The Japanese Invasions of Korea proved to be damaging to not only Korea, but both Japan and China as well. Instead of strengthening his clan, Hideyoshi had bled his loyalist Toyotomi forces in a distant land (perhaps 150000 dead total out of 300000), resulting in its eventual destruction by the forces of Tokugawa Ieyasu. Ming China, already bleeding from long-running conflicts against the Manchus, faced even more financial strain on top of 30000 dead, though their Qing replacements benefited from the survival of the Chinese tributary system. Korea however suffered by far the most, with perhaps 260000 military dead; being the territory fought over, and with increased starvation, banditry and disease, some civilian death estimates run up to 1 million. Little known in the West, the Imjin War colors Korean-Japanese international relations to this day.
Dates 1592–1598
Location Korean Peninsula
Combatants Japan vs. Joseon Korea and China
Principal Commanders Japan: Daimyo Toyotomi Hideyoshi,
Konishi Yukinaga, Kato
Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga
Korea: King Sonjo, Sin Nip, Yi Sun Sin
China: Emperor Wanli (Zhū Yìjūn), Li Rusonh
Principal Battles Ch’ungju, Hansan-do, Busan, Pyokchegwan,
Haengju, Chinji,
Ch’ilch’onnyang, Myongnyang, Noryang Strait
Outcome Although Joseon Korea expelled the Japanese and
remains independent, Korea itself is more devastated by the war than any other in
its history. The roots of anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea are found in this
war.
In 1590 Japanese daimyo and general Toyotomi Hideyoshi
established himself as the power behind the throne control- ling the entire
nation. Toyotomi dreamed of making Japan the dominant power in East Asia and
set the ambitious goal of conquering Ming dynasty China. Such an effort would
have the advantage of diverting the energies of the ever-ambitious Japanese
warlords from domestic affairs. To get at China, Toyotomi planned to first
invade and secure Joseon (Choson) Korea, then a tributary state of China. Joseon
Korea appeared weak and vulnerable to invasion. Having enjoyed two centuries of
peace, its leaders had allowed the nation’s military to deteriorate. The Korean
military forces were small, disorganized, poorly equipped, and scattered around
the country.
When the Koreans refused a Japanese demand for free passage
to China, which would have meant Japanese occupation of their country, Toyotomi
dispatched forces across Tsushima Strait (Korea Strait). The resulting first
invasion is known in Korea as the Japanese Disturbance of Imjin (1592 being an
imjin year in the Chinese sexagenary cycle).
On May 23, 1592, Japanese ships carrying some 158,000 men
crossed from Tsu- shima, easily brushed aside two Korean naval squadrons and
landed at the port of Busan (Pusan) in southern Korea. The Japanese had the
advantage of unity of command and superior weaponry in the form of matchlock
firearms. Although the Koreans resisted the invasion, the Japanese soon secured
Busan and, once they had reorganized, sent three columns northward. These met
little resistance. In a major battle at Chungju (Ch’ungju) on June 7, the
Japanese soundly defeated Korean Army forces under General Sin Nip. Several
days later Korean king Sonjo fled north, first to Pyongyang, and then to Uiju
on the Chinese border. Japanese forces entered the Korean capital of Seoul on
June 9, only to discover much of the city burned and empty of inhabitants.
The Japanese expeditionary force then split into two main
bodies: one under General Konishi Yukinaga proceeded north through western
Korea to Pyongyang, while the other under General Kato Kiyomasa advanced up the
eastern coast of Korea. Everywhere the Korean people paid a heavy price, with
the Japanese killing many civilians as well as soldiers. (The Japanese kept a
body count by routinely cutting off the ears of those slain.)
The Japanese military strategy called for the army to hold
the southeastern and central regions of Korea, with the navy responsible for
securing the rich rice- producing areas of Cholla (Chollq) and Chungcheong
(Ch’ungch’ong) Provinces in order to secure a stable food supply for the
occupying Japanese forces. This plan, however, rested on Japan maintaining control
of the sea, also necessary in securing the lines of communication back to
Japan, and that now came into question.
Korean admiral Yi Sun Sin (Yi Sun-sin), certainly one of history’s most brilliant naval commanders, was one of the few Korean leaders to have taken meaningful steps to prepare for a Japanese invasion. On March 9, 1591, with the threat of Japanese invasion fully apparent, Yi had been appointed head of the left naval command of Cholla Province, along the southeastern coast. He then designed and caused to be built the famed kobukson (turtle ship), a new type of warship and in fact the world’s first armored [note] warship.
Sufficiently detailed descriptions of these vessels survive
to provide a fairly complete picture of their appearance. They were about 116
feet in length and 28 feet in beam. They had a raft-like rectangular-shaped
hull, a transom bow and stern, and a superstructure supporting two masts, each
with a square rectangular mat sail. A carved wooden dragon head was set at the
bow.
The ships were powered by both sail and oar, with openings for 8-10 oars on each side of the superstructure. The oars were to provide additional speed and maneuverability. The superstructure was protected by a curved iron plated top that gave the vessel a turtle shell-like appearance. The iron plating had spikes set in it to prevent an enemy crew from boarding. The turtle ships mounted cannon: six on each side and several at the bow and stern.
The first of the turtle ships was launched just days before
the Japanese invasion in May 1592. With the invasion, Yi collected 85 ships.
These included two dozen galley battleships and 15 scout ships, with the
remainder being fishing boat conversions. With this force, on June 16, 1592, Yi
surprised and destroyed 26 Japanese ships off Okpo (Okp’o). The next day he
sank another 16 Japanese ships off Chokjinpo (Chokjinp’o).
Following repairs, Yi sailed with 26 ships, including 2
turtle ships, and destroyed 12 more Japanese ships off Sacheon (Sach’on) on
July 8. On July 10 he sank 20 other Japanese ships off Dangpo (Tangp’o).
Reinforced, on July 13 he sank the majority of 26 Japanese ships at Dan-
ghangpo (Tanghangp’o). These victories led the Japanese to send naval reinforcements.
Yi, now with 55 ships, on August 13 discovered 75 Japanese ships at Kyonnaeryang
(Kyonnaeryang) and sent a few of his own ships into the harbor in a successful
effort to lure out the Japanese. The next day he captured 12 large Japanese
ships and sank more than 40 others off Hanson Island (Hansan-do) in what is
regarded as one of the most important Korean victories of the war. On August 16
he destroyed 30 or more of 40 Japanese ships at Angolpo (Angolp’o).
In September, Yi had at his disposal a fleet of 74 war
galleys and 92 smaller vessels. He trained his men for three weeks and then set
out for the principal Japanese base at Busan. Here the Japanese had 500 ships,
100 of them warships. On October 5 in the Battle of Busan, Yi attacked, destroying
or capturing 100 Japanese vessels. He then scattered a large Japanese
reinforcing convoy, sinking many of its ships.
The Japanese were now experiencing great difficulty ashore
as well. Not only had Admiral Yi cut them off from resupply from Japan, but
there was also a famine in Korea that reduced Japanese foraging, and the
Japanese were under constant harassment from the increasing numbers of Koreans
who joined insurgent militia forces known as uibyong (righteous warriors).
Meanwhile, at the request of the vassal state of Korea, China intervened. In
January 1593 Ming emperor Wanli (Zhu Yijun) sent a 40,000-man army commanded by
General Li Rusonh into northern Korea, and on February 8 Chinese and Korean
forces recaptured Pyongyang and pushed the Japanese forces southward. Chinese
and Korean forces then prepared for a joint effort to retake Seoul. After they
sustained heavy losses in a battle at Byeokjegwan (Pyokchegwan), however, the
Chinese withdrew back to Pyongyang. This left the Korean forces vulnerable to
an attack on their mountain fortifications north of the Han River at Haengju.
Some 43,000 Japanese attacked, but after nine separate assaults and substantial
casualties, the Japanese retreated southward. The Battle of Haengju of March
14, 1593, is celebrated in Korean history as one of the most important of the
war.
With the principal Japanese generals, including Konishi
Yukinaga, urging peace and the Chinese eager to return home, the two sides
entered into talks. Japanese troops then withdrew from Seoul into an enclave
around Pusan. The Japanese were determined, however, to secure the strong- hold
of Jinju (Chinji), which controlled access to the key rice-producing area of
Cholla Province. Already in November 1592 a far smaller Korean force led by Kim
Si-min had defeated a much larger Japanese army there, inflicting 30,000 casualties.
Now in July 1593, the Japanese sent 79,000 men against Jinju and this time
captured it on July 27, slaughtering many of its inhabitants.
Truce talks between China and Japan opened in April 1593 and
went on for three years without resolution, with each side refusing to accept
the demands of the other. Meanwhile, the Japanese withdrew most of their troops
from Korea, and the Chinese removed all of theirs. On April 23, 1594, Yi
attacked and sank 31 Japanese ships in actions around Danghangpo. On March 1,
1597, General Toyotomi launched a new invasion from Japan, sending some 141,000
men by ship across the straits. Landing near Pusan, the Japanese forces again
drove north, devastating much of the country and causing Ming China to again
intervene militarily. The Koreans had been able to rebuild and improve their
military, and this time the Japanese en- joyed less success on land and were
held largely to Kyongsang Province.
The Japanese did, however, send out false information in an
attempt to lure Admiral Yi into a trap. Aware of what the Japanese intended, Yi
refused a royal order to attack, whereupon he was dismissed from command. His
successor, Won Kyun, led the Korean fleet to destruction off Pusan in the
Battle of Chilcheollyang (Ch’ilch’onnyang) on August 28, 1597. Won was among
those killed, and the Koreans lost 157 of their 169 ships.
Following the disastrous Battle of Chilcheollyang, Yi was
reinstated in command of the Korean Navy, now reduced to only 12 ships.
Following a series of small victories, on December 4, 1597, in the Battle of
Myeongnyang (Myongnyang), Yi employed his considerable experience and knowledge
of Korean tides and currents to win his most brilliant victory over the
Japanese. With only 12 ships of his own, he engaged 133 Japanese ships,
although many of the latter were transport vessels. Yi sank 31 Japanese ships
for no losses of his own before the remaining Japanese ships hauled off.
A lull in fighting of more than a year followed, giving Yi
time to build up his naval strength. With some 150 ships, including 63 Ming
warships led by Admiral Chen Lin, Yi attacked a Japanese fleet of equal size
commanded by General Konishi Yukinaga. In the Battle of Noryang Strait of
December 16, 1598, the Korean and Ming fleets captured or destroyed 200 Japanese
ships. During the battle, however, Yi was struck and killed by a cannonball.
Again the Koreans and Chinese controlled the straits, and
Japanese lines of communication to Korea were again effectively severed,
cutting off their forces in Korea. Another motivation for peace was the death
of Japanese general Toyotomi, the prime mover behind the invasion, on September
18, 1598. The new governing body of Japan, the Council of Five Elders, ordered
the Japanese troops to evacuate Korea.
For Korea, the Japanese invasions were more devastating than
any other war in their history including the 1950-1953 Korean War. The Koreans
suffered tremendously from the Japanese presence but also at the hands of their
allies, the Chinese. The decrease in the population had a tremendous effect on
the agricultural economy, and the years that followed saw widespread famine,
disease, and political upheaval. Certainly the Joseon dynasty never quite
recovered from the shock of the war.
Korea also lost many priceless cultural treasures taken by
the Japanese to Japan and never returned. The Japanese also took back to Japan
tens of thousands of Koreans, most of them artisans and craftsmen, including
highly skilled potters. (Korean pottery was then being highly prized and their
work became the basis for much of subsequent Japanese pottery.) The departure
of these skilled workers was a major blow to the Korean economy and greatly
benefited that of Japan. Although some 7,000 Koreans were returned by Japan following
the normalization of relations be- tween the two countries in 1607, a large
portion of the remaining captives were sold to European traders-mostly Portuguese-who
then resold them in Southeast Asia. It is no wonder that Korean nationalists
cited the war and its heroes in seeking to rally resistance to the Japanese
occupation of 1910-1945. Certainly much of the present anti-Japanese sentiment
in Korea stems from the Japanese-Korean War of 1592-1598.
In China, the war of 1592-1598 was used to fuel
nationalistic fervor during the Japanese invasions of China in the 20th
century. The war is also often cited by Chinese historians as proof of Chinese-
Korean friendship.
The war also brought political upheaval in Japan and ultimately
resulted in arguably its most important battle. Following the death of Toyotomi
in 1598, a struggle ensued between his most powerful vassals for control,
Toyotomi’s son Hideyori then being only five years old. The leading nobles soon
declared their allegiance to one side or the other, and on October 20, 1600,
battle was joined at Sekigahara in what was probably both the largest and most
important military engagement in Japanese history. Although fighting continued
for some time thereafter, the victor at Sekigahara, Tokugawa Ieyasu, won out.
Named shogun by Emperor Go-Yozei in 1603, Tokugawa moved the capital from Kyoto
to Edo (Tokyo) and became de facto dictator of Japan. The Tokugawa shogunate
lasted until the Meiji Restoration of 1868.
The war also had profound geopolitical significance in East Asia, as it weakened the Ming garrisons in Manchuria, making it far easier for the Manchus to attack there and ultimately bringing the military defeat of the Ming dynasty and the beginning of the Manchu dynasty.
[note] Samuel Hawley, The Imjin War: Japan’s Sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer China, Berkeley: The Royal Asiatic Society and The Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 2005, 195–8, disputes the notion that the turtle boats were covered with metal plates.
Further Reading Brown, Delmer M. “The Impact of
Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543-1598.” Far Eastern Quarterly 7(3) (May
1948): 236-253. Galuppini, Gino. Warships of the World: An Il- lustrated
Encyclopedia. New York: Military Press, 1989. Hawley, Samuel. The Imjin War.
London: Institute of East Asian Studies and the Royal Asiatic Society, Korea
Branch, 2005. Henthorne, William E. A History of Korea. New York: Free Press,
1971. Kang, Ch’ol-won. Songung Yi Sun-sin [Yi- Sun-sin, a National Hero].
Seoul: Chisong Munhwa-sa, 1978. Kim, Jinwung. A History of Korea: From
“Land of the Morning Calm” to States in Conflict. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2012. Park, Son-sik. Yi Sun-sin. Seoul: Kyujanggak,
1998. Sansom, George. A History of Japan, 1334- 1615. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1961. Swope, Kenneth M. “Crouching Tigers, Secret
Weapons: Military Technology Employed during the Sino-Japanese-Korean War,
1592-1598.” Journal of Military History 69 (January 2005): 11-42. Swope,
Kenneth M. A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great
East Asian War, 1592-1598. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009.
Turnbull, Stephen R. Fighting Ships of the Far East (2): Japan and Korea,
612-1639. Buffalo, MN: Osprey, 2003. Turnbull, Stephen R. Samurai Invasion: Ja-
pan’s Korean War, 1592-98. London: Cas- sell, 2002. Yi, Sun-sin. Nanjung Ilgi:
War Diary of Admiral Yi Sun-sin. Edited by Sohn Pow-key and translated by Ha
Tae-hung. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1977.
