Nader Shah, the Persian Napoleon



“Battle of Karnal” painting by adel adili

Nader Shah, a former ghulam, seized effective control of the empire under the last Safavid shah before claiming the throne for himself in 1736. The future conqueror started out as Nader Khan, an able leader from the Turkman Afshar tribe in northern Khorasan. He had initially fought with the Afghans against the Uzbeks, but after Esfahan fell Na der split from the Afghan army and offered his services to the Safavids in 1727. He assembled an army and began the reconsolidation of the country, displaying the military genius that led some historians to refer to him as the Napoleon of Persia or the Second Alexander. After successfully expelling the Afghans from Safavid domains in 1729, Nader was the true ruler, although he acknowledged Sultan Hussein’s weak son, Tahmasp II (r. 1722-32), as the Safavid shah. In 1730, Nader decisively defeated the Ottomans at the Battle of Hamadan, which he followed up with a swift occupation of southern Iraq and Azerbaijan. While Nader was quelling a revolt in Khorasan in 1732, Tahmasp led part of the Safavid army against the Ottomans and was soundly beaten. The young shah made an unfavorable peace treaty that surrendered Georgia, Armenia, and Nader’s gains in the west from two years earlier. Enraged by the shah’s actions, Nader deposed the Safavid monarch and then served as regent to Tahmasp’s infant son, Abbas III, until 1736, at which time Nader declared himself shah.

Nader Shah used every religious and political ploy in his power to build up his position in Persia. He was a Sunni and proclaimed Sunnism as the religion of Iran at his coronation. He made various attempts to reconcile his Persian subjects’ Shia beliefs with the Sunni creed and sought to get the Ottomans to recognize this new Persian Sunnism as its own sect. His motivation may have been to facilitate relations with the Sunni Ottomans, but possibly his real aim was to overthrow the Turks by uniting the Muslim world with him as its head. This would extend his domains to the ancient Achaemenian boundaries and would create a cohesive Muslim front better able to prevent the depredation of the rising Christian powers of Europe. Nader Shah’s personal devotion was very shallow, however, which created doubts about his real intentions, especially among his rivals for Islamic leadership in the Ottoman capital of Istanbul. For the most part, Nader Shah’s major motivation for conquest was to restore lost territory and protect his frontiers against avaricious neighbors. He also sought to improve Iran’s economic position through plunder and to reassert Iran’s control over the silk trade, which had been damaged by the Russian and Ottoman conquests during the latter stages of the Safavid decline.

Nader Shah’s military was administratively and organizationally a direct continuation of the Safavid establishment. Its ideology and resources had changed, however, which affected the army’s composition and role. Most of his core troops were Afghans, steppe Turkman, and Khorasan Kurds who shared Nader Shah’s Sunni beliefs. These Sunni fighters outnumbered the other members of Nader’s military, the Shia Turkman and the ethnic Persian soldiers from central and western Iran who made up the Safavid partisans. In its later campaigns, the army swelled as various tribal forces, allies, camp followers, and freebooters joined it. The army Nader assembled in 1741 for a campaign in Dagestan in the northern Caucasus supposedly included up to one hundred and fifty thousand men, with Indians and Uzbeks joining the mix of nationalities. His 1743 campaign against the Ottomans allegedly involved a polyglot and multisectarian host of three hundred seventy- five thousand, which included Sunni Turkman, Afghans, Uzbeks, and Kurds; Shia Persians, Arabs, and Turks; Christian Armenians and Georgians; and both Sunni and Shia Indians. Nader Shah’s large army became the main element of the state, and he subordinated the Persian economy, much diminished by Afghan and Ottoman occupations, to the needs of his growing military. His requirement for more and more funds probably was a factor driving him to his later military conquests, especially after increased taxation to support the army provoked rebellions.

Organizationally, the army was composed primarily of cavalry recruited from pastoral nomadic tribes, who were lightly armored and armed with lances and broadswords. In a shift from past Safavid practice, Nader often supplied horses to his cavalry at his own expense, possibly to reduce the horsemen’s reluctance to put their mounts at risk, especially against firearms. The rest of Nader’s army was composed of a large force with gunpowder weapons that was trained to use them effectively on the battlefield. Infantry armed with matchlock muskets were recruited from the Persian peasantry. To preserve their newly developed skills, Nader enlisted these poor souls for life, with desertion punishable by death. Another force of musketeers, the jazayerchis, generally served on horseback as a mobile force and carried a larger musket, called a jazayer, which was fired dismounted from a rest. The Persian musketeers used a powder horn and ball rather than a paper cartridge, measuring the appropriate charge for the range of each target. This flexibility improved their accuracy, especially over longer ranges, although at the cost of a slower rate of fire.

Nader Shah clearly believed in the decisive impact of firepower, but the region’s rugged terrain and the absence of good roads, which had been allowed to deteriorate since Abbas the Great’s reign, inhibited the use of heavy siege artillery. Instead, Nader had a small artillery force that employed the zanburak, the small cannon that could swivel around on its mount on its special camel saddle and fired a half- pound to two- pound ball. Nader’s corps of musketeers and field artillery were well disciplined, if not always well trained. Lacking a skilled corps of engineers, Nader’s various sieges were less successful than his battles.

Nader Shah recognized the importance of having his own navy, especially following his 1741-42 campaign in Dagestan, when he had to rely on mercilessly greedy Russian merchants for the transportation of supplies. He increased spending and initiated several major projects to build Caspian and Persian Gulf fleets to reduce his dependence on foreign shipping. He first ordered eleven ships from Surat, India, that were constructed of teak and known for their durability. After the first ship was delivered in 1741, Nader balked at the cost. The traditional source of lumber for the Gulf region, however, was India, and Nader Shah was forced to devise a new means to create his navy.

Ignoring the practical problems and costs, Nader conscripted thousands of his subjects and enemy prisoners of war to procure timber from the Alborz Mountains, some six hundred miles from the port of Bushehr, where the new ships were to be constructed. Much of the lumber was transported on the shoulders of the conscripted peasants because there was a shortage of wagons, and large numbers died of exhaustion in the effort to move Nader’s shipbuilding material. A cannon foundry to provide arms for his ships was built at Gombroom (near Jarun and part of the area incorporated into the modern port of Bandar Abbas). In the end, however, the shipwrights and other laborers at Bushehr were unable to construct the type and number of ships Nader Shah wanted. He turned back to the Indian shipyards, and by 1745 his navy numbered some thirty ships. The Shah’s demands for men and money for a navy increased popular grievances against him, and he eventually abandoned the effort to build a large fleet and instead sought an alliance with the British in an effort to get them to supply him ships.

Nader Shah was a poor judge of naval talent and made serious mistakes in choosing his admirals and marine commanders. Years before the Dagestan campaign, Nader had selected Latif Khan to be his first admiral and to create a small naval force. In 1735 Latif sailed into the Shatt al- Arab to threaten the city of Al Basrah with a few small vessels and three ghurabs, or “grabs,” a local type of trading ship used by Arabs on the coast. The local Ottoman commander commandeered two British ships and attacked Latif’s small flotilla, which quickly retreated. In 1737 Latif provided transports to move troops to Oman to help the local ruler suppress rebels there. In the course of these operations, the Persian land commander, Muhammad Taqi Khan, poisoned Latif and took over command of the navy. Taqi Khan’s poor treatment of his Arab seamen caused a mutiny that ended the Persian intervention.

Over the next several years, new admirals fared little better, because they and their subordinate officers were unprofessional and generally incompetent. The Arab sailors, upon whom Nader Shah’s navy relied, repeatedly mutinied, and in 1740 mutineers waged a war of coastal raids against Iran. Nader sent two admirals to end the raids, but they spent more time quarrelling over precedence and command. One eventually was imprisoned by his rival, Imamverdi Khan, a seriously unqualified officer. Khan was later killed when a cannon exploded after he ordered its powder charge doubled with the goal of increasing the weapon’s range. In January 1742 Nader Shah inexplicably turned again to Muhammad Taqi Khan to be his chief admiral. Persian forces intervened in another rebellion in Oman later that year, capturing Oman’s capital, Muscat, for Nader’s Omani ally. After a lengthy siege and three thousand casualties, the Persian ground forces, under Kalb Ali Khan, captured the city of Suhar in July 1743, which put an end to the rebellion. With Oman pacified, Nader recalled most of his forces. For a second time, however, Muhammad Taqi Khan murdered his superior officer, killing Kalb Ali and then attempting to spark a revolt in Fars. Nader put down the revolt, but the disruption in the navy prevented him from supporting his garrisons in Oman, which were overrun and cost him the intervention’s political gains.

In land warfare Nader’s success rested on careful planning and preparations as much as on the capabilities of his armed forces. He effectively mobilized large forces for his campaigns and was careful to stockpile provisions to sustain his forces in the field. Nader paid attention to the morale of his army and did not rely just on the material improvements he made to its organization and administration. He ensured that his troops were regularly paid and fully equipped, which, along with the prospect of spoils from their successful wars, undoubtedly helped to keep them motivated. Nader maintained his officers’ support and commitment with generous gifts of money, horses, and weapons.

Daily exercises to prepare the troops for campaigns were routine in Nader’s army. In these exercises, according to a Greek observer, the cavalry practiced wheels and counterwheels, charges, retreats, and counterattacks while using real weapons. The jazayerchis also exercised together and even conducted target practice, expending expensive powder and balls to improve their skills. Nader sometimes joined in the exercises, demonstrating his skill with a bow on horseback and generally leading by example. Individual soldiers observed doing well by Nader and his commanders were often promoted on the spot, providing further encouragement for each soldier to do his best. In addition, the diversified ethnic composition of the army probably helped to encourage competition and improve military effectiveness. It also lessened the risk of disaffection spreading and offset the influence of the Safavid partisans. The large amount of resources and time put into building his army meant that Nader Shah could not allow it to be demobilized or allow the soldiers to return to their tribal homelands, as had been the Safavid practice.


Sir William Carr Beresford, (1768-1854)


Appointed to reorganize the Portuguese armed forces in 1809, Beresford commanded the Allied forces at the Battle of Albuera in 1811 and remained commander in chief and marshal general of all the Portuguese armies until 1820.

Beresford was born on 2 October 1768, the illegitimate son of the Marquis of Waterford. His younger brother became Rear Admiral Sir John Poo Beresford. He attended a French military academy in Strasbourg and was commissioned into the 6th Foot at the age of seventeen, serving with his regiment in Canada where he lost the use of an eye in a shooting accident in 1786. In 1789 he purchased a lieutenancy in the 16th Foot. He saw active service with Sir John Moore and Admiral Alexander Hood in Italy and at the siege of Toulon, respectively. In 1794 he was made colonel of a regiment newly raised by his father and in 1795, at the age of twenty-seven, he was made colonel of the 88th Foot, the Connaught Rangers. In 1800 he served under Brigadier General Arthur Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington) in India, whence he accompanied his regiment to Egypt to join Sir Ralph Abercromby’s army, which had been sent to expel the remnants of Bonaparte’s forces from Egypt. Remaining in Alexandria until 1803, Beresford was promoted to the rank of brigadier. In 1805 he took part in Sir David Baird’s capture of the Cape of Good Hope and was appointed to command the expeditionary force that was sent with Commodore Home Riggs Popham to seize Buenos Aires. After capturing the city in June 1806, Beresford acted as governor for two months before surrendering to a superior Spanish force. After escaping from captivity, Beresford returned to London, where he was appointed to command the force being assembled for action against Madeira.

On 24 December 1807 Beresford, in command of an army of 3,500 men, occupied the island of Madeira, which was annexed as a crown colony. As first, and only, British governor of Madeira, Beresford got his first experience of commanding Portuguese troops. He taught himself Portuguese and embarked on an energetic program of reform, which was cut short in March 1808 when the island was handed back to the Portuguese Crown.

Returning to London in August 1808 Beresford was attached to the staff of Sir Harry Burrard and was appointed one of the commissioners to oversee the implementation of the Convention of Cintra. After the departure of the French, Beresford became commandant of Lisbon. After Moore’s arrival there, Beresford was sent to negotiate with the bishop of Oporto and then to put the fortress of Almeida into a state of defense. He commanded one brigade of Moore’s army in Spain, and it was his troops who covered the embarkation of the army at Corunna after the death of its commander. Beresford emerged from the fiasco of Moore’s campaign with a higher reputation, and in March 1809, newly promoted to lieutenant general, he was appointed to take command of the new Portuguese army that was being formed.

Beresford proved to be a highly successful organizer and was a strict disciplinarian. After only three months in command he was able to field an army of 19,000 men for the campaign against Marshal Nicolas Soult in northern Portugal. He eventually commanded a Portuguese army that grew to number 60,000 men, organized along British lines and commanded by a corps of seconded British officers that eventually numbered 100. Portuguese officers were recruited and promoted on merit, and strict military discipline was enforced. Beresford followed the Portuguese practice of dividing the army between front line units and militia, or segunda linha, formations. It was the militia that manned the Lines of Torres Vedras. Beresford also made use of the traditional Portuguese light infantry, the Caçadores. Beresford was supported in his work both by Wellesley, who became a close friend, and by the secretary to the Portuguese Council of Regency, Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz, who worked with Beresford to create a centralized commissariat for supplying the army. Beresford became, in effect, Wellesley’s second in command and the officer who Wellesley intended should assume command of all the Allied forces should he be killed in action.

Beresford’s forces took part in the campaign against Soult in northern Portugal in 1809 and played a major part in the Battle of Busaco, where they fought off the attempt by Marshal André Masséna’s army to storm the mountain ridge outside Coimbra. After the battle Beresford was made a Knight of the Bath, and his success in these campaigns was rewarded in 1811 when he was made commander of all the Allied armies in the southern theater. Having laid siege to Badajoz, his main objective was to prevent Soult from raising the siege and invading Portugal. He fought a number of minor actions against the French, the principal being at Campo Mayor (Campo Maior), which culminated in the Battle of Albuera on 16 May 1811. Beresford’s handling of the Allied armies at Albuera was later strongly criticized by the Peninsular War historian William Napier and became the subject of a lengthy pamphlet war that lingered on into the 1840s. Beresford was criticized for having dismissed General Robert Long, the commander of his cavalry, on the eve of the battle and for allegedly having issued orders for a retreat at the height of the battle-an accusation that Beresford always vigorously denied. Whatever the truth of these allegations, Beresford never lost the confidence of Wellington or of the Portuguese Prince Regent.

The Portuguese army fought at Salamanca, where Beresford was wounded, and in 1813 at Vitoria, where Portuguese and British troops were equal in number. In the campaign in the Pyrenees Beresford held commands at the battles of Nivelle and Toulouse, and he commanded the Allied forces that received the surrender of Bordeaux.

With the defeat of Napoleon, Beresford was raised to the peerage as Baron Beresford of Albuera and received the Portuguese titles of Conde de Trancoso and Marques de Campo Maior. With his army, he returned to Portugal, where he retained his appointment as commander in chief. In June 1815 Wellington asked for the Portuguese army to be sent to the Low Countries for the Waterloo campaign, and Beresford prepared his forces to go. However, he was refused permission to sail by the Regency Council. This refusal brought into the open a long-festering feud between the commander and the Regents. Beresford now sought the backing of the Prince Regent in Rio de Janeiro, returning to Portugal in 1816 with the new title of marshal general of all the Portuguese armies and with extensive new powers over the armed forces in Portugal. In 1817 he claimed to have uncovered a conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy, and after the execution of the leading conspirator, Gomes Freire de Andrade, in October 1817 Beresford was the most powerful man in Portugal. Units of his army, under General Carlos Lecor, were sent to Brazil for King Joao (John) VI’s ultimately unsuccessful campaigns, and Beresford retained the king’s confidence until he was ousted from his command by the outbreak of the Revolution of 1820.

Beresford returned to Portugal in 1824 and helped the king survive the Abrilada coup, after which he pressed without success to be allowed to return to Portugal as commander in chief or as British ambassador. When Wellington became prime minister in 1828, Beresford was appointed to the cabinet as master general of the ordnance and advised Wellington on Portuguese affairs. When Wellington left office in 1830 Beresford’s public career was over. He helped the Marquis of Waterford maintain the Waterford influence in northern Ireland’s politics, he pursued a vigorous pamphlet war against Napier and the Longs, and he married his first cousin, the Honorable Louisa Hope, in 1832 and settled at Bedgebury in Kent. He was made governor of Jersey, a ceremonial office he held until his death on 8 January 1854, at the age of eighty-six.

Beresford was greatly admired by some of the officers who served under him-notably Sir Benjamin d’Urban, his quartermaster general. He was more grudgingly admired by some Portuguese as an efficient organizer of the armed forces who gave Portugal, for the first and only time in its history, an army that could compete with the best in Europe. He was, moreover, trusted by the Duke of Wellington. However, Beresford was not a very likable man. He was notoriously ill mannered and greedy for titles and wealth. In 1823 he became Viscount Beresford. He acquired estates and pensions in Portugal, which he fought hard to retain. He took as his mistress the wife of the Visconde de Juromenha, who was his private envoy in Rio de Janeiro. He had three children by her, but when her husband eventually died, she refused to marry the British general. Beresford was prodigiously strong (a popular print showed him lifting a Polish lancer bodily from the saddle at Albuera), but he was also a hypochondriac, habitually taking the waters whether for reasons of ill health or to recover from the breakdown he suffered after the Battle of Albuera.

Although never acquiring the heroic reputation of others of Wellington’s general officers, Beresford played a far more important part in the Peninsular War than any other Allied general except Wellington himself. Beresford’s role in creating a Portuguese army from nothing cannot be overestimated, while the successful conduct of his troops on every campaign from 1809 to 1814 made him one of the principal architects of Wellington’s famous victories.

References and further reading Cetre, F. O. 1991. “Beresford and the Portuguese Army, 1809-1814.” In New Lights on the Peninsular War, ed. Alice Berkeley, 149-155. Lisbon: British Historical Society of Portugal. Chartrand, René. 2000. The Portuguese Army of the Napoleonic Wars. 3 vols. Oxford: Osprey. Glover, Michael. 1970. Britannia Sickens: Sir Arthur Wellesley and the Convention of Cintra. London: Cooper. Livermore, H. V. 1999. “Beresford and the Reform of the Portuguese Army.” In A History of the Peninsular War, ed. Paddy Griffith, 9:121-144. London: Greenhill. Macaulay, Rose. 1990. “King Beresford: Este Britanico Odioso.” In They Went to Portugal Too, ed. L. C. Taylor, 98-232. Manchester: Carcanet. Napier, William Francis Patrick. 1992. A History of the War in the Peninsula. 6 vols. London: Constable. (Orig. pub. 1828.) Newitt, Malyn, and Martin Robson. 2004. Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal, 1807-1820. Lisbon: Instituto de Ciencias Sociais. Vichness, Samuel E. 1976.”Marshal of Portugal: The Military Career of William Carr Beresford.” Ph. D. diss., Florida State University.