China debuted the new DF-26 IRBM during the 3 September 2015 Victory
Day Parade. Official Chinese media commentary describe the system as “one
carrier, many warheads.” Other media reports revealed it was capable of
nuclear and conventional missions and its design enabled strikes against many
kinds of targets, including large ships. It also requires little support
equipment and has fast reaction times, according to descriptions in official
Chinese media outlets
DF-21D ASBM missile. China’s deployed ballistic missile force, operated
by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and PLA Rocket Force after being
renamed – from the Second Artillery late last year as part of the PLA’s
reorganization – is expanding in both size and types of missiles. China
continues to field conventionally armed SRBMs such as the CSS-6 (DF-15) and the
CSS-7 (DF-11) opposite Taiwan, and has developed a number of mobile,
conventionally-armed MRBMs and IRBMs. Missiles such as the CSS-11 (DF-16),
CSS-5 Mod 4 (DF-21C) and Mod 5 (DF-21D) and DF-26 are key components of the
Chinese military modernization program, specifically designed to prevent
adversary military forces’ access to regional conflicts. The CSS-5 Mod 5 and a
variant of the DF-26 have anti-ship missions
China’s conventional missile force includes the CSS-6
short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) with a range of 725-850 km; CSS-7 SRBM
with a range of 300-600 km; CSS-11 SRBM with a range of over 700 km;
land-attack and anti-ship variants of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile
(MRBM); the DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM); and the CJ-10 ground-launched
cruise missile (GLCM). China’s conventionally-armed CSS-5 Mod 5 anti-ship
ballistic missile (ASBM) gives the PLA the capability to attack ships,
including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean. During the PLA’s
90th anniversary parade in July 2017, China displayed a new MRBM designated the
DF-16G, which China claims features high accuracy, short preparation time, and
an improved maneuverable terminal stage that can better infiltrate missile
defense systems. China also displayed the DF-26 IRBM during the PLA’s 90th
anniversary parade. First fielded in 2016, this system is capable of conducting
conventional and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets and
conventional strikes against naval targets in the western Pacific and Indian
Oceans and the South China Sea.
The DF-26 is a Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missile.
It is based on the earlier DF-21 , but has a longer range. Existence of this
missile was revealed in 2014. The DF-26 was first publicly revealed in 2015. It
appears to be in operational service for several years. This missile is in
service with Second Artillery Corps, that are de facto strategic missile forces
of the Chinese army.
Chinese sources claim that currently the DF-26 is the most
advanced intermediate-range ballistic missile in the world. It is worth noting
that the United States and Russia can not develop missiles of this class due to
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, that was signed back in 1987. The
only other comparable missile is the Indian Agni V. Chinese sources claim that
the DF-26 is superior to the Agni V.
The DF-26 is a two-stage solid-fuel missile. Its estimated
range is around 3 000 – 4 000 km. Other sources suggest that its maximum range
is in excess of 5 000 km. It is believed that the DF-26 can carry payload of 1
200 to 1 800 kg. This missile is fitted with a nuclear warhead.
The DF-26 is a road-mobile, two-stage solid-fueled IRBM with
an antiship variant possibly also in development.13 According to Chinese
sources, the missile measures 14 m in length, 1.4 m in diameter, and has a
launch weight of 20,000 kg.14 The missile has a range of 3,000-4,000 km, which
puts Guam within striking distance. Its ability to strike Guam has resulted in
the nicknames “Guam killer” and “Guam express.” The DF-26 comes with a “modular
design,” meaning that the launch vehicle can accommodate two types of nuclear
warheads and several types of conventional warheads. The accuracy of the DF-26
is uncertain, with speculators estimating the CEP at intermediate range between
150-450 meters. It is likely that this missile has internal navigation system
with indigenous Chinese BeiDou satellite navigation system. It should have an
accuracy of less than 100 m. Possibly less than 10 m.
The DF-26 is transported and fired from a Chinese-built HTF5680 12X12
Transporter Erector Launcher.
The United States Navy is particularly concerned about the
DF-21D, a solid-fuel missile with a range of 1,500 kilometers and armed with a
maneuverable warhead. The missile and warhead are equipped with their own
sensors to allow for course corrections in the terminal phase of flight. This
missile would be able to sink large maneuvering surface vessels, including
aircraft carriers, greatly enhancing China’s anti-access, area denial
capability. The DF-21D has been tested against land-based targets, but its
ability to hit moving targets in the open ocean is uncertain. China is also
working on an improved version of this system in the DF-26.
China’s antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) program is perhaps
the most dramatic example of the PLA’s strategy to control the Near Seas from
its continental position, if only because the PLA is implementing a maritime
strike technology no other country has mastered. The DF-21D missile is China’s
ASBM and is a modified version of an existing medium-range ballistic missile
(MRBM) in the Second Artillery’s inventory. The DF-21D has a range of up to 1,500
kilometers and employs a maneuvering reentry vehicle armed with a unitary or
submunition warhead. The reentry vehicle likely receives midcourse updates from
the Second Artillery’s command network, with the warhead’s terminal guidance to
a target provided by active radar and infrared homing. With the employment of
midcourse countermeasures, high hypersonic speed, and warhead maneuvering, the
DF-21D warhead is thought invulnerable to existing missile defenses. China’s
annual production of MRBMs, the missile class used for the DF-21D ASBM, is
estimated at ten to eleven per year, with the capacity to perhaps double this
rate during a surge in production. By the end of the decade, the PLA could
possess at least eighty DF-21Ds mounted on mobile TELs, a force large enough to
execute many multimissile volleys against adversary naval task forces. Along
with its cruise missile cousins, China’s antiship ballistic missile program is
another aspect of the missile and sensor revolution that calls into question surface
naval operations within a useful range of China and its Near Seas.
China’s Maritime
Reconnaissance Complex
China’s antiship missile systems and strategies will only be
as good as the intelligence, targeting, and command systems that support them.
The PLA operates complementary and redundant C4ISR (command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) networks
that by 2020 are likely to fully support China’s missile forces.
China operates land-based sky- and surface-wave
over-the-horizon radars capable of detecting the rough position of surface
naval forces as far as three thousand kilometers out to sea. To identify
specific surface ships, such as U.S. aircraft carriers, for targeting by
China’s submarines, antiship ballistic missiles, or Flanker regiments, China
would employ its growing constellations of reconnaissance and navigation
satellites. China has roughly fifteen imaging satellites useful for military
reconnaissance missions, employing electro-optical, multispectral, and
synthetic aperture radar sensors, capable of remote sensing by day or night and
in all weather conditions.
In 2013 this imaging satellite constellation was not
sufficiently numerous to provide the PLA with continuous coverage of the
maritime areas out to the Second Island Chain. However, steady launches of
additional imaging satellites should give China the targeting capability the
DF-21D requires within the next five to ten years.60 For example China’s
synthetic aperture radar satellites provide all-weather, day and night
coverage, with imaging resolution of five meters or less, sufficient to detect any
U.S. Navy warship. By 2020 China’s reconnaissance satellite constellations are
likely to be capable of revisiting targeted areas every thirty minutes,
frequently enough to track adversary naval task forces under way. China’s
planned constellation of communications and data link satellites will reliably
connect the imaging satellites to PLA commanders by 2020. In addition, China’s
Beidou-2/Compass global navigation satellite constellation will be complete by
2020, giving China’s aircraft, ships, and missiles an independent and highly
accurate navigation and timing capability.
China’s attack submarine and surface naval forces, including
the Type 052D guided missile destroyer equipped with long-range phased array
radars, will be other sources of information on adversary naval and air forces.
China also operates ocean-bottom sonar beds in its Near Seas, similar to the
antisubmarine listening networks the United States operated during the Cold
War. In the air, China has adapted the indigenously produced Y-8 cargo aircraft
for airborne early warning, electronic surveillance and warfare, and
communication relay missions. China will also likely use its civilian maritime
patrol craft and even fishing vessels to spot adversary naval targets for its
reconnaissance and command network.
Finally, in the future China will use its continental
position to develop an extensive land-based unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
capability for patrolling the Near Seas and conducting other military
operations such as data relay, electronic warfare, deception, and direct
attack. The PLA is establishing a broad research and industrial base for UAV
development, customized for the requirements of the Second Artillery, the air
force, and the navy. Over the next decade, China will very likely deploy
medium- and high-altitude long-endurance UAVs deep into the western Pacific
Ocean for surveillance, targeting support for antiship missiles, data relay,
and electronic warfare. Such a land-based UAV capability will supplement and
provide critical redundancy for China’s satellites and will likely possess
capacity and resilience that expeditionary U.S. and allied forces will have
trouble matching.
