The action at La Hogue in May 1692 formed a crucial scene in the wider context of the Battle of Barfleur. This was a naval battle of the War of the League of Augsburg [Nine Years’ War], 1689-97, fought between an Anglo-Dutch and a French fleet. It was not finally brought to a conclusion until 24 May in the Bay of La Hogue, in the course of which the French flagship ‘Soleil Royal’ as well as the ‘Triomphant’ and the ‘Admirable’ were burned by the English. The centre of this dramatic scene is occupied by a group of six French ships burning. A seventh is shown burning on the shore. They have been attacked by the boats of the Anglo- Dutch fleet which are also attacking another group of ships further round the Bay of La Hogue, one to the left which is also burning. On the extreme left in the distance the Allied fleet can be seen at anchor. In the right background a third lot of shipping is burning near a town. An odd feature of the picture is that two of the ships in the nearest group wear white flags with a blue cross, a flag associated with 17th century French merchant ships. The painting is signed ‘Diest fe.’ Diest, Adriaen van Credit National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London, Caird Collection
Until the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England installed
William of Orange as King of England, the French Navy had few issues to plan
for as the Dutch were only aggressive when France chose to start a war (mainly
on land), while the English were allied with France for much of the time. The
events of 1688 changed this, uniting the two maritime powers, and for the first
time in decades threatening a challenge to the dominant French superpower.
Forthwith the role of the French Navy altered from supporting the army in
campaigns against the Dutch to safeguarding French commerce against the likely
aggression of the combined Anglo-Dutch forces. A building race ensued, while at
sea the Navy began its campaign by a successful operation to land and supply
the army of King James in Ireland. This culminated in the inconclusive Battle
of Bantry Bay in May 1689, an action which led to a formal declaration of war.
France rapidly consolidated its battlefleets, bring the
Toulon-based Flotte du Levant around to the Atlantic coast and joining the
existing Flotte du Ponant at Brest. By 1690 France was clearly on its way to
equalling, if not overtaking, the combined strengths of the allied English and
Dutch Navies in the Channel. William of Orange’s priority had been to land his
ground forces at Carrickfergus in June 1690, leading to his success in
defeating James at the Battle of the Boyne on 11 July. Meanwhile Louis ordered
his Vice-Amiral du Ponant, Comte de Tourville, to enter the Channel with his 84
ships (and the 15 galleys under the Chevalier de Noailles).
His initial remit had been to attack the English at
Plymouth, Torbay and Portland, and then to attack the enemy’s main base at
Portsmouth before proceeding to the Straits of Dover. However, these
instructions were later amended by Louis, instructing Tourville to seek out the
enemy fleet and do battle wherever the opponents met. A major battle in the
Channel (off Beachy Head – known to the French as Béveziers) on 10 July pitted
70 French vaisseaux (plus 5 frégates légeres and 18 fireships) against 34
English and 22 Dutch ships. The English lost only one ship (the 70-gun Anne)
while the Dutch lost a total of 7 ships and 3 fireships. While most English
ships were undamaged, the majority of the remaining 15 Dutch ships were
severely damaged and required dockyard repairs before they could face the
French again. The battle demonstrated the capabilities of the French fleet; its
victory in that battle gave the French control of the waterway for almost two
years.
Seignelay, Colbert’s son and successor, died in November
1690. His replacement, the Comte de Pontchartrain (Louis Phélypeaux), who was
also the Controleur général des finances, began by continuing Colbert’s
strategy, but lacked Seignelay’s prime interest in the Navy and long awareness
of naval affairs. The French naval campaign of 1691 was dominated by the
`Campagne du Large’; Pontchartrain’s instructions to Tourville, issued on 26
May 1691, instructed the latter to cruise for three months in the Western
Approaches (the entrance to the Channel) and to try to capture the homebound
merchant fleet en route from Smyrna (Izmir). The French fleet, comprising 73
ships (plus 21 fireships) sailed from Brest in June and returned in August from
this `distant cruise’ without fighting a fleet action, but since 1690 the
Allied strength had improved both in quantity (92 ships) and in quality. The
French advantage was lost by 1691. In 1692, without waiting for the completion
of the major battlefleet units under construction, Louis ordered the fleet’s
commander, Comte de Tourville, to put to sea and challenge the Allies, even
though the French at that time were numerically inferior to their opponents.
A realisation by Louis soon after of the tactical error came
too late, as Tourville had followed his orders, and the countermanding message
from Louis failed to arrive in time. The resulting contest off Barfleur
resulted in a bruising defeat for the French, even if no ships were lost in the
actual battle. The retreating French fleet was split up, with twenty ships
making for the safety of Brest, while three heavily damaged ships, including
Tourville’s flagship Soleil Royal, were stranded at Cherbourg, while another
twelve sailed east and took refuge in the port of La Hougue. All fifteen were
boarded and set on fire a few days later by the Allies.
The losses sustained to the battlefleet at Cherbourg and at
La Hougue, while not in themselves catastrophic (French construction was able
to fill the gaps with even more powerful 1st and 2nd Rank ships) had
significant tactical and strategic consequences. The fact that the destruction
at La Hougue had been carried out by ships’ boats rather than by fireships
convinced the French that building new fireships was a waste of resources;
those on order or projected were cancelled, and on the limited occasions France
employed fireships thereafter, they were always converted purchases or prizes.
Notwithstanding the major efforts to achieve battlefleet
superiority until 1692 (which ironically would have achieved success by 1694 if
continued), Louis XIV was always more concerned with continental strategy than
maritime dominance, and Pontchartrain’s views were closer to the King’s than
Colbert’s and Seignelay’s commercial and naval strategy. During the financial crisis
of 1693-94, Pontchartrain ceased ordering large battlefleet units, and in
October 1693 wrote to the intendants at each major dockyard to tell them that
no new battlefleet vessels were to be begun, although those already building
could continue. The procurement strategy turned instead to vessels which –
together with French privateers – could disrupt English and Dutch commerce.
Indeed, as part of this strategy, a considerable number of battlefleet units
were loaned out to partnerships put together for privateering on a strictly
commercial basis. While causing concern in the allies’ mercantile interests,
this was never enough to affect the outcome of the war.
Moreover, it was now realised that France’s strength in
naval construction could be undone if their Ponant and Levant Fleets were kept
separate. Initially, the allies maintained a posture of concentrating warships
in the Channel, to ward off invasion attempts and control commerce, a strategy
held since Elizabethan times; this left France, even with its (temporarily)
reduced naval strength, in control of the Mediterranean. William III adopted a
policy, against the urging of his Council and naval commanders, that would
challenge France in Mediterranean waters and – more importantly – would deter
any attempt to deploy the Levant Fleet northwards. He dispatched an Anglo-Dutch
fleet (under Adm John Berkeley and Lt-Adm Philips van Almonde) into the
Mediterranean in 1694, and ensured that it wintered there – in Cadiz Bay, where
an English base was established to shelter and repair the fleet. As a
consequence, the Levant Fleet was confined to port at Toulon, or at best able
to operate in the Western Mediterranean only. And as a result, maintaining
control of the Straits of Gibraltar became a permanent aim of the English.
Pontchartrain’s son, Jérome Phélypeaux, the new Comte de
Pontchartrain, was awarded the survivance of his father’s office three years
later. When Louis de Ponchartrain received the top-ranking position of
chancelier de France (Minister of Justice), Jérome in September 1699 became
Secretary of State for the Navy, but with only the mere addition of the
portfolios of the Colonies, the Sea Fishing, the Maritime Trade and the
Consulates: therefore, he was to become the politically weakest Secretary of
State for the Navy of the reign.
