Battle of the Delta was a sea battle between Egypt and
the Sea Peoples, circa 1175 BCE when the Egyptian pharaoh Ramesses III repulsed
a major sea invasion. Illustration by Igor Dzis
A contingent of the Sea Peoples Invasion came by water. The
Ramesses III reliefs text at Medinet Habu, Western Thebes, states that there
was a naval encounter at the mouths of the Nile in the Delta. The king’s
defensive measures included a stockade of lances that was set up on the shore
to impede the enemy ships. At the minimum, this was done to prevent the Sea
Peoples from landing their troops. In the accompanying reliefs, perhaps
reflecting artistic sensibility, only four Egyptian ships attack five Sea
Peoples war vessels. The king remained on land while his archers provided the
necessary attack force. No chariots were employed because the battle was fought
from shore to ship and from ship to ship. The naval victory was celebrated at a
coast fortress. Ramesses III indicates the types of ships employed in this
defense, and that they were also divided into three groups: ordinary
transporters, galleys, and coasters. The first term was the most common one,
and we can assume that the king requisitioned all types of Nile-bound vessels
in order to provide his defense. The second refers to cargo ships whereas the
third was employed for naval vessels undertaking lengthy voyages in the
Mediterranean along the eastern coastline of Palestine and Syria.
The naval battle, quite rightfully, has been the subject of
much study. The ships of the enemy reflect an Aegean tradition, one that was
based on relatively long sea voyages across a large extent of water. In other
words, they were not mere coasters or trading vessels. The hulls of the enemy
fleet were angular and the prows and sternposts vertical. In addition, it seems
that the Egyptian fleet blockaded the river outlets in order to prevent the
enemy from escaping. This novel interpretation implies that Ramesses purposely
waited until the enemy was close to disembarking and then, after having trapped
them between shore and sea, attacked. In the scenes of battle, the enemy ships
are stationary and within range of the land-based archers. Their vessels appear
slender and lower in the water than the Egyptian ones, but a problem remains
concerning the artistic impression. The Egyptian ships, on the other hand,
reveal quite astounding details. Their high angular sternpost has no native
parallel. The aftercastles were built with two stories, thereby providing a
higher base for the naval archers and giving the helmsman a better position.
But the high bulwark that protects the rowers is not known in the Nile Valley
even though it was commonplace among the Aegean Bronze Age galleys. The low
prow may imply the practice of ramming and therefore reflect a technological
defense against the maritime activities of the Sea Peoples. This interpretation,
however, seems questionable. Under Ramesses II and III the Egyptians began to
employ a type of merchant ship hitherto unknown within the Nile Valley. These
ships, called menesh, were probably built in the royal dockyards. But they were
not developed from local sailing vessels known to the Egyptian for many
centuries earlier. Lucien Basch has proposed that these menesh were derived
from the north, and he pinpoints Syria, although Phoenicia is meant, as the
origin. Known from the early years of Ramesses II, these ships were also
present in the naval battle of Ramesses III against the Sea Peoples but
operated as well in the Red Sea for voyages to the fabulous land of Punt,
inland from the Somali coast or, as has been recently argued, along the southern
coastline of Arabia. By and large, it seems reasonable that in Dynasty XIX, if
not somewhat earlier, the flotilla of Egypt was reorganized according to the
naval traditions of the Phoenicians. Their ports had close connections with
various peoples traversing the eastern Mediterranean, and possibly their
shipwrights had developed the high prows and sterns of other foreign sea
cruisers. Moreover, these high prows were also common in scenes of the Syrian
ships that unloaded their produce at Thebes in Dynasty XVIII. It appears
reasonable to conclude that the Egyptian state improved its own merchant and
combat navy during the second half of Dynasty XVIII and the first part of the
succeeding dynasty in order to transport soldiers and to deliver “tribute” from
Asia. Later, however, they would be used in sea combat.
The reliefs show that the fighting was mainly hand-to-hand,
notwithstanding the presence of Egyptian archers on land and in the ships. Many
of the Sherden and other enemies are carved in the position of captives. Their
hands are constrained within wooden shackles. Some Egyptians have spears
whereas others brandish swords. The Peleshet, Sherden, and other sea enemies
mainly depended upon spears, swords, and protective shields. The reliefs depict
one enemy ship captured by Sherden “mercenaries,” and we can see their round
shields, medium but thick swords, and distinctive helmets. (Note that the
Sherden do not appear to have been part of the archer contingent of the
Egyptian army.) Here, an Egyptian with shield is about to climb into an enemy
ship. In another location one vessel has already been seized. Avner Raban,
after subjecting the scenes of warfare, concluded that Ramesses’ flotilla may
have been built upon the lines of the Sea Peoples’ fleet. We can add that it is
equally possible that the Egyptians, with the Sherden for instance, may have
reorganized their ships along more up-to-date military lines. Whether or not
this was a contemporary innovation must remain open, especially because the
encounter between Ramesses II and the Sea Peoples early in his reign could have
provided such an impetus. At any rate, the juxtaposition of both fleets is so
close that we must conclude that only the final hour of the battle is
pictorially recorded. The melee appears similar to a land battle, with the
tactics of the Egyptian navy dependent upon the use of archers, thereby
reflecting the New Kingdom tradition of the composite bow. In other words, just
as with chariots, bows and arrows provided the main element of fighting.
Although the navy (such as it was) was certainly not as
extensive as the navies of contemporary nations/states. For much of the
Dynastic Period, shipping in the Mediterranean was mostly commercial, not
military, but this seemed to change towards the latter part of the New Kingdom,
when the Delta coastline was under threat from several seaborne foreign armies.
For example, there was a raid by Sherden pirates in the second year of Ramesses
II’s reign; these pirates were not only defeated, but were also incorporated
into the Egyptian military as mercenaries. However, Ramesses II’s reaction to
this seemed to be the building of multiple fortresses along the coastline,
rather than increasing the number of military ships.
Most of the time, the ancient Egyptian fleet seems to have
been used more for the transport of troops to battlefields as quickly as
possible for the active engagement in naval battles. For example, towards the
end of the Second Intermediate Period, Kamose (making a point to emphasise the
amount of timber to be used in the construction of the flotilla) arranged for
his fleet to lay siege to the Hyksos capital of Avaris, the soldiers and war
supplies being transported to the site more quickly than they could be by
marching overland. This would change to some extent later in the New Kingdom,
but not hugely.
Much of the evidence for actual naval battles and warships
seem to come from the reign of Ramesses III, when (in the eighth year of his
reign) the Sea Peoples attacked at the Delta border. They came first over land
(but were defeated in a single battle at the northern edge of the Sinai desert)
and then by sea, where they were defeated in what seems to have been a fairly
epic naval battle. This naval battle is portrayed at the mortuary temple of
Medinet Habu, where the relief depicts handto-hand combat between the Sea
Peoples (on five boats) and the Egyptians (on four boats which were, naturally,
larger than their Sea Peoples counterparts). Ancient Egyptian artistic
sensibilities and aesthetics must be taken into account here and it is safe to
say that perhaps the numbers of vessels depicted on the reliefs do not
accurately reflect the actual numbers that took part in the battle. It is
possible, as with the smiting scenes discussed elsewhere, the artists were
instructed to portray the superiority of the Egyptian fleet, or maybe there
simply was not enough room on the relief to fit in the correct numbers of
vessels.
The Egyptian vessels have rows of up to twenty-two oarsmen
along with archers and foot-soldiers (although the exact numbers are difficult
to discern with any precision), outnumbering the people on board the Sea
Peoples vessels, where it is argued that the figures on-board must have
doubled-up as warriors and rowers. The Egyptian vessels are described as having
low prows, high, angular sterns, with ‘aftercastles’ of two storeys, and a high
bulwark. The Sea Peoples boats were angular, with vertical prows and sterns
(very much in the tradition of Aegean ships), designed to do well on long sea
voyages. One of the Sea Peoples vessels has seemingly capsized or been brought
down by the Egyptian flotilla and the Sea Peoples dead are seen floating in the
surrounding water. As with the Sherden pirates discussed above, the Sea Peoples
were apparently also assimilated into ancient Egyptian empire after Ramesses
III’s victory, although in the long-term this solitary victory was only
putting-off the unavoidable as the region of Canaan was lost to the Sea Peoples
by the end of the Twentieth Dynasty.
It would seem that most of the time, particularly during the
latter part of the Dynastic Period, any Egyptian fleet was mostly used to
protect and enforce Egypt’s trade interests. For example in the Twenty-Sixth
Dynasty, the Saite pharaohs created a large fleet of war-galleys, in the style
of Graeco-Phoenician ships, in order to regain (albeit temporarily) control of
trade in the Levantine.
Despite this evidence for some aspect of naval warfare later
on in Dynastic Egypt, throughout most of the Dynastic Period Egypt’s military
forces were chiefly land-based, resorting to naval battles rarely, with the
flotilla mostly being used to transport equipment and soldiers to battles.
Certainly, there is a dearth of evidence for Egypt’s flotilla in the New
Kingdom, but there is a wealth of evidence for the land-based forces; this
either suggests that the sea-based military was not as important or developed
as the land-based army, or that there is simply an annoying lack of primary
resources providing relevant information. The former is the most likely
explanation, with the land-based military indeed being far more advanced and
essential to Dynastic warfare than the ancient Egyptian navy (such as it was).
Sea Peoples
They were a confederation of various groups who were active
as pirates and marauders in the Ramessid Period, the Nineteenth Dynasty
(1307-1196 B. C. E.) and the Twentieth Dynasty (1196-1070 B. C. E.). RAMESSES
II (r. 1290-1224 B. C. E.) sought a pact with the HITTITE ruler HATTUSILIS III,
in defense against these wide-ranging attackers, and MERENPTAH (r. 1224-1214 B.
C. E.) faced one contingent of them during his reign. The actual listing of the
Sea Peoples, however, dates to RAMESSES III (r. 1194-1163 B. C. E.), who
destroyed them.
The Sea Peoples recorded on the walls of MEDINET HABU at
THEBES include the Ekwesh, believed to be Greek Achaeans; Teresh, Anatolian
sailors, possibly the Tyrrhenians; Lukka, an Anatolian coastal people;
Sherdana, probably a group of Sardinians; Shekelesh, identified as members of the
Sicilian Siculi; Peleset, from Crete and the ancestors of the Philistines.
Others not identified with certainty were the Kizzuwatna, Arzawa, Zakala,
Alasiya, Tjeker, and Denyen. The MESHWESH, Libyans who were always active in
Egypt’s Delta, were also listed.
Originally some of the groups had fortified cities and
worked copper mines. Displaced, the Sea Peoples conquered CYPRUS and blockaded
Syrian ports. They began their first campaigns near their homelands. The
Mycenean Greeks repulsed them, but other nations, including the Hittites,
endured their aggression.
In Ramesses III’s eighth regnal year, the Sea Peoples had
attacked Cilicia, CARCHEMISH, Palestine, Arzawa, CYPRUS, Amurru, and the
HITTITES and had arrived in the Delta region with the Libyans. These marauders
came in carts, bringing their entire families to the invasion. They wore kilts
and headdresses of feathers or pleated stiffened cloths and they carried
spears, short swords, and round shields. The Great HARRIS PAPYRUS adds other
details.
Ramesses III met the Sea Peoples who were entering Egypt as
migrants, not as marauders. Crop failures in the eastern Mediterranean region
caused these nomads to destroy entire cities in their movement. They sought the
safety of the Nile, and Ramesses III had to repel land and sea assaults. He
moved defensive units to the eastern border and fortified the Nile branches in
the Delta. By allowing the Sea Peoples to enter certain Nile branches and then
moving floating islands and debris behind them, Ramesses III trapped entire
contingents and annihilated them. Others he took as prisoners and forced them
into his armed forces or made them slaves.
Egypt withstood their assaults, but the Sea Peoples changed
the political matrix of the Mediterranean. One group that managed to escape
Ramesses III’s assaults were called the Peleset. These are believed to have
been the Philistines documented in Palestine. Some records indicate that the
Peleset, or Philistines, were sent into Palestine to control the area there for
Egypt.
