FORMER INMATES OF AUSCHWITZ

Other former inmates of Auschwitz were also to suffer at the hands of the Russians—ironically Russians themselves. 10,000 Red Army prisoners of war had been sent to Auschwitz in October 1941 to build the camp here at Birkenau. The handful who survived this horror, were, after their liberation, about to be persecuted again.

Pavel Stenkin, Former Soviet POW, Auschwitz: “They invented that at Auschwitz, this Camp of Death, they were training spies. So somebody got this idea in his head – what if they had turned me into a spy?”

Pavel Stenkin was sent into internal exile in the closed city of Perm in the Urals. A victim of Stalin’s policy that all Red Army soldiers who’d been captured should be treated as suspected traitors.

Pavel Stenkin: “When I arrived in Perm to work I was called in every 2nd night – “admit this, agree to that, we know everything, we only don’t know the purpose you were sent here for. But we will find out with or without your help. Come on, admit that you are a spy.” And I would say – “I am not a spy, I’m an honest Soviet man.” And the interrogator smiled ironically—”Soviet man”. And he smiled again. “Just confess and it’ll all be over.” 

They were tormenting and tormenting me. And then they decided to get rid of me. They sent me to prison. And the details of my sentence – do you think I heard anything or I read anything about it? I heard nothing and read nothing. Judges were in rush they had theatre tickets so they were in hurry to leave the court.”

Pavel Stenkin was sent to a labor camp within the Soviet Gulag system. Captured by the Germans in 1941, he was finally released only after Stalin’s death in 1953.

Pavel Stenkin: “I was always feeling hungry. It was not until I was released from prison, in 1953 that I started to eat my fill.” 

Auschwitz: Inside the Nazi State


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Book Review: Propaganda und Terror in Weißrußland 1941-1944: Die deutsche "geistige" Kriegsführung gegen Zivilbevölkerung und Partisanen.

Babette Quinkert. Propaganda und Terror in Weißrußland 1941-1944: Die deutsche “geistige” Kriegsführung gegen Zivilbevölkerung und Partisanen. Krieg in der Geschichte. Paderborn: Schöningh Paderborn, 2008. 420 pp. EUR 58.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-3-506-76596-3.
Reviewed by Jeff Rutherford (Wheeling Jesuit University)
Published on H-German (March, 2010)
Commissioned by Susan R. Boettcher
Nazi Germany’s Battle for Hearts and Minds
 
On June 22, 1944, German occupation authorities staged an especially dramatic “day of celebration” in Minsk. During the early morning hours, marching columns of boys and girls from the White Ruthenian (Belarusian) Youth Organization (WJW) as well as members of a Belarusian SS unit marched to the German “cemetery of heroes” where they laid a wreath in recognition of Germany’s efforts to free Belarus from the Soviet yoke. Following this part of the day’s festivities, focus shifted to the center of the city where another procession took place, one that illustrated the German narrative of the war. The first few wagons that passed symbolized Bolshevik rule. A group of individuals wearing tattered clothes and standing behind the hammer and sickle flag were soon followed by a Stalin puppet manipulated by six “Jews.” Slogans declaring that “Bolshevism destroyed the intelligentsia” and “Stalin and Lenin preach that religion is opium” were accompanied by sculptors of destroyed churches. The “‘freedom’ of the NKVD” was symbolized by a prison and a rail car traveling towards Siberia. “After such poverty, misery, exploitation and terror,” (p. 363), the second stage of the procession–which focused on German “achievements” in the Soviet Union–began. Slogans such as “the path to European freedom” and “long live a free White Ruthenia” were accompanied by marching German troops and more WJW members. Doctors and workers, who symbolized modern medical care and the unity of Europe laboring to defeat the communist menace, followed the military procession. As Babette Quinkert notes in her comprehensive study of German propaganda in Belarus during the Second World War, this event was not isolated; rather, it was the culmination of the German state’s approach to total war. Quinkert’s work persuasively challenges the prevailing view that the Third Reich utilized only terror in its attempt to conquer the Soviet Union. Instead, she suggests, Germany pursued a much more balanced policy towards civilians living in the occupied territories.
As her title indicates, Quinkert examines connections between propaganda and terror as they developed from planning by Wehrmacht officials during the 1930s to the actual occupation of Belarus between 1941 and 1944. Her first section deals with the development of psychological warfare during the interwar period with a focus on its orientation towards the Soviet Union. Quinkert begins her analysis with a look at how Germany grappled with the importance of psychological warfare during the interwar period. Building upon the lessons of the First World War–which highlighted the importance of propaganda, both to strengthen one’s own military and home fronts and to weaken the enemy’s morale–German military thinkers attempted to construct a military policy that effectively employed propaganda. This process was accelerated after the reintroduction of conscription in 1935 and in 1938 chief of the Oberkommando des Wehrmacht Wilhelm Keitel enunciated its necessity for future war. He argued that Germany would have to exploit its entire means “against the enemy’s armed forces, against the material sources of the strength of the enemy and the spiritual strength of his people” (p. 34). This statement was not mere rhetoric; the German army had established already in 1929 a Psychological Laboratory within the Reichswehr Ministry, which led to the creation of four Wehrmacht propaganda companies by 1938. Quinkert persuasively argues that not only did the Germans recognize “that wars of propaganda, economics and combat constituted an inseparable unity,” but that they followed this idea to its logical end by building an institutional basis to wage such a multifaceted conflicted (p. 42).
One of Quinkert’s most interesting theses concerns the development of the “criminal orders” that turned the German invasion of the Soviet Union into a war of unbridled savagery and atrocity. As Europe underwent a process of ideological polarization during the 1930s–a development most tangibly manifested by the Spanish Civil War–Germany’s military thinkers engaged in a “war before the war” with the Soviet Union (p. 43). Two important points arose during this early planning. First, German authorities believed that the Soviets would utilize propaganda behind the advancing German front, stirring up resistance among civilians to the occupiers. This agitation, according to a 1935 study of such possibilities, could have “a devastating effect” on German operations (p. 45). Thus, individuals who could inspire both civilians and soldiers to such actions required special attention; this clearly meant commissars. Second, German propagandists believed that Soviet society could be split along “national and racial lines” and thus developed different programs for the various national groups (p. 47). One commonality among these propaganda lines was the failure of Bolshevism to provide its subjects with the land, peace, and bread it had promised and the resulting use of violence by the regime to keep the state together. Again, the commissars occupied a special place in this propaganda. One position paper from 1935 suggested the use of the following slogans to be directed towards Soviet conscripts: “beat them [commissars] to death, desert either individually or in entire units…. We promise you proper treatment and nourishment…. Turn your bayonets around and fight with us against the damned Jewish commissars” (p. 47). Here, the desire to break up the Soviet Union from within combined with a call for the murder of allegedly Jewish commissars. Already, six years before the Commissar Order was drafted and distributed to the Ostheer, commissars had been targeted for death by at least one section of the German army.
According to Quinkert, this line of thinking directly led to the formulation and implementation of the Commissar Order. The political and military leadership believed that murder of Soviet commissars would both destabilize the Red Army and ensure a far easier occupation of the eastern territories, as no one would lead civilian resistance in the rear areas. In other words, the murder of Soviet commissars was understood as what Quinkert describes as a “preventative defensive strategy against the guerilla war [Kleinkrieg] in the rear area” (p. 59). While her claim that that the German military carried out this order not merely for ideological reasons, but also for “independent pragmatic motives” is not entirely novel, it is certainly convincing and it provides evidence of a German army prepared to contravene the established rules of war long before the opening of Operation Barbarossa.
The implementation of the Commissar Order constituted one aspect of the terror utilized by Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union. Quinkert then shifts gears and examines the other side of German occupation policies in her second section: the institutionalization of propaganda for the eastern campaign. The resources devoted to the propaganda mission reflected its status as an important component of the operation. The Wehrmacht propaganda section attached thirteen propaganda companies to the army with another twelve war reporter companies attached to Luftwaffe, naval, and Waffen-SS units. These were complemented by units under the Reich Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories (which were active in the civilian-administered areas) as well by individuals attached to Joseph Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry. In addition, SD and police units, the Foreign Ministry, and Soviet nationals also worked to propagate the Nazi view of the war to the civilian population. Unlike the generally held view that “polycracy” doomed any rational occupation policy in the east, Quinkert persuasively maintains, “the central authorities not only cooperated closely, but also worked together in an effective and solution-oriented way” (p. 109).
Germany utilized various forms of media to reach the civilian population, ranging from pamphlets and posters (both image and text) to film and radio, on a hitherto unprecedented scale during the war. Quinkert notes that during the entirety of the French campaign, a total of two million leaflets were distributed by the Germans; in comparison, during the first week or so of the Soviet campaign, the Germans circulated some thirty million different pieces of propaganda materials. By the turn of the year, this number had risen to 433,000,000 pieces. Some of these materials originated in the Reich but the majority were produced locally by Wehrmacht propaganda units that ran their own printing presses and paper factories. This impressive production system, however, was stymied by problems of delivery: the same lack of roads and vehicles that starved the blitzkrieg made it very difficult for propaganda units to spread their message throughout rural Russia.
Quinkert then examines how German propaganda activities and messages changed during the course of the war by focusing on Belarus. While Belarus is perhaps the best-researched area of Germany’s eastern empire, her analysis of connections between terror and propaganda allows for a generally fresh interpretation of the occupation. During the opening phase of the invasion, the propaganda line revolved around the idea of the Germans as liberators, saving Soviet civilians from “Jewish-criminal despotism” that had produced only “poverty and misery” (p. 140). The focus on the alleged links between Judaism and Bolshevism was complemented by concerted efforts to rouse the civilian population into open revolt against the Soviet state; this policy resulted directly from planning during the 1930s. Such cooperation, however, was framed by threats against those who failed to rise to the occasion.
Despite these attempts to win over or at least coerce the Soviet population into supporting the side of the invaders, such propaganda efforts failed. As Quinkert notes, “civilians were not only witnesses to such [German] crimes, but they themselves were also affected” by German occupation policies (p. 157). German claims that the Soviets caused their desperation and misery failed to convince individuals living in cities destroyed by German bombing or those who were rounded up and sent to prison camps in which the Germans murdered various categories of prisoners. Therefore, during the opening months of the war, the reality of German actions completely extinguished any possibility of winning the hearts and minds of the Belarusian population through positive propaganda.
Quinkert shows that in contrast to scholarly assumptions, once this initial propaganda foray failed, the Germans displayed flexibility by changing their message in hopes of achieving greater resonance with the population. Three primary and interconnected themes dominated the remainder of Germany’s propaganda campaign in Belarus: the agrarian question; labor policies; and anti-partisan warfare (and its ties to the genocide of the Jews). Since Belarus was primarily an agricultural region, some Germans–primarily within the Wehrmacht and Alfred Rosenberg’s Ministry–believed that a policy that promised an end to the hated kolkhoz system promised to generate real support for the occupiers. This policy was to be introduced to the population as one that would be an “intention for the long term” (p. 166) as the Germans feared that the immediate closing of the collective farms would disrupt their ability to live off the land in the Soviet Union.
When it was clear that the war would continue into 1942, German authorities became much more concerned about winning the support of Soviet civilians for the war effort and agricultural reform was made a priority. The propaganda campaign in support of these reforms concentrated on making them comprehensible to peasants and illustrating the “advantages” (p. 221) for them. That this was a major effort is evidenced by the ten million leaflets, one million copies of a special edition of a Russian-language newspaper, sixteen thousand posters, and one hundred eighty thousand sheets of guidelines distributed by Propaganda Section Ostland alone. Despite the intensity of this campaign, it proved a political failure. After an initial surge in peasant support for German policies, attitudes soon retreated back to indifference to the occupiers at best.
This swing was due in part to German anti-partisan policies–where the connection between terror and propaganda of Quinkert’s title manifested itself most concretely. From the German perspective, partisans posed a real threat to the systematic exploitation of the country’s agricultural resources, especially in 1942 and 1943. The Germans adjusted their policies from a more spontaneous reaction to partisans in 1941 to much larger, more systematic operations in later years. These “large operations” utilized terror on a tremendous scale in the rear areas in an attempt to quash the partisan movement. As Quinkert notes, these operations targeted “actual or alleged partisans … with a merciless persecution and death” (p. 256), but they were accompanied by a propaganda campaign designed to delegitimate the partisan movement and convince civilians to assist the Germans. While German authorities hoped that the combination of terror and propaganda would lead to a quieter rear area, the campaign failed to extinguish the partisan threat. German rhetoric and promises failed to compensate for the murder of family members or friends linked to the partisans and use of violence actually drove civilians over to the resistance. The final German policy that led to a mushrooming of the partisan movement was the Reich Labor Action, and here again, propaganda constituted an important part of the program.  
Part of Germany’s newfound engagement with the civilian population drew on the realization that workers–both for the Reich and for the occupied territories–were desperately needed. Once again, the occupiers utilized various means of propaganda to persuade Soviet civilians to work for the Reich. Two primary themes emerged. First, propaganda emphasized the cultural and economic superiority of Germany, in order to convince Belarusians both that the Reich could not lose the war and that Germany could serve as a model for Belarus. Second, and by far the more important, especially as the war dragged on into 1943 and 1944, was the idea that Europe needed to unify around the German core in order to defeat Bolshevism. This idea of a new Europe struggling to save western civilization against the “Jewish Bolsheviks” led to a campaign that revised many long-standing German attitudes; as Quinkert notes, even the SS began to “revise … anti-Slavic tendencies” in its training materials (p. 291).
This radical change in propaganda was part of a “change in course” (p. 274) that sought to elevate Belarus (or, in the contemporary terminology, White Ruthenia) to the level of an independent and sovereign state within the Nazi New Order. The idea of the “rebirth of White Ruthenia” (p. 297) now constituted a major piece of the German propaganda effort. The celebration described in the opening paragraphs of this review was the culmination of this effort; it was, in short, an attempt to construct a national identity for Belarusians distinct from competing Soviet or Russian identities that was, however, inextricably linked to Germany. As Quinkert points out, this day of national celebration took place a mere two weeks before the Red Army liberated Minsk from German rule. The military situation was just part of the quandary facing the occupiers. One of the higher-ranking members of the propaganda section in Minsk listed numerous problems plaguing the German propaganda effort: forced requisitioning and labor (some 380,000 Belarusians toiled in the Reich during the war); a peasantry increasingly caught between partisans and Germans; and destruction of homes and lives as well as other daily horrors facing the civilian population. He concluded by stating that all of these “could not be used by even the best propaganda!” (p. 365).
Quinkert has produced an important and useful addition to the literature on German occupation. Her exploration of the neglected topic of German propaganda in the occupied Soviet territories fills a considerable void in the literature without overstating its importance relative to the terror and violence applied on a wide scale by the Wehrmacht, SS, and other Nazi organizations. One minor difficulty in her study is its overwhelming reliance on German sources. While she has utilized three archives in the former Soviet Union, these have been primarily mined for German-language sources. Certainly the propaganda arm of the Wehrmacht was concerned with the ways in which its various messages were received by the population and it made every effort to gauge their effectiveness. Some Belarusian voices, however, would be useful in determining how civilians actually interpreted and understood German propaganda. Aside from this minor caveat, however, Quinkert’s study persuasively highlights the totality of Nazi Germany’s war effort in the Soviet Union.

General Andrei A . Vlasov at Leningrad

At Leningrad, neither side succeeded in its designs for the isolated city. The German armies could not crack the stub- born Soviet defenses ringing Leningrad’s southern outskirts, and, in fact, the line of battle changed very little. Soviet efforts to break through to the city were all but doomed by the plight of the Second Shock Army, whose 130,000 men had been cut off in the nearby Volkhov swamps since mid- March; rescue attempts diverted several Red Army divisions from their offensive assignments. At the end of March, a Soviet relief column managed to pierce the German lines and rush some supplies into the pocket. But the narrow corridor soon collapsed under German counterattack.

The Second Shock Army’s prospects were bleak indeed, and its best hope seemed to be its new commander, Lieut . General Andrei A . Vlasov, a brilliant leader and popular hero who had flown in to take over on March 21. Vlasov had sprung to prominence during the disaster at Kiev, when his strong handling of an army made up of shattered divisions had been instrumental in preventing even greater losses. Then he had served with distinction in the winter counter- offensive in front of Moscow, and as soon as he arrived on the Volkhov front, he had shown his mettle by attacking two German divisions and advancing eight miles-to within 15 miles of Leningrad. It was true that his drive then petered out, but Moscow was still confident that if anyone could extricate the Second Shock Army, it was Vlasov.

 

But in April, Vlasov worked no miracles; his troops and tanks were immobilized by mud when the frozen swamps melted, and they could neither attack nor defend them- selves. The crisis deepened in May, and two other armies in Vlasov’s group launched another desperate drive to open an exit route through the surrounding German lines. Finally, they succeeded in driving a 400-yard-wide corridor through to the Second Shock Army. Many of Vlasov’s wounded were evacuated through the gap, and a large number of troops rushed out in wild disarray. The corridor remained open only for a short time, until German artillery and Luftwaffe dive bombers closed it.

In June, the men of the Second Shock Army were sick, starving, almost out of ammunition and under constant, heavy German fire. German forces kept closing in, reducing the pocket. Many a time Vlasov radioed for help, but each time the Leningrad front headquarters in charge of the Vlokhov area told him to keep on pressing the attack. At one point, headquarters sent a plane to get him out, but he refused to leave his men.

Finally, in late June, the pitiful remnants of the Second Shock Army made their last attempt to break out. The men punched two small holes in the German lines. Vlasov, having done all he could, ordered his survivors to destroy whatever heavy equipment remained, then break up into small groups to try to escape. Some men filtered out, but German troops swarmed over those still in the pocket. About 32,000 Russians survived to surrender; all the rest lay dead or dying in the putrid swamp. The debacle had cost the Red Army nearly 100,000 men.

As for Vlasov, his story took a weird turn. German soldiers came upon the hero general in a farmhouse and took him prisoner. When the Russians next heard of Vlasov, they were bewildered and mortified to find out that he had turned traitor and was leading an army of Soviet defectors against their homeland. What had gone wrong with Vlasov? Soviet propagandists lamely suggested that he had been a German agent from the start and had deliberately led his army to destruction. Actually, Vlasov’s harrowing experience convinced him that he had to undertake a patriotic war to liberate his countrymen from the ruinous clutches of Stalinism. But he paid the price for treason in full. In the last days of the War, when Vlasov and his anti-Communist Russians were stationed in Czechoslovakia, the turncoat general surrendered to American forces. He was sent back to the Soviet Union, where he was formally tried for treason, condemned and executed.

MISENUM – Portus Julius

A small promontory jutting into the Tyrrhenian Sea from the coast of Campania in Italy on the Bay of Naples. Misenum was situated in the region of Cumae, Bauli, Baiae and Puteoli. Its name was derived supposedly from Misenus, the trumpeter of Aeneas, who drowned in the waters of its bay. For many years the Campanians were threatened by pirate sorties out of the Tyrrhenian Sea. These attacks were a leading reason for Pompey’s brilliant campaign of 67 B.C. against the pirates in the Mediterranean.

Conference of Misenum

Meeting held in 39 B.C. between the Triumvirs Marc Antony and Octavian (Augustus) on one side, and Sextus Pompey, the pirate son of Pompey the Great. Sextus had proven a surprisingly successful pirate chief, whose ships commanded much of the Mediterranean, threatening all of the Italian coast as well as the provinces, and wielding the power to cut off vital shipments of grain from Africa to Rome. Following the Treaty of Brundisium in 40 B.C., both Antony and Octavian had recognized the need to deal with Sextus Pompey. They were, however, not in a position to hound him from the seas and consequently agreed to a discussion. The first encounter at Puteoli ended in nothing, but in the spring of 39, real progress in negotiations led to the Treaty of Misenum. By the terms of this agreement, Sextus promised to leave the corn supply unmolested, to respect the integrity of Italy, return all seized property and to engage in no hostile actions. In return, he received Corsica, Sardinia, Achaea and Sicily, along with vast sums of money as recompense, and a position in the triumvirate. He was also promised eventual augurship and consulship. His status was thus strengthened militarily and politically, although both of his opponents knew that the treaty would not remain intact.

Naval Base

Misenum’s strategic value was clear, and when Augustus reorganized the armed forces of Rome, he chose the spot and its bay to build an excellent harbor.

Misenum was the largest base, Portus Julius, of the Roman navy, since it was the base of the Classis Misenensis, the most important Roman fleet. It was first established as a naval base in 27 BC by Marcus Agrippa, the right-hand man of the emperor Augustus.

Misenum emerged, with Ravenna, as one of the major ports for the Roman Imperial Navy in Italy.

Portus Julius (alternately spelled in the Latin “Iulius”) was the home port for the Roman western imperial fleet, the classis Misenensis, named for nearby Cape Miseno. (The eastern fleet was in Ravenna.) The port was located at the western end of the gulf of Naples and other than the waters of the bay, itself, consisted of three bodies of water in the area: Lake Lucrino, Lake Averno, and the natural inner and outer harbor behind Cape Misenum. The port was named for Julius Caesar.

In preparation for the epochal naval battle of Actium, the Romans constructed a ship-building and training facility in the area. After the successful outcome of the battle, the facility was expanded by Caesar Augustus in 37 BC. The various lakes were linked by canals and the area was also joined to nearby Cumae by an underground passage 1 km (0.6 mile) long and wide enough to be used by chariots.

The Romans built new breakwaters and a freshwater reservoir, the Piscina Mirabilis, of unparalleled size. The outer harbor behind Cape Misenum served the active vessels of the Roman navy and provided room for training exercises, while its inner counterpart (to which it was connected by a canal crossed by a wooden bridge) was designed for the reserve fleet and for repairs, and as a refuge from storms. Because of its location, the area controlled the entire Italian west coast, the islands and the Straits of Messina.

Command of the fleet at Misenum was considered a very important step upward in a Roman career. Often marines and sailors could be transferred from Misenum to Rome for special imperial duties or as rigging operators at the Colosseum.

As was true with much of Campania, the community that developed around the bay was a favorite retreat for the most powerful people in Rome. Marius owned a villa there, which passed into the hands of Tiberius. There, in 37 A.D., Gaius Caligula looked on as the aged emperor either died of natural causes or was murdered.

The Organization of the Eastern Troops, 5 May 1943

How To Use the Formation Tables Below
The tables below provide the organization of the Eastern Troops in service of the Germany Army on 5 May 1943.  Only units known to the General der Osttruppen, the commanding officer responsible for supervising eastern troops, are presented in the tables.  The tables are not intended to display the organization of regular German Army formations and units, their titles are only provided to show which formation or unit each Osttruppen unit was attached to.  The tables cover all Heeresgruppen and theatres of war.  The Schematische Kriegsgliederung does not indicate to which specific divisional commands each unit is assigned to, unless the division in question is a German Army security division.  Where an eastern unit has been attached directly to a German Army division, it is usually noted as being “bei…”, so an eastern unit attached to the 344. Infanterie-Division would have a note next to it indicating that the unit is “bei 344. Infanterie-Division.”
The tables are laid out so that the organization of higher-echelon formations, i.e. corps and armies, and their respective attachments should be clear.  The tables go from the top-most organization to the bottom-level organization, so if you are reading the page from top to bottom you will begin at the Army Group level, and proceeding down you will see the various assigned Army and Corps.  Use the links within the tables to jump from one formation to another.
Each table has a label at the top, indicating which formation it refers to.  This title is repeated in the left-hand column of the table for reference.  The right-hand column lists all of the Osttruppen units assigned to that particular formation.  Within the right-hand column, each “level” of indentation indicates a level of subordination.  No indentation means that the unit in question is directly attached to the main formation.  Units indented one level are directly subordinate to the parent unit above it.  A parent unit or formation of regiment size or larger with subordinate elements is always displayed in boldface type, and without being indented.
The echelon-level of certain units and command staffs, i.e. REGIMENT, BRIGADE, CORPS, etc., is provided next to the unit’s or staff’s title in brackets with capital letters: e.g. Armenische Legion (REGIMENT).  This is used where the unit’s or staff’s title designation does itself indicate the exact size.
Research footnotes next to unit titles are presented in BLACK type and in brackets [ ].  These are footnotes that were added by the researcher, and are either additions, corrections, or translations of notes found on the original document.
Original footnotes next to unit titles are presented in BLUE type and in parenthesis ( ).  These are notes added directly to the original document, and are not translated or altered from their original form.
Unit assignments are occasionally noted next to a unit in RED type and in brackets [ ].  These indicate the actual higher formation that the unit is assigned to.
The unit titles of all units and formations are presented in their original German form, and appear in BLUE type.  If you need translations of their titles, use the Site Glossary.  In most cases, the unit titles are in their unabbreviated form.  Unit titles are left unabbreviated when the actual title can not be determined.
Source: This information was largely taken from the original document listed below, found on Microfilm Roll T78-413, Frame 1302, a holding of the U.S. National Archives.  Supplemental information was provided by the sources listed at the bottom of this page.
Notes on the Summary Tables:
Below each Formation Table is a Summary Table that presents an overall picture of the total numbers of Osttruppen units, organized by unit type, ethnicity, and size, that were assigned to that formation on 5 May 1943.  The Summary Tables are meant to be used to perform quick examinations of the total units assigned to each formation, and present this information in an easy-to-read format.  In-depth examinations should instead be performed using the Formation Tables, as they provide more specific information.  The Summary Tables use certain abbreviations and categories to organize the information, as noted below:
Categories:

  • Construction Battalions: includes all Bau- and Träger-Bau-.
  • Construction Companies: Includes all Bau- and Straßenbau-, and Eisenbahn-Bau-.
  • Supply Companies: Includes all Nachschub- and Nachschub-Transport-.
  • Cossack Cavalry: Used to differentiate between Cossack cavalry and other cavalry units.
  • Cossack: Cossack infantry units are listed under the regular “Infantry” categories, Cossack cavalry units are under their own category, “Cossack Cavalry.”
  • Infantry categories: If not specified, units (regardless of size) are assumed to be infantry.  Also includes Gebirgs-, Jäger-, Feld-, and Sicherungs-Infanterie-.
  • Cavalry: Also includes Kavallerie-Sicherungs.

Unit Composition/Size:

  • Unspecified units in 162. Infanterie-Division (turk.) are listed as being “Turkic.”
  • School category units are company-sized units unless otherwise specified.

Abbreviations:

  • Armen.: Armenian
  • Aserb.: Azerbaijani
  • Estn.: Estonian
  • Finn.: Volga-Finnish
  • Georg.: Georgian
  • Kalmuken: Kalmuck
  • Kauk.: Caucasian
  • Kosaken: Cossack
  • Lett.: Latvian
  • Litau.: Lithuanian
  • Nordkauk.: North Caucasian
  • Nordukr.: North Ukrainian
  • Ost: Composed of mostly Russian and Byelorussian personnel, possibly with some Ukrainians, unless otherwise specified.
  • Ostvölk.: Eastern peoples (general term)
  • Turk.: Turkestani, also used as a general term for the “Asiatic” eastern peoples
  • Ukrain.: Ukrainian
  • Wolgatat.: Volga-Tatar
  • BR = Total Brigade-sized units.
  • R = Total Regiment-sized units.
  • B = Total Battalion-sized units.
  • C = Total Company-sized units.
  • P = Total Platoon-sized or smaller units
Schematische Kriegsgliederung der landeseigenen Verbände
5.Mai.43
T78-413, Frame 1302 (H 1/153)
OKH/Gen.St.d.H.
General der Osttruppen
Nr 402/43 gKdos.
Stand vom 5.Mai.43
General der Osttruppen
General der Osttruppen Heeresgruppe A Heeresgruppe Süd
Heeresgruppe Mitte
Heeresgruppe Nord
Oberbefehlshaber West
Wehrmacht Befehlshaber Ukraine
Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres
Total Eastern Troops, 5 May 1943

Heeresgruppe A
Heeresgruppe A Direct Attachments Befehlshaber Krim
Befehlshaber der Straße Kertsch
17. Armee (A.O.K. 17)
Heeresgruppe A, Total Eastern Troops
Direct Attachments (Heeresgruppe A)
Direct Attachments (Heeresgruppe A) Turkestanisches Feldzeug-Bataillon 8 (3 Kompanien) Turkestanisches Feldzeug-Bataillon 11 (3 Kompanien)
5. Georgische Nachschub-Transport-Kompanie/151
6. Georg.Nachschub-Transport-Kompanie/151
4. Turk.Nachschub-Transport-Kompanie/592
5. Kauk.Nachschub-Transport-Kompanie/546
Kaukasische Freiwilligen-Infanterie-Kompanie [No other designation]
Ukrainisches Bau-Bataillon 64 (4 Kompanien und Nachschub-Kolonne)
2 x Ost-Hiwi-Kompanie [These may be “Hiwi-Wach-Kompanien”, but the designation is not clear]
Ukrainische Nachschub-Kompanie (mot.) 666
Ost-Fernsprechbetriebsstaffel 15
Ost-Fernsprechbetriebsstaffel 27
Ost-Fernsprechbetriebsstaffel 55
Ost-Fernsprechbetriebsstaffel 63
Direct Attachments (Heeresgruppe A), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Georg. Kauk. Ost Turk. Ukrain. Total
Ordnance Battalions 2 2
Construction Battalions 1 1
Supply Companies 2 1 1 1 5
Hiwi Companies 2 2
Infantry Companies 1 1
Telephone Operation Sections 4 4
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 2 2 6 3 2 3B; 8C; 4P
Befehlshaber Krim (Heeresgruppe A)
Befehlshaber Krim (Heeresgruppe A) Turkestanisches Infanterie-Regiment Bergmann (17 Kompanien) [Reorganized on 24 July 1943 as:]
Georgisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./Bergmann (4 Kompanien)*
Kaukasisches Infanterie-Bataillon II./Bergmann (4 Kompanien)*
Kaukasisches Infanterie-Bataillon III./Bergmann (4 Kompanien)*
Aserbeidschanisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./73 (5 Kompanien; in Auffrischung)
Aserbeidschanisches Infanterie-Bataillon 804 (5 Kompanien)
Aserbeidschanisches Infanterie-Bataillon 806 (5 Kompanien; in Auffrischung)
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Batillon I./370 (5 Kompanien; in Auffrischung)
Georgisches Infanterie-Bataillon II./4 (5 Kompanien)
Georgisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./9 (5 Kompanien)
Turkestanisches Bau-Bataillon 245 [Number of companies not given]
5. Aserbeidschanische Straßenbau-Kompanie/551
5. Aserbeidschanische Straßenbau-Kompanie/559
5. Aserbeidschanische Straßenbau-Kompanie/563
5. Armenische Bau-Kompanie/51
5. Armenische Bau-Kompanie/144
5. Georgische Wach-Kompanie/43B
Befehlshaber Krim (Heeresgruppe A), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Armen. Aserb. Georg. Turk. Total
Infantry Regiments 1 1
Infantry Battalions 3 2 1 6
Construction Battalions 1 1
Construction Companies 2 3 5
Guard Companies 1 1
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 2 6 3 3 1R; 7B; 6C

* Counted as part of the regiment and not as independent battalions.

Befehlshaber der Straße Kertsch (Heeresgruppe A)
Befehlshaber der Straße Kertsch (Heeresgruppe A) 4. Turkestanische Nachschub-Kompanie/563 (In Zuführung:)
Georgische Bau-Kompanie 17
Georgische Bau-Kompanie 24
Turkestanisches Träger-Bau-Bataillon 1000
Befehlshaber der Straße Kertsch (Heeresgruppe A), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Georg. Turk. Total
Construction Battalions 1 1
Supply Companies 1 1
Construction Companies 2 2
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 2 2 1B; 3C
17. Armee (Heeresgruppe A)
17. Armee (A.O.K. 17) (Heeresgruppe A) Kosaken Regiment Platow (Stab und 8 Kompanien) Kosaken Kavallerie-Schwadron (bei Regiment 4 ) [No other designation; probably refers to Radfahrer-Sicherungs-Regiment 4]
Ukrainisches Bau-Bataillon 131 (4 Kompanien)
Ukrainisches Bau-Bataillon 221 (4 Kompanien)
Ukrainische Bau-Kompanie 97
Ukrainische Bau-Kompanie 101
Ukrainische Nachschub-Kompanie 562
Ost-Bau-Kompanie 4
Ukrainische Kraftfahr-Kompanie (mot.) 562
Ost-Fahr-Kompanie [No other designation]
Ost-Nachschub-Kolonne [No other designation]
1. Ost-Nachschub-Kolonne/125
2. Ost-Nachschub-Kolonne/125
1. Turkestanische Infanterie-Kompanie/452
Turkestanische Nachschub Kolonne 452
17. Armee (Heeresgruppe A), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Kosaken Ost Turk. Ukrain. Total
Cossack Cavalry Regiments 1 1
Construction Battalions 2 2
Cossack Cavalry Squadrons 1 1
Construction Companies 1 2 3
Supply Companies 1 1
Supply Columns 3 1 4
Motor Transport Companies 1 1
Motor Pool Companies 1 1
Infantry Companies 1 1
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 2 5 2 6 1R; 2B; 12C
Heeresgruppe A, Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Ethnicity Total
Cossack Cavalry Regiments 1 Kosaken 1
Infantry Regiments 1 Turk. 1
Total Regiments 2
Construction Battalions 2 Turk.; 3 Ukrain. 5
Infantry Battalions 1 Turk.; 2 Georg.; 3 Aserb. 6
Ordnance Battalions 2 Turk. 2
Total Battalions 13
Construction Companies 1 Ost; 2 Armen.; 2 Georg.; 2 Ukrain.; 3 Aserb. 10
Cossack Cavalry Squadrons 1 Kosaken 1
Guard Companies 1 Georg. 1
Hiwi Companies 2 Ost 2
Infantry Companies 1 Kauk.; 1 Turk. 2
Motor Pool Companies 1 Ukrain. 1
Motor Transport Companies 1 Ost 1
Supply Columns 1 Turk.; 3 Ost 4
Supply Companies 1 Kauk.; 2 Georg.; 2 Turk.; 2 Ukrain. 7
Total Companies 29
Telephone Operation Sections 4 Ost 4
Total Platoons/Sections 4

Heeresgruppe Süd
Heeresgruppe Süd Direct Attachments6. Armee (A.O.K. 6) 1. Panzerarmee (Pz.A.O.K. 1)
4. Panzerarmee (Pz.A.O.K. 4)
Armeeabteilung Kempf
Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet Süd
Heeresgruppe Süd, Total Eastern Troops
Direct Attachments (Heeresgruppe Süd)
Direct Attachments (Heeresgruppe Süd) Georgisches Infanterie-Bataillon II./198 (5 Kompanien) 6. Turkestanische Wach-Kompanie/571
7. Georgische Wach-Kompanie/571
4. Georgische Nachschub-Kompanie/592
5. Georgische Nachschub-Kompanie/592 [From 22 June 1943]
4. Turkestanische Nachschub-Kompanie/573
4. Ukrainische Wach-Kompanie/571
5. Ukrainische Wach-Kompanie/571
Ukrainisches Bau-Bataillon 112 [Number of companies not given]
Turkestanisches Bau-Bataillon 156 [Number of companies not given]
Turkestanisches Bau-Bataillon 305 (4 Kompanien und Nachschub-Kolonne)
Direct Attachments (Heeresgruppe Süd), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Georg. Turk. Ukrain. Total
Infantry Battalions 1 1
Construction Battalions 2 1 3
Guard Companies 1 1 2 4
Supply Companies 2 1 3
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 4 4 3 4B; 7C
6. Armee (Heeresgruppe Süd)
6. Armee (A.O.K. 6) (Heeresgruppe Süd) Ukrainisches Infanterie-Bataillon 6 (8 Kompanien) [Renamed Ost-Bataillon 551 1 June 1943] Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon 450 (5 Kompanien)
Ukrainisches Bau-Bataillon 109 (4 Kompanien und Nachschub-Kolonne)
Ukrainisches Bau-Bataillon 111 (3 Kompanien)
1. Kosaken Kavallerie-Schwadron/583
6. Armee (Heeresgruppe Süd), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Kosaken Turk. Ukrain. Total
Infantry Battalions 1 1 2
Construction Battalions 2 2
Cossack Cavalry Squadrons 1 1
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 1 1 3 4B; 1C
1. Panzerarmee (Heeresgruppe Süd)
1. Panzerarmee (Pz.A.O.K. 1) (Heeresgruppe Süd) Kosaken Abteilung 126 (4 Kompanien) Kosaken Abteilung 161 (4 Kompanien)
Kosaken Kavallerie-Schwadron (bei III. Panzerkorps) [No other designation]
1. Kosaken Kavallerie-Schwadron/82
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./94 (4 Kompanien)
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./295 (4 Kompanien)
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./371 (4 Kompanien)
Nordkaukasisches Infanterie-Bataillon 802 (5 Kompanien)
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon 784 (4 Kompanien)
Aserbeidschanisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./111 (5 Kompanien)
Ukrainische Bau-Kompanie 235
1. Panzerarmee (Heeresgruppe Süd), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Aserb. Kosaken Nordkauk. Turk. Ukrain. Total
Cossack Cavalry Battalions 2 2
Infantry Battalions 1 1 4 6
Cossack Cavalry Squadrons 2 2
Construction Companies 1 1
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 1 4 1 4 1 8B; 3C
4. Panzerarmee (Heeresgruppe Süd)
4. Panzerarmee (Pz.A.O.K. 4) (Heeresgruppe Süd) 5. Turkestanische Nachschub-Kompanie/606 5. Armenische Nachschub-Kompanie/619
4. Georgische Nachschub-Kompanie/606
6. Turkestanische Nachschub-Kompanie/606 [From 22 June 1943]
4. Panzerarmee (Heeresgruppe Süd), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Armen. Georg. Turk. Total
Supply Companies 1 1 2 4
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 1 1 2 4C
Armeeabteilung Kempf (Heeresgruppe Süd)
Armeeabteilung Kempf (Heeresgruppe Süd) Kosaken Kavallerie-Schwadron (bei 57. Infanterie-Division) [No other designation] Kosaken Kavallerie-Schwadron (bei 6. Panzer-Division) [No other designation]
4. Georgische Wach-Kompanie/591
5. Armenische Nachschub-Kompanie/591
6. Armenische Nachschub-Kompanie/591 [From 22 June 1943]
Ost-Wach-Bataillon 555 (3 Kompanien)
Ukrainische Infanterie-Kompanie 248
Ost-Kompanie 448
5. Ost-Wach-Kompanie/122B
6. Ost-Wach-Kompanie/122B
Armeeabteilung Kempf (Heeresgruppe Süd), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Armen. Georg. Kosaken Ost Ukrain. Total
Guard Battalions 1 1
Cossack Cavalry Squadrons 2 2
Guard Companies 1 2 3
Supply Companies 2 2
Infantry Companies 1 1 2
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 2 1 2 4 1 1B; 9C
Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet Süd (Heeresgruppe Süd)
Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet Süd (Heeresgruppe Süd) (Kosaken-)Kavallerie-Regiment von Jungschultz (12 Kompanien) [Renamed Kosaken-Regiment 1 (von Jungschultz) on 15 February 1943, and redesignated 3. Reiter-Regiment Sswodno on 1 June 1943] Kalmuken Kavallerie-Regiment Dr. Doll (19 Kompanien)
Kalmuken-Kavallerie-Regiment 5 Kuban (4 Kompanien)
Kosaken Abteilung I./454 (3 Kompanien)
Kosaken Abteilung II./454 (3 Kompanien)
Kosaken Abteilung III./454 (4 Kompanien)
Kosaken Abteilung IV./454 (4 Kompanien)
Kosaken Kavallerie-Ausbildungs-Abteilung [No other designation]
Kosaken Abteilung 213 (5 Kompanien)
Ost-Reiter-Ausbildungs-Abteilung Kranz (3 Kompanien)
Ost-Reiter-Abteilung 403 (3 Kompanien)
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon 783 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bau-Bataillon 559 (5 Kompanien)
Ost-Minenräum-Kompanie 554
1. – 3. Ost-Kompanie/556
1. und 2. Ost-Fernsprechbetriebsstaffel/66
Ost-Fernsprechbetriebsstaffel 62
Ost-Fernsprechbetriebsstaffel 43
Ost-Fernsprechbetriebsstaffel 51
Ost-Kompanie 213
Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet Süd (Heeresgruppe Süd), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Kalmuken Kosaken Ost Turk. Total
Cossack Cavalry Regiments 1 1
Cavalry Regiments 2 2
Cossack Cavalry Battalions 5 5
Cossack Cavalry Training Battalion 1 1
Cavalry Training Battalions 1 1
Cavalry Battalions 1 1
Infantry Battalions 1 1
Construction Battalions 1 1
Mine Clearing Companies 1 1
Infantry Companies 4 4
Telephone Operation Sections 5 5
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 2 7 13 1 3R; 10B; 10C
Heeresgruppe Süd, Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Ethnicity Total
Cavalry Regiments 2 Kalmuken 2
Cossack Cavalry Regiments 1 Kosaken 1
Total Regiments 3
Cavalry Battalions 1 Ost 1
Cavalry Training Battalions 1 Ost 1
Construction Battalions 1 Ost; 2 Turk.; 3 Ukrain. 6
Cossack Cavalry Battalions 7 Kosaken 7
Cossack Cavalry Training Battalions 1 Kosaken 1
Guard Battalions 1 Ost 1
Infantry Battalions 1 Georg.; 1 Nordkauk.; 1 Ukrain.; 6 Turk. 9
Total Battalions 26
Construction Companies 1 Ukrain. 1
Cossack Cavalry Squadrons 5 Kosaken 5
Guard Companies 1 Turk.; 2 Georg.; 2 Ost; 2 Ukrain. 7
Infantry Companies 1 Ukrain.; 5 Ost 6
Mine Clearing Companies 1 Ost 1
Supply Companies 3 Armen.; 3 Georg.; 3 Turk. 9
Total Companies 29
Telephone Operation Sections 5 Ost 5
Total Platoons/Sections 5

Heeresgruppe Mitte
Heeresgruppe Mitte Direct Attachments2. Armee LII. Armeekorps
VII. Armeekorps
XIII. Armeekorps
rückwärtigen Armeegebiet 580
2. Panzerarmee
XX. Armeekorps
XXXXVII. Panzerkorps
XXXXVI. Panzerkorps
XXXXI. Panzerkorps
XXXV. Armeekorps
LIII. Armeekorps
LV. Armeekorps
rückwärtigen Armeegebiet 532
4. Armee
LVI. Panzerkorps
XII. Armeekorps
IX. Armeekorps
XXXIX. Panzerkorps
XXVII. Armeekorps
Korück 559
3. Panzerarmee
VI. Armeekorps
II. Luftwaffen Feldkorps
XXXXIII. Armeekorps
201. Sicherungs-Division
rückwärtigen Armeegebiet 590
rückwärtigen Armeegebiet 582
Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet Mitte
Heeresgruppe Mitte, Total Eastern Troops
Direct Attachments (Heeresgruppe Mitte)
Direct Attachments (Heeresgruppe Mitte) Ost-Bataillon 82 (2 Kompanien) Ost-Bataillon 308 (3 Kompanien)
1. Ost-Fernsprecher-Kompanie/515
2. Ost-Fernsprecher-Kompanie/515
Turkestanisches Träger-Bau-Bataillon 1001 (3 Kompanien)
Ost-Kompanie 606
4. Turkestanische Nachschub-Kompanie/544 [Brjansk)
1. Ost-Kompanie/607
2. Ost-Kompanie/607 (Gomel)
3. Ost-Kompanie/607 (Gomel)
4. Aserbeidschanische Nachschub-Kompanie/548 (Gomel)
5. Turkestanische Wach-Kompanie/B99 (Orscha)
Turkestanische Infanterie-Kompanie 493 (Orscha)
Ost-Kompanie 608 (Orscha)
Ost-Kompanie 611 (Orscha)
Ost-Kompanie 609 (Minsk)
1. Ost-Kompanie/610 (Minsk)
2. Ost-Kompanie/610 (Minsk)
3. Ost-Kompanie/610 (Minsk)
4. Georgische Nachschub-Kompanie/B147 (Bobruisk)
5. Turkestanische Infanterie-(K)Kompanie/51B (Witebsk)
5. Turkestanische Nachschub-Kompanie/B107 (Witebsk)
5. Turkestanische Nachschub-Kompanie/B23 (Smolensk)
(In Zuführung:)
Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie 79
Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie 135
Georgisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./1 (5 Kompanien)
Direct Attachments (Heeresgruppe Mitte), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Aserb. Georg. Ost Turk. Total
Construction Battalions 1 1
Infantry Battalions 1 2 3
Telephone Companies 2 2
Infantry Companies 10 2 12
Supply Companies 1 1 3 5
Guard Companies 1 1
Construction Companies 2 2
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 1 2 14 9 4B; 22C
2. Armee (Heeresgruppe Mitte)
2. Armee (Heeresgruppe Mitte) Ost-Reiter-Schwadron 299 Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie 120
Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie 123
Turkestanische Eisenbahn-Bau-Kompanie 217
LII. Armeekorps
1 x Schwadron/Ost-Reiter-Abteilung 57 [No other designation]
VII. Armeekorps
1 x Schwadron/Ost-Reiter-Abteilung 57 [No other designation]
Ost-Bau-Kompanie 168
Ost-Kompanie 407
XIII. Armeekorps
Ost-Kompanie 340
Ost-Kompanie 413
Ost-Kompanie 182
rückwärtigen Armeegebiet 580
Ost-Reiter-Abteilung 580 (3 Schwadronen)
Ost-Aufklärungs-Abteilung (mot.) 581 (4 Schwadronen)
Ost-Wach-Bataillon 552 (7 Kompanien)
Ost-Wach-Bataillon 581 (5 Kompanien)
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./76 (5 Kompanien)
Turkestanisches Feld-Bataillon I./389 (5 Kompanien)
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./785 (4 Kompanien)
2. Armee (Heeresgruppe Mitte), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Ost Turk. Total
Cavalry Battalions 1 1
Reconnaissance Battalions 1 1
Guard Battalions 2 2
Infantry Battalions 3 3
Cavalry Squadrons 3 3
Construction Companies 1 2 3
Rail Construction Companies 1 1
Infantry Companies 4 4
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 12 6 7B; 11C
2. Panzerarmee (Heeresgruppe Mitte)
2. Panzerarmee (Heeresgruppe Mitte) Ost-Kompanie 85 4. Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie/44
4. Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie/320
4. Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie/511
Kosaken Artillerie-Batterie 553
XX. Armeekorps
1. Ost-Kompanie/84
2. Ost-Kompanie/84
XXXXVII. Panzerkorps
1. Kosaken Kavallerie-Schwadron/137
2. Kosaken Kavallerie-Schwadron/137
Ost-Kompanie 45
Ost-Kompanie 102
XXXXVI. Panzerkorps
Ost-Wach-Bataillon 581 (2 Kompanien)
1. Ost-Kompanie/446
2. Ost-Kompanie/446
Ost-Kompanie 178
XXXXI. Panzerkorps
Ost-Kompanie 383
XXXV. Armeekorps
Ost-Kompanie 34
Ost-Kompanie 156
LIII. Armeekorps
Ost-Kompanie 25
Ost-Bataillon 441 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Kompanie 453
LV. Armeekorps
Ost-Bataillon 134 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Kompanie 110
Ost-Bataillon 339 (4 Kompanien)
1. Ost-Reiter-Schwadron/447
2. Ost-Reiter-Schwadron/447
Ost-Kompanie 455
Ost-Bataillon I./447 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon II./447 (4 Kompanien)
Armenisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./125 (5 Kompanien)
rückwärtigen Armeegebiet 532
Kosaken Kavallerie-Sicherungs-Abteilung III./57 (4 Schwadronen)
Ost-Bataillon 615 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 616 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 617 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 618 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 620 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Artillerie-Abteilung 621
Armenisches Infanterie-Bataillon II./9 (5 Kompanien)
Aserbeidschanisches Infanterie-Bataillon 807 (5 Kompanien)
2. Panzerarmee (Heeresgruppe Mitte), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Armen. Aserb. Kosaken Ost Turk. Total
Cossack Cavalry Battalions 1 1
Guard Battalion 1 1
Infantry Battalions 2 1 10 13
Artillery Battalions 1 1
Cossack Cavalry Squadrons 2 2
Cavalry Squadrons 2 2
Infantry Companies 15 15
Construction Companies 3 3
Artillery Batteries 1 1
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 2 1 4 29 3 16B; 23C
4. Armee (Heeresgruppe Mitte)
4. Armee (Heeresgruppe Mitte) 4. Ost-Nachschub-Kompanie (mot.)/604 5. Ost-Nachschub-Kompanie (mot.)/604
4. Ost-Nachschub-Kompanie/622
4. Ost-Nachschub-Kompanie/687
4. Ost-Nachschub-Kompanie/690
Ost-Kompanie 612
1. Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie/136
2. Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie/137
4. Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie/57
4. Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie/544
Ost-Kompanie 626 (mit Oberquartiermeister 4, A.O.K. 4)
Ost-Ersatz-Bataillon 4 (4 Kompanien)
LVI. Panzerkorps
Ost-Banden-Jagd-Kompanie (mit 31. Infanterie-Division)
1. Ost-Kompanie/131
2. Ost-Kompanie/131
Ost-Kompanie 10
1. Ost-Kompanie/267
2. Ost-Kompanie/267
Ost-Bataillon 456 (3 Kompanien)
XII. Armeekorps
Ost-Kompanie 260
Ost-Kompanie 268
Ost-Bataillon 412 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Banden-Jagd-Kompanie [Assigned to 98. Infanterie-Division]
IX. Armeekorps
Ost-Banden-Jagd-Kompanie [Assigned to 252. Infanterie-Division]
XXXIX. Panzerkorps
Ost-Kompanie 195
Ost-Kompanie 439
XXVII. Armeekorps
Ost-Kompanie 152
Ost-Kompanie 253
Ost-Bataillon 229 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 427 (2 Kompanien)
Korück 559
Ost-Bataillon 627 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 642 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 643 (3 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 629 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Artillerie-Batterie 614
Ost-Bataillon 646 (Dorogobusch) (3 Kompanien)
Ost-Kompanie 613 (Dorogobusch) (mit Ortskommandantur 292)
Ost-Wach-Kompanie 640 (Dorogobusch)
4. Armee (Heeresgruppe Mitte), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Ost Turk. Total
Infantry Battalions 9 9
Replacement Battalions 1 1
Supply Companies 5 5
Infantry Companies 14 14
Construction Companies 4 4
Anti-Partisan Companies 3 3
Guard Companies 1 1
Artillery Batteries 1 1
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 34 4 10B; 28C
3. Panzerarmee (Heeresgruppe Mitte)
3. Panzerarmee (Heeresgruppe Mitte) Ost-Kompanie 639 Ost-Kompanie 644
Ost-Kompanie 645
Ost-Kompanie 59
2. Wolgatatarische Bau-Kompanie/825 [Became 4./Wolgatatarisches Bau-Bataillon 18 on 13 August 1943]
VI. Armeekorps
Ost-Kompanie 183
Ost-Bataillon 406 (3 Kompanien)
4. Georgische Bau-Kompanie/91
4. Georgische Bau-Kompanie/415
II. Luftwaffen-Feldkorps
1. Ost-Kompanie/263
2. Ost-Kompanie/263
3. Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie/248
3. Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie/416
XXXXIII. Armeekorps
Ost-Kompanie 205
Ost-Kompanie 331
Kosaken Abteilung 443 (3 Kompanien)
201. Sicherungs-Division
Kosaken Bataillon 622 (5 Kompanien)
Kosaken Bataillon 623 (5 Kompanien)
Kosaken Bataillon 624 (5 Kompanien)
Kosaken Bataillon 625 (5 Kompanien)
Kosaken Kompanie 638
Ost-Bataillon 603 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Reiter-Schwadron 201
1. Wolgatatarische Infanterie-Kompanie/825
5. Ost-Sicherungs-Kompanie/722
Ost-Wach-Bataillon 508 (3 Kompanien)
rückwärtigen Armeegebiet 590
Ost-Bataillon 281 (3 Kompanien)
rückwärtigen Armeegebiet 582
Ost-Bataillon 628 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 630 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Artillerie-Batterie 582
Ost-Ersatz-Kompanie 582
Ost-Unteroffizier-Schule
3. Panzerarmee (Heeresgruppe Mitte), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Georg. Kosaken Ost Turk. Wolgatat. Total
Infantry Battalions 4 5 9
Guard Battalions 1 1
Cossack Cavalry Battalions 1 1
Infantry Companies 1 10 1 12
Replacement Companies 1 1
Artillery Batteries 1 1
Cavalry Squadrons 1 1
Construction Companies 2 2 1 5
NCO School Unit 1 1
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 2 6 20 2 2 11B; 21C
Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet Mitte (Heeresgruppe Mitte)
Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet Mitte (Heeresgruppe Mitte) Ost-Ersatz-Regiment Mitte (9 Kompanien) [Became
Ost-Ausbildungs-Regiment Mitte on 10 July 1943 (handwritten note)] Kosaken Abteilung 600 (5 Kompanien)
Ost-Nachschub-Kompanie 350
Ost-Nachschub-Kompanie 354
Ost-Bataillon 633 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 634 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 635 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 636 (2 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 637 (4 Kompanien)
1. Ost-Kompanie/221
2. Ost-Reiter-Schwadron/221
Ost-Bataillon 602 (4 Kompanien)
1. Ost-Kompanie/203
2. Ost-Reiter-Schwadron/203
Ost-Bataillon 604 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Reiter-Schwadron 286
Ost-Bataillon 601 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 605 (4 Kompanien)
Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet Mitte (Heeresgruppe Mitte), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Kosaken Ost Total
Replacement Regiments 1 1
Cossack Cavalry Battalions 1 1
Infantry Battalions 9 9
Supply Companies 2 2
Infantry Companies 2 2
Cavalry Squadrons 3 3
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 1 17 1R; 10B; 7C
Heeresgruppe Mitte, Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Ethnicity Total
Replacement Regiments 1 Ost 1
Total Regiments 1
Artillery Battalions 1 Ost 1
Cavalry Battalions 1 Ost 1
Construction Battalions 1 Turk. 1
Cossack Cavalry Battalions 3 Kosaken 3
Guard Battalions 4 Ost 4
Infantry Battalions 1 Aserb.; 1 Georg.; 2 Armen.; 3 Turk.; 35 Ost 42
Reconnaissance Battalions 1 Ost 1
Replacement Battalions 1 Ost 1
Total Battalions 54
Anti-Partisan Companies 3 Ost 3
Artillery Batteries 1 Kosaken; 2 Ost 3
Cavalry Squadrons 9 Ost 9
Construction Companies 1 Ost; 1 Wolgatat.; 2 Georg.; 14 Turk. 17
Cossack Cavalry Squadrons 2 Kosaken 2
Guard Companies 2 Ost 2
Infantry Companies 1 Kosaken; 1 Wolgatat.; 2 Turk.; 55 Ost 59
NCO School Unit 1 Ost 1
Replacement Companies 1 Ost 1
Supply Companies 1 Aserb.; 1 Georg.; 3 Turk.; 7 Ost 12
Telephone Companies 2 Ost 2
Total Companies 111

Heeresgruppe Nord
Heeresgruppe Nord Direct Attachments16. Armee 18. Armee
Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet Nord
Heeresgruppe Nord, Total Eastern Troops
Direct Attachments (Heeresgruppe Nord)
Direct Attachments (Heeresgruppe Nord) (In Zuführung:) Aserbeidschanische Bau-Kompanie 25
Aserbeidschanische Bau-Kompanie 87
Armenische Bau-Kompanie 254
Armenische Bau-Kompanie 257
Georgische Bau-Kompanie 127
Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie 414
Litauische Wach-Kompanie 650
Lettische Wach-Kompanie 651
Lettische Wach-Kompanie 652
Direct Attachments (Heeresgruppe Nord), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Armen. Aserb. Georg. Lett. Litau. Turk. Total
Construction Companies 2 2 1 1 6
Guard Companies 2 1 3
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 2 2 1 2 1 1 9C
16. Armee (Heeresgruppe Nord)
16. Armee (A.O.K. 16) (Heeresgruppe Nord) rückwärtigen Armeegebiet 584 Ost-Ersatz-Bataillon 16 (1. und 3. Kompanie in Aufstellung) [Number of companies not given]
Ost-Bataillon 667 (6 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 668 (6 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 669 (3 Kompanien in Vfg.; 3 Kompanien in Aufstellung)
Ost-Bataillon 620 (4 Kompanien)
1. Ost-Artillerie-Batterie/670
2. Ost-Artillerie-Batterie/670
Ost-Nachrichten-Kompanie 671 [Disbanded 23 August 1943]
Ost-Bataillon 653 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 654 (4 Kompanien)
Kosaken Kavallerie-Schwadron 655
Estnische Infanterie-Kompanie 657
16. Armee (Heeresgruppe Nord), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Estn. Kosaken Ost Total
Replacement Battalions 1 1
Infantry Battalions 6 6
Artillery Batteries 2 2
Signals Companies 1 1
Cossack Cavalry Squadrons 1 1
Infantry Companies 1 1
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 1 1 10 7B; 5C
18. Armee (Heeresgruppe Nord)
18. Armee (A.O.K. 18) (Heeresgruppe Nord) rückwärtigen Armeegebiet 583 Estnisches Infanterie-Bataillon 658 (4 Kompanien)
Estnisches Infanterie-Bataillon 659 (4 Kompanien)
Estnisches Infanterie-Bataillon 660 (4 Kompanien)
Estnisches Ersatz-Bataillon Narwa (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 661 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 662 (2 Kompanien)
Ost-Ersatz-Bataillon 663 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon (Finn.) 664 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Bataillon 665 (4 Kompanien)
Ost-Pionier-Bataillon 666 (4 Kompanien)
18. Armee (Heeresgruppe Nord), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Estn. Ost Total
Replacement Battalions 1 1 2
Engineer Battalions 1 1
Infantry Battalions 3 4* 7
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 4 6 10B

* One of the Ost-Bataillone is designated as (Finn.).  This probably refers Volga-Finns, and not Finns from Finland.

Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet Nord (Heeresgruppe Nord)
Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet Nord (Heeresgruppe Nord) Ost-Reiter-Abt. 207 (3 Kompanien)

Nordkaukasisches Infanterie-Bataillon 842 (2 Kompanien)*
Nordkaukasisches Infanterie-Bataillon 843 (2 Kompanien)*

Armenisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./198 (5 Kompanien)
Ost-Pionier-Bataillon 672 (3 Kompanien)
Ost-Reiter-Abteilung 285
1., 2. Nordkaukasische Infanterie-Kompanie/844

Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet Nord (Heeresgruppe Nord), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Armen. Nordkauk. Nordukr. Ost Total
Infantry Battalions 1 2 3
Engineer Battalions 1 1
Cavalry Battalions 2 2
Infantry Companies 2 2
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 1 2 2 3 6B; 2C
Heeresgruppe Nord, Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Ethnicity Total
Cavalry Battalions 2 Ost 2
Engineer Battalions 2 Ost 2
Infantry Battalions 1 Armen.; 2 Nordukr.; 3 Estn.; 10 Ost 16
Replacement Battalions 1 Estn.; 1 Ost 2
Total Battalions 22
Artillery Batteries 2 Ost 2
Construction Companies 1 Georg.; 1 Turk.; 2 Armen.; 2 Aserb. 6
Cossack Cavalry Squadrons 1 Kosaken 1
Guard Companies 1 Litau.; 2 Lett. 3
Infantry Companies 1 Estn.; 2 Nordkauk. 3
Signals Companies 1 Ost 1
Total Companies 16

Oberbefehlshaber West
Oberbefehlshaber West
LXXXVIII. Armeekorps Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon 787 (5 Kompanien)
Armenisches Infanterie-Bataillon 812 (5 Kompanien)
7. Armee (A.O.K. 7)
LXXXIV. Armeekorps
Georgisches Infanterie-Bataillon 797 (5 Kompanien)
76. Infanterie-Division
Georgisches Infanterie-Bataillon 798 (5 Kompanien)
1. Armee (A.O.K. 1)
Nordkaukasisches Infanterie-Bataillon 803 (5 Kompanien)*
Wolgatatarisches Infanterie-Bataillon 826 (5 Kompanien)
Oberbefehlshaber West, Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Armen. Georg. Nordukr. Turk. Wolgatat. Total
Infantry Battalions 1 2 1 1 1 6
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 1 2 1 1 1 6B

Wehrmacht Befehlshaber Ukraine
Wehrmacht Befehlshaber Ukraine 2 x Kosaken Infanterie-Bataillon (Schepatowka) [No other designation] Kosaken Infanterie-Bataillon (6 Kompanien) (Mosyr) [No other designation]
Kosaken Infanterie-Bataillon 2 (6 Kompanien)
Kosaken Infanterie-Bataillon 4 (8 Kompanien)
Kosaken Infanterie-Bataillon 6 (8 Kompanien)
Kosaken Infanterie-Bataillon 10 (8 Kompanien)
Kosaken Infanterie-Bataillon 11 (8 Kompanien)
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon 786 (5 Kompanien)
Nordkaukasisches Infanterie-Bataillon 835 (5 Kompanien)
Kosaken Infanterie-Bataillon 3 (8 Kompanien) (bei 1. Kavallerie-Division)
Kosaken Infanterie-Bataillon 9 (8 Kompanien) (bei 1. Kavallerie-Division)
Legionslager Shitomir
3 x Aserbeidschanische Kompanie [No type or designation given]
Legionslager Berditschew (Verlegung nach Zaslaw)
Armenische Kompanie [No type or designation given]
Legionslager Proskurow
9 x Turkestanische Kompanie [No type or designation given]
Legionslager Zaslaw
Georgische Kompanie [No type or designation given]
2 x Armenische Kompanie [No type or designation given]
Wehrmacht Befehlshaber Ukraine, Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Armen. Aserb. Georg. Kosaken Nordkauk. Turk. Total
Infantry Battalions 10 1 1 12
Infantry Companies 3 3 1 9 16
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 3 3 1 10 1 10 12B; 16C

Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres
Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres Wehrkreis im Generalgouvernement162. Infanterie-Division (turk.) 1. Kosaken-Division
Wehrkreis im Generalgouvernement (Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres)
Wehrkreis im Generalgouvernement (Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres) Armenische Legion (BRIGADE) Legion-Führer-Schule (Legionowo) (BRIGADE)
Ostvölkisches Genesenden-Bataillon I (Kossow)
Armenisches Stamm-Bataillon
Armenische Unterführer-Kompanie
Armenisches Infanterie-Bataillon 810 (5 Kompanien)
Armenisches Infanterie-Bataillon 813 (5 Kompanien)
Armenisches Infanterie-Bataillon 809 (in Auffrischung)
Armenisches Infanterie-Bataillon 814 [Added by handwritten note dated 31 August 1943]
Aserbeidschanische Legion (REGIMENT)
Aserbeidschanisches Stamm-Bataillon
Aserbeidschanische Unterführer-Kompanie
Aserbeidschanisches Infanterie-Bataillon 817 (5 Kompanien)
Aserbeidschanisches Infanterie-Bataillon 805 (in Auffrischung)
Georgische Legion (REGIMENT)
Georgisches Stamm-Bataillon
Georgische Unterführer-Kompanie
Georgisches Infanterie-Bataillon 799 (5 Kompanien)
Georgisches Infanterie-Bataillon 822 (5 Kompanien)
Kaukasische Infanterie-Kompanie General Bergmann
Georgisches Infanterie-Bataillon 795 (in Auffrischung)
Georgisches Infanterie-Bataillon 823 [Added by handwritten note dated 31 August 1943]
Nordkaukasische Legion (REGIMENT)
Nordkaukasisches Stamm-Bataillon
Nordkaukasische Unterführer-Kompanie
Nordkaukasisches Infanterie-Bataillon 836 (5 Kompanien)
Nordkaukasisches Infanterie-Bataillon 800 (in Auffrischung)
Turkestanische Legion (REGIMENT)
Turkestanisches Stamm-Bataillon
Turkestanische Unterführer-Kompanie
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon 788 (5 Kompanien)
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon 789 (5 Kompanien)
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon 781 (in Auffrischung)
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon 782 (in Auffrischung)
Wolgatatarische Legion (REGIMENT)
Wolgatatarisches Stamm-Bataillon
Wolgatatarische Unterführer-Kompanie
Wolgatatarische Dolmetscher-Vorschule-Kompanie
Wolgatatarisches Infanterie-Bataillon 827 [Number of companies not given]
Wolgatatarisches Infanterie-Bataillon 828 [Added by handwritten note dated 31 August 1943]
Vorlager
Zajezjerze
Malkinia
Biala Podkaska
Benjamino
Wlodawa
Demplin
Wehrmacht Befehlshaber Ukraine, Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Armen. Aserb. Georg. Kauk. Nordkauk. Ostvölk. Turk. Wolgatat. Total
Officers School (Brig.) 1 1
Convalescent Battalions 1 1
Reception Battalions 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
Infantry Battalions 4 2 4 2 4 2 18
NCO Companies 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
Translator Companies 1 1
Infantry Companies 1 1
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 7 4 6 1 4 1 6 5 1BR; 25B; 8C
162. Infanterie-Division (turk.) (Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres)
162. Infanterie-Division (turk.) (Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres) Nachrichtenstaffel Divisions-Führer-Schule
Turkestanische Stamm-Kompanie
Wehrmacht-Instandsetzungs-Zug
Georgische Legion (REGIMENT)
Georgische Unterführer-Kompanie
Georgische Bau-Kompanie
Georgisches Ersatz-Bataillon [No other designation]
Aserbeidschanische Legion (REGIMENT)
Aserbeidschanische Unterführer-Kompanie
Aserbeidschanische Bau-Kompanie
Aserbeidschanisches Jäger-Bataillon I./97
Aserbeidschanisches Gebirgs-Bataillon I./4
Aserbeidschanisches Jäger-Bataillon I./101
Aserbeidschanisches Infanterie-Bataillon II./73
Aserbeidschanisches Ersatz-Bataillon [No other designation]
1. Turkestanische Legion (REGIMENT)
Turkestanische Unterführer-Kompanie
Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./305
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./44
Turkestanisches Ersatz-Bataillon [No other designation]
2. Turkestanische Legion (REGIMENT)
Turkestanische Unterführer-Kompanie
Turkestanische Bau-Kompanie
Turkestanisches Jäger-Bataillon I./100
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./384
Turkestanisches Infanterie-Bataillon I./297
Turkestanisches Ersatz-Bataillon [No other designation]
Vorlager
Neuhammer (mit Bau-Kompanie [No other designation])
Starakonstantinow
162. Infanterie-Division (turk.), Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Aserb. Georg. Turk. Total
Replacement Battalions 1 1 2 4
Infantry Battalions 4 5 9
Reception Companies 1 1
Division’s Officers School 1 1
Construction Companies 1 1 3 5
NCO Companies 1 1 2 4
Signals Section 1 1
Repair Platoon 1 1
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 7 3 16 13B; 11C; 2P
1. Kosaken-Division (Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres)
1. Kosaken-Division (Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres) (in Aufstellung:) Kosaken Kavallerie-Regiment Don 1
Kosaken Kavallerie-Regiment Kuban 4
Kosaken Kavallerie-Regiment Terek 6
Kosaken Kavallerie-Artillerie-Regiment
1. Kosaken-Division, Total Eastern Troops:
Unit Type Kosaken Total
Cossack Cavalry Regiments 3 3
Artillery Regiments 1 1
Total Units by Ethnicity/Size 4 4

The Summary Table below displays the total number of Osttruppen units serving in the German Army on 5 May 1943.  The regiments, battalions, companies, and platoons/sections listed in the above table include all independent units, as well as the subordinate elements of the 162. Infanterie-Division (turk.) and 1. Kosaken-Division.  These totals are provided in order to allow a more immediate analysis of the type and number of Osttruppen units serving in the German Army on this date.  The specific formation tables should be used for more in-depth examination of the Osttruppen units and their assignments.

Total Eastern Troops, 5 May 1943:
Unit Type Ethnicity Total
Artillery Regiments 1 Kosaken 1
Cavalry Regiments 2 Kalmuken 2
Cossack Cavalry Regiments 5 Kosaken 5
Infantry Regiments 1 Turk. 1
Replacement Regiments 1 Ost 1
Total Regiments 10
Artillery Battalions 1 Ost 1
Cavalry Battalions 4 Ost 4
Cavalry Training Battalions 1 Ost 1
Construction Battalions 1 Ost; 5 Turk.; 6 Ukrain. 12
Convalescent Battalions 1 Ostvölk. 1
Cossack Cavalry Battalions 10 Kosaken 10
Cossack Cavalry Training Battalions 1 Kosaken 1
Engineer Battalions 2 Ost 2
Guard Battalions 5 Ost 5
Infantry Battalions 1 Ukrain.; 3 Estn.; 3 Nordukr.; 3 Wolgatat.; 4 Nordkauk.; 8 Armen.; 10 Aserb.; 10 Georg.; 10 Kosaken; 21 Turk.; 45 Ost 118
Ordnance Battalions 2 Turk. 2
Reception Battalions 1 Armen.; 1 Aserb.; 1 Georg.; 1 Nordkauk.; 1 Turk.; 1 Wolgatat. 6
Reconnaissance Battalions 1 Ost 1
Replacement Battalions 1 Aserb.; 1 Estn.; 1 Georg; 1 Turk.; 2 Ost 6
Total Battalions 170
Anti-Partisan Companies 3 Ost 3
Artillery Batteries 1 Kosaken; 4 Ost 5
Cavalry Squadrons 9 Ost 9
Construction Companies 1 Wolgatat.; 2 Ost; 3 Ukrain.; 4 Armen.; 6 Aserb.; 6 Georg.; 18 Turk. 40
Cossack Cavalry Squadrons 9 Kosaken 9
Division Officers School 1 Turk. 1
Guard Companies 1 Litau.; 1 Turk.; 2 Lett.; 2 Ukrain.; 3 Georg.; 4 Ost 13
Hiwi Companies 2 Ost 2
Infantry Companies 1 Estn.; 1 Georg.; 1 Kosaken; 1 Ukrain.; 1 Wolgatat.; 2 Kauk.; 2 Nordkauk.; 3 Armen.; 3 Aserb.; 12 Turk.; 60 Ost 87
Mine Clearing Companies 1 Ost 1
Motor Pool Companies 1 Ukrain. 1
Motor Transport Companies 1 Ost 1
NCO Companies 1 Armen.; 1 Nordkauk.; 1 Wolgatat.; 2 Aserb.; 2 Georg.; 3 Turk. 10
NCO School Units 1 Ost 1
Reception Companies 1 Ost; 1 Turk. 2
Signals Companies 1 Ost 1
Supply Columns 1 Turk.; 3 Ost 4
Supply Companies 1 Aserb.; 1 Kauk.; 2 Ukrain.; 3 Armen.; 6 Georg.; 7 Ost; 8 Turk. 28
Telephone Companies 2 Ost 2
Translator Companies 1 Wolgatat. 1
Total Companies 221
Repair Platoons 1 Turk, 1
Signals Section 1 Turk. 1
Telephone Operation Sections 9 Ost 9
Total Platoons/Sections 11

Additional Sources:
Munoz, Antonio J. Hitler’s Eastern Legions Volume II: The Osttruppen.  New York: Axis Europa, Inc., 1997.
Tessin, Georg. Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS 1939 – 1945: Band 1 – 14. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1976.

Research: Forrest Opper and Jason von Zerneck

*Corrections by Victor N. Titov

The royal galley of Juan de Austria

To mark the fourth centenary of the battle of Lepanto, a replica was built at the Museu Marítim de Barcelona of the royal galley of Juan de Austria. The vessel was the flagship of the fleet of the Holy League (comprising Spain, the Republic of Venice, the Papal States and Malta), which fought the Turkish navy at Lepanto on 7 October 1571. 

A very large vessel, the royal galley had a length of 60 metres and a breadth of 6.2 metres. Propelled by 59 oars operated by 236 oarsmen, the vessel was also rigged with 2 masts, specifically a mainmast and a foremast with respective heights of 22 metres and 15 metres, and lateen sails with a surface area of 691 square metres. 

One of the galley’s characteristic features was its decoration, the work of Seville’s most highly renowned artists of the age. Juan de Mallara, a humanist and a counsel of the Spanish court, was responsible for the design of the decoration, the selection of themes and the iconography used. He actually left a detailed written description thereof, on the basis of which it was possible to reproduce those elements on the replica. The features on the stern are a highlight of the overall decorative work. The sculptures and paintings which appeared on that part of the original vessel were produced by Juan Bautista Vázquez and Benvenuto Tortello, portraying mythological figures and scenes along with symbols of the Catholic doctrine, such as faith, hope and charity, represented by the awning’s lamps.

Rowing means Rowing Well!

The Athenian fleet developed muscular bonding among a larger proportion of the total population than ever fought in Sparta’s phalanx. In 483 B.C., when Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to build a fleet of triremes, the citizens who manned the oars found themselves in a situation that required prolonged and precise movement in unison. The three tiers of oars had scant clearance. Every oarsman had to keep pace with those in front and behind, while also keeping his oar out of the path of those banked above or below him. Deviation of more than a few inches, and mistiming by a fraction of a second, meant a tangle of oars and loss of momentum. Precision was absolutely vital, and it took considerable practice for a crew to settle into a smooth, effective rhythm.
Rowing flexes the same arm and leg muscles as marching and dancing, and a seated posture may not diminish the emotional effect of keeping together in time that results from such exercises when people stay on their feet. Unlike contemporary rowers, ancient trireme crews pulled their oars in unison by conforming to the beat of a mallet on a special sounding board; and this may have strengthened their visceral response to keeping together in time. If so, the Athenians, too, were in a position to provoke the same sort of emotional solidarity that the Spartans did, with the difference that the upwelling of common feeling among the Athenians concentrated among citizens too poor to equip themselves for the phalanx, and who, instead of fighting on land, rowed in the fleet almost every summer between 480 and 404 B.C.