhilane, it was agreed that
the US Twelfth Air Force and No. 242 Group RAF from Algeria and Tunisia, would
concentrate on bombing German air fields round the clock. DAF would confine
itself to close support of Eighth Army, and its offensive against the Mareth
Line, through a western out-flanking ‘left-hook’ tactic, to the west as well as
a direct assault in the east.
During the night of 19/20 March, 50th (Northumbrian
Division) and 23 Armoured Brigade of XXX Corps began to move up for the frontal
attack on the Mareth Line’s formidable defences in the Wadi Zigzaou near the
coast. Simultaneously 200 tanks and 27,000 troops of the New Zealand Division
and 8 Armoured Brigade began the left hook around the south-west end of the
line. When the French built the Mareth Line defences they thought the terrain
of this area to be too difficult for any sizeable force to negotiate. The Free
French on 19 March had taken positions across the Wadi el Outio, north of Ksar
Rhilane, so that overnight on 19/20 March the New Zealanders skirted south and
west around the Mareth Line, and then began to head north towards the Tebaga
Gap.
As Axis forces in response reacted to hurry west to meet the
outflanking threat, on the evening of 20/21 March Eighth Army mounted a frontal
attack on the eastern end of the Mareth Line. In support DAF commenced the
‘shuttle service’ bombing by light bombers on 21 March around Mareth. During
the day fighter-bombers went out on armed reconnaissance searching for targets
of opportunity, and the tank-buster Hurricanes of DAF’s No. 6 Squadron did
their work again claiming thirty-two hits on enemy vehicles.
When Eighth Army’s 50th Division had to pull back to the
south side of the Wadi Zigzaou on 23 March they had suffered very heavy
casualties with some brigades down by a third. Montgomery ordered 1st Armoured
Division to reinforce the New Zealand Division, transferring the main impetus
to his left hook.
Having seen that Axis forces were being fully drawn into
battle in the east, Montgomery ordered the left flank attack to press forward
towards El Hamma. If successful this left hook would reach behind the Mareth
Line, and force the Axis General Messe to pull back all his troops to the
north. As the first attack on the eastern sector of the Mareth Line struggled
to make a breakthrough, the 4th Indian and 1st Armoured Divisions moved to the
west to bolster Montgomery’s ‘left-hook’ tactic. The Luftwaffe, hammered by the
bombing campaign against its airfields, was unable to attack the miles and
miles of dusty columns. It confirmed that the Allies had gained air
superiority, which allowed Eighth Army to redeploy its forces without fear of
Luftwaffe attacks.
The problem with the ‘left-hook’ strategy was that Axis
forces were entrenched in strong positions at El Hamma, in the Tebaga Gap’s
confined approach. Eighth Army’s tanks would be vulnerable to the German 88mm
guns, which were well dug-in, and lethal against armour. A direct frontal
attack by Eighth Army could be a disaster.
The New Zealanders were held up by very strong Axis
positions which comprised extensive minefields and dug-in artillery, in a
6,000-yard-wide defile code-named the ‘Plum’. The ‘Plum’ defile ran between
Djebel Melaba on the north edge of the Matmata Hills and Djebel Tebaga, and
Axis forces had also made use of a Roman wall which crossed the valley.
First Armoured Division began to follow the track now marked
by the New Zealanders. It wound its way through the edges of the Matmata Hills
for some 200 miles, and it would take two days. Meanwhile the New Zealanders
called for DAF air support. At the same time there were concerns that the
firepower of 1st Armoured when it arrived would be insufficient, and General
Messe could reinforce Axis positions further in the meantime. Montgomery and
Broadhurst agreed in principle to DAF mounting a ground attack operation to
blast a way through the ‘Plum’, later to be referred to as the El Hamma Line
(or ‘Mareth switch-line’). An Army-Air conference on 24 March agreed that,
instead of light bombers in formation attacks, fighter-bombers and strafing
attacks would be used in front of the ground attack.
The DAF success in attacking Axis armour at Ksar Rhilane
must have impressed Eighth Army’s planners. For the first time it was decided
that the full DAF attack role would change. Instead of their typical tactics of
strikes against supply columns and dumps, airfields and troop concentrations,
DAF fighter-bombers would fly sorties in close collaboration with Eighth Army’s
ground attack. The plan was for the Kittyhawk fighter-bombers to go in low,
bombing and strafing enemy lines, in the direct path of, and ahead of the 2nd
New Zealand, 4th Indian and 1st Armoured Divisions. In terrain so favourable
for the defenders, it was really the only hope for Montgomery’s plan to
succeed.
The reasoning for using the fighter-bombers was based upon a
number of factors, including the light bomber crews not knowing the new battle
area, and that the effectiveness of pattern bombing against dug-in targets was
doubted. It was thought that the fighter-bombers would be better at pinpointing
enemy positions, and their use would allow the light bombers to continue with
their night-bombing raids in the east. Perhaps the most influential factor was
that Broadhurst wanted the fighter-bombers, with their bombs and cannon, to lay
on a ‘low flying blitz’.
The modification of fighters so that they could carry bombs,
either under their fuselage or wings, in a fighter-bomber role, was a recent
development. It was controversial, with conflicting arguments for and against.
Flying with 450 Squadron RAAF of 239 Wing RAF at this time was Flight
Lieutenant Reginald ‘Rusty’ Kierath from a rural area in New South Wales,
Australia. Kierath was one of a number of pilots who had flown a Kittyhawk in a
fighter-bomber role, known as a Kittybomber, in the action at Ksar Rhilane. The
first trial of a Kittyhawk in such a role had been undertaken in early 1942 by
a fellow Australian, Clive Caldwell, a fighter ace with No. 112 Squadron RAF.
On 24 March 1943, the lives of the spearhead troops, and the turning of the
Mareth Line, depended upon the likes of Rusty Kierath and other flyers in DAF
to deliver the cutting edge of the new air – ground support tactic.
Besides tactical considerations on the ground, there were
unavoidable strategic reasons for mounting an air blitz. Having been unable to
break the Mareth Line near the coast in a frontal attack, to try again there
invited further defeat and heavy losses. The only other possible way was
through the defile at El Hamma. Yet the Axis had been able to reinforce its
defences to make the El Hamma gap just as unattractive. To sustain its supply
needs Eighth Army must break through, keep moving forward, and reach the main
port of Sfax farther up the coast to open up easier access to shipping cargoes.
The El Hamma strongpoint sat in a funnel of a valley, with
German gun positions on the hills either side, and protected by mines and
countless dry river beds. DAF was being called upon to destroy the trap.
The proposed plan for an ‘air blitz’ by DAF in support of
Eighth Army caused a reaction from AVM Coningham, who was now AOC-in-C of
Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF). NATAF comprised the Desert Air
Force, XXII Air Support Command and the Tactical Bomber Force (TBF). Coningham
was resistant to committing fighters to major ground attack operations. It was
against established RAF doctrine, because of the risk of losing large numbers
of fighters, and consequently air superiority. Coningham sent his senior air
staff to remonstrate with Broadhurst, who was not deterred. Backed by
Montgomery, Broadhurst got his way.
Immediately after the Army-Air conference on 24 March,
fighter-bombers and the tank-destroyer Hurricanes attacked the enemy’s tanks
and transport, which were confronting the New Zealanders. Also more detailed
planning for the ‘air blitz’ to break the El Hamma Line of the Axis forces got
under way at once. With the stalemate at Mareth, the Axis 21st Panzer and 164th
Infantry Divisions, already at El Hamma, could be reinforced by 10th and 15th
Panzer. The principal elements of the air support plan drawn up for the El
Hamma blitz were:
25/26 March: Night raid bombing on Axis HQs and telephone
centres to keep the enemy awake and confused.
26 March 1530: Attacks on tank concentrations first by
Hurricanes of the tank-buster No. 6 Squadron, followed by two squadrons of
fighter-bombers.
26 March 1600: A creeping artillery barrage behind which 8
Armoured Brigade and New Zealand infantry would begin to advance.
The creeping barrage would create an advancing bomb-line.
From sixteen fighter-bomber squadrons available for the operation, two
squadrons at a time would bomb and strafe the enemy positions in front of the
bomb-line for more than two hours continuously.
On the ground a large letter E marked the infantry’s start
line, with red and blue smoke next to it. As the troops moved forward they
would indicate their positions with yellow smoke. Although this would be of use
to enemy artillery in the valley’s hillsides, there was a real concern to avoid
the blitz hitting Allied troops. The New Zealanders provided locations of Axis
gun positions, which Allied artillery would target regularly with smoke shells
to further help strafing and dive-bombing by DAF fighters.
The ‘air blitz’ plan called for continuous strikes by
Kittyhawk fighter-bombers, commencing thirty minutes before the Army ground
attack, to be maintained in two-squadron formations at a time for two hours.
Could this revolutionary new tactic work? To break the Mareth Line the ‘left
hook’ attack of Eighth Army must succeed. If the new DAF tactics did not
achieve the planned effect, the ground attack would almost certainly be
repelled. If it failed, it would take a more drawn-out offensive to drive the
Axis forces back from the Mareth Line. General Eisenhower’s commitment to
London and Washington to defeat Axis forces in Tunisia by May 1943 and
subsequent plans for the invasion of Sicily would be in tatters.
To assist the DAF bombing runs, smoke and army vehicles were
deployed on the ground approaches: red and blue smoke for the start point,
trucks drawn up in the form of code letters for DAF pilots, yellow smoke for
Eighth Army positions, and white smoke shells bursting onto enemy positions.
The first ever experiment of Army/Air wireless communication was instigated,
using selected flight lieutenants with radios sitting in armoured cars in the
front lines.
On the morning of 26 March dust storms allowed the New
Zealand troops and 1st Armoured Division, to concentrate for the attack with
good cover against enemy observers. At 1530, in a late change, an unscheduled
wave of light bombers of 3 Wing SAAF pattern-bombed enemy positions. When the
dust and smoke from this raid cleared the anti-tank Hurricanes of 6 Squadron
went in against 21st Panzer. Despite intense flak no aircraft were lost.
At 1600, as planned, the creeping barrage began, with smoke
shells targeted as indicators on Axis gun positions. Then the waves of
Kittybombers began their attacks, about 400 aircraft continuously over more
than two hours. Squadrons would first drop their bombs on enemy positions, then
dive down again to strafe with cannon and machine guns. By the end of the
onslaught 21st Panzer and 164th Infantry Divisions had suffered significant
losses of artillery guns and ‘soft skinned’ vehicles, as against thirteen
Kittybombers lost.
Over 24 to 26 March, day and night, DAF light bomber strikes
had pounded Axis positions again and again south of El Hamma. On the afternoon
of 26 March, despite serviceability constraints brought on by those two days of
low-flying, DAF threw in 412 sorties in pattern-bombing against enemy telephone
communications. Before the German troops could begin to re-organize, DAF fighter-bombers
struck again, bombing and strafing at low level. The DAF bombing campaign,
culminating in the fighter-bomber attack, fully achieved its aim of keeping the
enemy’s heads down before the ground attack.
At the end of the air blitz 8 Armoured Brigade and the New
Zealand infantry drove through the enemy minefields and defensive positions.
First Armoured Division carried out a considerable advance in the hours of
darkness, to ensure that the valley’s natural features could not be used to
mount an ambush on the tanks. Over the next two days Axis forces fought
rearguard actions, until they could retreat north with 15th Panzer from Mareth.
As well as destroying large numbers of guns, tanks and other transport and
imposing a toll of dead and wounded, by 28 March the Allies had taken 700
prisoners. The combined DAF and artillery blitz had turned the Mareth Line, and
the Axis troops could hold no longer.
DAF lost seventeen Kittybombers in the operation, out of
some 400. To achieve the major success of breaking the Mareth Line at El Hamma
it was an acceptable loss. Those who were involved had no doubts about the
worth of this innovative use of air support. Yet Broadhurst’s decision to use
fighter-bombers was still criticized in higher circles. Perhaps most important
was the demonstration it gave of how fighter-bombers in close army-air support,
where circumstances were favourable for their use, could change the tide of
battle on the ground.
By late-March and early-April 1943 the rains began to
lessen. Planning and preparations were underway again for the spring offensive
to take Tunis. With temperatures on some days around a maximum of 25–28°C, it
allowed the bringing forward of more troops and supplies.
At the same time as the First Army infantry fought in the
Oued Zarga mountains in the north, in the south on 7 April the first forward
detachments of General Montgomery’s Eighth Army made contact with leading
patrols of II US Corps. The Allied pincer movement was beginning to close in on
the Axis forces. Speed was now critical on all fronts to exploit the
encirclement, and prevent the enemy from controlling his retreat and
withdrawing his forces to Italy.
#
The struggle for air supremacy in early-April continued
unabated. DAF squadrons began to come within range of RAF airfields in Tunisia,
and all Allied air forces were put under the unified command of AVM Coningham.
Every avenue was being explored to strengthen air superiority and Wing
Commander Dundas of 324 Wing was presented with orders to undertake a bizarre
mission. At the Bou Saada oasis in the desert, some 250 miles south of Algiers,
a Vichy French air force unit remained isolated. They had been resisting all
entreaties to collaborate with the Allies. Besides the opportunity to add
another wing-size group to Allied air power, there was a demand to eliminate
any threat they might pose. As the Allies ratcheted up the pressure on the
Axis, and closed on Tunis, the last thing they needed was a rogue strike on
their rear areas by some disgruntled Vichy French flyers.
Dundas’ orders were to fly down to Bou Saada and talk the
French CO into joining the Allies. He was to offer them the temptation of being
re-equipped with Spitfire fighters. For a long flight over desert and the Atlas
Mountains, and to guard against one of them having to make a forced landing for
engine trouble or some other unforeseeable event, he took with him a Canadian,
Jimmie Grey, commander of No. 243 Squadron RAF. In their two Spitfires they
finally located the landing strip, close to an oasis settlement. The green
palms and white of the houses and Foreign Legion fort sparkled in the sunset
against the surrounding desert. As they descended Dundas saw a figure emerge
from a tent and peer skywards:
I told Jimmie to go on
circling while I landed and taxied in. I would call him if I wanted him to
follow. With great caution – and a little trepidation – I landed and taxied
over to the tent. The man I had seen ran towards me, waving and smiling. I
called Jimmie and told him to come down. Our one man reception committee was a
young lieutenant in the French Air Force. He was evidently astonished to see
us, but he was courteous and friendly.
So as to portray his
authority to negotiate Dundas introduced himself to the young French lieutenant
as a lieutenant colonel, accompanied by Commander Grey. The young French
officer was astounded that they had attained such senior ranks at their
youthful age and was very envious. He then drove Dundas and Grey to his HQ
where they met the French commander, a major well into middle age. Without
enquiring the reason for their visit, he invited Dundas and Grey to dine with
him and other senior French officers. During the dinner the focal point of the
conversation was the Spitfire fighter, and their desire to get into the action.
Maybe it was the wine
working on me, but I decided that they were the sort of people we wanted with
us, and I told their CO that I was authorized to offer them the opportunity to
come and fight alongside us in the final liberation of Tunisia from the ‘sale
Boche’. This information aroused great enthusiasm – maybe the wine was working
on them too …
Next day Dundas and
Grey made an uneventful return flight to their home base but without gaining
any clear indication from the French commander of his intentions. Further
communications took place at a senior level between the Free French authorities
and the Allies and, in due course, the French airmen from Bou Saada joined the
Allied cause. They duly got their Spitfires and were flying operations in the
final battle for Tunis.
Despite the growing evidence that Allied air power was
winning the air war, for the troops on the ground, to most of whom the air force
was an unseen hand, it was not at all clear where and when a final victory in
Tunisia would come. The problem remained: how and where could the Allies break
through to close the trap? In the far north, on the coastal approaches to
Bizerte, the Americans were held up at mountain strongpoints such as Green Hill
and Bald Hill. In the south the armoured strength of Eighth Army after the
breakthrough at El Hamma had become neutralized by Axis defences in the hills
around Enfidaville to the south of Tunis.
In the central north, in the Medjerda river valley, there
seemed to have been little change since December. North of Medjez el Bab the
Germans were immoveable. On ridges such as Djebel Bou Aoukaz and Longstop Hill,
they stubbornly endured every attack by the Allies’ First Army. With the
terrain favouring the enemy’s defences, the fear was that for some months yet
the Axis could grind out a lengthy war of attrition before they succumbed.
Interdiction, an air
blitz and a ‘No Fly Zone’ to take Tunis
High above the island of Malta, Australian Flight Lieutenant
Bill McRae of 104 Squadron RAF wrestled with the controls of a twin-engined
Wellington bomber. He was taking off to raid Sicily’s capital and major port of
Palermo. In gusty winds and low cloud, groaning and creaking in its slow climb,
the bomber dropped then surged upwards. Bill recalled that:
Shortly after take-off
we ran into turbulent cloud. Our course was over the sea on the east of Sicily,
then a turn west through the straits of Messina and along the northern Sicilian
coast to Palermo.
At the outbreak of the Second World War, Bill McRae was
working for the Bank of New South Wales in the UK. As there were no Australian
forces in Britain, he first joined the Royal Artillery before transferring to
the RAF to train as a pilot. On completion of his training he had flown the new
Wellington Mk VIII torpedo-bomber to Cairo, and later he was posted to Malta.
On that night bombing raid to Palermo, despite the increasingly poor weather,
Bill was aware of the pressure to get the job done.
As we approached the
north coast of Sicily, the cloud cleared and we were able to identify some
islands, and work out the bombing run. We circled off the coast at 10,000 feet
until ‘blitz’ time, then hugged the shoreline towards the target, Palermo
Harbour.
I began to lose height
down to 8,000 feet, and increased speed to 160 knots. With the nose down I had
a good view, and saw a ship moored at the wharves. At first there was not a lot
of flak. We had no trouble in identifying the target and let the bombs go in
one stick.
Then I opened the
throttles, and with the engines screaming at maximum revs, did a steep climbing
turn, trying to get through the flak bursts, which were now targeting the
aircraft. When we were back to 8,000 feet, I eased back on the throttles, and
pushed the nose down to level off.
Both engines suddenly
cut out. In that instant, it seemed that time stood still. It flashed through
my mind that we had been hit. Then, after a couple of seconds, the engines
picked up.
As usual, when getting clear of a target, Bill found his
mouth had gone completely dry. In another operation for McRae and his crew, to
cut off German supplies, the target was the port of Sfax in Tunisia.
We took off in
daylight, at 1700 hours, and I was delighted to be at the controls of a
Wellington, which I was very familiar with from our Egypt based operations. We
flew south low over the sea and then turned 90 degrees right towards our
target. It was dark as we neared Sfax, and we were able to pin point our
position on some islands to the east of the town. We had climbed to 6,500 feet
and Ian had obtained the wind for the bombing run. The weather was clear and
the buildings in the port were easy to identify.
As we began our run in
exactly on the ‘blitz’ time, another aircraft dropped a string of flares. Ian
did a couple of bombing runs, and with no guns firing at us, he thought he was
back home on a training exercise. Turning over the sea for another run, with
the light from the flares we spotted a ship a few miles off shore. We circled
round to line up on it but the flares went out. We had our own flares, but
Ernie found there were problems with their ripcords not working, which should
pull off a cap, and arm the flare. I even took the laces out of my desert
boots, and sent them back to Ernie to see if that would help. He launched three
more, but none of them lit up.
That ship had a lucky
escape. We returned to Sfax and got rid of the remaining bombs. On the way home
the aircraft ran like a bird. It seems she must have known it was her last
trip, as she went missing the next night along with its pilot, my good friend
Flight Sergeant Iremonger, and crew.
